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This article adopts a two-tiered approach: it provides a detailed, historical account of anti-terrorist finance initiatives in the United Kingdom and United States--two states driving global norms in this area. It then proceeds to a critique of these laws. The analysis assumes--and accepts--the goals of the two states in adopting these provisions. It questions how well the measures achieve their aim. Specifically, it highlights how the transfer of money laundering tools undermines the effectiveness of the states' counterterrorist efforts--flooding the systems with suspicious activity reports, driving money out of the regulated sector, and using inappropriate metrics to gauge success. This article recognizes that both states consider the fight against terrorism to be partly military but also a matter of bringing certain democratic principles to bear. Critics have been quick to condemn some of the measures for their encroachments into civil liberties. My goal is not to measure the success of the laws according to any particular ideology but rather, accepting the governments' democracy-promoting goals, and the role these play in generating domestic and international support, to clarify which components do not appear to serve the states' aims.

This article won Stanford Law School's Carl Mason Franklin Prize for 2005-2006, for most distinguished written work in international law.

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The Bush administration's response to the September 11 attacks has rendered more urgent Al Qaeda's stated objective to eject the United States from the Middle East. The aim here is not to evaluate the direction of the war on terrorism, but to explore why Al Qaeda has been so unsuccessful in capitalizing on its political violence. The article begins with the premise that terrorism is a communication strategy. It contends that Al Qaeda's policy failures are due to its inability to convince Bush that it would refrain from attacking Americans if the United States moderated its Middle East policies. Borrowing from the literature in political psychology and perception and misperception in international relations, the article offers several explanations for Al Qaeda's ineffectiveness in getting this message across. The article concludes by deriving general observations about the limitations of terrorism as a form of political communication.

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Terrorism and Political Violence
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Chapter 6 in Reappraising Openheimer: Centennial Studies and Reflections, edited by Cathryn Carson and David A. Hollinger (Office for History and Science of Technology, University of California, Berkeley, 2005).

The editors write: "From the beginning all the way up to the present, the Soviet nuclear weapons project has served as foil for the American effort. It preoccupied Robert Oppenheimer's minders in the Manhattan Project, fixated by the possibility of espionage; it drove his postwar attempts to achieve international control of atomic weapons just as surely as it lit up his opponents' mistrust of his stance on the hydrogen bomb. Throughout the arms race, Soviet progress vis-a-vis American weapons production helped drive the dynamic of the Cold War. More recently, Soviet and post-Soviet sources have inspired careful reanalysis of the dual courses of the two nations' nuclear projects. That effort has shed new light on the conditions under which Oppenheimer's wartime labors could find the conclusion they did. . . .

"David Holloway explores parallels between Robert Oppenheimer and his Soviet counterpart, Iulii Khariton. Similarities in background and differences in role make Holloway's contrast instructive."

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University of California, Berkeley in "Reappraising Oppenheimer: Centennial Studies and Reflections"
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On June 16, 2002, Dennis Pluchinsky, a senior intelligence analyst at the U.S. Department of State, wrote an article in the Washington Post calling for censorship. The article began, "I accuse the media in the United States of treason." Pluchinsky, who worked counterterrorism in the government for twenty-five years, pointed to post-9/11 articles that revealed not scientific advancements, but American vulnerabilities in regard to the food supply, electricity, chemical production, transportation, and border security. He suggested that research conducted by the media could not have been funded by one, single terrorist organization: "Our news media, and certain think tankers and academicians, have done and continue to do the target vulnerability research for them."

Pluchinsky has a point. Terrorist organizations can and do use the media--and the protections afforded speech in the United States and the United Kingdom--to obtain and disseminate critical information.

The crucial point is this: Both liberal, democratic states, and nonstate terrorist organizations need free speech. Under what circumstances are the interests of the state secured and the opportunism of terrorist organizations avoided? Here, the experiences of the United States and United Kingdom prove instructive. On both sides of the Atlantic, where the state acts as sovereign, efforts to restrict persuasive political speech have relaxed over time to allow for more criticism. In the United States, Brandenburg v. Ohio cemented this shift. In the United Kingdom, change came gradually. The practical elimination of treason and seditious libel, and incorporation of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) into domestic law through the 1998 Human Rights Act (HRA), marked the transition. If free speech remains central to our understanding of liberal democracy, it would nevertheless be naïve to rely on these alterations to protect expression in the contemporary counterterrorist environment--regardless of how remarkable they might be in the context of what went before.

Underlying my argument in this paper is a deeper concern that centers on the shifting nature of technology. What the average person could have done in 1776, or for that matter, 1976, to hurt either state pales in comparison to what a person with basic knowledge of microbiology, $1000, and a lab can do today. But neither American nor British law appears to have come to terms with what weapons of mass destruction, in terrorist hands, means for free speech.

This article won the 2004-2005 Steven M. Block Civil Liberties award for the best piece of writing in civil liberties at Stanford Law School. It also won second place in the national competition for the 2005 Judge John R. Brown Award for Excellence in Legal Writing, which recognizes the best legal writing by U.S. law students.

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This presentation is based on a paper written by Anne Platt Barrows, Paul Kucik, William Skimmyhorn and John Straigis.

Paul Kucik is a Major in the U.S. Army. He served in Aviation units in a series of assignments, including Company Command. He then served as Assistant Professor in the Department of Social Sciences at the United States Military Academy. He later served as analyst and as deputy director of the U.S. Army Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis. He has a Bachelor of Science degree in Economics from the United States Military Academy and a Master of Business Administration from the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

Anne Platt Barrows is a Member of the Technical Staff in the Advanced System Deployments department at Sandia National Laboratories in Livermore, California. She focuses on facility protection, primarily on defending facilities against attacks with chemical agents. She holds a B.S. degree in Electrical Engineering and a B.A. in Ethics, Politics, and Economics from Yale University.

William Skimmyhorn is a Captain in the U.S. Army. He has served in Aviation units in a variety of assignments including Bosnia, Kosovo and two tours in Korea. His jobs have ranged from Platoon Leader to Liaison Officer to Troop Commander. He is currently a dual Master's Student at Stanford University studying International Policy and Management Science and Engineering. He has a Bachelor of Science Degree in Economics from the United States Military Academy.

John Straigis is currently working as a Systems Engineer at Lockheed Martin Space Systems Company in Sunnyvale, California. He just celebrated his second anniversary with the company, and is presently in Special Programs. Concurrently, he is completing his second Master's degree from Stanford University, in Management Science and Engineering, with a focus on Decision and Risk Analysis. His first Master's, before beginning his career at Lockheed Martin, was in Aero/Astro Engineering, also from Stanford. For undergraduate, he attended Rose-Hulman Institute of Technology, in Terre Haute, Indiana, receiving double degrees in Chemical Engineering and Mechanical Engineering. Outside of work and school, he enjoys several sports, particularly ice hockey, in which he is the starting goaltender for the Stanford ice hockey team.

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Paul Kucik PhD Candidate Speaker Department of Management Science and Engineering, Stanford
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A lasting legacy of the Cold War is the continued existence of weapons of mass destruction--uniquely, nuclear arms. The context in which they exist has been drastically changed in the realm of international politics. Father Hehir will probe the changed context of proliferation, as he addresses the continuing ethical and strategic challenges inherited from the past and now reshaped in this century.

 

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Speaker's Biography: J. Bryan Hehir is the Parker Gilbert Montgomery Professor of the Practice of Religion and Public Life at Harvard University and the Secretary for Social Services and the President of Catholic Charities for the Archdiocese of Boston. Father Hehir's research focuses on ethics and foreign policy, and the role of religion on world politics and in American society. His writings include The Moral Measurement of War: A Tradition of Continuity and Change and Military Intervention and National Sovereignty.

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J. Bryan Hehir Parker Gilbert Montgomery Professor of the Practice of Religion and Public Life, Kennedy School of Government Speaker Harvard University
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Lawrence M. Wein
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The president's border security and immigration reform proposals won't protect Americans from the gravest cross-border threat: the possibility that a ship, truck or train will one day import a 40-foot cargo container in which terrorists have hidden a dirty bomb or nuclear weapon. To tackle this problem, policymakers need to think inside the box, write CISAC's Lawrence M. Wein and colleague Stephen E. Flynn in this New York Times op-ed.

This week President Bush will seek to focus the nation's attention on border security and immigration reform. But the president's proposals won't protect Americans from our gravest cross-border threat: the possibility that a ship, truck or train will one day import a 40-foot cargo container in which terrorists have hidden a dirty bomb or nuclear weapon.

The Bush administration maintains that it has a smart strategy to reduce this risk. A new 24-Hour Rule requires that importers report the contents of their containers to customs inspectors one day before the boxes are loaded on ships bound for the United States. The Department of Homeland Security's National Targeting Center then reviews the data, checking against other intelligence to determine which boxes may pose a threat. Although the containers deemed high risk are inspected at cooperating foreign ports or when they enter the United States, the rest--more than 90 percent--land here without any perusal.

We have two concerns about this strategy. First, it presumes that the United States government has good enough intelligence about Al Qaeda to reliably discern which containers are suspicious and which are not. But our inability to thwart the attacks in Iraq demonstrates that we lack such specific tactical intelligence. And supporting customs inspectors, who must make the first assessment of risk, is not a priority for the intelligence agencies. Inspectors must rely on their experience in spotting anomalies--a company that claims to be exporting pineapples from Iceland, for example.

Second, determined terrorists can easily take advantage of the knowledge that customs inspectors routinely designate certain shipments as low risk. A container frequently makes 10 or more stops between its factory of origin and the vessel carrying it to American shores. Many of the way stations are in poorly policed parts of the world. Because name-brand companies like Wal-Mart and General Motors are widely known to be considered low-risk, terrorists need only to stake out their shipment routes and exploit the weakest points to introduce a weapon of mass destruction. A terrorist cell posing as a legal shipping company for more than two years, or a terrorist truck driver hauling goods from a well-known shipper, can also be confident of being perceived as low risk.

So what needs to be done? A pilot project under way in Hong Kong, the world's largest container port along with Singapore, offers one piece of a potential solution. At an estimated cost of $7 per container, new technology can photograph the box's exterior, screen for radioactive material, and collect a gamma-ray image of a box's contents while the truck on which it is carried moves at 10 miles per hour.

Terrorists can defeat radiation sensors by shielding a dirty bomb with dense materials like lead. But by combining those sensors with gamma ray images, the Hong Kong system allows inspectors to sound the alarm on suspiciously dense objects. Inspectors would need to analyze enough of the scans--perhaps 20 percent to 30 percent--to convince terrorists that there is a good chance that an indistinct image will lead a container's contents to be sent for more reliable X-ray or manual examinations. Images of container contents would then be reviewed remotely by inspectors inside the United States who are trained to spot possible nuclear weapons.

If terrorists were to succeed in shipping a dirty bomb, for example, the database of these images could serve as a kind of black box--an invaluable forensic tool in the effort to identify how and where security was breached. That information could help prevent politicians from reacting spasmodically and freezing the entire container system after an attack.

Such a program could significantly reduce the likelihood that terrorists will smuggle plutonium or a dirty bomb through American ports. But it still would not stop a terrorist from importing highly enriched uranium, which can be used to construct a nuclear weapon. Lengthening the time that a container is screened for radiation would help, and this could be done without increasing waiting times if additional monitors were added to the Hong Kong system near the gate where the trucks must already stop for driver identification checks. Better still would be for the Department of Homeland Security to make the development of new technology that can recognize the unique signature of highly enriched uranium an urgent priority.

Finally, we must find ways to ensure that terrorists do not breach containers before shipments arrive at loading ports. Sensors should be installed inside containers in order to track their movements, detect any infiltration and discern the presence of radioactive material. Where boxes are loaded, certified independent inspectors should verify that companies have followed adequate protocols to ensure that legitimate and authorized goods are being shipped.

Taken together, these recommendations will require new investments and an extraordinary degree of international cooperation. But increased container security will not only help the United States prevent terrorism, it will also help all countries reduce theft, stop the smuggling of drugs and humans, crack down on tariff evasion and improve export controls. What's more, such a program would require an investment of just one one-hundredth of the capital that could be lost if we shut down the global container shipping system after an attack.

Container security is a complex problem with enormous stakes. American officials insist that existing programs have matters well in hand. But we cannot afford to take these perky reassurances at face value while the same officials fail to embrace promising initiatives like the Hong Kong pilot project.

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Marc Trachtenberg, a historian by training, now teaches political science at UCLA. He's the author of a number of works on twentieth century international politics, including most notably A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963. He just finished a book due to come out this spring called The Craft of History: A Guide to Method.

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Marc Trachtenberg Professor of Political Science Speaker University of California, Los Angeles
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