Jacob Shapiro (speaker) is a CISAC postdoctoral fellow. His primary research interest is the organization of terrorism and insurgency. His other research interests include international relations, organization theory, and security policy. Shapiro's ongoing projects study the balance between secrecy and openness in counterterrorism, the impact of international human rights law on democracies' foreign policy, the causes of militant recruitment in Islamic countries, and the relationship between public goods provision and insurgent violence in Iraq and Afghanistan. His research has been published in International Security, International Studies Quarterly, Foreign Policy, and a number of edited volumes. Shapiro is a Harmony Fellow at the Combating Terrorism Center at the United States Military Academy. As a Naval Reserve officer he was assigned to the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Naval Warfare Development Command. He served on active duty at Special Boat Team 20 and onboard the USS Arthur W. Radford (DD-968). He holds a PhD in political science and an MA in economics from Stanford University and a BA in political science from the University of Michigan.

Jeremy Weinstein (discussant) is an assistant professor of political science at Stanford University and an affiliated faculty member at CDDRL and CISAC. Previously, he was a research fellow at the Center for Global Development, where he directed the bi-partisan Commission on Weak States and US National Security. While working on his PhD, with funding from the Jacob Javits Fellowship, a Sheldon Fellowship, and the World Bank, he conducted hundreds of interviews with rebel combatants and civilians in both Africa and Latin America for his forthcoming book, Inside Rebellion: The Politics of Insurgent Violence. He has also worked on the National Security Council staff; served as a visiting scholar at the World Bank; was a fellow at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars; and received a research fellowship in foreign policy studies at the Brookings Institution. He received his BA with high honors from Swarthmore College, and his MA and PhD in political economy and government from Harvard University.

Jeanne Mager Stellman (speaker) has just recently joined the Department of Preventive Medicine and Community Health at SUNY-Downstate Medical Center in Brooklyn N.Y as Professor and Director of the Division of Environmental Health Sciences. She had been a member of the faculty of the School of Public Health at Columbia University since 1981 and directed the General Public Health track. Stellman is actively engaged in research on herbicides in Vietnam and was director of a multimillion dollar study for the National Academy of Science to develop exposure methodologies for epidemiological studies of military herbicides. She and her husband, Steven D. Stellman, are collaborating on several follow-up studies and, with National Library of Medicine support, she is now creating a website on Vietnam that uses the geographic information system they developed to make it accessible to researchers around the world. The Stellmans are the recipient of The American Legion's Distinguished Service Medal because of their ongoing research and assistance to veterans. In addition, Stellman is now heavily engaged in research and policy in the aftermath of the World Trade Center terrorist attacks. She served on the EPA's Technical Advisory Panel for WTC Cleanup and is a consultant to the Mt. Sinai WTC Medical Monitoring program, where she is co-directing research on the mental health and well-being of the first responders. Stellman served as Editor-in-Chief of the Encyclopedia of Occupational Health and Safety, 4th edition (1998). She is the recipient of a Guggenheim fellowship and was named one of Ms. Magazine's "80 women to watch in the 80's." She has written several books, many monographs and chapters and peer-reviewed publications.

Lynn Eden (discussant) is associate director for research/senior research scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University. Eden received her Ph.D. in sociology from the University of Michigan, held several pre- and post-doctoral fellowships, and taught in the history department at Carnegie Mellon before coming to Stanford. In the area of international security, Eden has focused on U.S. foreign and military policy, arms control, the social construction of science and technology, and organizational issues regarding nuclear policy and homeland security.

The Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is a pivotal litmus test to determine a nation's "walking-the-walk dedication" on nonproliferation matters. The September Article XIV conference to obtain Entrance-Into-Force was attended by delegations from Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, China, Russia, and 101 other nations, but not the United States, North Korea, and India (1). The views of key global diplomats on the purpose and direction of the CTBT will be cited, followed by an analysis of funding and regional acceptance.

Official proceedings were adjourned for a two-hour session with three non-diplomats and Ambassador Jaap Ramaker (UN Conference on Disarmament chief CTBT negotiator) (2). The technical presentation on CTBT monitoring progress (2005-6 CISAC study) will be summarized (3). Monitoring has advanced since the 1999 Senate defeat by lowering the monitoring threshold from 1 kt to 0.1 kilotons (1-2 kt in a cavity), and by improvements in regional seismology (results of 2006-DPRK test and other data), correlation-wave seismology, interferometric synthetic aperture radar, cooperative monitoring at test sites without losing secrets, radionuclide monitoring improvement by a factor of 10, and other results. This presentation showed that the CTBT was effectively verifiable, in accordance with the Nitze-Baker definition.

CTBT has not been discharged from the Senate's Executive Calendar, thus the United States cannot legally resume nuclear testing without a Senate vote to discharge it. The NPT regime is in trouble; Article IV will mostly allow sensitive fuel cycle operations. The overlap between NPT and CTBT will be discussed. The statement of concern on CTBT by Senator Kyl (Cong. Record, 10-24-07) will be examined. Lastly, a path to Entrance-Into-Force for the CTBT will be described.

David Hafemeister was a 2005-2006 science fellow at CISAC. He is a professor (emeritus) of physics at California Polytechnic State University. He spent a dozen years in Washington as professional staff member for Senate Committees on Foreign Relations and Governmental Affairs (1990-93 on arms control treaties at the end of the Cold War), science advisor to Senator John Glenn (1975-77), special assistant to Under Secretary of State Benson and Deputy-Under Secretary Nye (1977-78), visiting scientist in the State Department's Office of Nuclear Proliferation Policy (1979), the Office of Strategic Nuclear Policy (1987) and study director at the National Academy of Sciences (2000-02). He also held appointments at Carnegie Mellon, MIT, Stanford, Princeton, and the Lawrence-Berkeley, Argonne and Los Alamos national laboratories. He was chair of the APS Forum on Physics and Society (1985-6) and the APS Panel on Public Affairs (1996-7). He has written or edited ten books and 140 articles and was awarded the APS Szilard award in 1996.

(1) http://www.ctbto.org/reference/article_xiv/2007/article_xiv07_main.htm

(2) http://www.vertic.org/news.asp#ctbtreport

(3) D. Hafemeister, "Progress in CTBT Monitoring Since its 1999 Senate Defeat," Science and Global Security 15(3), 151-183 (2007).

This presentation aims at answering questions regarding India's capability to produce weapons-grade plutonium and the impact of the U.S.-India deal, or the lack thereof, on India's nuclear weapons program. The basic answers provided here are that the U.S.-India deal does not significantly affect the military plutonium production program. Any reduction in weapons-grade plutonium production could be compensated for by any of several methods that would, however, require government decision and budget allocation. The uranium constraint is a serious long-term restraint, particularly, on the civilian power program, which is the major national consumer of natural uranium. There are ways of alleviating and ultimately resolving this constraint, relying on India's domestic uranium resources, which would more than suffice for the remaining life of all the currently existing and planned reactors, if mining and milling capacity could be commissioned on time. The U.S.-India deal would alleviate the near-term uranium supply-demand mismatch by allowing uranium imports into the country. In the meantime, India is pursuing several strategies discussed here to ease its impending uranium supply crunch.

Chaim Braun is a vice president of Altos Management Partners, Inc., and a CISAC science fellow and affiliate. He is a member of the Near-Term Deployment and the Economic Cross-Cut Working Groups of the Department of Energy (DOE) Generation IV Roadmap study. He conducted several nuclear economics-related studies for the DOE Nuclear Energy Office, the Energy Information Administration, the Electric Power Research Institute, the Nuclear Energy Institute, Non-Proliferation Trust International, and others. Braun has worked as a member of Bechtel Power Corporation's Nuclear Management Group, and led studies on power plant performance and economics used to support maintenance services. Braun has worked on a study of safeguarding the Agreed Framework in North Korea, was the co-leader of a NATO Study of Terrorist Threats to Nuclear Power Plants, led CISAC's Summer Study on Terrorist Threats to Research Reactors, and most recently co-authored an article with former CISAC Co-Director Chris Chyba on nuclear proliferation rings.

This presentation provides an overview of the history of US satellite-based reconnaissance as has been publicly revealed by the US Government to date. Extrapolating from there, it will transition to the evolutionary and revolutionary role that commercial satellite imagery is now playing on the international stage in proving a heretofore-unimaginable basis for greater global transparency and the way it has helped, and will continue to help, to detect and monitor undeclared unconventional weapons related facilities and activities. In addition, new geospatial tools, which draw heavily upon commercial satellite imagery as well as augmenting it, have also become available over the internet. Among those Geospatial tools, "Digital Virtual Globes" (i.e., Google Earth, Virtual Earth, etc.) not only provide a much improved mapping capability over previously used simple plan-view line drawings used by various international inspection organizations such as the IAEA, but the offer much improved visualization of known and inspected sites. Such digital globes also provide a new, essentially free means to conduct broad area baseline search for possible "clandestine" sites...either allege through open source leads; identified on internet blogs and wiki layers with input from a "free" cadre of global browsers and/or by knowledgeable local citizens that can include ground photos and maps; or by other initiatives based on existing country program knowledge. The digital globes also provide highly accurate terrain mapping for better overall geospatial context and allow detailed 3-D perspectives of all sites or areas of interest. 3-D modeling software, when used in conjunction with these digital globes can significantly enhance individual building characterization and visualization (including interiors), allowing for better international inspector training through pre-inspection walk-arounds or fly-around, and perhaps better IAEA safeguard decision making. In sum, these new geospatial visualization aids are ideal for international inspector training and orientation, as well as site characterization, monitoring and verification. But perhaps just as significantly, these new geospatial tools also now make it possible for anyone to conduct his or her own satellite-based reconnaissance for any application from the comfort of home, at a wi-fi enabled coffee shop, or even on the beach at a tropical island resort.

Frank Pabian is a Senior Nonproliferation Infrastructure Analyst at Los Alamos National Laboratory who has over 35 years experience in the nuclear nonproliferation field including six years with the Office of Imagery Analysis and 18 years with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's "Z" Division. Frank also served as a Chief Inspector for the IAEA during UN inspections in Iraq from 1996-1998 focusing on "Capable Sites." In December 2002, Frank served as one of the first US nuclear inspectors back in Iraq with UN/IAEA. While at Los Alamos, Frank has developed and presented commercial satellite imagery based briefings on foreign clandestine nuclear facilities to the International Nuclear Suppliers Group, the IAEA, NATO, and the Foreign Ministries of China and India on behalf of the NNSA and STATE.

The US military is very dependent on satellites. The existing satellite architecture used has single point failures to existing recognized threats. A concept that could provide a significant part of the solution of how the US as well as other states can overcome such vulnerabilities is discussed. The prescription centers on a new satellite architecture --the 'Multi-tiered Microsatellite Constellation Architecture' (MMCA) -- which reduces risks to space assets by increasing system redundancy, modularity and dispersion through the use of microsatellite constellations in several orbital tiers. An example constellation design is given for each of the five major contemporary military space uses -- early warning, reconnaissance, signals intelligence, military communications and navigation. The scheme is placed in the context of other complimentary elements that are likely to be necessary to enable security of space assets, in particular: protection of space systems; responsive space access; terrestrial alternatives; space surveillance; treaties; and verification means thereof. Since the Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) test, the response of the US military in part has been to re-double efforts to develop Operationally Responsive Space (ORS). Whilst ORS is a key ingredient, it must be complemented by a more secure satellite architecture. In addition to dealing with satellite vulnerabilities, the talk will discuss issues relating to space-based weapons and their effectiveness.

William Marshall is based in the Small Spacecraft Office at NASA's Ames Research Center in California. He holds a PhD in Physics from the University of Oxford, U.K., where his thesis centred on an experimental proposal to create macroscopic mass quantum superposition states. He conducted two years of his research at the University of California in Santa Barbara. He holds a degree in Physics with Space Science and Technology (MPhys) from the University of Leicester, UK. He has held placements at the European Space Agency, NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Marshall Space Flight Center and the Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (POST) in London. Will's work at NASA centers on mission planning, in particular trajectory analysis, and spacecraft testing for a variety of microsatellite missions, focusing on lunar orbiters and landers. He is working on a project on the topic of space traffic management. Will serves on the Governance Group of the Space Security Index research project and also holds positions of non-resident fellow at both the Space Policy Institute (SPI) of the George Washington University and the Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. In these capacities, Will has published on strategic benefits and costs of the deployment of space weapons and more broadly the increasingly important role that space is playing in global security issues. Will is the Global co-Chair of the Space Generation Advisory Council to the United Nations Programme on Space Applications (SGAC), which represents the views of students and young professionals interested in space to the UN and space agencies around the world.

Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones is the well-known scholar of U.S. intelligence agencies and the author of numerous books, among them The CIA and American Democracy; Cloak and Dollar: A History of American Secret Intelligence; Changing Differences: Women and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy; and Peace Now! American Society and the Ending of the Vietnam War. His most recent book, The FBI: A History (Yale University Press, September 2007), examines the bureau's history from a European perspective and in the context of American history, including the prism of race.

Jeffreys-Jones, a professor of American History at the University of Edinburgh, received his BA from the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth, and his PhD from the University of Cambridge. Other appointments have included a fellowship at the Charles Warren Center for the Study of American History, Harvard University; stipendiary, JFK Institut für Nordamerikastudien, Berlin; and Canadian Commonwealth Fellow and Visiting Professor, University of Toronto.