Leaders or representatives from 47 countries recently attended the nuclear security summit in Washington. By holding a bilateral meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama and delivering an important speech at the summit, Hu Jintao highlighted China's positive image for people across the globe and helped reverse the deterioration of US-China relations.

Obviously, it takes a long path toward establishing a global mechanism to counter nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism. Many of these leaders were not quite sure whether they would come away from the summit empty-handed.

However, they decided to attend the summit mainly to respond positively to Obama, who had launched a number of initiatives to build a nuclear-free world. The same is true for Hu Jintao and his decision to attend the summit.

Hu's visit to Washington will help lead the bilateral relations toward a positive direction. Although some disputes continue between the two countries, Hu's visit to Washington will no doubt contribute to lowering U.S. hostility toward China.

Earlier, the rapid increase in GDP had stimulated some Chinese diplomats to take blind pride in dealing with their foreign counterparts. Now, it is time to rethink whether it is necessary to adhere to the well-established principle of keeping a low profile in handling Sino-American relations.

China's GDP will soon become the second largest in the world. Who is the greatest beneficiary from the pursuance of this principle over the past three decades? Needless to say, it is China.

Now, China is just halfway through its course of "peaceful rise." In the foreseeable future, the United States will remain the No. 1 power in the world. Two decades from now, who will become the greatest beneficiary if China, as the biggest developing country, is able to maintain stable relations with Washington? Obviously, the answer is China.

In his opening statement at the summit, Obama pointed out that in today's world, the world has reduced the risk of a nuclear war between big powers, but the threat of nuclear terrorist assaults is increasing. He is right. Terrorists can penetrate all places throughout the world without leaving a trace.

It is difficult for all major powers, especially the United States, to detect and prevent them from launching assaults including sudden attacks with "dirty bombs" as weapons. As such, the whole world faces the most serious security challenge.

Such a strategic assessment prompted Obama to convene the nuclear security summit as well as his earlier initiative of "a world free of nuclear weapons." Preoccupied by this assessment, he has spared no effort to promote the campaign of countering nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.

To fight nuclear terrorism, the summit focused on establishing an international nuclear security mechanism. The United States and many countries face the threat of nuclear terrorism. China is no exception.

In case the East Turkistan separatists consider the timing is mature to intensify conflicts with Beijing, they will no doubt take whatever means necessary to penetrate nuclear facilities or acquire "dirty bombs." Moreover, the large-scale construction of nuclear power plants in China introduces more security challenges. China will be in the peak period of building such plants in the next two decades.

The ongoing construction of such plants scattered in coastal areas would expose the nation to threat. A terrorist attack on even one plant would result in consequences more serious than that of detonating a nuclear bomb over a city. Taking this into account, Beijing has adopted various measures to strengthen nuclear security in recent years.

As a positive response from China to the international community, Hu Jintao made the decision to attend the summit, which reflects that Beijing and Washington actually are sharing common interests by making joint efforts to establish a global mechanism for countering nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism.

This action indicates that Beijing regards nuclear terrorist assaults as a huge threat to national security interests and it hopes to strengthen international cooperation to limit or even eliminate this type of threat.

Also, this decision has indeed enabled China to avert a head-on collision with the United States and helped reverse a deterioration of U.S.-China relations. Based on this, we can suppose that Beijing is able to conduct strategic adjustment at a critical moment and formulate appropriate foreign policies.

The release last week of the Obama administration's Nuclear Posture Review brings long overdue attention to the vital issue of U.S. strategic posture. Issues raised in the NPR and START have reinvigorated a crucial national nuclear dialogue that has been missing.

As the chairman and vice chairman of Congress's bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission, which issued its report last May, we have watched with great interest the administration's steady progress this past year on its Nuclear Posture Review and the START negotiations.

Themes from our report run through the Nuclear Posture Review and are embodied in the new START agreement. While debate and disagreement must be part of the crossfire in this renewed nuclear dialogue, we want to emphasize important dimensions of both the Posture Review and START treaty that figure prominently in our bipartisan report.

Now that the NPR is completed, we see that it is compatible with our recommendations. The review gives a comprehensive and pragmatic plan for reducing nuclear risks to the United States. We believe it offers a bipartisan path forward - while allowing for healthy disagreements on specific issues.

And it incorporates many of our points - such as pursuing a quick and modest reduction of nuclear weapons with Russia and sustaining the nuclear triad of land-based ICBMs, sea-based SLBMs and bombers. It also recognizes that nuclear weapons safeguarded U.S. security during the Cold War by deterring attack and that we will need them for deterrence in the foreseeable future, as long as others also possess them.

We also see that the NPR puts special emphasis, as our report recommended, on improving the nation's complex nuclear infrastructure and enhancing programs to recruit and keep the nation's best scientific minds. The administration's commitment to increase investment in our national laboratories also ensures that they continue their important role in sustaining a safe, secure and effective nuclear arsenal and in solving many other problems facing the nation.

The review is correct to make preventing nuclear terrorism and proliferation the top priority, while also seeking to strengthen deterrence and to reassure U.S. allies and recognizing the importance of strategic stability with Russia and an emerging China. Our commission reached the same conclusions.

The NPR's changes in U.S. declaratory policy - especially the assurance that Washington "will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear parties to the Nonproliferation Treaty that are in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations" - go beyond our recommendation that the U.S. retain "calculated ambiguity."

It is, however, a sensible variation on a theme that the U.S. should support nonproliferation while preserving deterrence for itself and its allies.

We also note that the NPR chose, as we advised, to avoid adopting a "no first use" policy for nuclear weapons while narrowing the scope of possible first use to "extreme circumstances" - language that was in our bipartisan report.

We believe that the substantial edge the U.S. has developed in conventional military capabilities, which the NPR notes, permits this country to sharply reduce reliance on nuclear weapons. But we caution those who make light of this major U.S. strategic advantage and its implications.

We support the NPR's call for the U.S. not to develop new nuclear weapons now. Our report similarly called for a case-by-case approach to extending the life of today's warheads. And we agree that the focus should be on safety, security and reliability - not developing new military capabilities.

The NPR echoes our call to negotiate a worldwide end to the production of new fissile materials - the key ingredients of nuclear weapons.

Our final report strongly endorsed the U.S. deterrence policy to cover our allies and partners with the U.S. nuclear umbrella - an objective the NPR also embraces.

The report suggested deploying proven missile defenses against threats such as North Korea and Iran but emphasized, as the NPR does, that these defenses should not be so big as to encourage Russia to add warheads to counter them, which would only undermine efforts to reduce nuclear weapons. We included China as well as Russia in this.

But in two areas, we believe the NPR might have fallen short of the mark.

First, we understand that the review considered declassifying additional information about the size and composition of the U.S. nuclear stockpile. It should have done so. This would demonstrate U.S. leadership on the transparency that is needed to secure nuclear materials globally and to bolster strategic stability with Russia and China.

Second, the NPR called for the consideration of conventional "prompt global strike" capabilities. But it did not explain whether these systems would have a niche role against small regional powers such as North Korea or be an ultimate substitute for nuclear weapons in deterrence with Russia and China.

We feel the former is the only sensible approach. Keeping this issue ill-defined creates needless anxiety in Moscow and Beijing that could lead to future problems.

Even with these two caveats, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review makes important strides in charting a sustainable bipartisan path forward for the United States.

Healthy disagreement over some NPR specifics should not obscure the valuable contribution it makes to advancing U.S. security interests - resting, as it does in part, on our bipartisan 2009 Strategic Posture Commission report.

William J. Perry served as secretary of defense in the Clinton administration. He was chairman of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States. James R. Schlesinger was the nation's first energy secretary and served as secretary of defense from July 1973 to November 1975. He was vice chairman of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States.

 

Article Highlights * After a spring and summer filled with rocket and nuclear tests, relations with North Korea have calmed. * Washington should use this period of quiet to its advantage by abandoning its current hard-line strategy against Pyongyang in favor of a strategy of engagement. * Such a change will better help the United States reach its ultimate goal--a denuclearized North Korea.

It is routine in U.S. foreign policy for a pot not boiling over to be moved to the back burner. Precisely because the North Korean issue is not boiling, however, might offer an all-too-rare chance to make progress with Pyongyang. Over the past several months, the North has signaled publicly and privately that it is in engagement mode. In Washington, arguments abound about whether or not this is a stall tactic or a trick, but we'll never know if we don't move ahead with serious and sustained probing of the North's position. So long as our government sticks to an all-or-nothing approach in terms of Pyongyang, the opportunity to advance vital U.S. security interests in northeast Asia could be lost.

Underlying Washington's current position are two beliefs, so firmly held that they approach dogma. The first is that we should wait until the situation with North Korea breaks in our favor or sanctions force North Korean leadership to reassess its attachment to nuclear weapons. A year into the Obama administration, this waiting borders on self-imposed paralysis even though North Korea remains capable of badly damaging regional stability as well as U.S. nonproliferation goals. So instead of positively defining and shaping the realities on the ground, we have taken shelter behind fixed positions: enforcing U.N. Security Council sanctions and demanding that the North make progress on denuclearization at the Six-Party Talks. These may be useful parts of an overall policy, but they cannot be effective by themselves and must be handled carefully.

Sanctions will inevitably get in the way of diplomatic progress, and there needs to be a way to use their loosening--as much as their tightening--in support of negotiations. Moreover, Washington's single-minded insistence that the North return to the Six-Party Talks actually has ceded to Pyongyang a great deal of tactical initiative. There is nothing the North Koreans love more than leaping over our heads to a new position just as we think we have them cornered. As such, in mid-January, they reversed their opposition to talks in the framework of the September 2005 Six-Party joint statement and have proposed that talks proceed on all fronts simultaneously.

The second part of Washington's dogma is that there is no sense in negotiating with Pyongyang because history shows that agreements with North Korea always fail and the United States ends up snookered. But the idea that our deals with the North have all been useless is based on a flawed reading of the record, a lingering misrepresentation of the accomplishments of the 1994 U.S.-North Korea Agreed Framework. In fact, the utility of that agreement (which lasted from 1994 until 2002) is still evident. Without it, North Korea would have produced far more fissile material and a significantly larger arsenal of nuclear weapons. Two hulking, unfinished North Korean nuclear reactors testify to its lasting legacy.

Reinforcing the belief that we don't need to, or shouldn't, pursue an active policy toward North Korea is the Obama administration's apparent concern that it will be vulnerable to charges of being "weak" if it approaches Pyongyang from anything but the toughest position possible. Thus, on the grounds that the September 2005 joint statement calls for progress on the North's denuclearization before talks can begin on replacing the 1953 Korean Armistice with permanent peace arrangements, Washington rejected out of hand Pyongyang's recent proposals to move on both issues simultaneously. We may find it difficult to hold that position because it is neither what the joint statement actually says nor what some of the other parties (especially the Chinese) intended.

The fundamental U.S. goal is exactly right: We want North Korea to denuclearize and to return to the international nuclear nonproliferation regime. But stating the goal isn't the same as moving closer to it. To do so, we must accomplish things that can help stabilize the situation, make it less likely that the strategic threat from the North will get worse, and begin exploring with Pyongyang a range of ideas for reducing tensions on the Korean Peninsula and in the region. A couple of mid-term steps could include a halt in nuclear testing and long-range ballistic missile launches, along with a complete freeze of the Yongbyon nuclear center, which would involve further decommissioning and a return of international inspectors.

These interim steps won't "solve" the nuclear problem, but they aren't beyond what we can accomplish. They will do considerably more to protect our interests and those of our allies than the current all-or-nothing policy, which is going nowhere fast.

Anticipating Opportunities: Using Intelligence to Shape the Future
"We spend $45 billion annually to reduce uncertainty, to help us combat threats to our nation, our people, and our security," said Payne Distinguished Lecturer Thomas Fingar in his third Payne lecture on October 21, devoted to anticipating the future -- "not for purposes of prediction but for purposes of shaping it."  Noting that strategic intelligence treats the future neither as "inevitable or immutable," Fingar employed real-life examples from his career in national intelligence (most recently as deputy director of national intelligence for analysis and chairman of the National Intelligence Council) to explore concrete ways intelligence can be used to move developments in a more favorable direction.

Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World examined the trends which will "drive, shape and constrain" individuals, governments, and nations around the world. Among prominent trends, he cited globalization, which will provide unprecedented prosperity but greater inequality; the rise of the BRIC countries - Brazil, Russia, India, and China; the rise of new powers such as Indonesia, Turkey, and Iran; and the coming demographic boom, which will add 1.2 billion people to the world, with less than 3 percent of that occurring in the West.

The Geopolitical Implications of Climate Change.  Instructed by the Congress to provide an assessment of the impact of global climate change, given controversy about the imminence of the threat and man's role in it, the NIC studied which regions and countries would be most dramatically affected by climate change, with a focus on water, food production, and changes in weather patterns. The results remain classified, because of the potential impact on vulnerable countries. 

The 2007 National Intelligence Estimate on Iran's Nuclear Intentions and Capabilities. This estimate, attacked from both the right and the left, concluded with a moderate to high degree of confidence that Iran had not obtained sufficient fissile material from external sources (to make a bomb) and that its fastest route to produce a nuclear weapon would be through domestic production of enriched uranium. The NIE also judged that Iran had halted the weaponization portions of its nuclear program in 2003, but had retained the option to pursue a weapon and whether to do so was a "political decision" which could be made at any time.

CISAC is pleased to announce fellows and visitors in residence at the Center during the 2009-10 academic year.

• Max Abrahms
  University of California, Los Angeles, Department of Political Science
  Strategic Logic of Terrorism
• Undraa Agvaanluvsan
  Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Nuclear Experimental Group
  Energy, Security, and Economic Implications of Nuclear Industry Development in Mongolia
• Chaim Braun
  CISAC
  Nuclear Power Growth and its Nonproliferation Implications in India, the Middle East, the Korean Peninsula, and South America
• Sarah Zukerman Daly
  Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Department of Political Science
  Guns, Politics or Bankruptcy: Disentangling the Determinants of Armed Organizations Post-war Trajectories
• Matthias Englert
  Darmstadt University of Technology, Interdisciplinary Research Group in Science Technology and Security
  Managing the Proliferation Risks of Gas Centrifuges - Technical and Political Measures
• Andrea Everett
  Princeton University, Department of Politics
  Responding to Catastrophe: Democratic Society and the Origins of Humanitarian Intervention
• Kelly Greenhill
  Tufts University and Research Fellow, Harvard University
  Fear Factor: Understanding the Origins and Consequences of Beliefs about National Security and the Threats We Face
• Tom Isaacs
  Director, Office of Planning and Special Studies, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
  Internationalization of the Nuclear Fuel Cycle and the Role of the U.S.
• Joseph Martz
  Los Alamos National Laboratory
• Katherine Marvel
  University of Cambridge, Department of Applied Mathematics and Theoretical Physics
  Nuclear Energy in Africa: Utility, Feasibility, and Security
• Emily Meierding
  University of Chicago, Department of Political Science
  Fueling Conflict, Facilitating Peace: Oil & International Territorial Disputes
• Eric Morris
  Ford Dorsey Program in International Policy Studies
  Civilian Capacity for Peace Operations
• Charles Perrow
  Yale University, Department of Sociology
• Brenna Powell
  Harvard University, Department of Government and Social Policy
  Normalizing Security After Conflict: Jobs for the Boys and Justice for the Hoods
• Arian Pregenzer
  Sandia National Laboratories, Department of Cooperative International Programs
  International Technical Cooperation to Support Arms Control and Nonproliferation: Review of Past Approaches, Identification of Lessons Learned, and Recommendations for the Future
• William Reckmeyer
  San Jose State University, Department of Anthropology
  Systemic Connections: Developing an Integrated National Strategy to Promote International Security and Cooperation
• Jefferey Richardson,
  Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory
  Science as a Tool for International Engagement
• Robert Rosner
  University of Chicago, Distinguished Service Professor, Departments of Astronomy & Astrophysics and Physics, and Laboratory Director, Argonne National Laboratory
• Jan Stupl
  University of Hamburg, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy
  Missile Technology Control Regime
• Michael Sulmeyer
  Stanford Law School
• Phil Taubman
  Former Associate Editor and Reporter, The New York Times
• Jianqun Teng
  China Arms Control and Disarmament Association
  Nuclear Free World Initiative in the Context of Sino-U.S. Relations
• John Vitacca
  United States Air Force
  Nuclear Policy Issues
• Gang Zhao
  Chinese Academy of S & T for Development (CASTED)
  Deepening the China-U.S. Relationship through Collaboration in Science and Technology with Particular Attention to Alternative Energy Solutions
• Yunhua Zou
  General Armaments Department, People's Liberation Army, China
  Space Arms Control; Security Cooperation with China; U.S.-China Relations