The nuclear weapons news of late has been alarming. David Sanger reported in "The New York Times" on January 9 that Iran's top nuclear official had announced his country was near initiating uranium enrichment at a new plant. And the recent leadership change in North Korea means added uncertainty about one of the world's most unpredictable nuclear weapons states. Both developments mean the danger is rising that nuclear weapons or the means to make them will spread in this year.

The ominous news brings to mind a comment that Robert M. Gates made a few years ago while working as President Obama's Secretary of Defense. "If you were to ask most of the leaders of the last administration or the current administration what might keep them awake at night," he told me, "it's the prospect of a [nuclear] weapon or nuclear material falling into the hands of Al Qaeda or some other extremists."

I was interviewing Gates for a book about nuclear threats. The book, "The Partnership: Five Cold Warriors and Their Quest to Ban the Bomb," [Harper, $29.99] examines the acute state of nuclear dangers today, including the spread of nuclear materials and technology to unstable nations like Pakistan, North Korea and Iran. If a terror group like Al Qaeda is ever going to get its hands on a nuclear weapon, or more likely the fissile material needed to make one, the source is likely to be one of those three nations. North Korea and Pakistan have a frightening history of exporting nuclear weapons technology. Iran may be next.

Despite the denials of Iranian leaders, Tehran seems well on the way to building its first nuclear weapon. Iran already has enough enriched uranium to make several warheads once the uranium is raised to a higher level of enrichment. The enrichment process can move very quickly from a low level to high, bomb-grade levels. Some upgrading of known Iranian enrichment facilities are required to get there, and these changes would be visible to the outside world. Still, Iran may well have hidden enrichment programs already cranking out highly enriched uranium. If it does move openly to higher enrichment, Israel and the United States will be tempted to attack Iran's nuclear installations.

A simple but powerful nuclear weapon can be fabricated with just a small amount of highly enriched uranium. The hardest part of making a uranium bomb is producing highly enriched uranium, something that requires advanced, industrial-scale technologies beyond the reach of a terror group. But with just 60 pounds of highly enriched uranium, a small, savvy group of engineers with some basic laboratory equipment could construct a fission bomb in a garage. The bomb mechanism is so straightforward that the United States did not bother to test a uranium weapon before dropping one over Hiroshima in 1945. And it is not wildly improbable to imagine Iran giving highly enriched uranium to a terror group.

The continuation of the Kim dynasty in North Korea - now in its third generation with the recent installation of Kim Jong-un as the new supreme leader - does not augur well for more responsible behavior by North Korea. With its active nuclear weapons program, hunger for hard currency and record of selling nuclear weapons goods to Libya and Syria, North Korea is one of the most dangerous nations on earth.

While North Korea is unlikely to sell a nuclear weapon to a terror group, it could provide the materials and knowhow to make a crude but powerful bomb. The United States, for all its intelligence-gathering hardware like spy satellites, does not know a great deal about the North Korean program. Washington was surprised to learn in 2010 that North Korea had constructed a uranium enrichment plant outfitted with the latest centrifuge technology. News about the existence of the plant came from a group of American scholars who were shown the facility during a visit to the North Korean nuclear complex at Yongbyon.

The plant is not a problem if it is producing low enriched uranium to fuel a small, light water reactor. But the plant could be used to produce highly enriched uranium. The rapid construction of the plant - it was built in just 18 months - suggested that the North Koreans might have honed their techniques at another enrichment facility, as yet undetected by the United States.

I recently asked my Stanford colleague Sig Hecker, one of the scholars who visited the enrichment plant in 2010, to outline what to watch for in the North Korean weapons program in coming weeks to determine if the new leadership is planning any change in nuclear policy and/or operations. Sig served as director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory 1986-1997. He has been a frequent visitor to North Korea, one of the few Americans to get a first-hand look at the North Korean nuclear program.

His response:

I believe that there will be a period of quiet on the diplomatic front, both for mourning and to rethink strategy. Just before Kim Jong-il died, American and North Korean diplomats came close to an agreement of American food aid in return for some concessions on the nuclear program (some reports indicated that Pyongyang would stop enrichment - but I have yet to hear official confirmation from the UnitedStates - and we never may). What to look for is to see when North Korean diplomats are ready to re-engage with Americans in quiet bilateral talks, mostlikely in China.

On the technical front: I would expect "normal operations" at Yongbyon. That means they will continue with the experimental light water reactor construction- although little will be seen from overheads because it is winter time. Much of the interior components will be fabricated in shops. I also expect them to continue with operations of the centrifuge enrichment facility - either to make more low enriched uranium for reactor fuel or to get the facility to operate fully (which it may not have been when we visited). Both of these operations will continue regardless of which way Pyongyang eventually decides to go with the nuclear program. I don't see any reason why they would cut back on these operations now.

As for potential provocative actions - they could prepare for another nuclear test -- but that is highly unlikely, if for no other reason than it is winter. Their tests occurred in October 2006 and May 2009. Nevertheless, the third test tunnel appears to have been dug some time ago (South Korean news reports and overhead imagery) and one should watch closely for activity at the test site (particularly come spring). We should also look for potential missile tests - the new launch site on the west coast should be watched for another potential long-range missile launch. (They have had three attempts from the old launch site in the east: 1998 over Japan, 2006 a complete failure, and 2009 two out of three stagesworked.) They also have not flight-tested the Musudan road-mobile missile."

It would not surprise me if North Korea conducted another nuclear test in 2012. If Kim Jong-un is looking for a way to flex North Korean military power and remind his impoverished people that their nation matters to the rest of the world, detonating a nuclear weapon will do the trick.

Iran's nuclear program will also likely generate news and international anxiety this year. Iranian threats to attack US naval vessels in the Persian Gulf may seem self-defeating, but a military confrontation between Iran and the United States is not out of the question.

There is no greater danger to American and global security than the spread of nuclear weapons and the means to make them.

OVER the last three years, as I delved into the world of American nuclear weapons, I felt increasingly as though I had stepped into a time warp. Despite the nearly total rearrangement of the international security landscape since the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, the rise of Islamic terrorism and the spread of nuclear materials and technology to volatile nations like Pakistan, North Korea and Iran, the Defense Department remains enthralled by cold war nuclear strategies and practices.

Barack Obama took office determined to change that. He has made progress on many fronts. Last week, he outlined a new, no-frills defense strategy, downsizing conventional forces. He now needs to double down on his commitment to refashion nuclear forces. He should trim the American nuclear arsenal by two-thirds to bring it down to a sensible size, order the Pentagon to scale back nuclear war-fighting plans so they are relevant to contemporary threats, remove most American intercontinental, land-based missiles from high alert and drop the quaint notion that a fleet of aging B-52 bombers can effectively deliver nuclear weapons to distant targets.

This agenda is not only desirable, it is doable without undercutting American security. It would save tens of billions of dollars a year, a relatively small amount by Pentagon standards, but every billion counts as Leon E. Panetta, the defense secretary, trims his budget. And the steps can safely be taken without requiring reciprocal moves by Russia that must be codified in a treaty.

For the last few months, the Obama administration has been conducting a classified review of the doctrines and operations that determine the shape and potential uses of America’s nuclear armaments. If the president pushes back against the defenders of the old order at the Pentagon and other redoubts of the nuclear priesthood, he can preserve American security while making the United States a more credible leader on one of today’s most critical issues — containing the spread of nuclear weapons. Like a chain smoker asking others to give up cigarettes, the United States, with its bloated arsenal, sounds hypocritical when it puts pressure on other nations to cut weapons and stop producing bomb-grade highly enriched uranium, the key ingredient of a crude nuclear weapon.

American actions alone won’t end the proliferation danger, but American leadership is essential to any hope of containing the threat.

Sam Nunn, the former chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, and anything but a dove over the years, rightly warns that the spread of weapons and the means to make them may soon reach a combustible stage where New York, Washington, Moscow, Tokyo or London is at risk of a nuclear terrorist attack.

Mr. Nunn and other keepers of America’s cold-war armory, George P. Shultz and Henry A. Kissinger, former Republican secretaries of state, and William J. Perry, a former Democratic defense secretary, have banded together in recent years to press, among other things, for cutting nuclear forces, de-alerting missiles and, ultimately, eliminating nuclear arms. Mr. Obama has embraced their aims and welcomed them to the Oval Office. Their high-powered, bipartisan alliance, if adroitly employed by the White House, ought to provide some political cover as Mr. Obama reshapes nuclear policy while running for a second term.

There is no national security rationale for maintaining an arsenal of some 5,000 warheads, with nearly 2,000 arms ready to use on short notice and the rest in reserve. We don’t need thousands of warheads, or even hundreds, to counter threats from countries like Iran or North Korea.

The only conceivable use of so many weapons would be a full-scale nuclear war with Russia, which has more warheads than the United States. But two decades after the collapse of the Soviet Union, even Vladimir V. Putin, with his authoritarian bent, is not about to put Russia on a collision course with the United States that leads to nuclear war. China, equally unlikely to escalate tensions to the nuclear brink, probably has fewer than 400 warheads and a policy to use them only in self-defense. Pakistan has roughly 100, North Korea fewer than 10 and Iran, so far, zero.

The United States could live quite securely with fewer than 1,500 warheads, half in reserve. Defenders of the nuclear faith claim we need 5,000 weapons as a hedge against warheads that may become defective over time. But an elaborate Energy Department program to maintain and refurbish warheads, the Stockpile Stewardship Program, has proved highly effective.

Another oft-cited reason for increasing our arsenal is that the Pentagon’s nuclear war-fighting plans still call for striking hundreds of targets in Russia and China, as well as dozens of sites in a number of other publicly unidentified nations — presumably Iran, North Korea and Syria — considered potentially hostile to the United States and eager to possess unconventional weapons.

Washington’s current nuclear war plans remain far too outsize to deal with any plausible attack on America. Mr. Obama could remove some nations from the hit list, starting with China, and tell his generals to limit the number of targets in the countries that remain.

The oversize American nuclear arsenal features an equally outdated reliance on long-distance bombers. The days when lumbering B-52 bombers could play a central role in delivering nuclear weapons — memorably spoofed in Stanley Kubrick’s “Dr. Strangelove” — ended decades ago. Mr. Obama should ground the bombers and depend on land- and sea-based missiles.

The high-alert status of America’s intercontinental ballistic missiles is another anachronism. There are few circumstances that might require the United States to quickly launch nuclear-tipped missiles, and missiles on high alert are an invitation to an accident, or impulsive action. In the first year of his presidency, Mr. Obama outlined an ambitious nuclear weapons agenda. Absent new action, Washington will remain frozen in a costly cold war posture.

Philip Taubman is a former New York Times bureau chief in Moscow and Washington and the author of “The Partnership: Five Cold Warriors and Their Quest to Ban the Bomb.”

Article Highlights (From Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists)

In the January/February issue of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Siegfried S. Hecker and Robert Carlin assessed North Korea's nuclear developments in 2011. That assessment preceded the death of Kim Jong-il on December 17. This article supplements the Hecker/Carlin piece with detailed overhead imagery, additional analysis of Pyongyang's march toward a more threatening nuclear weapons capability, and brief commentary on how the accession of Kim Jong-un to leadership may influence North Korea's nuclear trajectory.

Abstract

As the diplomatic standoff in North Korea enters its fourth year, the crisis atmosphere on the Korean peninsula sparked by Pyongyang's military actions in 2010 has eased. Pyongyang has agreed to return to the diplomatic table, its hand strengthened by advancing its nuclear program in the interim. Washington and Seoul remain reluctant to engage, having been burned by Pyongyang's clandestine uranium enrichment program unveiled in 2010. The authors argue that re-engagement, with the immediate objective to stop a third nuclear test and prevent further missile tests, is imperative to contain the nuclear threat for now; preventing the nuclear program's expansion and preparing the way for the ultimate denuclearization of the peninsula—critical goals—must be left to a second step.

Note: There is a supplement to this piece with detailed overhead imagery, additional analysis of Pyongyang's march toward a more threatening nuclear weapons capability, and brief commentary on how the accession of Kim Jong-un to leadership may influence North Korea's nuclear trajectory. Click here to access "North Korea from 30,000 Feet"

"Whether China and the United States maintain basically cooperative or fundamentally antagonistic relations obviously has very different implications for the region and for the prospects and policies of others in—and beyond—NEA," states Thomas Fingar in the chapter "Alternate Trajectories of the Roles and Influence of China and the United States in Northeast Asia and the Implications for Future Power Configurations" (One Step Back? Reassessing an Ideal Security State for Asia 2025, 2011). Fingar examines several key factors and interactions between countries that he predicts are likely to play a role in configuring the security structure of Northeast Asia between now and 2025.

Edited by L. Gordon Flake, executive director of the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation, One Step Back? Reassessing an Ideal Security State for Asia 2025 is the second collection of papers published as a part of a research project to identify and refine the "ideal" state of peace and security in Northeast Asia in 2025. Full-length versions of the two publications are available for download, free of charge, at the Foundation website.

The supercommittee's failure to reach an agreement on debt reduction will probably result in unexpected reductions of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. That possibility concerns the defense establishment, but it also presents an opportunity: It might finally be possible to have an honest debate about the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. strategy and the prospect for further arms reductions.

Before moving ahead with this conversation, though, it is critical to review and debunk three misguided ideas about nuclear weapons.

The first is that our nuclear world is safe and stable and that all we need to do now is prevent other nations from acquiring nuclear weapons. Though it is undoubtedly true that the U.S. stockpile is safer than ever, the dangers are far from over. Nuclear terrorism remains a threat. Mistakes are possible, too. In just one example, in August 2007, six nuclear warheads disappeared for two days between North Dakota's Minot and Louisiana's Barksdale Air Force bases.

What's more, unsafe nuclear weapons elsewhere remain a major threat. Tensions between nuclear India and Pakistan, the security of the Pakistani nuclear arsenal and the future of the North Korean nuclear weapons program all suggest that the commitment to making U.S. weapons more reliable and secure will not solve the problem.

The second piece of nuclear mythology is that nuclear disarmament has never taken place and never will. Put slightly differently, it is the idea that nuclear history is proliferation history. But nuclear disarmament is far from unprecedented. South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan all disarmed. Many nuclear-capable states chose to pursue security without nuclear weapons because policymakers recognized these weapons would endanger rather than protect them. Sweden went down the nuclear path and then decided against it in the late 1960s.

Germany had a nuclear weapons program during World War II but became a law-abiding, non-nuclear member of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Japan had two nuclear weapons programs during the war and accumulated a significant quantity of plutonium; since then, its authorities thought about restarting a weapons program four times but decided against it.

In each of those cases, most analysts did not believe that giving up nuclear weapons ambitions was possible. They were wrong, and today we all are glad these countries chose the path they did.

The third misguided concept is that reducing the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal will lead to proliferation. Those who believe this think that countries that no longer feel protected by U.S. nuclear weapons will start building their own to protect themselves. Although this might have some validity, it should be assessed on a case-by-case basis.

Historically, many of the states that have disarmed or given up their nuclear-weapon ambitions - including every non-nuclear nation outside of NATO - have done so despite the absence of a nuclear-security guarantee.

On the other hand, states determined to get the bomb, such as the United Kingdom and France, have done so despite security guarantees. Finally, this argument assumes that the role of nuclear weapons in future alliances and geopolitical relationships will be as important as it was in the past. This might be true, but it cannot be considered a fact. It is just a bet on the future and a set of policy priorities.

In 2007, "the four horsemen" - Henry Kissinger, Sam Nunn, William Perry and George Shultz - wrote a highly influential opinion piece in the Wall Street Journal arguing that relying on nuclear weapons for the purpose of deterrence has become "increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective." Coming from former Cold Warriors from both sides of the political aisle, it legitimized the goal of a world without nuclear weapons and challenged the conventional wisdom.

Now policymakers in Washington and candidates on the electoral trail should embrace the issue, and begin a real conversation with the electorate about the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. policy rather than allowing that policy to be driven by inertia or budget cuts.