Stanford University

The National Plant Diagnostic Network and Agricultural Biosecurity in the U.S.

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The National Plant Diagnostic Network (NPDN) was created to enhance the capabilities of existing diagnostic laboratories in the nation to detect and report introduced pathogens, pests and weeds of high consequence to plant agriculture and natural ecosystems.  An important goal of the network is to coordinate diagnostic and scientific expertise at land-grant universities, state departments of agriculture, agencies within the USDA (CSREES and APHIS), and other organizations involved in agricultural production and security.  The program, which is administered through the USDA, was established in 2002 through funding created by the Homeland Security Act in response to concerns that agricultural pests and pathogens could be used as agents of bio-terrorism.  Responsibilities of the NPDN include the compilation and establishment of diagnostic protocols for priority agents, the development of a web-based distributed plant pest diagnostic and reporting system for the nation, the provision of up-to-date information on plant pests for the nation, the development of analytical tools to exploit these data, and the recruitment and training of first detectors.  The national network is organized into 5 regions, with regional centers located at the University of California, Davis (Western Region), Kansas State University (Great Plains Region), Michigan State University (North Central Region), the University of Florida (Southern Region), and Cornell University (Northeastern Region).  A parallel network for veterinary medicine, the National Animal Health Laboratory Network, also has been established with regional centers located at the same institutions as the NPDN regional centers.  The mission and design of the NPDN, its programs, and progress towards meeting network objectives, will be presented and discussed.

Richard Bostock is a professor and former chair (1999-2005) of the Department of Plant Pathology at the University of California, Davis.  In 2002, he was appointed as the founding Director of the Western Region of the National Plant Diagnostic Network (NPDN).  The NPDN is a distributed system comprised of public institutions for the purpose of quickly detecting and identifying high consequence pests and pathogens.  The network links plant health professionals, researchers and diagnostic labs throughout the region, providing a way for them to share information about occurrences of plant diseases and pests that could have an impact on the region's most economically important crops.   This information also is reported to first responders and decision makers. Funding for the network is provided through the United States Department of Agriculture. Dr. Bostock received his Ph.D. in Plant Pathology at the University of Kentucky in 1981, and was appointed to the faculty at UC Davis that year.  His research and teaching interests are the biochemistry and molecular biology of plant-microbe interactions and general plant pathology.  He teaches several courses in the department and in the Science and Society program on various aspects of plant pathology, plant-microbe interactions, and issues related to food production. 

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Richard Bostock Professor of Plant Pathology and Director, Western Plant Diagnostic Network Speaker University of California, Davis
Seminars
Science, Technology and Security Seminars (2009-2010)

Is Mother Nature the Best Bioterrorist?

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As we find ourselves at the start of the "biological century" with a wealth of potential benefits to public health, agriculture, and global economies, it is almost deliberately naive to think that the extraordinary growth in the life sciences might not be exploited for nefarious purposes. A report published in 2006 by an ad hoc committee of the National Academies of Science recognized that the breadth of biological threats is much broader than commonly appreciated and will continue to expand for the foreseeable future. The nature of these threats, and a set of potential approaches with which to mitigate these threats, will be reviewed.

David Relman, MD, is professor of medicine, and of microbiology and immunology at Stanford University. He is also chief, infectious diseases section, at the VA Palo Alto Health Care System in Palo Alto, California. His research is directed towards the characterization of the human indigenous microbial communities, with emphasis on understanding variation in diversity, succession, the effects of disturbance, and the role of these communities in health and disease.  This work brings together approaches from ecology, population biology, environmental microbiology, genomics and clinical medicine.  In addition, his research explores the classification structure of humans and non-human primates with systemic infectious diseases, based on patterns of genome-wide gene transcript abundance in blood and other tissues. The goals of this work are to recognize classes of pathogen and predict clinical outcome at early time points in the disease process, as well as to gain further insights into virulence. Past scientific achievements include the description of a novel approach for identifying previously-unknown pathogens, the identification of a number of new human microbial pathogens, including the agent of Whipple's disease, and some of the most extensive analyses to date of the human indigenous microbial ecosystem. See http://relman.stanford.edu

Among his other activities, Dr. Relman currently serves as Chair of the Board of Scientific Counselors of the National Institute of Dental and Craniofacial Research (NIH), Chair of the Institute of Medicine's Forum on Microbial Threats (U.S. National Academies of Science), member of the National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity, and advises several U.S. Government departments and agencies on matters related to pathogen diversity, the future life sciences landscape, and the nature of present and future biological threats.  He co-chaired a three-year study at the National Academy of Sciences that produced a report entitled, "Globalization, Biosecurity, and the Future of the Life Sciences" (2006). He is a member of the American Academy of Microbiology. Dr. Relman received the Squibb Award of the IDSA in 2001, and was the recipient of both the NIH Director's Pioneer Award, and the Distinguished Clinical Scientist Award from the Doris Duke Charitable Foundation, in 2006.

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David Relman Professor of Medicine and of Microbiology and Immunology Speaker Stanford University
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Science, Technology and Security Seminars (2009-2010)

Report of Visit to North Korea to Senate Foreign Relations Committee

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On July 15, 2007, the DPRK shut down and sealed the key nuclear facilities at Yongbyon and allowed IAEA inspectors back to monitor the shut-down. DPRK workers began to disable these facilities under U.S. technical supervision a few months later. The shut-down halts the production of additional bomb fuel (plutonium) and the disablement makes it more difficult to restart plutonium production should the DPRK decide to do so.

Our visit leads me to conclude that the DPRK leadership has made the decision to permanently shut down plutonium production if the United States and the other four parties live up to their Oct. 3, 2007 commitments. If the DPRK decides to break out of the six-party agreement and restart operations, it will have only limited capacity for plutonium production.

This report accompanied a trip report made by Keith Luse, senior staffer to Sen. Richard Lugar, to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

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Siegfried S. Hecker

Resuscitating American Power: Overcoming the Bush-Rice Legacy

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Marcus Mabry is International Business Editor of The New York Times, directing and editing international coverage in the Business Day section of the newspaper and on the front page, as well as managing Business Day’s corps of foreign correspondents and contract contributors. Prior to coming to the Times in July 2007, Mabry spent 19 years at Newsweek, the last five as chief of correspondents, responsible for managing and deploying the magazine’s domestic and international correspondents. He also held positions as a senior editor on the U.S. and international editions; Africa bureau chief; Paris correspondent; Washington correspondent; State Department correspondent; and associate editor in the business section.

Mabry’s latest book is Twice as Good: Condoleezza Rice and Her Path to Power (Modern Times/Rodale, 2007), an intimate examination of the life and career of Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice. Mabry’s first book, published in 1995 when he was 28 years old, is the memoir White Bucks and Black-Eyed Peas: Coming of Age Black in White America (Scribner’s), which recounts his personal journey from poverty and welfare, the son of single mother, to prep school, Stanford, and the largely white world of mainstream media. Both White Bucks and Black-Eyed Peas and Twice as Good were released in paperback in February 2008.
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Marcus Mabry International Business Editor Speaker The New York Times
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Making Nuclear Energy Work

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The search for solutions to two growing crises--human induced climate change and the loss of cheap oil--places nuclear energy front and center. Many see the expansion of nuclear power in the United States as a way to mitigate concerns over energy as well as national and environmental security brought on by the two global problems. Looking at the U.S. nuclear scene's past, present, and future, and focusing on a 21st-century approach to the underlying technical issues, one can see the potential for an expanded nuclear energy future.

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Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
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The U.S. satellite shootdown: An unnecessary action

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The intercept of the disabled USA-193 spy satellite the United States conducted on February 20 set a new benchmark for military exercises that have no benefits, but come at a tremendous political cost. The intercept topped even the U.S. decision to deploy missile defense installations in Poland and the Czech Republic as an ill-advised maneuver that could only bring scores of suspicion and mistrust--exactly what the deployments inspired in Russia, where missile defense now poisons virtually every other issue in U.S.-Russian relations. In this vein, the intercept, or more aptly, a test of an antisatellite (ASAT) capability, merely fosters further international distrust of U.S. policies and intentions.

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Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Online
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Pavel Podvig

Hecker shares findings from North Korea trip

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North Korea has shut down its key nuclear facilities and is discussing how to retrain workers at the Yongbyon nuclear complex, CISAC Co-Director Siegfried S. Hecker said Feb. 20 following a five-day visit to the country.

"The disablement actions at the three key nuclear facilities--that is [the] fuel fabrication plant, the reactor, and the reprocessing plant--those disablement actions are just about complete at this point," Hecker told reporters during a press conference at Stanford. "In my judgment, they are very serious actions, and they will require serious time and effort to restart those facilities."

Hecker, a research professor of management science and engineering and senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, visited scientists at Yongbyon and government officials in Pyongyang from Feb. 12 to 16. Joel Wit, a former U.S. State Department official, and Keith Luse, a staffer for Sen. Richard Lugar, R-Indiana, accompanied him during a private visit that also involved discussions on formalizing health and educational exchanges between the two nations. "All the way around, it was a very good visit, a very professional one on the DPRK's side," Hecker said, referring to the country's acronym for the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

According to Hecker, "significant hurdles" remain before North Korea will offer a "complete declaration," or complete list of its nuclear program, both past and present. The North Koreans told Hecker that the process has been delayed because other parties in the six-party talks, which aim to find a peaceful resolution to the country's nuclear weapons program, have been slow in delivering compensation such as heavy fuel oil. Despite this, Hecker said, cooperation between the U.S. and North Korean technical teams was excellent during the visit.  "The DPRK wants these obligations [of the other member nations] to be met quickly so they can move on to the next stage, that's the stage of dismantlement," he said, referring to agreements reached Oct. 3, 2007, during talks to achieve a nuclear weapons-free Korean peninsula.

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Group led by Stanford physicist says there's an urgent need for nuclear detectives

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A terrorist nuclear explosion devastates Manhattan, but no group takes credit. The pressure on the U.S. president to retaliate is intense. Acting on sketchy information, the president orders an attack, but it turns out to be the wrong terrorists, in the wrong country. Things go downhill from there.

To avoid that and other nightmare scenarios, a group of 12 scientists with extensive nuclear expertise, headed by Stanford physicist Michael M. May, is urging an international push to improve the science of nuclear forensics.

May is a research professor emeritus and former co-director the Center for International Security and Cooperation. He also is the former director of the U.S. nuclear weapons design laboratory in Livermore, Calif. Other members have experience in nuclear intelligence and defense research. One member, Jay Davis, was a United Nations inspector in Iraq.

They say there is an urgent need for more nuclear detectives, armed with science PhDs and instilled with the instincts of an investigator. And those detectives will need training, advanced equipment and stronger ties to intelligence agencies, political leaders and law enforcement.

With the right mobile equipment, nuclear detectives could sift through the debris and the radioactive cloud of an attack in this country or elsewhere and quickly glean crucial information, the scientists argue in a 60-page report to be discussed Feb. 16 at the annual meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Science (AAAS) in Boston.

The report, Nuclear Forensics: Role, State of the Art, Program Needs, was written by a joint working group of the AAAS and the American Physical Society.

Using radiochemistry techniques and access to proposed international databases that include actual samples of uranium and plutonium from around the world, the nuclear investigators might be able to tell the president—and the world—where the bomb fuel came from, or at least rule out some suspects.

“Nuclear forensics can make a difference,” May said in an interview.

But the U.S. capacity for such investigations has deteriorated since the end of the Cold War, when the capabilities were well supported at the nuclear weapons laboratories. “Presently available trained personnel are highly skilled, but there are not enough of them to deal with an emergency and they are not being replaced,” according to May. “A program to refill the pipeline of trained personnel should be undertaken.”

There’s also a need for development of new equipment, both in the lab and on the street, which could provide a faster analysis during a crisis. The authors also recommend more coordination between scientists and law enforcement; even simple steps such as trading phone numbers could prove crucial. “You really want the top decision makers to know where to get information,” May said.

The remnants of an atomic explosion carry a host of clues, even at the microscopic level, including crystal structures and impurities.

Uranium, for example, varies in isotopic composition and impurities according to where it was mined and how it was processed. Weapons-grade plutonium can be exposed during its production to different neutron fluxes and energies, depending on the particular reactor used. It is also possible to establish the length of time plutonium spent in the reactor.

In some cases, it may be possible for scientists at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory or Los Alamos National Laboratory to use their experience, intelligence data and software codes to reverse-engineer a nuclear bomb from its debris and learn telltale details of the design of the explosive.

These clues would not be the equivalent of fingerprints or DNA, May said, but would in most cases allow officials to at least rule out or in broad classes of possible sources.

Tracing bomb material to its source may be only the beginning of an investigation, rather than the end, as the authors acknowledge. Discovering that a terrorist explosive was made of uranium stolen from a specific site in Russia, for example, does not identify the terrorists, but it does provide a starting point, especially if there is suspicion that the bomb makers had inside help.

In their report, the scientists recommend that atomic sleuthing be applied also to radioactive materials seized by law enforcement agencies or border guards. Tracking the substances back to their source might prevent or deter attacks, they said. The authors note that the International Atomic Energy Agency’s Illicit Trafficking Database contains 1,080 confirmed events involving illicit trafficking in nuclear and other radioactive materials between 1993 and 2006.

Convincing the nuclear states to share database information about their own uranium and plutonium may be difficult, May said. He suggests that the International Atomic Energy Agency, which has databases of its own, could play an important role.

The authors of the report:

Michael M. May, Chair, Stanford University

Reza Abedin-Zadeh, International Atomic Energy Agency (retired)

Donald A. Barr, Los Alamos National Laboratory (retired)

Albert Carnesale, University of California-Los Angeles

Philip E. Coyle, Center for Defense Information

Jay Davis, Hertz Foundation

Bill Dorland, University of Maryland

Bill Dunlop, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

Steve Fetter, University of Maryland

Alexander Glaser, Princeton University

Ian D. Hutcheon, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory

Francis Slakey, American Physical Society

Benn Tannenbaum, American Association for the Advancement of Science

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A New Look at 9/11 Intelligence Failures: American Institutions and Embodied Knowledge

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Lynn Eden (speaker) is associate director for research/senior research scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University. Eden received her Ph.D. in sociology from the University of Michigan and taught in the Department of History at Carnegie Mellon University. Eden's first book, Crisis in Watertown was a finalist for a National Book Award. Her second, Witness in Philadelphia, with Florence Mars, was a retrospective look at the murders of civil rights workers Schwerner, Chaney, and Goodman in the summer of 1964; it was a Book of the Month Club Alternate Selection. In the area of international security, Eden focuses on U.S. foreign and military policy, organizational issues, and the social construction of science and technology in the nuclear realm. She co-edited, with Steven E. Miller, Nuclear Arguments. Eden was an editor of The Oxford Companion to American Military History, a social and cultural approach war and peace in U.S. history; the volume was chosen as a Main Selection of the History Book Club. Eden's Whole World on Fire: Organizations, Knowledge, and Nuclear Weapons Devastation won the American Sociological Association's 2004 Robert K. Merton award for best book in science, knowledge and technology. Currently, Eden is particularly interested in organizational learning and error, misunderstandings of the environment, and organizational explanation and rhetoric.

Brent Durbin (discussant) is completing his PhD in political science at the University of California, Berkeley, and is a predoctoral fellow at CISAC and a dissertation fellow at the Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation. His dissertation, "Changing the Guard: How U.S. Intelligence Adapts to New Threats and Opportunities," explains the policy processes governing how U.S. intelligence agencies respond to major changes in the international threat environment. More broadly, Durbin's research focuses on the micro- and macro-level organizational dynamics of national security bureaucracies. Durbin has previously held research fellowships at The George Washington University's Elliott School of International Affairs, and at the University of Cambridge (U.K.). Prior to attending Berkeley, he served as press secretary for U.S. Senator Patty Murray, and worked as an advisor and senior staff member on several campaigns for U.S. Congress. He graduated magna cum laude from Oberlin College with a BA in politics and English literature. He also holds an MPP from Harvard University's John F. Kennedy School of Government, and an MA in political science from the University of California, Berkeley.

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Brent Durbin Speaker

Lynn Eden

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Lynn Eden is a Senior Research Scholar Emeritus. She was a Senior Research Scholar at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation until January 2016, as well as was Associate Director for Research. Eden received her Ph.D. in sociology from the University of Michigan, held several pre- and post-doctoral fellowships, and taught in the history department at Carnegie Mellon before coming to Stanford.

In the area of international security, Eden has focused on U.S. foreign and military policy, arms control, the social construction of science and technology, and organizational issues regarding nuclear policy and homeland security. She co-edited, with Steven E. Miller, Nuclear Arguments: Understanding the Strategic Nuclear Arms and Arms Control Debates (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989). She was an editor of The Oxford Companion to American Military History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), which takes a social and cultural perspective on war and peace in U.S. history. That volume was chosen as a Main Selection of the History Book Club.

Eden's book Whole World on Fire: Organizations, Knowledge, and Nuclear Weapons Devastation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004; New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2004) explores how and why the U.S. government--from World War II to the present--has greatly underestimated the damage caused by nuclear weapons by failing to predict damage from firestorms. It shows how well-funded and highly professional organizations, by focusing on what they do well and systematically excluding what they don't, may build a poor representation of the world--a self-reinforcing fallacy that can have serious consequences, from the sinking of the Titanic to not predicting the vulnerability of the World Trade Center to burning jet fuel. Whole World on Fire won the American Sociological Association's 2004 Robert K. Merton Award for best book in science, knowledge, and technology.

Eden has also written on life in small-town America. Her first book, Crisis in Watertown (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1972), was her college senior thesis; it was a finalist for a National Book Award in 1973. Her second book, Witness in Philadelphia, with Florence Mars (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977), about the murders of civil rights workers Schwerner, Chaney, and Goodman in the summer of 1964, was a Book of the Month Club Alternate Selection.

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