Abstract: In this age of increasing "Global Transparency," commercial satellite imagery has now made it possible for anyone to remotely peer "over the fence" and view what heretofore had been otherwise impossible...clandestine nuclear facilities (most significantly, those capable of producing fissile material suitable for use in nuclear weapons). The synergistic combination of readily available tools: personal computers, the internet, three-dimensional virtual globe visualization applications such as Google Earth, and high resolution commercial satellite imagery has gone beyond what anyone could have imaged just a few years ago. The downside of all this is that those who want to keep their clandestine nuclear facilities and associated activities from being either detected, identified, and/or monitored, are becoming more adept in their use of camouflage, concealment, and deception.

Iran is one such case where it has followed a steep learning curve of adapting to the threat that overhead observation can pose. After repeated dissident group revelations about Iran's clandestine nuclear facilities, together with confirming media broadcast of commercial satellite images of those facilities followed by verification inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA); the government of Iran has become increasingly aware of this threat and gone to greater and greater lengths to try and defeat it. Iran's cover-up tactics have improved with time...from concealed infrastructure and false cover stories (Natanz)...to refurbishment and sanitization of facilities following removal of incriminating equipment (Kalaye Electric and Lashkar Abad), to the wholesale razing of facilities together with the removal of dirt and vegetation to defeat IAEA forensic environmental sampling (Lavizan).

While the international community continues to debate the issue of whether or not Iran's nuclear program is purely peaceful in nature (helping it to stay an "open case"), Iran is defiantly pursuing its goal of fissile material production. Syria, on the other hand (evidently together with North Korea), was also quite aware of the overhead observation threat, taking great pains to conceal its plutonium production reactor at Al-Kibar. Syria disguised the true function of the facility by employing minimal site security (no fences or guard towers), having minimal support infrastructure (with non visible powerlines and only buried water lines), not installing a telltale reactor ventilation stack or cooling tower, hiding the reactor building in a ravine (terrain masking), and finally camouflaging the facility with a false façade to make it appear as a byzantine fortress. Nonetheless, despite all those steps, a leak of ground-level reactor construction and interior photographs, which formed the basis for the subsequent bombing of the facility by Israel, successfully thwarted that effort (the "closed case?"). Rather than confessing the truth about al-Kibar, the Syrian government rushed to remove all traces of the destroyed reactor and supplant it with a new larger footprint building for as yet unknown purposes while continuing to claim it was previously only a disused military warehouse. The IAEA asked d Syria for permission to inspect not only the Al-Kibar site, but reportedly up to three other sites thought to be associated with it. The Syrians refused access to all but the now heavily sanitized Al-Kibar location. We must now all await the IAEA report on the findings of that singular onsite inspection.

Frank Pabian is a Senior Nonproliferation Infrastructure Analyst at Los Alamos National Laboratory who has over 35 years experience in the nuclear nonproliferation field including six years with the Office of Imagery Analysis and 18 years with Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory's "Z" Division.  Frank also served as a Chief Inspector for the IAEA during UN inspections in Iraq from 1996-1998 focusing on "Capable Sites." In December 2002, Frank served as one of the first US nuclear inspectors back in Iraq with UN/IAEA. While at Los Alamos, Frank has developed and presented commercial satellite imagery based briefings on foreign clandestine nuclear facilities to the International Nuclear Suppliers Group, the IAEA, NATO, and the Foreign Ministries of China and India on behalf of the NNSA and STATE.

Ward Wilson is an award-winning scholar living in Trenton, NJ. He has written, studied and read extensively about nuclear weapons issues for more than twenty-five years. After training as a historian at the American University in Washington, DC with a special emphasis on philosophy, he was a Fellow at the Robert Kennedy Memorial Foundation in 1981 where he wrote about nuclear weapons issues. He has been published in The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Dissent, the Chicago Tribune, Nonproliferation Review and International Security (among others). His work has been described as "some of the most original and exacting thinking being done about nuclear weapons today." In 2007 he published a ground-breaking study of the bombing of Hiroshima in International Security titled "The Winning Weapon? Rethinking Nuclear Weapons in Light of Hiroshima." The distinguished physicists Freeman Dyson has said that the article "effectively demolishes the generally-accepted myth that the atomic bombings brought World War II to an end." Wilson argues that "Much of what has been written about nuclear weapons is conceptually muddled. A great deal of work is necessary to intellectually recast the field." He advocates an approach rooted in the work of William James and Ludwig Wittgenstein that emphasizes examining the usefulness of nuclear weapons. "The only important question is ‘Are nuclear weapons useful?' If the answer is no, why keep them?" Wilson writes regularly at www.rethinkingnuclearweapons.org.

Barton Bernstein began his current position as Professor of History at Stanford University in 1965, after receiving his Ph.D. in History from Harvard University in 1964. At Stanford, he has served as the director of the History Honors Program, the International Relations program, and the International Policy Studies program. Prof. Bernstein is a member of the American Historical Association, the Conference on Peace Research in History, and has served on the Editorial Advisory Committee for the Nuclear Age Series at Stanford University. He has been awarded numerous grants and research positions, including the National Endowment for the Humanities Fellowship and the Lawrence-Livermore Grant. Prof. Bernstein was a CISAC fellow during the 1985-86 academic year.  Many of Prof. Bernstein's publications and articles have received national acclaim. He co-edited, with Don Kennedy, a series in Modern American History. A beloved professor and prolific author, Prof. Bernstein's research interests include U.S. foreign policy, modern U.S. political history, and science and technology policy. His talk "Why did Japan Surrender in World War II" addresses and challenges false or outdated conceptions of Japan's role in WWII.

Jacob N. Shapiro is Assistant Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University. His primary research interests are the organizational aspects of terrorism, insurgency, and security policy. Shapiro's ongoing projects study the balance between secrecy and openness in counterterrorism, the causes of militant recruitment in Islamic countries, and the relationship between public goods provision and insurgent violence in Iraq and Afghanistan. His research has been published in International Security, International Studies Quarterly, Foreign Policy, Military Operations Research, and a number of edited volumes. Shapiro is a Harmony Fellow at the Combating Terrorism Center at the United States Military Academy. Professor Shapiro served as a Naval Reserve officer with the Office of Naval Intelligence and the Naval Warfare Development Command. On active duty he served at Special Boat Team 20 and onboard the USS Arthur W. Radford (DD-968). Ph.D. Political Science, M.A. Economics, Stanford University. B.A. Political Science, University of Michigan.

Lieutenant Colonel David Ottignon is a national security affairs fellow for 2008-2009 at the Hoover Institution. LTCOL Ottignon represents the U.S. Marine Corps. Ottignon graduated from Ithaca College and was commissioned in the Marine Corps in 1987 as a combat engineer. He participated in Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, Operation Enduring Freedom in the Philippines, and most recently, in Operation Iraqi Freedom from 2007 to 2008. Other previous assignments include service in the U.S. Pacific Command, Assistant Professor of Military Science at the University of Rochester and Commanding Officer, 2d Combat Engineer Battalion, 2d Marine Division. He has earned his MBA from the Simon School, University of Rochester and a Masters in National Security and Strategic Studies from the Naval War College. His research at Hoover will focus on current and future national security issues. Ottignon is on the select list for promotion to Colonel.