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The United Nations High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change completed its comprehensive review of collective security, recommending historic changes to the U.N. in its report, "A more secure world: Our shared responsibility." Among the panel's 101 recommendations for the U.N. and member states are expansion of the U.N. Security Council and creation of a Peacebuilding Commission to advance proactive, preventive global security measures.

The report culminates a year-long project for which SIIS Senior Fellow Stephen J. Stedman served as research director. The 16-member panel, commissioned by U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan and chaired by former Thailand Prime Minister Anand Panyarachun, represents the U.N.'s most comprehensive effort to analyze collective security, since the founding of the international body in 1947. The select panel sought international input in an effort to honor the perspectives of all member states, as it analyzed current threats and identified specific security measures.

Nations are the "front line in today's combat," Annan said, introducing the report. He added, "The task of helping states improve their own capacities to deal with contemporary threats is vital and urgent. The United Nations must be able to do this better. The panel tells us how."

The report identifies six major threats to global security: war between states; violence within states, including civil wars, large-scale human rights abuses and genocide; poverty, infectious disease and environmental degradation; nuclear, chemical, biological and radiological weapons; terrorism; and transnational organized crime.

The panel proposed expanding the U.N. Security Council--for which it put forth two options--as well as creating a Peacebuilding Commission to help the Security Council pursue the recommended preventive security strategies. One proposal for Security Council expansion would appoint new permanent members, and the other would establish new long-term, renewable seats. Neither option creates any new vetoes.

In a cover letter to the secretary-general, Panyarachun thanked CISAC and Stedman for supporting the panel's work. CISAC Co-Director Christopher F. Chyba served on the panel's 30-member resource group, providing expertise on nuclear nonproliferation and bioterrorism. CISAC hosted a nuclear nonproliferation workshop at Stanford for the panel last March, and Panyarachun discussed security issues with representatives from China, India, Pakistan, Russia and the United States at CISAC's Five-Nation Project meeting in Bangkok last summer. Stedman's research staff included Bruce Jones, a former CISAC Hamburg Fellow, and Tarun Chhabra, a graduate of CISAC's undergraduate honors program.

Annan has asked Stedman to stay at the United Nations another year to help gain worldwide support in implementing the panel's recommendations.

The panel's report received prominent news coverage, including a front-page New York Times article ("Report urges big changes for the U.N.," by Warren Hoge, Dec. 4), and in the Economist an invited article by Annan ("Courage to fulfill our responsibilities," Dec. 4) as well as several other pieces in the Nov. 24 and Dec. 4 issues.

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Alan Isenberg
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Earlier this month, the so-called EU Three--Britain, France and Germany-- achieved an important victory for global security, convincing Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing activities pending further negotiation on its nuclear question. Though Iran claims that it does not desire a nuclear bomb, the West has long been skeptical of the oil-rich state's contention that it seeks a nuclear fuel cycle for energy purposes alone. Europe and the United States (and of course Israel) will sleep better knowing that Tehran is not pursuing enrichment activities, whatever their alleged purpose.

But the EU3 agreement, which fails to discuss consequences for Iran if it breaks the deal, is vulnerable to being undermined not only by Iran but also by the United States; both have already raised eyebrows in the wake of the accord. Iran raced to produce uranium hexafluoride, a gas that can be enriched into bomb fuel, before it began to observe the temporary suspension on Monday. And both President George W. Bush and outgoing Secretary of State Colin Powell have publicly aired their suspicions that Iran will continue its drive for nuclear weapons under cover of the deal.

At the moment, administration hawks are pressing to confront the mullahs at the United Nations Security Council, where economic sanctions could be considered; calls for using force and for regime change are likely to follow.

Military action is inadvisable at this point, because of a dearth of solid intelligence and the secretive, geographically diffuse nature of Iran's nuclear sites. If the issue reaches the Security Council with the United States and Europe continuing along divergent paths, the inevitable deadlock will deal a severe and lasting blow to international security. Therefore, the agreement must be fortified to keep the Iranians honest, the Europeans effectively engaged and the U.S. hawks bridled.

This can be achieved through a U.S.-European accord laying out trigger mechanisms for specified consequences if Iran violates certain benchmarks. For example, if Iran fails to allow inspectors the access accorded by the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty's additional protocol--which Iran is provisionally observing pending ratification--or resumes enrichment and centrifuge-building activities, it could face severe economic sanctions, censure by the Security Council (necessitating cooperation from Russia and China), or in the event of hostility, a forceful response.

We don't know yet whether Tehran will play by the rules. The regime has mastered the art of behaving badly and then seeking rewards for getting back into line. To date, the Europeans have played into its hands, offering carrots for compliance without wielding sticks to punish violations.

Therefore, the Bush administration's apparent comfort with a military option can serve as an important deterrent against Iranian cheating, arming the EU3 agreement with teeth that it would not otherwise have. Iran desires economic incentives but does not yet desperately need them; without a credible threat of U.S.-backed sanctions imposed by the international community, the mullahs can simply decide one day that the restrictions have ceased to be worth their while, and break any deal as though it were merely a business contract.

For the United States, accepting the EU3's carrot-based approach (provided the benchmarks are added) will show the world that it still supports negotiated diplomacy and multilateralism, even in cases where military threats loom. Participating in this framework will also send a message to Iran that the United States is not ruling out renewed relations. This would resonate with the largely pro-American Iranian populace, who despise their regime and are seeking inroads to break free of it.

But if the United States instead presents itself as a unilateralist maverick, it will hinder its own interests; the only thing Iranians disdain more than the mullahs is outside meddling with their deeply nationalistic desire for self-determination. The more overtly hostile the United States acts toward Iran, the more the mullahs are able to spin America's posture to alienate Iranians against the "Great Satan."

The way to keep the Iranian regime in check while speeding its demise is to insure the nuclear agreement through benchmarks and triggers, and then give the mullahs exactly what they ask for in terms of increased access to international institutions like the World Trade Organization.

Such carrots can also be Trojan Horses, allowing the forces of democratic reform within Iran to blossom by enabling pro-democracy elements to make global connections. The U.S. and Europe should saddle up those horses together.

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In the wake of the September 11, 2001, attacks, many members of the media and the public became aware that further acts of terrorism against U.S. targets were possible, and that such attacks could involve chemical, biological, or nuclear weapons. Although accurate basic information about the effects of nuclear and radiological weapons is available, mainly through specialized sources, it is not widespread, and it can be difficult to separate from misinformation about the sources, characteristics, and effects of radioactivity. In short, there was a clear appetite for more and better information. At the same time, concerns exist on the part of scientists and first responders about how best to meet the public's need for information about these types of threats in order to avert panic and save lives--without simultaneously helping terrorist groups to stage more effective attacks.

This workshop is a step toward meeting these needs and concerns, bringing together local representatives of the media (newspaper, radio, and television); local first responders, including local representatives of federal and state agencies; scientists; and risk analysts for an informal, daylong meeting.

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Michael May is Professor Emeritus (Research) in the Stanford University School of Engineering and a senior fellow with the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. He is the former co-director of Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, having served seven years in that capacity through January 2000.

May is a director emeritus of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, where he worked from 1952 to 1988, with some brief periods away from the Laboratory. While there, he held a variety of research and development positions, serving as director of the Laboratory from 1965 to 1971.

May was a technical adviser to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty negotiating team; a member of the U.S. delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks; and at various times has been a member of the Defense Science Board, the General Advisory Committee to the AEC, the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, the RAND Corporation Board of Trustees, and the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the National Academy of Sciences. He is a member of the International Institute on Strategic Studies, and a Fellow of the American Physical Society and the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

May received the Distinguished Public Service and Distinguished Civilian Service Medals from the Department of Defense, and the Ernest Orlando Lawrence Award from the Atomic Energy Commission, as well as other awards.

His current research interests are nuclear weapons policy in the US and in other countries; nuclear terrorism; nuclear and other forms of energy and their impact on the environment, health and safety and security; the use of statistics and mathematical models in the public sphere.

May is continuing work on creating a secure future for civilian nuclear applications. In October 2007, May hosted an international workshop on how the nuclear weapon states can help rebuild the consensus underlying the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Proceedings and a summary report are available online or by email request. May also chaired a technical working group on nuclear forensics. The final report is available online.

In April 2007, May in cooperation with former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry and Professor Ashton Carter of Harvard hosted a workshop on what would have to be done to be ready for a terrorist nuclear detonation. The report is available online at the Preventive Defense Project. A summary, titled, "The Day After: Action Following a Nuclear Blast in a U.S. City," was published fall 2007 in Washington Quarterly and is available online.

Recent work also includes a study of nuclear postures in several countries (2007 - 2009); an article on nuclear disarmament and one on tactical nuclear weapons; and a report with Kate Marvel for the American Academy of Arts and Sciences on possible game changers in the nuclear energy industry.

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Lisa Sickorez, financial manager for the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), will receive the annual Marsh O'Neill staff award on Tuesday, Nov. 16, at the Faculty Club for her outstanding support and dedication to the center's directors and scholars.

Sickorez, a Stanford employee since 1993, was enthusiastically nominated by the center's co-directors and professors. CISAC, part of the Stanford Institute for International Studies, conducts research and training pertaining to international security.

As financial manager, Sickorez performs essential behind-the-scenes duties, such as moving grant proposals through the university process, ensuring funds are properly spent once they are received and participating in general strategic planning.

The award, presented by the Office of the Dean of Research and Graduate Policy, honors staff who have made exceptional and enduring contributions to Stanford's research enterprise. Those who nominated Sickorez described several ways in which she applies a rare combination of quickness, accuracy and creativity to her job.

When a senior scholar last summer reported that he hoped to research the effects of arms buildup in India and Pakistan, Sickorez suggested applying for a grant from the Nuclear Threat Initiative, a foundation she had recently read about. The foundation has a similar focus, and Sickorez knew that CISAC had not tapped the organization for several years.

Another time, center co-director Scott Sagan met with a potential donor in New York who unexpectedly proposed phasing in funding over 10 years--necessitating some quick number crunching to reassess immediate financial needs.

Before the lunch meeting ended, Sickorez had faxed from her office in Encina Hall the adjusted amounts, clearly outlined in a chart for Sagan and his host to read.

"This is a dedicated staff member who can work miracles very promptly and efficiently," Sagan said. "The breadth of her interest and skills are quite stunning, and she combines them in a way that are, in my experience, highly unusual."

Sickorez came to the university as a research administrator in the Stanford Institute for Theoretical Economics, a program in the Department of Economics. She has held her current position at CISAC since 1998.

Part of her job, she says, is keeping abreast of potential funding sources, which she does through her "voracious" reading and online searches using keywords gleaned from research proposals. But her position also meshes well with her personal interest in current events and politics.

"I am very interested in the research that goes on at the center," she said. "It's intellectually stimulating; it's current events."

Indeed. The center's scholars include former Secretary of Defense William Perry, also a professor of management science and engineering, and Stephen Stedman, a senior fellow at the center who is currently on leave to direct research for United Nations Secretary General Kofi Annan.

Sickorez may see the center's heavy hitters only occasionally, but she says she feels like she plays an essential role at the center. She collaborates often with the various directors and says they are generous in their expressions of gratitude.

"It's a wonderful place to work," Sickorez said. "The center doesn't have much of a strict hierarchy."

Sickorez was chosen from among 21 nominees who work in the university's various academic units, central administration and Medical School. She will receive a $3,000 certificate and a plaque. Each nominee will receive a congratulatory letter from the Office of the Dean of Research and Graduate Policy.

The award is named after Marshall O'Neill, former associate director of the W. W. Hansen Laboratories, who became the first recipient upon retirement in 1990. The Nov. 16 reception for the award winner begins at 4 p.m.; friends and colleagues are invited.

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Slayton’s research and teaching examine the relationships between and among risk, governance, and expertise, with a focus on international security and cooperation since World War II. Slayton’s current book project, Shadowing Cybersecurity, examines the historical emergence of cybersecurity expertise. Shadowing Cybersecurity shows how efforts to establish credible expertise in corporate, governmental, and non-governmental contexts have produced varying and sometimes conflicting expert practices. Nonetheless, all cybersecurity experts wrestle with the irreducible uncertainties that characterize intelligent adversaries, and the fundamental inability to prove that systems are secure. The book shows how cybersecurity experts have paradoxically gained credibility by making threats and vulnerabilities visible, while acknowledging that more always remain in the shadows.

Slayton’s first book, Arguments that Count: Physics, Computing, and Missile Defense, 1949-2012 (MIT Press, 2013), shows how the rise of a new field of expertise in computing reshaped public policies and perceptions about the risks of missile defense in the United States. In 2015, Arguments that Count won the Computer History Museum Prize. In 2016, Slayton was awarded a National Science Foundation CAREER grant for her project “Enacting Cybersecurity Expertise.” In 2019, Slayton was also a recipient of the United States Presidential Early Career Award for Scientists and Engineers, for her NSF CAREER project.

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Karthika Sasikumar began her education in Hyderabad, India. She obtained her undergraduate degree from St. Francis College for Women. From 1995 to 1999, she was a student at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, where she earned Master's and M.Phil Degrees from the School of International Studies.

Dr. Sasikumar received her Ph.D. from the Government Department at Cornell University in 2006. Her dissertation explores the interaction between India and the international nuclear nonproliferation order.

Before coming to San Jose State University, where she is a Professor of Political Science, Dr. Sasikumar was a Program Associate at the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, and an Associate in the International Security Program at Harvard University’s  Kennedy School of Government, both in Cambridge, Massachusetts. She has also been a Postdoctoral Fellow at the University of British Columbia’s  Liu Institute for Global Issues in Vancouver, and a Predoctoral Fellow at the Center for International Security and CooperationStanford University.

In 2010-11, she spent a year at the Belfer Center as the first Stanton Nuclear Security Junior Faculty Fellow. She is the Vice-Chair of the SJSU Senate, and has served as a mentor in the Preparing Future Professors Program, and as the Co-PI for the university’s Intelligence Community Center for Academic Excellence.

Her research and teaching interests are in International Relations theory, international regimes, global security, migration, and national identity.

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I am a child of the Cold War. As such, my thinking for decades was conditioned by the great issue of that era: How to maintain freedom in the face of our perceptions of Soviet ambitions for world domination?

For the first few decades of the Cold War, the United States strategy for achieving this objective was containment backed up with a powerful nuclear deterrence. But as the nuclear arms race heated up, it became increasingly clear that this strategy risked precipitating a nuclear holocaust. Thus, by the late sixties, nuclear arms control had become the overriding security issue - certainly it dominated my thinking on security during that era.

But with the ending of the Cold War, the threat of nuclear holocaust receded and arms control, as we had practiced it during that era, was no longer the dominant security issue. The most serious threat to the United States became nuclear weapons in the hands of failed states or terrorists - used not in a standard military operation, but in extortive or apocalyptic ways. Therefore, in the present era, preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons replaces arms control as the organizing principle for our security. Certainly it has dominated my thinking on security for the last decade.

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William Perry is the Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor (emeritus) at Stanford University. He is a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute and the Hoover Institution, and serves as director of the Preventive Defense Project. He is an expert in U.S. foreign policy, national security and arms control. He was the co-director of CISAC from 1988 to 1993, during which time he was also a part-time professor at Stanford. He was a part-time lecturer in the Department of Mathematics at Santa Clara University from 1971 to 1977.

Perry was the 19th secretary of defense for the United States, serving from February 1994 to January 1997. He previously served as deputy secretary of defense (1993-1994) and as under secretary of defense for research and engineering (1977-1981). Dr. Perry currently serves on the Defense Policy Board (DPB). He is on the board of directors of Covant and several emerging high-tech companies. His previous business experience includes serving as a laboratory director for General Telephone and Electronics (1954-1964); founder and president of ESL Inc. (1964-1977); executive vice-president of Hambrecht & Quist Inc. (1981-1985); and founder and chairman of Technology Strategies & Alliances (1985-1993). He is a member of the National Academy of Engineering and a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

From 1946 to 1947, Perry was an enlisted man in the Army Corps of Engineers, and served in the Army of Occupation in Japan. He joined the Reserve Officer Training Corps in 1948 and was a second lieutenant in the Army Reserves from 1950 to 1955. He was awarded the Presidential Medal of Freedom in 1997 and the Knight Commander of the British Empire in 1998. Perry has received a number of other awards including the Department of Defense Distinguished Service Medal (1980 and 1981), and Outstanding Civilian Service Medals from the Army (1962 and 1997), the Air Force (1997), the Navy (1997), the Defense Intelligence Agency (1977 and 1997), NASA (1981) and the Coast Guard (1997). He received the American Electronic Association's Medal of Achievement (1980), the Eisenhower Award (1996), the Marshall Award (1997), the Forrestal Medal (1994), and the Henry Stimson Medal (1994). The National Academy of Engineering selected him for the Arthur Bueche Medal in 1996. He has received awards from the enlisted personnel of the Army, Navy, and the Air Force. He has received decorations from the governments of Albania, Bahrain, France, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Korea, Poland, Slovenia, and Ukraine. He received a BS and MS from Stanford University and a PhD from Pennsylvania State University, all in mathematics.

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With nuclear weapons, there is no effective defense. As a result, unless or until universal disarmament can be achieved, arming to prevent war can only mean nuclear deterrence. The US and the Soviet Union overdid deterrence by a large factor in my estimation, but the general view is that it seemed to work in that particular situation. The key assumption of nuclear deterrence is that the prospect of a single weapon dropped on a single city makes any war of conquest unattractive. Equally important is that the inevitable devastation was obvious to all ahead of time, so that the usual demagogic arguments for war failed and for the most part were not made.

No one pretends that what I have just said about nuclear deterrence is the whole story. For one thing, there are many traps and dangers in the actual practice of nuclear deterrence. What is to be done, for instance, about challenges that don't directly involve the risk of nuclear war but might do so down the line? There were plenty of such challenges during the Cold War, in Korea, in Berlin, in Cuba, and in Israel.

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The nuclear programs of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), Iran, and Pakistan provide the most visible manifestations of three broad and interrelated challenges to the nuclear nonproliferation regime. The first is so-called latent proliferation, in which a country adheres to, or at least for some time maintains a façade of adhering to, its formal obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) while nevertheless developing the capabilities needed for a nuclear weapons program. That country can then either withdraw from the NPT and build actual weapons on short notice, or simply stay within the NPT while maintaining the latent capability for the rapid realization of nuclear weapons as a hedge against future threats. This was the path followed by the DPRK with its plutonium program and one that is likely being followed by Iran and more subtly by others. The second broad challenge is first-tier nuclear proliferation, in which technology or material sold or stolen from private companies or state nuclear programs assists nonnuclear weapons states in developing illegal nuclear weapons programs and delivery systems. The third challenge--the focus of this article--is second-tier nuclear proliferation, in which states in the developing world with varying technical capabilities trade among themselves to bolster one another's nuclear and strategic weapons efforts.

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