As tensions on the Korean peninsula rise after an international investigation found that North Korea was responsible for the sinking of a South Korean warship, a Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) Independent Task Force warns that North Korea's continued provocations pose a serious threat to its neighbors and that its nuclear weapons program must be stopped. "The United States must seek to resolve rather than simply manage the challenge posed by a nuclear North Korea," asserts the Task Force.

In its report, U.S. Policy Toward the Korean Peninsula, the Task Force emphasizes that "despite the difficulty of the challenge, the danger posed by North Korea is sufficiently severe, and the costs of inaction and acquiescence so high, that the United States and its partners must continue to press for denuclearization." The United States cannot risk "the potential spread of nuclear weapons to rogue states, terrorist groups or others-especially in the Middle East."

The Task Force says that the United States also must provide leadership with its regional partners to "coordinate actions designed to contain the spillover effects of possible North Korean instability while insisting that North Korea give up its destabilizing course of action." It recommends that contingency pla nning be prioritized: "Given the uncertainties and associated risks related to North Korea's future, it is necessary and sensible for its neighbors to consider the possibility of volatility in North Korea and plan for its possible effects."

The bipartisan Task Force, chaired by former special envoy for negotiations with North Korea Charles L. "Jack" Pritchard and former commander of UN Command/U.S. Forces Korea John H. Tilelli Jr., and directed by CFR Adjunct Senior Fellow Scott A. Snyder, is comprised of roughly two dozen distinguished experts, including CISAC Co-Director Siegfried Hecker, representing a wide variety of backgrounds. The report commends the U.S.-South Korean partnership and applauds the close alliance coordination following the ship incident. The Task Force urges the passage of the South Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, which it says is good for America and would send a strong message of support for South Korea.

While each member of the Six Party talks-China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South Korea, and the United States-has its own concerns, "any hope of resolving the North Korean standoff will depend on all parties cooperating with one another and being firm with North Korea." The report emphasizes that "Chinese cooperation is essential to the success of denuclearization on the Korean peninsula and to ensuring regional stability."

The report makes several specific recommendations, including calling for the establishment of a dialogue with China about the future of the Korean peninsula, bilateral talks with North Korea regarding missile development, and close consultations with allies South Korea and Japan. The report recommends that the Obama administration prioritize its approach to North Korea in the following order.

• Prevent horizontal proliferation: "The United States and its allies should heighten vigilance against the possibility of a transfer of nuclear weapons technologies or fissile material from North Korea and strengthen the capacity to carry out effective counterproliferation measures."
  
• Stop vertical proliferation: "North Korea's unconstrained efforts to develop a missile delivery capability for its nuclear arsenal would dramatically expand its ability to threaten its neighbors and further complicate prospects for reversing its nuclear program."
  
• Denuclearize: "The debate over nonproliferation versus denuclearization is a false choice; the United States and its partners can and must do both by containing proliferation while also pressing for denuclearization."
  

The Task Force recommends that the United States seek ways to integrate North Korea into the international community, including through cultural and academic exchanges. "The Obama administration should change long-standing U.S. policies blocking North Korea's participation in activities of international financial institutions," notes the report. It also condemns North Korea's abysmal human rights record: "North Korea's shameful human rights situation and failure to meet the needs of its people is a human tragedy that should be addressed by U.S. humanitarian assistance and other measures to improve human rights conditions inside North Korea."

In recent years, much attention has focused on the dangers of dependency on energy imports. Fears of energy import dependency are particularly acute in Eastern Europe, where most countries remain heavily dependent on Russian gas, but similarly dependent relationships exist across the globe. Most energy security research focuses on exporters; this thesis contributes to the study of energy security by exploring the effects of energy dependence on importers. It examines data from 167 dyadic oil and gas trade relationships (1990-2008) to answer two questions.

First, does gas import dependency have a more profound effect on foreign policy
creation than oil dependency? Structural factors predict it should and the study confirms this empirically.

Second, what factors exacerbate or mitigate the foreign policy effects of gas import
dependency? The study identifies three quantifiable factors that tend to increase the foreign
policy affinity importers display towards their suppliers, and two quantifiable factors that tend to reduce the foreign policy affinity importers show towards their suppliers.

Three case studies (Japan/Indonesia, Argentina/Bolivia, and Poland/Russia) confirm the
plausibility of these statistical findings. They also highlight how the ownership structure of gas production and distribution can mitigate, or exacerbate, the foreign policy effects of gas imports.

This study is intended to be useful to policymakers gauging the impact of gas import
dependency.

Introduction

With the recent attention to new nuclear power, the challenge of managing the spread of nuclear technology has increased. At the same time, the growth of interest in nuclear power can serve as an important opportunity to improve the related safety, security, and nonproliferation regimes. One such opportunity arises in the context of the back-end of the nuclear fuel cycle, and the concern over how to mitigate the spread of enrichment and reprocessing, as well as how to store and ultimately dispose of spent nuclear fuel.

The first essay in this collection, "The Key Role of the Back-End in the Nuclear Fuel Cycle" by Charles McCombie and Thomas Isaacs, has been reprinted from the Winter 2010 issue of Daedalus on the global nuclear future. It focuses on the proliferation concerns that arise from enrichment and reprocessing as well as on the opportunities at the back-end of the fuel cycle for regional and international initiatives that may help to assuage energy, security, and waste concerns. Managing the emerging nuclear order will require the development of a clear set of goals, in which the issues surrounding the back-end of the fuel cycle must be included and satisfactorily addressed. This essay seeks to contribute to those efforts.

It is followed by four new papers whose authors were invited to reflect on this issue and to share their thoughts on this topic. These new papers reflect a diversity of sources and opinions, in keeping with both the global importance of these questions and the benefits of developing an international perspective on how they might be addressed. The authors focus on various aspects of the challenges raised by the back-end of the fuel cycle and offer possible options for addressing these challenges.

This volume also includes an edited version of remarks made by Ellen Tauscher, undersecretary of state for Arms Control and International Security, at a January 2010 conference at the Hoover Institution. Tauscher's remarks underscore the shared sense of the importance of addressing the back-end of the fuel cycle, in government as well as within academic and other non-governmental circles. This importance cannot be overstated when considering the growth of nuclear power. As Tariq Rauf observes in his essay, most of the spent fuel around the world is kept at the nuclear power plants that have generated it. All of the authors, however, support the idea of moving from the current status quo toward some form of multinational or international approach to dealing with spent fuel, including the possibility of the establishment of international spent fuel repositories. Although Rauf notes the likelihood of strong public opposition to international repositories (based on the traditional resistance even to national repositories), Frank von Hippel observes that communities in Finland and Sweden that host nuclear power plants have actually volunteered to host underground repositories, suggesting that it may be possible for public opposition--even toward international repositories--eventually to be overcome.

Two of the authors (Frank von Hippel and Atsuyuki Suzuki) suggest that the United States should be the first to serve as a host for an international repository and take spent fuel from other countries with small programs, as a way both to strengthen the nonproliferation regime and to increase nuclear safety and security worldwide. Suzuki asserts that such an approach, by the United States, would serve as an "epoch-making opportunity for the [Obama] administration to take the leadership" on this issue.

The essays in this collection engage with the challenge of the back-end of the fuel cycle in very different ways, whether through a cross-comparison of the programs of Japan, the Republic of Korea, and Russia, or through a focus on the history and current role of international organizations in this area. All, however, are linked by a recognition that the back-end of the fuel cycle has often been overlooked in discussions of the anticipated nuclear renaissance. They also share a general support, in principle, for international approaches to the backend of the fuel cycle, although, as Noramly Bin Muslim points out, such approaches "by no means constitute a ‘magic bullet' that can solve nonproliferation problems."

This publication thus stands as the continuation of the conversation begun both by the special issues of Daedalus on the Global Nuclear Future and by a meeting sponsored by the Academy in Abu Dhabi on nuclear power in the Middle East. With a growing desire for development, and a reliable energy supply, comes the need for a global expansion in nuclear power. A serious discussion of all aspects of this expansion is necessary if it is to be managed safely and securely.

We hope that the papers contained herein contribute to that discussion and help to build the basis for a more sustainable international nuclear order.

Leslie Berkowitz
CEO, American Academy of Arts and Sciences

The 9/11 terrorist attacks opened America's eyes to a frightening world of enemies surrounding us. But have our eyes opened wide enough to see how our experiences compare with other nations' efforts to confront and prevent terrorism? Other democracies have long histories of confronting both international and domestic terrorism. Some have undertaken progressively more stringent counterterrorist measures in the name of national security and the safety of citizens. But who wins and who loses? In The Consequences of Counterterrorism, editor Martha Crenshaw makes the compelling observation that "citizens of democracies may be paying a high price for policies that do not protect them from danger." The book examines the political costs and challenges democratic governments face in confronting terrorism.

Using historical and comparative perspectives, The Consequences of Counterterrorism presents thematic analyses as well as case studies of Britain, France, Germany, Spain, Japan, and Israel. Contributor John Finn compares post-9/11 antiterrorism legislation in the United States, Europe, Canada, and India to demonstrate the effects of hastily drawn policies on civil liberties and constitutional norms. Chantal de Jonge Oudraat and Jean-Luc Marret assert that terrorist designation lists are more widespread internationally than ever before. The authors examine why governments and international organizations use such lists, how they work, and why they are ineffective tools. Gallya Lahav shows how immigration policy has become inextricably linked to security in the EU and compares the European fear of internal threats to the American fear of external ones.

A chapter by Dirk Haubrich explains variation in the British government's willingness to compromise democratic principles according to different threats. In his look at Spain and Northern Ireland, Rogelio Alonso asserts that restricting the rights of those who perpetrate ethnonationalist violence may be acceptable in order to protect the rights of citizens who are victims of such violence. Jeremy Shapiro considers how the French response to terrorist threats has become more coercive during the last fifty years. Israel's "war model" of counterterrorism has failed, Ami Pedahzur and Arie Perliger argue, and is largely the result of the military elite's influence on state institutions. Giovanni Cappocia explains how Germany has protected basic norms and institutions. In contrast, David Leheny stresses the significance of change in Japan's policies.

Preventing and countering terrorism is now a key policy priority for many liberal democratic states. As The Consequences of Counterterrorism makes clear, counterterrorist policies have the potential to undermine the democratic principles, institutions, and processes they seek to preserve.

What is the problem?
Progress towards reducing nuclear dangers is currently hampered by entrenched divisions between Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty members and non-members, and between Western and non-aligned states. Longstanding differences between Australia and India typify this problem.

What should be done?
New partnerships and platforms for dialogue would expand the space for agreement and new thinking. An unconventional diplomatic partnership between India and Australia could be a test bed for the larger challenge of how to bridge old divides on nuclear and security issues.

Early steps in such a partnership would include a leaders' statement identifying common aims in reducing nuclear dangers. Nonproliferation export controls could be a primary area of cooperation. Canberra should promote Indian involvement in the so-called Australia Group on chemical and biological weapons export controls, including to raise comfort levels between New Delhi and other nonproliferation arrangements.

A new bilateral nuclear dialogue could consider the prevention of illicit nuclear transfers at sea, the negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty, the security of nuclear energy growth in Southeast Asia, the reduced role of nuclear arms in defence postures, and recommendations from the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament sponsored by Australia and Japan.

Interest in nuclear disarmament has grown rapidly in recent years. Starting with the 2007 Wall Street Journal article by four former U.S. statesmen-George Shultz, Henry Kissinger, William Perry, and Sam Nunn-and followed by endorsements from similar sets of former leaders from the United Kingdom, Germany, Poland, Australia, and Italy, the support for global nuclear disarmament has spread. The Japanese and Australian governments announced the creation of the International Commission on Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament in June 2008. Both Senators John McCain and Barack Obama explicitly supported the vision of a world free of nuclear weapons during the 2008 election campaign. In April 2009, at the London Summit, President Barack Obama and President Dmitri Medvedev called for pragmatic U.S. and Russian steps toward nuclear disarmament, and President Obama then dramatically reaffirmed "clearly and with conviction America's commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons" in his speech in Prague.

There is a simple explanation for these statements supporting nuclear disarmament: all states that have joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) are committed "to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament." In the United States, moreover, under Clause 2 of Article 6 of the Constitution, a treaty commitment is "the supreme Law of the Land." To af1/2rm the U.S. commitment to seek a world without nuclear weapons is therefore simply promising that the U.S. government will follow U.S. law.

A closer reading of these various declarations, however, reveals both the complexity of motives and the multiplicity of fears behind the current surge in support of nuclear disarmament. Some declarations emphasize concerns that the current behavior of nuclear-weapons states (NWS) signals to non-nuclear-weapons states (NNWS) that they, too, will need nuclear weapons in the future to meet their national security requirements. Other disarmament advocates stress the growth of global terrorism and the need to reduce the number of weapons and the amount of fissile material that could be stolen or sold to terrorist groups. Some argue that the risk of nuclear weapons accidents or launching nuclear missiles on false warning cannot be entirely eliminated, despite sustained efforts to do so, and thus believe that nuclear deterrence will inevitably fail over time, especially if large arsenals are maintained and new nuclear states, with weak command-and- control systems, emerge.

Perhaps the most widespread motivation for disarmament is the belief that future progress by the NWS to disarm will strongly influence the future willingness of the NNWS to stay within the NPT. If this is true, then the choice we face for the future is not between the current nuclear order of eight or nine NWS and a nuclear-weapons- free world. Rather, the choice we face is between moving toward a nuclear- weapons-free world or, to borrow Henry Rowen's phrase, "moving toward life in a nuclear armed crowd."

There are, of course, many critics of the nuclear disarmament vision. Some critics focus on the problems of how to prevent nuclear weapons "breakout" scenarios in a future world in which many more countries are "latent" NWS because of the spread of uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing capabilities to meet the global demand for fuel for nuclear power reactors. Others have expressed fears that deep nuclear arms reductions will inadvertently lead to nuclear proliferation by encouraging U.S. allies currently living under "the U.S. nuclear umbrella" of extended deterrence to pursue their own nuclear weapons for national security reasons. Other critics worry about the "instability of small numbers" problem, fearing that conventional wars would break out in a nuclear disarmed world, and that this risks a rapid nuclear rearmament race by former NWS that would lead to nuclear first use and victory by the more prepared government.

Some critics of disarmament falsely complain about nonexistent proposals for U.S. unilateral disarmament. Frank Gaffney, for example, asserts that there has been "a 17 year-long unilateral U.S. nuclear freeze" and claims that President Obama "stands to transform the ‘world's only superpower' into a nuclear impotent." More serious critics focus on those problems-the growth and potential breakout of latent NWS, the future of extended deterrence, the enforcement of disarmament, and the potential instability of small numbers-that concern mutual nuclear disarmament. These legitimate concerns must be addressed in a credible manner if significant progress is to be made toward the goal of a nuclear-weapons-free world.

To address these problems adequately, the current nuclear disarmament effort must be transformed from a debate among leaders in the NWS to a coordinated global effort of shared responsibilities between NWS and NNWS. This essay outlines a new conceptual framework that is needed to encourage NWS and NNWS to share responsibilities for designing a future nuclear-fuel-cycle regime, rethinking extended deterrence, and addressing nuclear breakout dangers while simultaneously contributing to the eventual elimination of nuclear weapons.