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David Holloway (speaker) is the Raymond A. Spruance Professor of International History, a professor of political science, and an FSI senior fellow. He was co-director of CISAC from 1991 to 1997, and director of FSI from 1998 to 2003. His research focuses on the international history of nuclear weapons, on science and technology in the Soviet Union, and on the relationship between international history and international relations theory. His book Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956 (Yale University Press, 1994) was chosen by the New York Times Book Review as one of the 11 best books of 1994, and it won the Vucinich and Shulman prizes of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies. Since joining the Stanford faculty in 1986 -- first as a professor of political science and later (in 1996) as a professor of history as well -- Holloway has served as chair and co-chair of the International Relations Program (1989-1991), and as associate dean in the School of Humanities and Sciences (1997-1998). Before coming to Stanford, he taught at the University of Lancaster (1967-1970) and the University of Edinburgh (1970-1986). Born in Dublin, Ireland, he received his undergraduate degree in modern languages and literature, and his PhD in social and political sciences, both from Cambridge University.

Michael May
(discussant) is Professor Emeritus (Research) in the Stanford University School of Engineering and a senior fellow with the Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. He is the former co-director of Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, having served seven years in that capacity through January 2000. May is a director emeritus of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, where he worked from 1952 to 1988.  He served as director of the Laboratory from 1965 to 1971. May was a technical adviser to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty negotiating team; a member of the U.S. delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks; and at various times has been a member of the Defense Science Board, the General Advisory Committee to the AEC, the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, the RAND Corporation Board of Trustees, and the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the National Academy of Sciences. May received the Distinguished Public Service and Distinguished Civilian Service Medals from the Department of Defense, and the Ernest Orlando Lawrence Award from the Atomic Energy Commission, as well as other awards. His current research interests are in the area of nuclear and terrorism, energy, security and environment, and the relation of nuclear weapons and foreign policy.

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Stanford University
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Senior Fellow Emeritus at the Freeman Spogli Institute of International Studies
Raymond A. Spruance Professor of International History
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David Holloway is the Raymond A. Spruance Professor of International History, a professor of political science, and an FSI senior fellow. He was co-director of CISAC from 1991 to 1997, and director of FSI from 1998 to 2003. His research focuses on the international history of nuclear weapons, on science and technology in the Soviet Union, and on the relationship between international history and international relations theory. His book Stalin and the Bomb: The Soviet Union and Atomic Energy, 1939-1956 (Yale University Press, 1994) was chosen by the New York Times Book Review as one of the 11 best books of 1994, and it won the Vucinich and Shulman prizes of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies. It has been translated into seven languages, most recently into Chinese. The Chinese translation is due to be published later in 2018. Holloway also wrote The Soviet Union and the Arms Race (1983) and co-authored The Reagan Strategic Defense Initiative: Technical, Political and Arms Control Assessment (1984). He has contributed to the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Foreign Affairs, and other scholarly journals.

Since joining the Stanford faculty in 1986 -- first as a professor of political science and later (in 1996) as a professor of history as well -- Holloway has served as chair and co-chair of the International Relations Program (1989-1991), and as associate dean in the School of Humanities and Sciences (1997-1998). Before coming to Stanford, he taught at the University of Lancaster (1967-1970) and the University of Edinburgh (1970-1986). Born in Dublin, Ireland, he received his undergraduate degree in modern languages and literature, and his PhD in social and political sciences, both from Cambridge University.

Faculty member at the Center for International Security and Cooperation
Affiliated faculty at the Center on Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law
Affiliated faculty at The Europe Center
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FSI Senior Fellow
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Michael May is Professor Emeritus (Research) in the Stanford University School of Engineering and a senior fellow with the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. He is the former co-director of Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, having served seven years in that capacity through January 2000.

May is a director emeritus of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, where he worked from 1952 to 1988, with some brief periods away from the Laboratory. While there, he held a variety of research and development positions, serving as director of the Laboratory from 1965 to 1971.

May was a technical adviser to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty negotiating team; a member of the U.S. delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks; and at various times has been a member of the Defense Science Board, the General Advisory Committee to the AEC, the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, the RAND Corporation Board of Trustees, and the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the National Academy of Sciences. He is a member of the International Institute on Strategic Studies, and a Fellow of the American Physical Society and the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

May received the Distinguished Public Service and Distinguished Civilian Service Medals from the Department of Defense, and the Ernest Orlando Lawrence Award from the Atomic Energy Commission, as well as other awards.

His current research interests are nuclear weapons policy in the US and in other countries; nuclear terrorism; nuclear and other forms of energy and their impact on the environment, health and safety and security; the use of statistics and mathematical models in the public sphere.

May is continuing work on creating a secure future for civilian nuclear applications. In October 2007, May hosted an international workshop on how the nuclear weapon states can help rebuild the consensus underlying the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Proceedings and a summary report are available online or by email request. May also chaired a technical working group on nuclear forensics. The final report is available online.

In April 2007, May in cooperation with former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry and Professor Ashton Carter of Harvard hosted a workshop on what would have to be done to be ready for a terrorist nuclear detonation. The report is available online at the Preventive Defense Project. A summary, titled, "The Day After: Action Following a Nuclear Blast in a U.S. City," was published fall 2007 in Washington Quarterly and is available online.

Recent work also includes a study of nuclear postures in several countries (2007 - 2009); an article on nuclear disarmament and one on tactical nuclear weapons; and a report with Kate Marvel for the American Academy of Arts and Sciences on possible game changers in the nuclear energy industry.

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Dr. Chiozza investigates the popular basis of support for suicide terrorism carried out against Americans and other Western targets in Iraq. Using survey data from six countries in the Middle East and South Asia, he investigates how demographic factors, such as gender, education, and age, interact with specific predispositions and attitudes, including fear of the United States, anti-Semitism, and personal anomie, to explain who would consider suicide terrorism against American and Western targets in Iraq justifiable. Methodologically, he employs Classification and Regression Tree (CART) models, a novel methodology that allows for a parsimonious identification of interactive and non-linear effects in the data. Dr. Chiozza shows that fear of the U.S. trumps other motivations in the countries that are geographically closer to Iraq.

Giacomo Chiozza (speaker) is an Assistant Professor of Political Science in the Travers Department of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley. He holds a PhD from Duke University and a BA from the Università degli Studi di Milano. Before joining the Berkeley Political Science department, he was a post-doctoral fellow in national security at the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University. His research interests include the study of foreign perceptions of the United States in the American World Order and the quantitative analysis of conflict processes. He is the author of "A Crisis like No Other? Anti-Americanism at the Time of the Iraq War" (European Journal of International Relations, forthcoming); "Disaggregating Anti-Americanism: An Analysis of Individual Attitudes Towards the United States" (In Keohane and Katzenstein, Anti-Americanisms in World Politics, 2007), as well as of articles on leaders and conflict processes that were published in the American Journal of Political Science, the Journal of Conflict Resolution, and the Journal of Peace Research.

Aila Matanock (discussant) is a doctoral student in political science at Stanford.  She received an undergraduate degree magna cum laude in Social Studies from Harvard University, while working with the Belfer Center’s Managing the Atom Project and with the Los Alamos National Laboratory.  After graduation, she took a job at the RAND Corporation as a research assistant where she analyzed projects on terrorism and nuclear weapons.  Her current research is on social support for terrorism, the effect of nuclear weapons on conventional conflict, and the reasons for varying levels of shared sovereignty in international agreements.

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Giacomo Chiozza Assistant Professor of Political Science Speaker University of California, Berkeley
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Steven E. Miller is Director of the International Security Program, Editor-in-Chief of the quarterly journal, International Security and also co-editor of the International Security Program's book series, BCSIA Studies in International Security (which is published by the MIT Press). Previously, he was Senior Research Fellow at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and taught Defense and Arms Control Studies in the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. Miller is a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, where he has been a member of their Committee on International Security Studies (CISS). He is also co-chair of the U.S. Pugwash Committee, a member of the Council of International Pugwash, a member of the Advisory Committee of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), a member of the Scientific Committee of the Landau Network Centro Volta (Italy), and formerly a member of the Council of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS).  Miller was born and raised in North Hollywood, California. He did his undergraduate degree at Occidental College in Los Angeles. He received a Master of Arts in Law and Diplomacy (MALD) and a PhD in international relations from the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy. He is married to Deborah K. Louis. They have two sons: Jonathan (1989) and Nicholas (1997).

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Steven E. Miller Editor-in-Chief Speaker <i>International Security</i>
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Nuclear energy production today and in the near future will still be dominated by light-water reactors and therefore there will be a continued need for uranium enrichment. There is currently a focused attention on gas centrifuge enrichment. Gas centrifuge technology is much cheaper and efficient, but also poses a greater security concern, than the former gas diffusion technology.

In order to address the increased security concerns, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is planning and implementing strengthened safeguards procedures involving an increased reliance on continuous and remote monitoring technologies, and environmental sampling. The IAEA is also promoting multilateral enrichment centers as an additional avenue to enhance international security. Much of the current enrichment industry today already involves international partnerships such as between the US and European companies, or the tripartite agreement between Russia, China and the IAEA.

In order for safeguards and multilateral approaches to be viable and effective, they need to be accepted by industry, operators, states and the regulatory agencies. This talk will address how strengthened safeguards could be implemented while accommodating potentially conflicting interests such as: the protection of proprietary information, transparency in monitoring, applicability in multilateral arrangements, cost-effectiveness, and the ultimate goal of ensuring that enrichment activities remain peaceful.

Elena Rodriguez-Vieitez is a postdoctoral science fellow at CISAC, Stanford. Her research concerns proliferation risks associated with the global expansion of nuclear power. She received her PhD in nuclear engineering at the University of California, Berkeley. Her dissertation focused on nuclear physics experimental work conducted at cyclotron facilities at the Lawrence Berkeley National Lab and Michigan State University, where she analyzed nuclear structure and fragmentation reaction data of neutron-rich unstable nuclei. As a nuclear engineering graduate student, she collaborated on a Department of Energy research project on radioactive waste transmutation in molten-salt reactors, where she modeled actinide transmutation efficiency and evaluated proliferation and environmental risks. As a graduate student, Rodriguez-Vieitez was also a research associate on public policy and nuclear threats at the University of California Institute on Global Conflict and Cooperation. Prior to her PhD studies, she was an intern at the National Academy of Sciences' Board on Radioactive Waste Management in Washington, DC.

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Elena Rodriguez-Vieitez Speaker
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Joshua Lederberg, PhD, winner of the 1958 Nobel Prize for his discovery of how bacteria transfer genes, died Feb. 2 of pneumonia. He was 82.

Months after winning the Nobel Prize, Lederberg arrived at the Stanford University School of Medicine to become the chair of genetics in 1959, after leaving his post at the University of Wisconsin. He led Stanford’s genetics department at a time when the medical school earned a reputation for research, until he left in 1978 to become president of The Rockefeller University in New York until 1990.

Lederberg shared the Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine with Edward Tatum and George Beadle. His portion of the prize came from his discovery that bacteria transfer genetic information, overturning the prevailing thought that bacteria weren’t able to swap DNA. Lederberg found that bacteria exchange loops of DNA called plasmids that allow bacteria to pick up new genes, and thereby adapt to new environments. The process Lederberg discovered has become a standard way for researchers to transfer genetic information between bacteria in the lab, and changed how researchers thought about infectious disease. It also laid the foundation for modern molecular biology, genetic engineering and biotechnology.

“Dr. Josh Lederberg was one of the greatest scientists of the 20th century with staggering achievements from virology and microbiology to genetics and planetary exploration,” said Philip Pizzo, MD, dean of the Stanford School of Medicine. “He was not only a world-renowned scientist but also an advocate on science and public policy. His impact on Stanford can be felt to this day and will surely continue long into the future.”

Lederberg was only 33 when he came to Stanford, but he already had a long research career that began in high school.

His father was a rabbi, and when Lederberg was a teen he promised to aid humanity through science rather than faith. He began doing independent research at the science-focused Stuyvesant High School, then continued that research as an undergraduate student at Columbia College. After starting medical school at Columbia University’s College of Physicians and Surgeons he left after two years to pursue a PhD at Yale, working with Tatum and Beadle on studies that led to their shared Nobel.

The year Lederberg arrived to head Stanford’s genetics department was a pivotal one in the medical school’s history. The school was in the process of moving from San Francisco to join the Stanford campus in Palo Alto. During that same time period Arthur Kornberg, PhD, who went on to win the 1959 Nobel Prize in Biochemistry, arrived to found Stanford’s biochemistry department. The departments led by Kornberg and Lederberg helped establish the medical school as a leader in biomedical research.

One of Lederberg’s first recruits to the new department was Leonard Herzenberg, PhD, emeritus professor of genetics, who went on to develop the fluorescence-activated cell sorting machine that opened up new areas of biological research. Herzenberg said Lederberg was supportive of his work without being dominating. “Josh was important for my life and for my career and made possible the development of the FACS,” he said.

Richard Myers, PhD, professor and the current chair of Stanford’s genetics department, called Lederberg a visionary. He said Lederberg recognized the importance of human genetics in a time when few people worked in that field. “That’s how Stanford became well-known in human and population genetics early on before it was really popular,” Myers said.

In addition to his scientific skills, Myers said he respected Lederberg for his diverse interests and generous personality. “He was extremely warm and interesting,” he said.

Throughout his career Lederberg had interests that strayed far from the laboratory bench. The launch of Sputnik in 1957 led Lederberg toward an interest in astronomy that lasted 20 years. His concern about the risk of spacecraft returning to Earth with contaminants from space resulted in a quarantine for space travel that remains in effect today. He went on to design experiments intended to detect the presence of life on Mars, resulting in the Mars Viking lander.

Early on, Lederberg recognized genetics as an information science and became increasingly aware of the value of computers. He formed collaborations with researchers at Stanford to create DENDRAL, a prototype artificial intelligence program for analyzing mass-spectrometric data of molecular structures, which led to further programs for disease diagnosis and management.

These wide-ranging interests were a hallmark of Lederberg’s intellect, according to Paul Berg, PhD, emeritus professor of biochemistry and Nobel Prize winner. “What was extraordinary is that he was at home in so many areas,” Berg said. “He made one of the really major discoveries that paved the way for modern genetics, but then he ventured into areas that were entirely different.”

Lederberg stayed true to his teenage promise to aid mankind. Concerned about the public’s awareness of science, he wrote a weekly science column in the Washington Post from 1966-71. Among the topics he addressed were infectious disease outbreaks and biological weapons, both of which were interests that he also pursued through his academic work. He served on national committees for biological weapons and became a national arms control advisor. These interests also led to collaborations with Stanford political scientists and physicists, which eventually resulted in the creation of an undergraduate curriculum in national security and arms control.

Lederberg left Stanford in 1978 to become president of The Rockefeller University. While there, he continued his research and, despite retirement in 1990, continued to work internationally to prevent the use of biological weapons, also serving on the executive committee and as a consulting professor at Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC).

Over the course of his life, Lederberg was elected to the National Academy of Sciences, the Institute of Medicine, received the Presidential Medal of Freedom and the National Medal of Science, was named an honorary life member of the New York Academy of Sciences, was awarded Foreign Membership of the Royal Society of London and holds the title of Commandeur, L’ordre des arts et des lettres in France.

Lederberg is survived by his wife Marguerite Stein Lederberg, PhD, his son David Kirsch and his daughter Anne Lederberg, and two grandchildren. Funeral services were held Feb. 5.

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Steven E. Koonin, chief scientist for BP in London, gave an address titled "Energy, Environment, Security: Can We Have It All?" at 4 p.m. Monday, Feb. 4, in the Frances C. Arrillaga Alumni Center.

The talk, free and open to the public, was this year's Drell Lecture, hosted by Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies.

In 2004, Koonin joined BP, one of the world's largest energy companies, as group chief scientist. He is responsible for the company's long-range technology plans and activities, particularly those "beyond petroleum." His purview also includes BP's major university research programs around the world, and he provides technical advice to BP's senior executives.

The annual Drell Lecture, named for CISAC co-founder Sidney Drell, professor emeritus at the Stanford Linear Accelerator Center, and endowed by Albert and Cicely Wheelon, traditionally addresses a current, critical national or international security issue with important scientific or technical dimensions. Previous Drell lecturers have included New York Times correspondent Thom Shanker; the Rev. J. Bryan Hehir, a Harvard professor; Mohamed ElBaradei, director-general of the International Atomic Energy Agency; physician Margaret Hamburg; astronaut and Stanford alumna Sally Ride; and physicist Freeman Dyson.

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Steven E. Koonin, chief scientist for BP in London.
Rod Searcey
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These days, it's rare to pick up a newspaper and not see a story related to intelligence. From the investigations of the 9/11 commission, to accusations of illegal wiretapping, to debates on whether it's acceptable to torture prisoners for information, intelligence—both accurate and not—is driving domestic and foreign policy. And yet, in part because of its inherently secretive nature, intelligence has received very little scholarly study. Into this void comes Reforming Intelligence, a timely collection of case studies written by intelligence experts, and sponsored by the Center for Civil-Military Relations (CCMR) at the Naval Postgraduate School, that collectively outline the best practices for intelligence services in the United States and other democratic states.

Reforming Intelligence suggests that intelligence is best conceptualized as a subfield of civil-military relations, and is best compared through institutions. The authors examine intelligence practices in the United States, United Kingdom, and France, as well as such developing democracies as Brazil, Taiwan, Argentina, and Russia. While there is much more data related to established democracies, there are lessons to be learned from states that have created (or re-created) intelligence institutions in the contemporary political climate. In the end, reading about the successes of Brazil and Taiwan, the failures of Argentina and Russia, and the ongoing reforms in the United States yields a handful of hard truths. In the murky world of intelligence, that's an unqualified achievement.

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Martha Crenshaw is a pioneer in terrorism studies, one of a handful of scholars worldwide who started investigating the subject long before Sept. 11, 2001.

Crenshaw, who joined CISAC this year as a senior fellow at FSI and a political science professor by courtesy, brings three decades of study to her current agenda of examining distinctions between so-called old and new terrorism, how terrorism ends, and why the United States is the target of terrorism.

"We are very fortunate to have Martha Crenshaw join CISAC as a senior fellow," said Scott Sagan, CISAC co-director. "Her detailed knowledge of the inside workings of terrorist organizations and her deep understanding of earlier counter-terrorist campaigns have brought much-needed historical perspective to contemporary policy debates after 9/11."

Associate professor of law Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, who led the search that resulted in Crenshaw's hiring, said her "combination of attention to historical detail, interdisciplinary methods, and knowledge of institutional context has made her one of the nation's foremost scholars of terrorism. Her appointment is great news for CISAC and Stanford, where she will strengthen an already significant scholarly community working on homeland security and terrorism."

Coming to Stanford from Wesleyan University, where she was the Colin and Nancy Campbell Professor of Global Issues and Democratic Thought and a government professor, Crenshaw said she found the opportunity to join an interdisciplinary research center a welcome change.

"CISAC's and my interests merged perfectly," she said, as the center was looking to build its research expertise in terrorism. She said she looks forward to teaching graduate students in the Ford Dorsey Program in International Policy Studies as well as working with research colleagues at CISAC and across campus.

Crenshaw's terrorism studies began with a graduate seminar paper she wrote on actions by the FLN, or National Liberation Front, during Algeria's war for independence from France in the 1950s and 60s. She arrived at the topic the way many professors advise students to do--she noted in a study of Vietnam-era guerrilla warfare the comment that "no one has studied terrorism."

That seminar paper inspired her dissertation, which formed the basis of her 1978 book, Revolutionary Terrorism: The FLN in Algeria, 1954-1962, a case study in the strategic use of terrorism by a revolutionary nationalist movement.

Having written numerous articles and edited four books on terrorism, Crenshaw is now editing a book tentatively titled The Consequences of Counterterrorist Policies in Democracies. The Russell Sage Foundation supported the research, which Crenshaw said illuminates issues such as "the strength of executive power, effects of counterterrorism legislation on minorities, and unintended consequences of counterterrorism policies."

As a lead investigator with the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism at the University of Maryland, a Department of Homeland Security Center of Excellence, Crenshaw is also researching why the United States is the target of terrorism, a study that could be especially useful in informing counterterrorism policy.

Crenshaw "trace[s] the evolution of anti-American terrorism over time--since the mid-1960s," she said, comparing groups that used terrorism to others with similar ideas that have not resorted to terrorism. Comparing case studies, she explained, allows her to "analyze incentives for the use of terrorism."

In "The Debate over 'New' versus 'Old' Terrorism," a paper Crenshaw presented at the American Political Science Association annual meeting in September--and which will be published as a chapter in an edited volume, she questions oft-heard claims that terrorism in recent years has taken on a new character to become more religious and lethal. She found the distinctions too hastily drawn and possibly dangerous.

"There is no fundamental difference between 'old' and 'new' terrorism," she said.

"Rejecting our accumulated knowledge of terrorism by dismissing it as 'obsolete'" would be a mistake that could lead to bad policy choices, she added. Before 9/ll, assumptions that "new" terrorism would forsake the "old" technique of hijacking and turn to weapons of mass destruction turned out to be wrong, she pointed out.

Crenshaw said researchers and policymakers should "ask why some groups cause large numbers of civilian casualties and others do not, rather than assuming that religious beliefs are the explanation for lethality."

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The US military is very dependent on satellites. The existing satellite architecture used has single point failures to existing recognized threats. A concept that could provide a significant part of the solution of how the US as well as other states can overcome such vulnerabilities is discussed. The prescription centers on a new satellite architecture --the 'Multi-tiered Microsatellite Constellation Architecture' (MMCA) -- which reduces risks to space assets by increasing system redundancy, modularity and dispersion through the use of microsatellite constellations in several orbital tiers. An example constellation design is given for each of the five major contemporary military space uses -- early warning, reconnaissance, signals intelligence, military communications and navigation. The scheme is placed in the context of other complimentary elements that are likely to be necessary to enable security of space assets, in particular: protection of space systems; responsive space access; terrestrial alternatives; space surveillance; treaties; and verification means thereof. Since the Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) test, the response of the US military in part has been to re-double efforts to develop Operationally Responsive Space (ORS). Whilst ORS is a key ingredient, it must be complemented by a more secure satellite architecture. In addition to dealing with satellite vulnerabilities, the talk will discuss issues relating to space-based weapons and their effectiveness.

William Marshall is based in the Small Spacecraft Office at NASA's Ames Research Center in California. He holds a PhD in Physics from the University of Oxford, U.K., where his thesis centred on an experimental proposal to create macroscopic mass quantum superposition states. He conducted two years of his research at the University of California in Santa Barbara. He holds a degree in Physics with Space Science and Technology (MPhys) from the University of Leicester, UK. He has held placements at the European Space Agency, NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Marshall Space Flight Center and the Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (POST) in London. Will's work at NASA centers on mission planning, in particular trajectory analysis, and spacecraft testing for a variety of microsatellite missions, focusing on lunar orbiters and landers. He is working on a project on the topic of space traffic management. Will serves on the Governance Group of the Space Security Index research project and also holds positions of non-resident fellow at both the Space Policy Institute (SPI) of the George Washington University and the Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. In these capacities, Will has published on strategic benefits and costs of the deployment of space weapons and more broadly the increasingly important role that space is playing in global security issues. Will is the Global co-Chair of the Space Generation Advisory Council to the United Nations Programme on Space Applications (SGAC), which represents the views of students and young professionals interested in space to the UN and space agencies around the world.

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William Marshall Speaker NASA - Ames Research Center
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Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones is the well-known scholar of U.S. intelligence agencies and the author of numerous books, among them The CIA and American Democracy; Cloak and Dollar: A History of American Secret Intelligence; Changing Differences: Women and the Shaping of American Foreign Policy; and Peace Now! American Society and the Ending of the Vietnam War. His most recent book, The FBI: A History (Yale University Press, September 2007), examines the bureau's history from a European perspective and in the context of American history, including the prism of race.

Jeffreys-Jones, a professor of American History at the University of Edinburgh, received his BA from the University College of Wales, Aberystwyth, and his PhD from the University of Cambridge. Other appointments have included a fellowship at the Charles Warren Center for the Study of American History, Harvard University; stipendiary, JFK Institut für Nordamerikastudien, Berlin; and Canadian Commonwealth Fellow and Visiting Professor, University of Toronto.

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Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones Professor of American History Speaker University of Edinburgh
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