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When David Relman learned in April that he was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, he was humbled – and a bit surprised. 

Relman is a senior fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and the Thomas C. and Joan M. Merigan Professor and a professor of medicine and of microbiology & immunology. AAA&S honors exceptional scholars, leaders, artists, and innovators engaged in advancing the public good. 

When he received notification, Relman went to the organization’s web site to check on the discipline area and specialty with which he was affiliated. 

“I looked at the areas and specialties that pertained to my background and expertise (medical sciences, microbiology and immunology, other aspects of the biological sciences), but I could not find my name,” he said. “I thought that maybe the notification was in error.” Then he looked more closely at AAA&S’s letter, and found that his nominators had proposed the “public affairs and public policy section.” 

Arguably that distinction truly reflects Relman’s wide-ranging and serious policy impact in biosecurity, as well as his groundbreaking career work on the nature of the human indigenous microbiota (microbiome). AAA&S’ section of 220 policy luminaries includes former President Barack Obama, former Secretary of Labor Robert Reich, and former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright. Indeed, Relman’s extensive knowledge in microbiology and immunology has played key roles on several critical U.S. and international policy fronts – most recently, the pandemic. 

 Boundless curiosity 

“When you consider the history of the academy and its origins in 1780 during the American Revolution by John Adams and John Hancock, it’s really quite awe-inspiring. You’re joining those who follow in that history,” said Relman, who received an S.B. (Biology) from MIT, M.D. from Harvard Medical School, and joined the faculty at Stanford in 1994. 

Relman’s scholarship is characterized by boundless curiosity – he asks the deeper questions about the pandemic, about human-microbial relationships – both beneficial and harmful, and what they portend for humanity and the future of life on Earth. With grace and diligence, he’s explored the assembly, diversity, stability, and resilience of human microbial communities, while collaborating with other scholars and policy makers on issues paramount to humanity. 

“When I step back and think about the pandemic, it’s clear that it is about much more than just the virus, but also about the social, political, and environmental factors that contribute to the emergence and impact of such pathogens,” said Relman, currently director of a Biosecurity and Global Health initiative at FSI. 

Why do pandemics and more localized outbreaks arise, and how do they uniquely manifest themselves, he ponders. 

“What are the factors that underlie these events, and can we anticipate them better? We much consider three categories of factors: One, is the microbes themselves – and microbes evolve and find ways to do new things. The second category is the hosts – humans, plants, and animals. And humans are undertaking new activities as individuals and as populations that tend to make us more vulnerable, such as immune suppressing ourselves to treat cancer and autoimmune disorders and crowding ourselves into megacities. The third is environmental, and that relates to climate change, and our changing use of land, such as deforestation, intrusion into previously isolated habitats, and other factors,” Relman said. 

Intrusion into new habitats, making contact with animal hosts such as bats that harbor potential disease-causing microbes and viruses, and then bringing these potential pathogens into a lab where we manipulate and alter these agents can lead to human error and accidents, not without grave consequence. “The choices we make in an effort to understand the world around us all come with risk,” he said. 

As far as the microbes and viruses go, “transmissibility is the key,” Relman said. The COVID pandemic reinforced this view for him. 

“When you see what happens when a virus can travel around the globe so quickly, transmissibility has to be viewed as the critical attribute. Viruses evolve and can outrun anything that we might throw in their way, even when we’re already prepared. So, we have to be agile, quick, and shrewd, and we desperately need a far better public health system across the globe that can respond and implement needed measures much more quickly.” 

It’s not just drugs and vaccines and science when it comes to tackling a pandemic. “It’s the social factors, the political factors, and the willingness of humans to work together, and trust, respect and believing in each other. We’ve learned the hard way that this is a tall order. Sometimes we really don’t work together very well,” he said. 

Long-view perspectives 

Relman quotes Joshua Lederberg, a Nobel Prize-winning geneticist and Stanford professor on this age-old war between humanity and viruses: 

“The future of humanity and microbes likely will unfold as episodes of a suspense thriller that could be titled, ‘Our Wits Versus Their Genes,’” Lederberg wrote in an essay, “Infectious History,” in 2000. 

That perspective inspires Relman, who considers this suspense thriller with open eyes and an open mind – digging deeply into complex scientific challenges while understanding long-view perspectives. 

“If you step back in time and consider the history of this planet,” he said, “realize the Earth is about 4.6 billion years old. The earliest life forms we know of were microscopic organisms (microbes) that left signs of their presence in rocks at least 3.7 billion years ago. They have had literally billions of years to diversify, adapt, and secure niches – including on and in animals.” 

On the other hand, modern humans (homo sapiens) have been around for only 200,000 years. “So, we’ve basically been here for the last 3 or 4 seconds of a 24-hour period that started with the formation of Earth. Compare this to microbial life, which has been here for more than 19 hours of this 24-hour period, and will be continue to persist and evolve on this planet for far longer than humanity,” Relman said. 

Relman contemplates and studies the intricacies of the human-microbe relationship, and delves into the issue of how do “favorable” relationships become established, whose interests do they serve, and how can they be supported or restored? 

“This is fundamental to my laboratory work. And why do those relationships sometimes go off the rails? What causes an unusual turn of events such as pandemics? And in what ways and for what reasons do humans mess with these storylines and relationships with these microbes? Those are the puzzles and mysteries that intrigue me,” he said. 

Health equity is a major concern for Relman. Pandemics and public health crises invariably result in harsher consequences for underserved populations than more privileged ones. Many of these communities lack ready access to vaccines, treatments and safeguards, and suffer more disproportionate economic and social turmoil. This is true regardless of how a pandemic arises, including and especially those that might arise because of irresponsible or deliberately malevolent human activities. 

“Subsequent generations are going to be looking at how we’ve handled this pandemic across society, especially for the underserved,” Relman said. “We need to, and can do, much better on this front.” 

Relman was a long-time volunteer for the Rock Medicine program organized by the Haight Ashbury Free Clinics, a free health care service provider serving more than 34,000 people who need access to quality medical care. He served as the chief medical officer for the program for more than a decade. In the 1990s he was featured on MTV for his work providing free medical care at concerts through the program. “Don’t get me started on the dangers of mosh pits,” he once said. 

Scientific truth-telling 

A pioneer in his field, Relman’s research paper on bacillary angiomatosis and a method for the discovery of new pathogens was selected as “one of the 50 most important publications of the 

past century” by the American Society for Microbiology. In other research, ecological theory and predictions are tested in clinical studies with multiple approaches for characterizing the human microbiome. His work has led to the development of molecular methods for identifying novel microbial pathogens, and the subsequent identification of several historically important microbial disease agents. He was one of the first to characterize microbial diversity in the human body using modern molecular methods. Relman is also the Chief of Infectious Diseases at the Veterans Affairs Palo Alto Health Care System in Palo Alto, California, and served as science co-director at CISAC from 2013-2017. 

During the pandemic, scientific knowledge has been expressed in many ways – but political polarization in the U.S. has sometimes worked against crafting sound policy. 

Relman said, “All good scientists know what they’re good at. You need to be very mindful about what you know and what you don’t know. While people are pretty quick to say what they know, they’re not terribly quick to admit what they don’t know. This goes to the issue of ‘lanes’ and the roles of scientists in policy formulation.” 

Many scientists, he added, may think that scientific information alone determines the ultimate public policy. “But it’s only a piece of it. Lots of other factors go into policy, such as social, cultural, political, and economic considerations,” he said. 

National security policy 

Relman served as vice-chair of the National Academy of Sciences Committee that reviewed the science performed as part of the FBI investigation of the 2001 “Anthrax Letters.” He’s also been a member of the National Science Advisory Board on Biosecurity, and was president of the Infectious Diseases Society of America. He is currently a member of the Intelligence Community Studies Board and the Committee on Emerging Infectious Diseases and 21st Century Health Threats, both at the National Academies of Science, as well as the Science and Security Board of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists and the Defense Science Board at the Pentagon. He received an NIH Pioneer Award, an NIH Transformative Research Award, and was elected a member of the National Academy of Medicine in 2011. 

He also chaired and led the work on the National Academies of Science 2020 report on “Havana syndrome,” cases of unexplained health disorders – aka, “anomalous health incidents” – among U.S. government personnel and their families at overseas embassies. Their findings pointed to a “plausible role of directed, pulsed radiofrequency energy,” though “no hypothesis has been proven, and the circumstances remain unclear.” 

Relman said, “I think that we’re going to be facing challenges like this one, that is, complex poorly-explained health problems at the interface of emerging science and national security, more frequently, and that’s what I’ve told our national leadership.” In the report, the scientists wrote, “We as a nation need to address these specific cases as well as the possibility of future cases with a concerted, coordinated, and comprehensive approach.” 

Megan Palmer, the executive director of the Bio Policy & Leadership Initiatives and Relman’s longtime colleague, said, “David is an exceptional scientist, mentor, colleague and friend. He is deeply thoughtful, especially about the role of science and scientists in society, and he is committed to work with integrity for the service of others. He is compelled to tackle the most difficult problems with great care, and he inspires others to follow suit. I am so grateful for his mentorship; he believes in and brings out the best in people.” 

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When David Relman learned in April that he was elected to the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, he was humbled – and a bit surprised.

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For spring quarter 2022, CISAC will be hosting hybrid events. Many events will offer limited-capacity in-person attendance for Stanford faculty, staff, fellows, visiting scholars, and students in accordance with Stanford’s health and safety guidelines, and be open to the public online via Zoom. All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone. 

SEMINAR RECORDING

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to William J. Perry Conference Room in Encina Hall may attend in person. 

Rose Gottemoeller
David Holloway
Scott Sagan
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Steven Pifer
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The Russia-Ukraine war is entering its fourth month, with no end in sight.  The Kremlin seems intent on achieving a victory on the battlefield, while relations between the West and Russia plummet to new lows.  One casualty:  U.S.-Russian arms control negotiations.

Negotiated limits on U.S. and Russian nuclear forces seem far more important today than in 2010, when the two countries concluded the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) and enjoyed warmer overall relations.  Keeping those limits in place, to say nothing of achieving new constraints, could prove difficult.

Prospects appeared brighter in 2021.  Immediately on taking office, President Biden agreed to extend New START until February 2026.  U.S. officials indicated a desire to engage Russia in a negotiation to limit all U.S. and Russian nuclear warheads, a logical next step after New START.

Following the June 2021 Biden-Putin summit in Geneva, U.S. and Russian officials met in the strategic stability dialogue to discuss nuclear arms and related issues, such as missile defense.  Although the dialogue by the end of the year had not produced a mandate for negotiations, both sides characterized the discussions as constructive.

Then, on February 24, 2022, the Russia launched its brutal and unjustified invasion of Ukraine.  Washington wound down “business as usual” and suspended the strategic stability dialogue.

Resumption of those discussions almost certainly will have to wait until an end to the war, and likely for some time after that.  Arms control skeptics will seize on Russia’s attack to intensify their opposition to any attempt to negotiate with Moscow.

If U.S.-Russian discussions resume at some point, the delay will have an impact.  Persuading Moscow to negotiate limits on non-strategic nuclear weapons, which would bring in a host of complex questions, would have been difficult in any case.  Now, however, the sides would have little time to conclude a treaty, let alone for the Senate to discuss ratification, before the U.S. political season cranks up in 2024.

Setting aside the time factor, the Russia-Ukraine war almost certainly will make it harder to persuade Russian negotiators to put non-strategic nuclear weapons on the table.  The Russian military attaches great importance to such weapons, seeing them as one means to make up for U.S. and NATO conventional force advantages (to say nothing about China).

Given the abysmal performance by its military against a smaller and out-gunned foe, the Russian General Staff is likely to regard its non-strategic nuclear arsenal as more necessary than ever.

Of particular note, the Russian military has devoted significant efforts in recent years to adding to its arsenal precision-guided conventional weapons, including long-range strike systems such as the Kalibr cruise missile.  They demonstrated some of those weapons in Syria.

However, the war against Ukraine has revealed significant shortcomings.  First, the Russian weapons appear to have a high fail rate.  U.S. officials estimated that some Russian “smart” weapons miss targets as much as 60 percent of the time.  Second, the large number of Russian air sorties delivering dumb bombs (which require that aircraft fly lower, making them more vulnerable to Ukrainian surface-to-air missiles) suggests that the Russian stockpile of smart weapons may not be large.  Third, Western bans on the export of hi-tech products to Russia could hinder Russian production of new precision-guided conventional weapons.

This will make it harder to get non-strategic nuclear weapons in the negotiation.  At a minimum, the price that Russian negotiators will demand, such as limits on missile defense, will increase.

The Biden administration thus has no chance to get an ambitious agreement in its first term.  As for a second term, who knows what the American electorate will decide in November 2024?

A less ambitious approach would look at extending the limits that now apply to U.S. and Russian strategic offensive forces.  That could offer a sensible fallback.  The U.S. military values New START’s verification and transparency measures.  The Russians, like the Soviets before them, traditionally have sought constraints on U.S. strategic forces.

New START’s terms, however, do not permit extension beyond 2026.  If U.S. and Russian negotiators concluded a new treaty merely extending New START’s constraints, securing the two-thirds vote needed in the Senate for consent to ratification could prove difficult.  Among other things, opponents would point out that, when consenting to ratify New START in 2010, the Senate called on the administration to negotiate limits on non-strategic nuclear weapons.

The administration could seek to extend New START’s limits in an agreement that it would submit to both houses of Congress for approval by simple majorities.  (The Nixon administration handled the 1972 Interim Offensive Arms Agreement that way.)  Doing so, however, would require majorities in both the House and Senate—and no doubt would generate complaints about end-running the Senate.

Another approach would center on politically-binding agreements (not submitted to Capitol Hill) or parallel unilateral declarations.  These could extend the New START limits, but they likely would not continue the treaty’s verification measures.  The Russians have taken the position in the past that they cannot share information that their system regards as classified without a legally-binding agreement.  Washington would have little enthusiasm for continuing New START limits unaccompanied by verification measures.

Arms control offers a useful national security tool that can put guardrails on the adversarial aspects of the U.S.-Russian relationship.  As Washington and Moscow find themselves at the most contentious point in their relations since the early 1980s and perhaps since the 1962 Cuban missile crisis, keeping such guardrails in place is more important than ever.  Unfortunately, the Russia-Ukraine war will make doing that more difficult than ever.

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The Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine USS Nebraska (SSBN 739) | Photo credit: U.S. Department of Defense, accessed via Wikimedia Commons
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The Russia-Ukraine war is entering its fourth month, with no end in sight.  The Kremlin seems intent on achieving a victory on the battlefield, while relations between the West and Russia plummet to new lows.  One casualty:  U.S.-Russian arms control negotiations.

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For spring quarter 2022, CISAC will be hosting hybrid events. Many events will offer limited-capacity in-person attendance for Stanford faculty, staff, fellows, visiting scholars, and students in accordance with Stanford’s health and safety guidelines, and be open to the public online via Zoom. All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone. 

SEMINAR RECORDING

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to William J Perry Conference Room in Encina Hall may attend in person. 

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Five of the CISAC Honors students from the 2021-22 cohort were formally inducted into Phi Beta Kappa. Alexandra Koch, Deborah Jantz, and Hannah Kohatsu were elected in their senior year and Olivia Morello and William Howlett were elected in their junior year. 

Phi Beta Kappa is the oldest academic honor society in the United States and selects students with high academic achievement who have also successfully taken classes showing a breadth of engagement across the humanities and arts; the natural sciences, engineering, and mathematics; and the social sciences.

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From left to right: Alexandra Koch, Deborah Jantz, Hannah Kohatsu, Olivia Morello, William Howlett
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Five CISAC Honors students were inducted into Phi Beta Kappa. Phi Beta Kappa selects students with high academic achievement who have also successfully taken classes showing a breadth of engagement across the humanities and arts; the natural sciences, engineering, and mathematics; and the social sciences.

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J. Luis Rodriguez
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Abstract

Why did Latin American states exclude a prohibition on maritime nuclear transit from their regional nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ)? Latin American countries and nuclear powers shared common anxieties about the dangers of the nuclear arms race in the early 1960s. Thus, they decided to craft a regional nuclear non-proliferation mechanism. Latin American states favoured limiting maritime nuclear transit as part of the Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, known as the Treaty of Tlatelolco. However, they disagreed on defining transit and the zone of application of a ban, and they faced US opposition. This article identifies issue bracketing as a negotiating tactic Latin America used to ensure a successful treaty codification. It argues that Latin American states bracketed the maritime nuclear transit issue out of the NWFZ discussions and onto the agenda of the negotiations establishing ocean governance rules in the 1970s. The Latin American construction of a NWFZ questions assumptions in international law and nuclear politics studies about the agency of the global South in the global nuclear order. Latin American concessions in Tlatelolco were not impositions from nuclear powers. Their compromises were strategic decisions that helped them promote their governance preferences.

Read the rest at International Affairs

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Why did Latin American states exclude a prohibition on maritime nuclear transit from their regional nuclear weapon-free zone (NWFZ)?

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For spring quarter 2022, CISAC will be hosting hybrid events. Many events will offer limited-capacity in-person attendance for Stanford faculty, staff, fellows, visiting scholars, and students in accordance with Stanford’s health and safety guidelines, and be open to the public online via Zoom. All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone. 

SEMINAR RECORDING

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to William J. Perry Conference Room in Encina Hall may attend in person. 

Frances Butcher
Sigrid Lupieri
Seminars
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For spring quarter 2022, CISAC will be hosting hybrid events. Many events will offer limited-capacity in-person attendance for Stanford faculty, staff, fellows, visiting scholars, and students in accordance with Stanford’s health and safety guidelines, and be open to the public online via Zoom. All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone. 

REGISTRATION

(Stanford faculty, visiting scholars, staff, fellows, and students only)

                                                                                           

About the Event: As constitutional democracies in the United States and around the world struggle to cope with a rising wave of authoritarian challenges, many pro-democracy scholars and advocates in the United States have looked to law reform as a means of bolstering substantive and structural checks on executive power - from anti-corruption measures to limits on the President’s ability to invoke emergency authorities or deploy military force. But these reform efforts arise against a wholly unsettled debate about the function and effectiveness of existing institutional and legal checks, many of which proved deeply vulnerable to evasion during the presidency of Donald Trump.  Using the example of domestic and international laws designed to regulate presidential recourse to military force, Pearlstein will discuss her findings on the operation of existing legal constraints inside the executive branch, and suggest broader lessons for calibrating our understanding of law’s ability to constrain the impulses of authoritarian leaders.

About the Speaker: Deborah Pearlstein is Professor of Constitutional and International Law and Co-Director of the Floersheimer Center for Constitutional Democracy at Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University.  Her work on national security and structural constraints on state power has been the subject of repeated testimony before Congress from war powers to executive branch oversight, and she today serves on the U.S. State Department Advisory Committee on Historical Diplomatic Documentation, an expert board that helps ensure the timely declassification and publication of government records surrounding major events in U.S. foreign policy. A graduate of Harvard Law School, Professor Pearlstein clerked for Judge Michael Boudin of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, then for Justice John Paul Stevens of the U.S. Supreme Court. Before embarking on a career in law, Pearlstein served in the White House from 1993 to 1995 as a Senior Editor and Speechwriter for President Clinton.

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to William J Perry Conference Room in Encina Hall may attend in person. 

Deborah Pearlstein
Seminars
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For spring quarter 2022, CISAC will be hosting hybrid events. Many events will offer limited-capacity in-person attendance for Stanford faculty, staff, fellows, visiting scholars, and students in accordance with Stanford’s health and safety guidelines, and be open to the public online via Zoom. All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone. 

REGISTRATION

(Stanford faculty, visiting scholars, staff, fellows, and students only)

                                                                                           

About the Event: This seminar will review key challenges facing Israel in the near term – such as the Iranian Nuclear Program and Iranian establishment in Syria - and will present the main dilemmas in formulating policy in the face of each challenge.

About the Speaker: Major General (ret.) Amos Yadlin joined the Middle East Initiative at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center as a Senior Fellow after 40 years of service in the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). He served as a fighter pilot for 33 years, ultimately becoming Deputy Commander of the Israeli Air Force. He then earned the rank of Major General, served as a commander of the IDF Military Colleges and the National Defense College, Defense Attaché to the United States, and Chief of the Military Intelligence Directorate. He was Executive Director of the Institute for National Security Studies from 2011 to 2021; under his leadership it was named the number one think tank in the Middle East and North Africa by the University of Pennsylvania’s Global Go To Think Tank Index Report in 2020.

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to William J Perry Conference Room in Encina Hall may attend in person. 

Amos Yadlin
Seminars
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For spring quarter 2022, CISAC will be hosting hybrid events. Many events will offer limited-capacity in-person attendance for Stanford faculty, staff, fellows, visiting scholars, and students in accordance with Stanford’s health and safety guidelines, and be open to the public online via Zoom. All CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone. 

REGISTRATION

(Stanford faculty, visiting scholars, staff, fellows, and students only)

                                                                                           

About the Event: Mainstream accounts of nuclear politics tend to focus on the actions of nuclear-weapon states (NWS), offering incomplete interpretations of the participation of non-nuclear-weapon states (NNWS) in the global nuclear order. These approaches usually portray NNWS as potential sources of nuclear instability and proliferation, especially those with the technical capabilities to build nuclear arsenals. However, NNWS have actively designed mechanisms to manage nuclear risks and crafted institutions to enforce them. Thus, this panel explores the agency of NNWS in nuclear politics to build a more comprehensive and accurate interpretation of their role in the global nuclear order. The presentations will explore how NNWS with developing economies balanced security and development in the negotiations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, how NNWS in various latitudes built regional mechanisms to manage nuclear risks with different levels of success, and how NNWS address fears that NWS might drag them into precipitous nuclear conflicts.


About the Speakers: 

Dr. Ryan A. Musto is the Director of Forums and Research Initiatives with the Global Research Institute at William & Mary. He holds a Ph.D. in history from The George Washington University, master’s degrees in international and world history from Columbia University and the London School of Economics, and a B.A. in history from New York University. Dr. Musto has served as a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at MIT and as a MacArthur Nuclear Security fellow at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. He is a Cold War and nuclear historian with concentrations in U.S. and Latin American diplomatic history. Dr. Musto is currently writing a book on the international history of nuclear weapon free zones.

Dr. J. Luis Rodriguez is a Stanton Nuclear Security Fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. He holds a Ph.D. and M.A. from the Department of Political Science at Johns Hopkins University. His research studies how the Global South builds and maintains limits on the use of force in international law and organization. Dr. Rodriguez focuses primarily on the negotiations to codify nuclear arms controls and humanitarian-intervention norms. Before joining the Ph.D. program at Johns Hopkins, he was a junior advisor to the Mexican Vice-Minister for Latin American Affairs, working on international security cooperation.

Dr. Lauren Sukin is currently a MacArthur Nuclear Security Fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation. In September 2022, she will join the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science as an Assistant Professor of International Relations. Dr. Sukin holds a Ph.D. and M.A. from the Department of Political Science at Stanford University. She also holds A.B.s from the Departments of Political Science and Literary Arts at Brown University (2016). Dr. Sukin’s research examines issues of international security, focusing on the role of nuclear weapons in international politics.

Virtual to Public. Only those with an active Stanford ID with access to William J Perry Conference Room in Encina Hall may attend in person. 

Luis Rodriguez
Lauren Sukin
Ryan Musto
Seminars
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