Abstract: The American Lab, published by Johns Hopkins University Press in 2018, tells the story of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (the Lab) from the events leading to its founding in 1952 through its transfer to private status in 2008 (after 66 years of sole University of California management). It highlights the important episodes in that journey beginning with the invention of Polaris, the first submarine launched ballistic missile, continuing through the Lab’s controversial role in the Star Wars program, and helping lead the development of the stockpile stewardship program after the cessation of nuclear testing. It describes the intense focus on-laboratory-scale thermonuclear fusion with early work in magnetic fusion to the world’s largest effort on laser fusion that ultimately resulted in the construction of the National Ignition Facility. It includes a number of smaller projects ranging from its participation in founding the Human Genome Project (and its subsequent effort in biodefense) to its array of activities on global climate and basic research. Throughout, the book emphasizes the national security environment in which the Lab existed and the increasing role of politics in “big science”.

Bio: C. Bruce Tarter is a theoretical physicist with a BS from MIT and a PhD from Cornell. He began as a researcher at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in 1967 and eventually served as its Director from 1994-2002. Since that time as Director Emeritus he has served on a number of Boards and Task Forces including the National Academy study of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States. He is a Fellow of the American Physical Society and the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

Speaker Bio: Sarah Kreps is an Associate Professor of Government and Adjunct Professor of Law at Cornell University. In 2017-2018, she is an Adjunct Scholar at the Modern War Institute (West Point). She is also a Faculty Fellow in the Milstein Program in Technology and Humanity at the Cornell Tech Campus in New York City.

Dr. Kreps is the author of four books, including, most recently, Taxing Wars: The American Way of War Finance and the Decline of Democracy (Oxford University Press, 2018), which deals with the causes and consequences of how advanced industrialized democracies such as the US, UK, and France pay for its wars.  She has also written two books on drones, including Drones: What Everyone Needs to Know (Oxford University Press, 2016) and Drone Warfare (Polity Press, 2014; with John Kaag).  Her first book was called Coalitions of Convenience: United States Military Interventions after the Cold War (Oxford University Press, 2011) and analyzed military interventions carried out over the last decade.

Beyond these books, her work has appeared or is forthcoming in the American Political Science Review, World Politics, Journal of Politics, International Security, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Security Studies, Journal of Strategic Studies, Political Science Quarterly, International Studies Perspectives, Foreign Policy Analysis, Polity, African Security Review, the Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law, the International Journal of Sustainable Development and World Ecology, Intelligence and National Security, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, and Polity. Her opinions have been featured in a series of media outlets including The Washington Post, International Herald Tribune, New York Times, Christian Science Monitor, USA Today, CNBC,and Reuters.

Dr. Kreps has held fellowships at the Council on Foreign Relations (and is a life member), Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, and the University of Virginia’s Miller Center for Public Affairs. She has a BA from Harvard, MSc from Oxford, and PhD from Georgetown. Between 1999-2003, she served on active duty in the United States Air Force.

Abtstract: Although the 2016 election highlighted the potential for foreign governments to employ social media for strategic advantages, the particular mechanisms through which social media affect international politics remain underdeveloped.  Building on insights from American politics, in particular the “democratic dilemma,” I observe that many issues of foreign policy are complex and the public is insufficiently informed to offer well-reasoned opinions. To resolve the knowledge deficits and ambivalence, they seek information from their media environment, which is where social media—as platforms that are open access and amplify content that is extreme either in their positive or negative valence—can cue individuals and tilt the balance of support.  In this context, the open media environment of a democracy is a particularly susceptible environment for foreign influence whereas the comparatively closed media environment of a non-democracy provides efficient ways for these governments to censor, cut, or counter social media in ways that promote regime survival.  The research has important implications for the role of media, technology, and persuasion in international politics.

Abstract: Europe and the United States have sharply divergent regulatory regimes and public perceptions on the benefits and risks of genetically modified foods. I draw on the history and factors behind this divergence, including the concept of regulatory precaution, to highlight how institutional design choices, contingent events and policy entrepreneurs can shape how societies absorb new technologies, with particular application to artificial intelligence, machine learning, and automation. The story of GMO governance is a precautionary tale for technologists and policy makers about possible governance futures for AI. 

Bio: Andrew J. Grotto is a William J. Perry International Security Fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation and a Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution, both at Stanford University.

Grotto’s research interests center on the national security and international economic dimensions of America’s global leadership in information technology innovation, and its growing reliance on this innovation for its economic and social life. He is particularly interested in the allocation of responsibility between the government and the privater sector for defending against cyber threats, especially as it pertains to critical infrastructure; cyber-enabled information operations as both a threat to, and a tool of statecraft for, liberal democracies; opportunities and constraints facing offensive cyber operations as a tool of statecraft, especially those relating to norms of sovereignty in a digitally connected world; and governance of global trade in information technologies.

Before coming to Stanford, Grotto was the Senior Director for Cybersecurity Policy at the White House in both the Obama and Trump Administrations. His portfolio spanned a range of cyber policy issues, including defense of the financial services, energy, communications, transportation, health care, electoral infrastructure, and other vital critical infrastructure sectors; cybersecurity risk management policies for federal networks; consumer cybersecurity; and cyber incident response policy and incident management. He also coordinated development and execution of technology policy topics with a nexus to cyber policy, such as encryption, surveillance, privacy, and the national security dimensions of artificial intelligence and machine learning. 

At the White House, he played a key role in shaping President Obama’s Cybersecurity National Action Plan and driving its implementation. He was also the principal architect of President Trump’s cybersecurity executive order, “Strengthening the Cybersecurity of Federal Networks and Critical Infrastructure.”

Grotto joined the White House after serving as Senior Advisor for Technology Policy to Commerce Secretary Penny Pritzker, advising Pritzker on all aspects of technology policy, including Internet of Things, net neutrality, privacy, national security reviews of foreign investment in the U.S. technology sector, and international developments affecting the competitiveness of the U.S. technology sector.

Grotto worked on Capitol Hill prior to the Executive Branch, as a member of the professional staff of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. He served as then-Chairman Dianne Feinstein’s lead staff overseeing cyber-related activities of the intelligence community and all aspects of NSA’s mission. He led the negotiation and drafting of the information sharing title of the Cybersecurity Act of 2012, which later served as the foundation for the Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act that President Obama signed in 2015. He also served as committee designee first for Senator Sheldon Whitehouse and later for Senator Kent Conrad, advising the senators on oversight of the intelligence community, including of covert action programs, and was a contributing author of the “Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Detention and Interrogation Program.”

Before his time on Capitol Hill, Grotto was a Senior National Security Analyst at the Center for American Progress, where his research and writing focused on U.S. policy towards nuclear weapons - how to prevent their spread, and their role in U.S. national security strategy.

Grotto received his JD from the University of California at Berkeley, his MPA from Harvard University, and his BA from the University of Kentucky.

Abstract: This presentation is based on the book with the same title (Yale University Press, 2018) which examines a crucial element of state behavior -- the use of international institutions, informal alignments and economic instruments such as sanctions -- to constrain the power and threatening behavior of dominant actors. Much of International Relations scholarship fails to capture the use of these non-military instruments for constraining superior power. The soft balancing debate for over a decade has generated much literature and criticisms. However, it has been used exclusively in the context of responses by second-tier states toward U.S. power. This book expands and tests soft balancing arguments to historical eras (such as the Concert of Europe, and the League of Nations during the interwar period) and the emerging/resurging powers, China and Russia while responding to criticisms aired against the concept and strategy. It seeks to explore: under what conditions do states resort to soft balancing as opposed to hard balancing (relying on formal military alliances and intense arms buildups)? When do they combine both? What are the differences and similarities between the 20^th and 21^st century cases of soft balancing--one under multipolarity, the other under near-unipolarity? When do soft balancing efforts elicit hostile reactions and when do they produce positive results? Finally, what are the implications of soft balancing for the rise of new great powers and the international order, especially conflict and cooperation among them in the 21^st century’s globalized international system?

Bio: T.V. Paul is James McGill Professor of International Relations in the Department of Political Science at McGill University, Montreal and a Fellow of the Royal Society of Canada. He was President of International Studies Association (ISA) during 2016-17. Paul is the author or editor of 18 books and over 70 scholarly articles/book chapters in the fields of International Relations, International Security, and South Asia. He is the author of the books: The Warrior State: Pakistan in the Contemporary World (Oxford, 2013); Globalization and the National Security State (with N. Ripsman, Oxford, 2010); The Tradition of Non-use of Nuclear Weapons (Stanford, 2009); India in the World Order: Searching for Major Power Status (with B.R. Nayar Cambridge, 2002); Power versus Prudence: Why Nations Forgo Nuclear Weapons (McGill-Queen’s, 2000); and Asymmetric Conflicts: War Initiation by Weaker Powers (Cambridge, 1994). Paul currently serves as the editor of the Georgetown University Press book series: South Asia in World Affairs. For more, see: www.tvpaul.com

Abstract: Climate change is an existential problem with far-reaching implications for the biosphere and human life.  Political science should be studying human responses to carbonization and potential measures to mitigate its effects.  Such investigations can focus on individuals, firms, or states as the units of analysis. Political science should also take note of emerging technologies for rapid decarbonization, which are likely to generate different political challenges.  It is our responsibility as political scientists to study the potential political barriers to technically feasible decarbonization, and to help devise strategies to overcome them.

Bio: Robert O. Keohane (PhD Harvard 1966) is Professor of Public and International Affairs (Emeritus) in the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University. He has served as Editor of International Organization and as President of the International Studies Association and the American Political Science Association.  He is a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, the American Academy of Political and Social Science, the American Philosophical Society, and the National Academy of Sciences; and he is a Corresponding Fellow of the British Academy. He has been a recipient of the Balzan Prize: International Relations: History Theory, 2016; the James Madison Award, American Political Science Association, 2014, for  lifetime achievement; the Centennial Medal, Harvard Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, 2012; the Skytte Prize from the Johan Skytte Foundation, Uppsala Sweden, 2005; the Grawemeyer Award for Ideas Improving World Order, 1989, and two honorary doctorates.  His publications include Power and Interdependence (with Joseph S. Nye, Jr., originally published in 1977), After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy (1984), Designing Social Inquiry (with Gary King and Sidney Verba, 1994), and Power and Governance in a Partially Globalized World (2002). His current work focuses on the international and comparative politics of climate change policy. Professor Keohane is married to Nannerl O. Keohane.  They have four children and ten grandchildren.  

This seminar will provide analysis and implications of the 2018 Nuclear Posture Review from the perspectives of three people who spent a significant portion of their careers working on the nuclear deterrent.  First, a brief history of nuclear posture reviews will be presented.  The results from the former reviews will be analyzed and the evolution of the nuclear posture reviews will be elucidated.  Next, a summary of the current security environment and the resulting important elements of the 2018 review will be presented.  The reasoning and rationale for the elements of the nuclear posture will be described.  Finally, a perspective of the implication of the 2018 nuclear posture review to the challenging issue of infrastructure and capabilities at the U.S. national laboratories responsible for the nuclear deterrent will be discussed.   The views of the speakers will differ from each other in some cases, and there will be time for questions from the audience to the panelists.

John R. Harvey Bio

Dr. John R. Harvey is a physicist with over 35 years of experience working nuclear weapons and national security issues, first at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, then at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Arms Control and in senior positions in the Departments of Defense (twice) and Energy.  From 2009-2013, he served as Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear, Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs under then Undersecretary Ash Carter.  He was Dr. Carter’s “go to” person for the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, as well as for interactions with the Department of Energy on joint oversight of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile.  Dr. Harvey also provided oversight to DoD acquisition programs to sustain and modernize nuclear weapons delivery systems and systems for their command and control.  Since retiring from government service in 2013, he consults with the Defense Science Board, Institute for Defense Analysis, Los Alamos National Laboratory, National Institute for Public Policy, Center for Strategic and International Studies and Strategic Command’s Strategic Advisory Group Panel on Nuclear Weapons Command and Control.

Charles McMillan Bio

Dr. Charles McMillan served as the tenth Director of Los Alamos National Laboratory from 2011 through 2017. The Laboratory is a principal contributor to the Department of Energy mission of maintaining the nation's nuclear weapons stockpile. McMillan began his career as an experimental physicist at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory in 1983. As a scientific leader, he helped create the Stockpile Stewardship Program, developing and applying advanced experimental and computational tools to ensure the safety, security and reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent without additional full-scale nuclear testing. He continues to serve as an adviser to the government, laboratories and industry.

Jill Hruby Bio

Jill Hruby is currently the inaugural Sam Nunn Distinguished Fellow at the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). Her work at NTI focuses on the intersection of technology and nuclear non-proliferation policy.

Hruby served as the Director of Sandia National Laboratories from July 2015 to May 2017. Sandia is a Department of Energy (DOE)/National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) national laboratory with over 12,000 employees and $3B annual revenue.  Sandia’s broad national security missions include nuclear weapons, cyberspace, energy, non-proliferation, biological defense, and space sensors and systems.

Hruby spent 34 years at Sandia in roles with increasing responsibilities.  In 2010, Hruby moved to Sandia’s New Mexico site after 27 years at Sandia’s California location to become vice president of the Energy, Nonproliferation, and High-Consequence Security Division, and leader of Sandia’s International, Homeland, and Nuclear Security Program.  

Abstract: Steve Fetter worked in the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy during the first three and last two years of the Obama administration.  In the first period he played a role in the debates that defined the administration’s nuclear policy; in the latter period he participated in the final push to make progress on what became known as “the Prague agenda.”  He will discuss the key successes and failures in President Obama’s attempt to revise U.S. nuclear weapon policy and lessons that can be learned for a future administration that seeks to reduce nuclear risks. 

Bio: Steve Fetter is Associate Provost, Dean of the Graduate School, and Professor of Public Policy at the University of Maryland.  Service in the U.S. government includes five years at the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, two years at the Department of Defense, and a year at the State Department.  He has been a visiting fellow at Stanford, Harvard, MIT, and Livermore and is a member of the National Academy of Sciences Committee on International Security and Arms Control.  Fetter holds a Ph.D. in energy and resources from Berkeley and a S.B. in physics from MIT.

Abstract: Revenge may not be a necessary condition for deterrence to operate, but it can certainly prove sufficient in many circumstances.  The psychology of revenge is implicitly embedded into the theory and practice of deterrence; it adds an important source of credibility to the threat of retaliatory strike. This discussion provides a deeper theoretical examination of the psychological nature of revenge, its situational triggers, and the implications for deterrence. This approach distinguishes revenge from other forms of retaliation often conflated with revenge, such as negative reciprocity, and highlights the importance of emotional cues such as anger and hatred as motivators.  This allows for greater clarification in understanding the psychological mechanisms that process information, regulate and trigger emotions, and provides a foundation for policymakers to determine the nature of the adversary they confront. We argue that the human psychology of revenge explains why and when policymakers readily commit to the otherwise seemingly ‘irrational’ retaliation that makes deterrence work. Counterintuitively, however, revenge is not motivated by the rational expectation of future deterrence; rather, it is driven by the intrinsic pleasure that one expects to experience upon striking back.  In other words, exacting revenge for perceived transgressions simply feels incredibly satisfying to most people. It is when revenge is sought for its own sake that its prospect can be such an effective deterrent to adversaries, and why it has evolved as such an effective psychological strategy.

Bio: Rose McDermott is the David and Mariana Fisher University Professor of International Relations at Brown University and a Fellow in the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.  She received her Ph.D.(Political Science) and M.A. (Experimental Social Psychology) from Stanford University and has taught at Cornell, UCSB  and Harvard. She has held fellowships at the Radcliffe Institute for Advanced Study, the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies and the Women and Public Policy Program, all at Harvard University. She has been a fellow at the Stanford Center for Advanced Studies in the Behavioral Sciences twice. She is the author of four books, a co-editor of two additional volumes, and author of over two hundred academic articles across a wide variety of disciplines encompassing topics such as experimentation, emotion and decision making, and the biological and genetic bases of political behavior.