Stanford University

Sovereignty as Responsibility

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* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

 

Seminar Recording: https://youtu.be/sFsmjTf9xUg

 

About the Event: Contemporary global politics are marked by a renewed debate over the significance and limits of state sovereignty. In the eyes of many, the COVID-19 pandemic has reasserted the importance of territorial sovereignty as well as of national identity and citizenship. Populations have become more acutely conscious of their rights and responsibilities as members of a particular political community, and their ultimate reliance upon their governments to protect them from the virus. Well before the outbreak of this pandemic, however, many scholars, policy-analysts, and state officials had already been highlighting the ‘return’ of sovereignty, often in juxtaposition to either the transnational economic forces of globalization or liberal international norms. Powerful economic and political trends (including protectionism and populism) were casting doubt on the reach and impact of liberal ideals such as free movement and economic interdependence. In part, these trends reflected a structural shift in international order in which the relative position of the United States was declining, and the standing of non-Western powers with attachment to what is loosely referred to as “Westphalian” sovereignty was increasing. Although some IR scholars have argued that today’s great powers (Russia, China and the US) are espousing and practicing a new form of “extra-legal sovereignty” (Paris 2020), the former two states - in order to garner wider support for their respective world views - regularly appeal to an understanding of sovereignty that underscores long-standing principles of territorial integrity and political independence.

This book project takes a step back, to more critically analyse the period preceding our current debate. Before we can address the question of whether and how Westphalian sovereignty has returned to shape contemporary global order, we should examine more deeply why sovereignty was alleged to have been transformed in the first place. In other words, what was the nature and reach of the post-Westphalian order that was proclaimed by so many in the first decades of the post-Cold War period?  While analysts and commentators have pointed to several manifestations of this changed understanding of sovereignty, I focus on the liberal idea of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’, which, inter alia, seemingly underpinned the articulation in 2005 of the principle of the ‘responsibility to protect’. According to this liberal understanding, sovereignty can no longer be conceived as unrivalled control over a delimited territory and the population residing within it – ‘sovereignty as authority’ – but rather as a status and set of rights which are conditional upon certain behaviours and capacities of states. Sovereignty is thus not solely the right of the state to be “undisturbed from without” but the responsibility to perform certain roles and tasks within its frontiers.

The central aim of this study is to examine the rise, contestation, and potential fate of what some have called this “revolutionary” understanding of sovereignty.  I ask three more specific questions. The first is conceptual and draws upon the history of ideas relating to sovereignty. Was the post-Cold War articulation of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ really so novel? Or was it juxtaposing itself to a very particular historical period, during which non-intervention was championed by newly decolonized states? The second set of issues is empirical. How has sovereignty been understood in the post-Cold War period, particularly through practices of intervention and state recognition? Have the key actors in international society spoken and acted in ways consistent with the liberal understanding of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’? And the final set of questions is normative. Is it desirable to understand sovereignty in this way? What are the benefits and limitations of viewing sovereignty as deeply connected with responsibility?

While the book project is organized around these three central themes, my presentation will focus in, for purposes of illustration, on the ‘responsibility to protect’ (RtoP). This chapter assesses the degree to which ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ has been widely accepted and practiced by states in their interpretation and implementation of this principle and, in so doing, seeks to both account for and analyse the nature and impact of the contestation that surrounds RtoP.  The chapter’s findings suggest that a conditional understanding of sovereignty was not necessarily shared or practiced across international society, even during the height of liberal internationalist ‘moment’ of the post-Cold War period - thereby posing a challenge not just to the proponents of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’, but also to some of its fiercest critics, who overstate its negative effects on international politics.

I begin by arguing that while the 2005 Summit Outcome Document (SOD) was a significant intergovernmental agreement that provided greater precision about the source, scope, and bearer of the responsibility to protect, its particular formulation indicates that the logic of ‘sovereignty as responsibility’ was not fully embraced.  Instead, the text reflected a horizontal logic, associated with respect for sovereign equality and positive international law, rather than a vertical logic that places the international community in a position of authority over states. While the notions of sovereignty and responsibility did come together, they did so in a way that did not override or replace sovereignty in situations of humanitarian emergency, but rather aimed to reinforce sovereignty and support states in protecting their populations.

In a second step, the chapter analyses the types of contestation that have accompanied RtoP’s development, which relate both to procedural matters (such as the appropriate intergovernmental body that should ‘own’ RtoP’s development) and to substantive elements of the principle – including, most notably, the relationship between national and international responsibility. I suggest that RtoP is particularly susceptible to contestation, given its complex structure and inherently indeterminate nature. I also argue that, far from establishing an independent international authority that specifies and enforces state responsibility, the most that RtoP creates within its so-called third pillar is a responsibility to consider a real or imminent crisis involving atrocity crimes - what in legal literature is sometimes called a ‘duty of conduct’.

In the final section of the chapter, I contend that the contestation surrounding RtoP can be better understood by giving greater attention to the normative underpinnings of contemporary critiques of the principle, most notably those which stress the importance of sovereignty equality. Given that RtoP has continued to be associated – rightly or wrongly – with the use of military force, it has frequently generated sharp debate among states about the meaning of sovereignty, and efforts to assert the continuing power of the principle of non-intervention. The result of this contestation, and the reshaping of RtoP by non-Western states such as China, has been a dampening of the original cosmopolitan roots of the principle and an increased focus on maintaining strong and capable states. In short, while RtoP has created a linkage in international discourse and practice between sovereignty and responsibility, it has not given effect to the liberal understanding of sovereignty as responsibility.

 

 

 

About the Speaker: Jennifer M. Welsh is the Canada 150 Research Chair in Global Governance and Security at McGill University. She was previously Professor and Chair in International Relations at the European University Institute and Professor in International Relations at the University of Oxford, where she co-founded the Oxford Institute for Ethics, Law and Armed Conflict. From 2013-2016, she served as the Special Adviser to the UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-moon, on the Responsibility to Protect.

Professor Welsh is the author, co-author, and editor of several books and articles on humanitarian intervention, the evolution of the notion of the ‘responsibility to protect’ in international society, the UN Security Council, norm conflict and contestation, and Canadian foreign policy.

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Jennifer Welsh Research Chair in Global Governance and Security McGill University
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When do Foreign Militants Support States? Examining Shia Militants’ Role as External Patrons in the Syrian Conflict

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Register in advance for this webinar: https://stanford.zoom.us/webinar/register/5616166186207/WN_Zdzl0PrwR7CXSPoASOs5Xg

 

About the Event: Conventional wisdom on proxy warfare exclusively focuses on explaining governments’ provision of military, logistical, and financial support to rebel groups involved in conflict abroad. In reality, foreign militant groups play a much larger role in these partnerships than recognized: foreign militants often provide government partners with intelligence, logistical support, access to their military infrastructure, and send elite units to train and supplement their state partner’s troops. Because armed non-state actors are smaller and face greater difficulties accessing resources, the fact that they provide any type of support – let alone deploying their forces to conduct joint combat operations with state armed forces abroad – is puzzling. In this presentation, I provide insights into the strategic benefits that foreign militants receive from supporting states, identify factors that influence the types of support foreign militants provide to government partners once the decision to provide support has been made, and highlight how foreign militants can constrain and influence their government partners’ future behavior. To do so, I conduct an in-depth examination of the overtime trends in the various types of support that Shia paramilitary groups from Lebanon, Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan provided to the Syrian regime and Russian forces throughout the course of the decade-long Syrian conflict.

 

 

About the Speaker: Melissa Carlson is currently a Postdoctoral Fellow in the Center for International Security and Cooperation’s Middle East Initiative. She received her PhD in Political Science from UC Berkeley. Her research examines cooperation between states and non-state actors in conflict, and her book manuscript explains variations in the types of support that governments and foreign militants provide to each other. Previously, Melissa has worked with the International Organization of Migration’s Missions in Jordan and Iraq to examine relations between refugees, host governments, and aid organizations.

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Melissa Carlson

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Dr. Melissa Carlson is currently working with the Defense Security Cooperation Agency's Assessment, Monitoring, and Evaluation unit, where she promotes rigorous standards of measuring the effectiveness of the U.S.'s security cooperation and assistance programming. During her tenure at CISAC, she was a postdoctoral research and teaching fellow. She received her PhD in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley, specializing in international relations, comparative politics, and methodology. Dr. Carlson's primary research examines the factors that influence the variation and intensity of partnerships between governments and foreign militant groups with a focus on the recent conflicts in Iraq and Syria. Her book-style dissertation project finds that, when foreign militant groups and state armed forces share similar organizational characteristics, they are more likely to deploy forces to conduct joint combat operations and provide each other with advanced weapons systems. In other research, Dr. Carlson examines the factors that influence informal and secret security cooperation between states and how misinformation and rumors influence refugees' relationships with host governments, service providers, and smugglers. Her research has been published in the American Political Science Review, the Review of International Organizations, and International Studies Quarterly, among other outlets. Outside of academia, Dr. Carlson has worked as a consultant for the International Organization for Migration's Iraq and Jordan Missions.

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CISAC Postdoctoral Fellow Stanford University
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The State From Below: Racial Authoritarianism in US Democracy

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Seminar Recording:  https://youtu.be/t4xteN7N99U

 

About the Event: In The State from Below, we seek to understand democracy through ground-up knowledge of the state. We use a new technology and civic infrastructure, Portals, to initiate conversations about policing in communities where these forms of state action are concentrated.  Portals are virtual chambers where people in disparate communities can converse as if in the same room.  Based on over 850 recorded and transcribed conversations across fourteen neighborhoods in five cities – the most extensive collection of first-hand accounts of the police to date – we analyze patterns in political discourse.  We reveal four currents that challenge liberal-democratic framings of political life:  that an arrangement of distorted responsiveness characterizes the relationship between policed communities and the state; that the political desire of policed communities is not for greater engagement and responsiveness but for political recognition – to be known by the state; and that in contrast to prevailing wisdom about uninformed electorates, these citizens have too much knowledge of and too little power vis-à-vis state representatives.  Finally, we observe among policed communities an “ethics of aversion” in their political responses, a belief that power is best achieved by receding from state institutions in the short term and forging their own collective, community autonomy in the long term. At a broader level, we observe that it is not exclusion from democratic institutions that characterizes political inequality in our time, but inclusion in what we call racial authoritarianism, and the experience of misrecognition that results.

 

 

About the Speaker: Vesla Mae Weaver is the Bloomberg Distinguished Associate Professor of Political Science and Sociology at Johns Hopkins University and a 2016-17 Andrew Carnegie Fellow. 

She has contributed to scholarly debates around the persistence of racial inequality, colorism in the United States, the causes and consequences of the dramatic rise in prisons and police power for race-class subjugated communities. She is co-author with Amy Lerman of Arresting Citizenship: The Democratic Consequences of American Crime Control, the first large-scale empirical study of what the tectonic shifts in incarceration and policing meant for political and civic life in communities where it was concentrated. Weaver is also the co-author of Creating a New Racial Order: How Immigration, Multiracialism, Genomics, and the Young Can Remake Race in America (with J. Hochschild and T. Burch). She is at work on a new book, The State From Below, based on the largest archive of policing narratives using an innovative civic infrastructure called Portals (https://www.portalspolicingproject.com).

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Vesla Weaver Bloomberg Distinguished Associate Professor of Political Science and Sociology Johns Hopkins University
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Rebuilding U.S.-German Relations: Harder than it Appears

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Steven Pifer
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The German government and many Germans breathed a sigh of relief when Joe Biden defeated Donald Trump in November.  Mr. Trump damaged U.S. relations with its trans-Atlantic allies, and he often targeted Germany and Chancellor Angela Merkel for particular ire.  Berlin has welcomed President Biden’s readiness to rebuild U.S.-German and U.S.-European ties.

All to the good, but rebuilding the U.S.-German relationship could well prove more difficult than it first appears.  Trump’s four years have left nagging questions in the German capital about the future of U.S. politics and Trumpism, and several issues will entail difficult exchanges between Washington and Berlin.

The Trump presidency meant a difficult time for Europe and the trans-Atlantic relationship.  He regarded the European Union as an economic adversary and questioned NATO’s value.  He held Germany in particularly low regard, criticizing its trade surpluses—telling his first NATO summit that “the Germans are very, very bad”—and decrying its defense spending levels, even suggesting that Berlin owes “vast sums of money” to the Alliance and America.  Trump had no personal chemistry with Merkel, reportedly referring to her as “stupid.”  In 2020, she publicly referred to “the limits of populism and denial of basic truths” without naming names.

In May 2020, Merkel declined, in the midst of the global COVID19 pandemic, to attend an in-person G7 summit at Camp David.  Shortly thereafter, Trump ordered the withdrawal of some 10,000 U.S. troops from Germany—a decision for which the Pentagon could offer no compelling strategic rationale (the Biden administration has suspended and ordered a review of the decision).

Berlin thus was delighted with Biden’s election, but Trump left much ground to make up.

What is the New “Normal” in America?

One senior German official privately observed that Trump had done real damage to German perceptions of the United States.  While welcoming Biden’s desire to rebuild relations with Germany and Europe and seeing his election as marking a return to “normalcy” in Washington, he wondered whether that “normalcy” was acceptable to the large segment of the American electorate that had voted for Trump.  Moreover, could Trump—or Trumpism—return to power?

In a separate discussion, another senior German official agreed that Trump had done significant damage to trans-Atlantic relations, noting that he had provided a boost to ideas such as strategic autonomy for Europe.  He pointed to the Conservative Political Action Conference held in late February as reminding Germans that Trump and Trumpism were not over.  What would the Republican Party look like in the future?

A third German official reiterated that Trump had caused many in Europe to contemplate how they might have to cope without strong U.S. leadership.  Germans had lost confidence in parts of the American political class.  It would be important that Biden define the level of U.S. leadership that his administration intended—and would be able—to provide.

Opinion surveys show that German citizens share these questions about America.  In a late 2020 poll commissioned by the European Council on Foreign Relations, 53 percent agreed or strongly agreed that “after voting for Trump in 2016, Americans cannot be trusted.”  The poll had 71 percent of Germans agreeing that the U.S. political system was somewhat or completely broken, though 48 percent believed that America could overcome its internal difficulties and contribute to solving global problems.  However, when asked whether they trusted in Europe or the United States, 53 percent opted for Europe compared to 4 percent for America.

Difficult Issues Loom

Early moves by Biden, such as rejoining the Paris Climate Agreement and World Health Organization, both of which Trump had quit, and reaffirming the U.S. commitment to NATO’s Article 5 (an attack on one shall be considered an attack on all) won plaudits in Berlin.  The Germans likewise welcomed Biden’s agreement to extend the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with Russia, as well as his administration’s readiness to return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action on Iran’s nuclear program and reengage with the UN Human Rights Commission.  However, other issues that promise to figure prominently on the U.S.-German agenda could prove contentious between Washington and Berlin.

The Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline running under the Baltic Sea from Russia to Germany tops the list.  The Biden administration, under pressure from Congress, has made clear its opposition to the pipeline, which is now about 95 percent finished.  Secretary of State Blinken issued a statement on March 18 reiterating the administration’s intent to comply with Congressional legislation calling for sanctions and warning that “any entity involved in the Nord Stream 2 pipeline risks U.S. sanctions and should immediately abandon work on the pipeline.”  On March 23, Blinken voiced U.S. opposition to the pipeline directly to German Foreign Minister Maas.

The German government, however, appears committed to finishing the pipeline, which has the support of the bulk of Merkel’s Christian Democratic Union (and the allied Christian Socialist Union) and the Social Democratic Party, the parties that together make up the current governing coalition.  The German business community also supports the pipeline.  The CDU/CSU-SPD coalition, moreover, has an incentive to complete the pipeline prior to the German national election in September.  Polls indicate that, whatever coalition emerges following that election, the Greens Party will be part of it.  The Greens strongly oppose Nord Stream 2, both on ecological grounds and because of their concern about the human rights situation in Russia.  If the pipeline remains unfinished in September, this will be a major issue for the negotiation on forming a new governing coalition.

German officials note that stopping the pipeline now would be potentially costly; the German government could find itself on the hook for part or all of the nearly 10 billion Euros (about 12 billion dollars) already invested in the pipeline.  They note that U.S. sanctions on German or European companies would provoke a backlash in Germany.  Even those opposed to Nord Stream 2 caution against sanctions on German or European companies, which would go down badly with the pro-America CDU and could unite the European Union against the extra-territorial application of U.S. sanctions.  German politicians dismiss American charges that buying gas from Russia feeds the aggressive Moscow machine and point out the United States now imports billions of dollars’ worth of oil from Russia.

Creative thinking by U.S. and German officials might find a way by which Washington could acquiesce in the pipeline’s completion without applying U.S. sanctions against German companies.  That most likely will entail developing some benefits for Ukraine, which stands to lose the most if Nord Stream 2 is completed.  German officials acknowledge that the Biden administration needs something to show if it does not go forward with sanctions, but the mood in Washington appears to be hardening, and time to find a settlement is running short.

China poses a second issue that could prove difficult for U.S.-German relations.  As the Biden administration puts in place a policy to compete more effectively with Beijing, it will look to its European allies for support.  Berlin, however, pushed the European Union to complete an investment deal with Beijing without waiting to consult with the incoming Biden administration and does not share U.S. concern about the security considerations of allowing Huawei, the Chinese IT giant, to take part in providing the German 5G network.

German business interests on this issue matter—a lot, as China has become Germany’s largest trading partner.  While some in Berlin have become more wary of Beijing’s policy objectives and the means used to advance those goals, the German government does not want to have to choose sides between Washington and Beijing.  It may well have been China that Merkel had in mind when she told the (virtual) Munich Security Conference on February 19 that, while Europe and the United States should develop joint approaches, “that doesn’t mean that our interests will always converge.” 

That appears to have the backing of the German public.  Asked what Germany should do if there were a disagreement between Washington and Beijing, the European Council on Foreign Relations-commissioned poll showed 16 percent favoring support for the United States, while 8 percent favored support for China and 66 percent opted for neutrality.  (Worryingly for Washington’s effort to maintain a trans-Atlantic front against Russia, the poll showed identical numbers when substituting Russia for China.)

A third issue is German defense spending and the NATO-agreed goal that allies devote 2 percent of gross domestic product to defense by 2024.  Germany is now spending much more on its military than in 2014 but likely will fall short of the 2 percent target.  The Biden administration almost certainly will be more diplomatic than Trump on this issue.  Still, it will look to NATO allies in Europe to bear a larger share of the burden of deterring and defending against Russia as the United States shifts its military focus to the Asia-Pacific region. 

And a German Election

One complicating factor is that Germany will soon move into the campaign season for the national election in September.  As one German think-tank analyst put it, the issues that would help solidify U.S.-German relations—suspending construction of Nord Stream 2, adopting a tougher policy toward China, dramatically bolstering defense spending, and moving forward to procure a nuclear-capable fighter to replace the aging Tornado and sustain Germany’s nuclear-sharing role in NATO—are not positions that will attract votes.  Quite the opposite, too close an embrace of Washington’s views on these questions could drive ballots to other parties.

The September election, moreover, will mean an end to Merkel’s long run as chancellor.  Most expect her replacement to come from the CDU or CSU, though prognostications are less certain after the lackluster showing by the CDU in March 14 state elections in Baden-Wuerttemberg and Rhineland-Pflaz.  Regardless, a new chancellor will need time to get up to speed, and that could affect how quickly he or she might engage and decide on issues of interest to Washington.

This does not mean that the U.S.-German relationship is headed for trouble.  The good news is that both Washington and Berlin clearly want to restore the comity that was lost during the Trump administration.  However, building that relationship back, and not letting things get derailed by difficult issues that could divide the two allies, will require flexible diplomacy and that each take some account of the other’s interests and domestic pressures.

* * * * *

CISAC affiliate Steven Pifer is spending the first part of 2021 on a fellowship with the Robert Bosch Academy in Berlin.

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The German government and many Germans breathed a sigh of relief when Joe Biden defeated Donald Trump in November. Mr. Trump damaged U.S. relations with its trans-Atlantic allies, and he often targeted Germany and Chancellor Angela Merkel for particular ire. Berlin has welcomed President Biden’s readiness to rebuild U.S.-German and U.S.-European ties.

Technology and International Security: From Interstate Influence Operations to Technological Revolutions and the Rise and Fall of Great Powers

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* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

 

Seminar Recording:  https://youtu.be/-hERfg-DCYw

 

About the Event: 

This presentation explores two topics at the nexus of technology and international security: interstate influence operations and technological revolutions.

After Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. election, influence operations have become a central focus among American policymakers, foreign policy pundits, and publics alike. Yet, Goldstein argues that they remain under-explored and under-theorized in international security studies, with disagreement over how to define the phenomenon implicit in the existing literature. Goldstein will introduce a conceptual framework for foreign influence operations and argue that security studies scholars should pay greater attention to the subject for two reasons. First, they are policy-relevant and likely to remain so; they are cost effective, propagandists are prone to inflate their impact, and they are difficult to deter. Second, studying influence operations can contribute to the academic discipline of security studies by helping to expand restrictive notions of state power and challenge dominant models of foreign policy decision-making.

How do emerging technologies affect the rise and fall of great powers? Scholars have long observed that rounds of technological revolution disrupt the economic balance of power, bringing about a power transition in the international system. However, there has been limited investigation of how this process occurs. The standard explanation emphasizes a country’s ability to dominate innovation in leading sectors, seizing monopoly profits in new, fast-growing industries centered around major technological breakthroughs. Investigating historical cases of industrial revolutions followed by economic power transitions, Ding will present an alternative mechanism based on the diffusion of general-purpose technologies. The findings have direct implications for how recent breakthroughs in artificial intelligence could affect the U.S.-China power balance.

 

About the Speakers: 

Jeffrey Ding is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford. Jeffrey’s current research is centered on how technological change affects the rise and fall of great powers. Through investigating historical cases of industrial revolutions, Jeffrey traces causal mechanisms that connect significant technical breakthroughs and economic power transitions — with an eye toward the implications of advances in AI for a possible U.S.-China power transition. Jeffrey’s previous research covered related topics, including China's development of AI, identifying strategic goods and technologies, and technical standards as a vehicle of AI governance.

 

Josh A. Goldstein is a PhD Candidate and Clarendon Scholar in the Department of Politics and International Relations at the University of Oxford. For the 2020-2021 year, he is a pre-doctoral fellow with the Stanford Internet Observatory and part of the inaugural class of non-resident Hans J. Morgenthau Fellows at the Notre Dame International Security Center. Josh’s 3-paper doctoral dissertation takes a multi-method approach to studying the challenges that democracies face from influence operations. His broader research interests lie in international security, political psychology, and foreign policy-decision making.

 

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Jeffrey Ding

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Jeff is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at George Washington University. Previously, he was a postdoctoral fellow at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation, sponsored by Stanford's Institute for Human-Centered Artificial Intelligence. His research agenda centers on technological change and international politics. His book project investigates how past technological revolutions influenced the rise and fall of great powers, with implications for U.S.-China competition in emerging technologies like AI. Other research papers tackle how states should identify strategic technologies, assessments of national scientific and technological capabilities, and interstate cooperation on nuclear safety and security technologies. Jeff's work has been published in Foreign Affairs, Security Studies, The Washington Post, and other outlets. Jeff received his PhD in 2021 from the University of Oxford, where he studied as a Rhodes Scholar. He has also worked as a researcher for Georgetown's Center for Security and Emerging Technology and the Centre for the Governance of AI at the University of Oxford.

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Fireside Chat with NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg

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* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

 

Seminar Recording:  https://youtu.be/Mwjn39S48rE

 

About the Event: NATO Secretary General Stoltenberg will speak about how the transatlantic alliance is adapting to change in this turbulent period.  President Biden has clearly signaled that he is resolved to reach out to the NATO allies, working to repair the trans-Atlantic bond. To strengthen the bond between America and Europe and prepare the alliance for the future, the Secretary General has launched the NATO 2030 initiative.  This includes proposals on how NATO can better harness technology and innovation, tackle the security implications of climate change, and help make our societies more resilient. While NATO must continue to deter and defend against Russia, it is also keeping channels open to Moscow. The rise of China presents both challenges and opportunities that NATO has started to address. And missions in Afghanistan and Iraq are on the cusp of change, with decisions underway about what role NATO will play in the future. All in all, an exciting time to hear from NATO’s Secretary General.

This event is co-sponsored with The Europe Center.

 

About the Speaker: 

Jens Stoltenberg became NATO Secretary General in October 2014, following a distinguished international and domestic career. As a former Prime Minister of Norway and UN Special Envoy, Mr. Stoltenberg has been a strong supporter of greater global and transatlantic cooperation. Mr. Stoltenberg’s mandate as NATO Secretary General has been extended until the end of September 2022.

Under Mr. Stoltenberg’s leadership, NATO has responded to a more challenging security environment by implementing the biggest reinforcement of its collective defence since the Cold War, increasing the readiness of its forces and deploying combat troops in the eastern part of the Alliance. He believes in credible deterrence and defence while maintaining dialogue with Russia. He has also advocated for increased defence spending and better burden sharing within the Alliance, and a greater focus on innovation. NATO has also stepped up its efforts in the fight against terrorism. He strongly supports a partnership approach, with cooperation between NATO and the European Union reaching unprecedented levels.

Before coming to NATO, he was the UN Special Envoy on Climate Change from 2013 to 2014. He has also chaired UN High-level Panels on climate financing and the coherence between development, humanitarian assistance and environmental policies.

As Prime Minister of Norway, Mr. Stoltenberg increased the defence spending and transformed the Norwegian armed forces with new high-end capabilities and investments. He also signed an agreement with Russia on establishing maritime borders in the Barents and Polar Sea, ending a 30-years dispute.

Mr. Stoltenberg was also Prime Minister during the deadly terrorist attacks, which killed 77 people in Oslo and Utøya on 22 July 2011, urging in response, “more democracy, more openness, and more humanity, but never naïvete”.

Mr Stoltenberg holds a postgraduate degree in Economics from the University of Oslo. After graduating in 1987, he held a research post at the National Statistical Institute of Norway, before embarking on a career in Norwegian politics.

  • 2005-2013: Prime Minister of Norway
  • 2002-2014: Leader of the Norwegian Labor Party
  • 2000-2001: Prime Minister of Norway
  • 1996-1997: Minister of Finance
  • 1993-1996: Minister of Industry and Energy
  • 1991-2014: Member of Parliament
  • 1990-1991: State Secretary at the Ministry of the Environment
  • 1985-1989: Leader of the Norwegian Labour Youth

Jens Stoltenberg was born in Oslo on 16 March 1959. He is married to Ingrid Schulerud. They have two grown-up children.

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Jens Stoltenberg Secretary General NATO
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European Security Initiative

European Media Coverage of the “Transatlantic Reset”

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* Please note all CISAC events are scheduled using the Pacific Time Zone.

 

Seminar Recording: https://youtu.be/aK8_FjQtlKc

 

About the Event: The US administration has pivoted 180°. So, what does that mean for Europe?

The last four years have shaped the way European media relate to world powers, security and Europe’s increasing push for sovereignty and strategic autonomy. We will discuss European and national media in Europe, as well as how media differ in Western and Eastern Europe. We will also look at how the narrative will change now that the US is once again striving for global leadership and transatlantic cooperation.

A key issue is how US-based media coverage is influencing the narrative. Increasing media output from Washington about the rest of the world is also shaping the narrative. Big Tech and digital media investments are pushing into national markets and will shape the way that news is made and consumed. Finally, we will dive into the role that media will play in rebalancing the power players in international security, and most importantly, fostering cooperation.

 

About the Speaker: Shéhérazade Semsar-de Boisséson is CEO of POLITICO in Europe, a joint venture between POLITICO and Axel Springer.

Shéhérazade was previously owner and publisher of European Voice, the leading media in Brussels covering EU policy, which she acquired from the Economist Group in 2013. In December 2014, POLITICO and Axel Springer jointly acquired European Voice and Paris-based Development Institute International (Dii), France’s leading event promoter in the public affairs space, a business Shéhérazade co-founded in 1993.

A native of Tehran, Iran and a French national, Shéhérazade graduated from the School of Foreign Service, Georgetown University in 1990 with a B.A. and a M.S. in International Finance.

Shéhérazade served as a member of the Board of Directors of Georgetown University, Washington D.C. from 2013 to 2019. She is currently serving on the Advisory Board of Georgetown’s School of Foreign Service and on the Board of Directors of the French-American Foundation.

From 2008 to 2010, Shéhérazade served on the Board of Directors of Femmes Forums, a leading women’s club in Paris, France. She represents DII at the French think tank: Institut Montaigne.

Shéhérazade lives in Brussels with her husband Laurent de Boisséson and their three children: Inès, Louise and Cyrus.

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Sheherazade Semsar-de Boisséson CEO POLITICO Europe
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Bioengineering Beyond Cells to Enable a Fair and Sustainable 21st Bio-Century

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Attend Webinar: https://stanford.zoom.us/j/93236889762?pwd=eVFtbVJDME95MU9wNU1scFNWTDUxdz09

 

About the Event: Synthetic Biology (SB) is one of the most promising fields of research for the 21st century. SB offers powerful new ways to improve human health, build the global economy, manufacture sustainable materials, and address climate change. However, current access to SBenabled breakthroughs is unequal, largely due to bottlenecks in infrastructure and education. Here, I describe our efforts to re-think the way we engineer biology using cell-free systems to address these bottlenecks. We show how the ability to readily store, distribute, and activate low-cost, freeze-dried cell-free systems by simply adding water has opened new opportunities for on-demand biomanufacturing of vaccines for global health, point-of-care diagnostics for environmental safety, and education for SB literacy and citizenship. By integrating cell-free systems with AI, we also show the ability to accelerate the production of carbon-negative platform chemicals. Looking forward, advances in engineering tools and new knowledge underpinning the fundamental science of living matter will ensure that SB helps solve humanity’s most pressing challenges.

 

About the Speaker: Michael Jewett is the Charles Deering McCormick Professor of Teaching Excellence, the Walter P. Murphy Professor of Chemical and Biological Engineering, and Director of the Center for Synthetic Biology at Northwestern University. Dr. Jewett received his PhD in 2005 at Stanford University, completed postdoctoral studies at the Center for Microbial Biotechnology in Denmark and the Harvard Medical School, and was a guest professor at the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH Zurich). He is the recipient of the NIH Pathway to Independence Award, David and Lucile Packard Fellowship in Science and Engineering, Camille-Dreyfus Teacher-Scholar Award, and a Finalist for the Blavatnik National Awards for Young Scientists, among others. He is the co-founder of SwiftScale Biologics, Stemloop, Inc., Pearl Bio, Induro Therapeutics, and Design Pharmaceuticals. Jewett is a Fellow of AIMBE, AAAS, and NAI.

 

For more information please contact Drew Endy (endy@stanford.edu) or Paul McIntyre (pcm1@slac.stanford.edu).

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Michael Jewett Professor Northwestern University
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Biden puts US national security first in extending New START Treaty

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Rose Gottemoeller
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Extending the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or New START, with Russia was one of President Biden’s first foreign policy acts after he took the oath of office on Jan. 20. The treaty would have otherwise ended on Feb. 5, leaving the U.S. and Russia without any agreed upon limits on their strategic nuclear forces for the first time since 1972. When relations are as bad as they are now between Moscow and Washington, U.S. national security would suffer from severe uncertainty over an unconstrained Russian nuclear arsenal.

Read the rest at The Hill

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Extending the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or New START, with Russia was one of President Biden’s first foreign policy acts after he took the oath of office on Jan. 20. The treaty would have otherwise ended on Feb. 5, leaving the U.S. and Russia without any agreed upon limits on their strategic nuclear forces for the first time since 1972.

The Biden Presidency and Ukraine

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Steven Pifer
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In a December 2020 New York Times interview, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky welcomed Joe Biden’s election as U.S. president. Zelensky observed that Biden “knows Ukraine better than the previous president” and “will really help strengthen relations, help settle the war in Donbas, and end the occupation of our territory.”[1]

While Zelensky’s comments may prove overly optimistic, there is little reason to doubt that the Biden presidency will be good for Ukraine. The incoming president knows the country, and he understands both the value of a stable and successful Ukraine for U.S. interests in Europe and the challenges posed to Ukraine and the West by Russia. That might—might, not will, but might—help break the logjam on the stalemated Donbas conflict, which Zelensky of course would welcome. Perhaps less welcome to the Ukrainian president may be Biden’s readiness to play hardball to press Kyiv to take needed but politically difficult reform and anti-corruption steps. Ukraine’s success as a liberal democracy depends not just on ending its conflict with Russia but also on combating corruption and advancing still necessary economic reforms.

U.S.-Ukraine Relations under Trump

In one sense, U.S. policy toward Ukraine during the Trump administration had its strengths. It continued political and military support for Kyiv, including the provision of lethal military assistance that the Obama administration had been unwilling to provide. It maintained and strengthened Ukraine-related sanctions on Russia. And it took further steps to bolster the U.S. and NATO military presence in central European states on Ukraine’s western border.

However, Donald Trump never seemed committed to his administration’s policy. His primary engagement on Ukraine was his bid to extort Kyiv into manufacturing derogatory information on his Democratic opponent, a bid that led to his impeachment.[2] Beyond that, Trump showed no interest in the country and consistently refused to criticize Vladimir Putin, who has inflicted more than six years of low-intensity war on Ukraine.

The Biden presidency will end this dichotomy in Washington’s approach to Kyiv. The president and his administration will align on policy. That new predictability will mean that Ukrainian officials no longer have to worry about late night presidential tweets or the subjugation of U.S. policy interests to the president’s personal political vendettas.

Two Challenges Confronting Ukraine

As Biden takes office, two principal challenges confront Ukraine. The conflict with Russia poses the first.[3] In March 2014, in the aftermath of the Maidan Revolution, Russian military forces seized Crimea. Weeks later, Russian security forces instigated a conflict in Donbas, masked poorly as a “separatist” uprising. The Kremlin provided leadership, funding, heavy weapons, ammunition, other supplies and, when necessary, regular units of the Russian army. Now in its seventh year, that conflict has claimed the lives of some 13,000 people.

While Moscow illegally annexed Crimea, it has not moved to annex Donbas. It appears instead to want to use a simmering conflict in that eastern Ukrainian region as a means to put pressure on, destabilize and disorient the government in Kyiv, with the goal of making it harder for the government to build a successful Ukrainian state and draw closer to Europe. (Moscow has interfered elsewhere in the post-Soviet space to try to maintain a Russian sphere of influence.)

Without the Kremlin’s cooperation, Kyiv on its own cannot resolve the conflict in Donbas, and Crimea poses an even harder question. However, meeting the second of the challenges facing Ukraine—implementation of reforms and anti-corruption measures needed to build a fair, robust and growing economy—lies largely within Kyiv’s purview. Unfortunately, after a good start by Zelensky and his first government, reforms have stagnated, oligarchs retain undue political and economic influence (including within Zelensky’s Servant of the People party), and the judicial branch remains wholly unreconstructed.[4] Among other things, this depresses much-needed investment in the country.

Progress Toward a Resolution in Donbas?

The Biden presidency might well play a more active role in the moribund negotiating process regarding Donbas. As co-chairs of the “Normandy process,” German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron have had little success of late in implementation of the 2015 Minsk agreement, which laid out a path to a settlement and restoration of full Ukrainian sovereignty over Donbas.[5] Unfortunately, it appears that the Kremlin calculates that the benefits of keeping Kyiv distracted currently outweigh the costs, including of Western sanctions.

Zelensky believes that a more active U.S. role could change that calculation and inject momentum into the process. At a minimum, the Biden presidency should appoint a special envoy to coordinate with the Germans and French, and, more broadly, with the European Union, Britain, Canada and others on Western support for Ukraine and sanctions against Russia. That position has gone unfilled since September 2019.

Whether Biden, who will face many demands on his time, will choose to engage personally is a different question. He knows Ukraine, having traveled there six times when he served as vice president. And, unlike Trump, who sought quick victories, Biden understands that solving a question like Donbas would require an investment of his time over a sustained period. It would make sense if it became clear that his engagement would shake up things in a way that would increase the prospects of a settlement and return of Donbas to Ukrainian sovereignty.

At first glance, the Kremlin might not welcome that kind of U.S. involvement, but there are good arguments for it. First of all, the United States is Ukraine’s strongest Western supporter, and Washington’s voice carries considerable weight in Kyiv. Second, Russia’s current conflict against Ukraine is not just about Donbas; it is also about Ukraine’s place in Europe, that is, where the country fits between Russia and institutions such as the European Union and NATO.[6] Addressing that question will require diplomatic finesse. Given the trans-Atlantic relationship, which will be revived under Biden, it is difficult to see such a geopolitical discussion taking place without American participation.

As for Crimea, Ukraine cannot at present muster the political, diplomatic, economic and military leverage to effect the peninsula’s return. Still, the U.S. government knows how to do non-recognition policy.[7] It did so for five decades with regard to the Baltic states’ incorporation into the Soviet Union. The Biden presidency will remain supportive of Kyiv’s claim to Crimea and not recognize its annexation by Russia—and the White House will express this view.

Domestic Reform

After an encouraging start on reform, Zelensky wavered in 2020. He has to do more, and Biden can be helpful, though in a manner the Ukrainian president may not appreciate. A big part of the problem is that Zelensky himself seems to have lost his way. Ruslan Ryaboshapka, his reformist first prosecutor general, observed that “Instead of fighting oligarchs, [Zelensky] chose to peacefully coexist with them.”[8] Biden could well prove the kind of friend that Ukraine needs now: supportive but direct with Zelensky on what must be done, and ready to push him to take politically hard measures that he might prefer to avoid.

Biden has already shown that he can do this. As vice president in the Obama administration, he had the lead on U.S. engagement with Ukraine. When necessary, he applied “tough love,” famously withholding a one-billion-dollar loan guarantee until then-President Petro Poroshenko fired a prosecutor general who was viewed widely, inside and outside of Ukraine, as corrupt.[9]

A dose of such tough love now seems necessary with Kyiv. One question concerns access to low interest credits under Ukraine’s stand-by agreement with the International Monetary Fund.[10] The IMF conditions disbursements of those credits on how Ukraine implements reform commitments that it made to secure the agreement. The Biden administration should, and almost certainly will, back the IMF in insisting that Ukraine needs to deliver on its commitments in order to secure additional disbursements.

Likewise, the Biden administration should make more bilateral U.S. assistance conditional on Ukraine tackling particular reforms. In doing so, it should consult and coordinate closely with the European Union, which has greater assistance resources available. Introducing a higher degree of conditionality to Western assistance programs could usefully ratchet up the pressure on the leadership in Kyiv to take reform steps that are in the country’s broader interest but opposed by key oligarchs or political groups who stand to lose from such reforms.

Priority should go to encouraging reform of the judicial branch, including the Constitutional Court, which has a core of judges who appear beholden to special interests. The high court reversed earlier laws requiring members of parliament and government officials to disclose their assets and could threaten other reforms.[11]

At home, the Biden administration can assist Ukraine by implementing a ban on anonymous shell companies by requiring disclosure of who actually forms companies in the United States as contained in the Corporate Transparency Act, part of the National Defense Authorization Act.[12] This will make it more difficult for corrupt Ukrainians to shelter ill-gotten gains in U.S. assets.

The Biden presidency is good news for Ukraine and those who wish to see it develop into a modern European state. It will mean more high-level but hard-nosed U.S. support. That could lead to greater progress on reform within the country. And, with some imaginative diplomacy and luck, it might even help break the logjam with Russia over resolving the fate of Donbas.

 

[1] Kramer, Andrew E. “With Trump Fading, Ukraine's President Looks to a Reset With the U.S.” The New York Times. The New York Times Company, December 19, 2020. https://www.nytimes.com/2020/12/19/world/europe/trump-zelensky-biden-ukr....

[2] Nichols, Tom. “Trump Is Being Impeached over an Extortion Scheme, Not a 'Policy Dispute'.” USA Today. Gannett Satellite Information Network, January 30, 2020. https://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2020/01/30/trump-impeachment-blac....

[3] Masters, Jonathan. “Ukraine: Conflict at the Crossroads of Europe and Russia.” Council on Foreign Relations. Council on Foreign Relations, February 5, 2020. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/ukraine-conflict-crossroads-europe-and-....

[4] Iliyas, Boktakoz. “Anti-Corruption Backtracking in Ukraine – Has Ze Reform Moment Passed?” Control Risks. Control Risks Group Holdings Ltd., December 17, 2020. https://www.controlrisks.com/our-thinking/insights/anti-corruption-backt....

[5] “Ukraine Walks a Tightrope to Peace in the East.” International Crisis Group, January 29, 2020. https://www.crisisgroup.org/europe-central-asia/eastern-europe/ukraine/ukraine-walks-tightrope-peace-east.; “Ukraine Ceasefire: New Minsk Agreement Key Points.” BBC News. BBC, February 12, 2015. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-31436513.

[6] Tefft, John F. “ Reflections on Russia, Ukraine and the U.S. in the Post-Soviet World.” American Foreign Service Association, n.d. https://www.afsa.org/reflections-russia-ukraine-and-us-post-soviet-world.

[7] Pompeo, Michael R. “Crimea Is Ukraine.” U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State, February 26, 2020. https://www.state.gov/crimea-is-ukraine-3/.

[8] Kranolutska, Daryna, and Volodymyr Verbyany. “Ukraine's Leader Is Being Broken by the System He Vowed to Crush.” Bloomberg.com. Bloomberg, December 16, 2020. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-12-17/ukraine-s-leader-is-b....

[9] Subramanian, Courtney. “Explainer: Biden, Allies Pushed out Ukrainian Prosecutor Because He Didn't Pursue Corruption Cases.” USA Today. Gannett Satellite Information Network, October 3, 2019. https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2019/10/03/what-really-happ....

[10] “IMF Executive Board Approves 18-Month US$5 Billion Stand-By Arrangement for Ukraine.” International Monetary Fund. International Monetary Fund Communications Department, June 9, 2020. https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2020/06/09/pr20239-ukraine-imf-exec....

[11] “Ukraine's Constitutional Court Attacks Anti-Corruption Laws.” The Economist. The Economist Newspaper, November 14, 2020. https://www.economist.com/europe/2020/11/14/ukraines-constitutional-cour....

[12] Pearl, Morris. “Commentary: Congress Just Passed the Most Important Anti-Corruption Reform in Decades, but Hardly Anyone Knows about It.” Fortune. Fortune Media IP, December 26, 2020. https://fortune.com/2020/12/26/ndaa-2021-shell-companies-corporate-trans....

 

Originally for Stanford International Policy Review

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President Joseph Biden Chip Somodevilla / Getty Images
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In a December 2020 New York Times interview, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky welcomed Joe Biden’s election as U.S. president. Zelensky observed that Biden “knows Ukraine better than the previous president” and “will really help strengthen relations, help settle the war in Donbas, and end the occupation of our territory.”

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