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President Volodymyr Zelensky reportedly will soon travel to Paris to meet with French President Emmanuel Macron. That is a trip very much worth making. After German Chancellor Angela Merkel steps down this fall, Zelensky may find himself more dependent on Macron, both in the Normandy format and for leadership in the European Union regarding the conflict that Russia has inflicted on his country.

The sooner Zelensky gets to Paris, the better.

First, he could ask Macron to call explicitly on Vladimir Putin to deescalate the tensions Russia has caused by its large and continuing build-up of military forces near Ukraine.

On April 3, the German and French foreign ministries issued a statement calling for restraint on “all sides”—a wrongly balanced appeal given that Russian actions provoked the crisis.  Merkel corrected this on April 8, when she spoke with Putin and “demanded that this [Russian] build-up be unwound in order to de-escalate the situation.” Macron has yet to speak in such clear terms.

Second, Zelensky should strengthen Macron’s understanding of the conflict and Ukraine’s position.  The Germans and French have for six years sought to broker a settlement between the Ukrainians and Russians in the Normandy format, with Merkel playing the lead role.  Later this year, when she steps down, the leadership of that process may well pass from Berlin to Paris.

Ukrainians often express frustration with the Normandy format and the Minsk II agreement that it produced in February 2015.  The terms of the agreement were never fully implemented, and thousands of Ukrainians have since died.  Berlin and Paris have not found the key to getting Russian and Russian proxy forces to leave Donbas, to say nothing of occupied Crimea.  (In fairness, it is not clear that anyone could have.)

However, the Normandy process has kept the two large continental European powers engaged in trying to resolve the conflict. That is to Kyiv’s advantage. The Minsk II agreement has provided the basis for sustaining European Union sanctions on Russia, sanctions that have proven far more resilient than many would have predicted when EU member states first approved them in 2014.

Merkel and German diplomats deserve credit for maintaining EU unity on sanctions, despite calls from some member states to move back toward business as usual with Moscow.  She has taken a greater interest in the Russia-Ukraine conflict than Macron or his predecessor.  That reflects in part her background, having been raised in the German Democratic Republic, her understanding of Russia, and her command of Russian.

But Merkel steps down this fall after 16 years as chancellor. While the German election is still more than five months off, most predictions suggest one of two coalitions will result: a combination of the Christian Democratic Union/Christian Socialist Union and Greens Party, or a grouping of the Greens, the Social Democratic Party, and Free Democratic Party.

In the first combination, the likely candidates for chancellor are Armin Laschet and Markus Soeder.  Both come from what was West Germany.  Neither has real experience with or appears to have shown particular interest in the Russia-Ukraine conflict.  Either might question the investment that Merkel put into the Normandy discussions, given that they have not succeeded and offer little pay-off in terms of German domestic politics.

In the second combination, the chancellor likely would come from the Greens.  That could bode well for Kyiv, as the Greens are skeptical about Russia, criticize Moscow’s human rights record, and oppose the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline.  However, the Greens have been out of government since 2005, and they might need time to get up to speed.

If the new German chancellor is uninterested in or needs time to engage in a meaningful manner, leadership within the Normandy format will move to Paris, something the Kremlin likely would welcome.  Macron has taken a less harsh tone on Russian misbehavior.  He has sought to regenerate links with Moscow.  For example, before the 2019 G7 summit in France, he hosted Putin for a bilateral meeting, seemingly seeking to make Paris a bridge between Moscow and the rest of the G7.

A pro-Russian tilt, even a small one, in the duo heading up the Normandy format process is hardly in Kyiv’s interest.  Zelensky needs to make his strongest possible case to Macron as regards the realities of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, for continuing to steward the Normandy format with Merkel’s steadiness, and for not succumbing to Putin’s blandishments, which would come at Ukraine’s expense.

 

Originally for Kyiv Post

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President Volodymyr Zelensky reportedly will soon travel to Paris to meet with French President Emmanuel Macron. That is a trip very much worth making.

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Dr. Brandon Kirk Williams is currently on detail at the Department of Defense in the Office of Secretary of Defense, Force Development and Emerging Capabilities. Brandon is a senior fellow at the Center for Global Security Research at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory. Brandon’s research examines the intersection of emerging technologies, innovation, and national security policy. He earned a Ph.D. in history from the University of California, Berkeley, in May 2020.

Starting as a CGSR postdoctoral fellow, he focused on cybersecurity before developing into a research agenda on quantum and AI as a senior fellow. He organized three CGSR cybersecurity workshops in addition to assisting in workshops on AI, US-China strategic competition, and latent emerging technologies. His outside publications draw upon this research expertise to consider the effect of technology competition on shaping US national security policy. He also contributed to over-the-horizon reports for the National Nuclear Security Administration on emerging technology as well as the nuclear security enterprise’s workforce of the future.

Brandon was selected as a 2022-2023 Wilson Center China Initiative non-resident fellow that culminated in chapter titled "The Innovation Race: US-China Science and Technology Competition and the Quantum Revolution.” He designed and researched a chapter-length project analyzing Chinese initiatives to steer global innovation by seizing the commanding heights of science and technology. The chapter also investigated Chinese investments to incubate a thriving quantum technology ecosystem. Since, he has published on quantum competition that may disrupt security, economics, and everyday life.

As a Ph.D. student, Brandon was a Fulbright-Hays grantee in Indonesia, and conducted multi-sited dissertation fieldwork in Indonesia, India, Switzerland, and throughout the United States. Brandon uses his doctoral training in history to make sense of technology competition and to contribute to discussions on the future of U.S. national security.

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Jacqueline L. Hazelton is the executive editor of the journal International Security. She was previously an associate professor at the U.S. Naval War College and an associate of the International Security Program at the Belfer Center, Harvard Kennedy School. Hazelton's research ranges from grand strategy, great power military intervention, and U.S. foreign and military policy to counterinsurgency, terrorism, and the uses of military power. She recently published Bullets Not Ballots: Success in Counterinsurgency Warfare and is working on a manuscript about great powers, liberal values, and military intervention.

Prior to her faculty appointment at the Naval War College, Hazelton was a visiting assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Rochester and a research fellow with the Belfer Center's International Security Program. Earlier experience included a stint as an international journalist with the Associated Press where she analyzed and reported on world events from Tokyo to Kabul and covered U.S. news as well. She received M.A.’s in English Literature and in International Relations from the University of Chicago and her Ph.D. from Brandeis University's Department of Politics.

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Herbert Lin
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On Feb. 12, White House National Security Adviser Robert O’Brien announced that the U.S. government has “evidence that Huawei has the capability secretly to access sensitive and personal information in systems it maintains and sells around the world.” This represents the latest attempt by the Trump administration to support an argument that allied governments—and the businesses they oversee—should purge certain telecommunications networks of Huawei equipment. The position reflects the preferred approach in the United States, which is to issue outright bans against select companies (including Huawei) that meet an as-yet-unknown threshold of risk to national security.

 

Read the rest at Lawfare Blog

 

 

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Jacek Durkalec is a staff officer at NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. Prior to joining NATO, he served as a senior fellow (2020-2023) and as a postdoctoral research fellow (2017-2020) at the Center for Global Security Research (CGSR) at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). Jacek was also a research analyst at the Polish Institute of International Affairs (PISM) from 2010 to 2017, a staff member in the Missile Defense Office of the Polish Ministry of National Defense in 2009-2010, and an intern in the Strategic Planning Unit of the Executive Office of the Secretary-General of the United Nations in 2008. In 2015, he was a visiting scholar at the National Security Affairs Department of the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. He holds a doctorate in political science (2016) and master’s degree in international relations (2008) from Jagiellonian University in Krakow, Poland. He has been a CISAC affiliate since 2019.

Jacek authored more than 60 publications and presented at more than 60 conferences and seminars on topics related to US extended deterrence in Europe and the Indo-Pacific region, NATO deterrence and defense policy, nuclear and conventional arms control, missile defense, and WMD non-proliferation.

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Seminar recording: https://youtu.be/fYUK-ALGqAE

 

Abstract:  Russian influence operations during the 2016 US elections, and the investigations that followed, revealed the broad scope of Russian political warfare against Western democracies. Since then, Russian operations have targeted the UK, France, Germany, Ukraine, and others. Other state and non-state actors, motivated by politics or profit, have also learned and adapted the Kremlin’s tool-kit. With the 2020 elections a year away, what have we learned about foreign information operations? How has the transatlantic community responded and what are the threats we are likely to face?  Drawing on extensive research on transatlantic relations, disinformation, and Russian foreign policy, Dr. Polyakova will discuss the state of policy options to address disinformation, analyze Russian intentions, and highlight emerging threats.

 

Speaker’s Biography:

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Alina Polyakova is the founding director of the Project on Global Democracy and Emerging Technology and a fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe at the Brookings Institution, where she leads the Foreign Policy program’s Democracy Working Group. She is also adjunct professor of European studies at the Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) at Johns Hopkins University. Her work examines Russian political warfare, European populism, digital authoritarianism, and the implications of emerging technologies to democracies. Polyakova's book, "The Dark Side of European Integration" (Ibidem-Verlag and Columbia University Press, 2015) analyzed the rise of far-right political parties in Europe.  She holds a master’s and doctorate from the University of California, Berkeley, and a bachelor's in economics and sociology with highest honors from Emory University. 

Alina Polyakova Director, Project on Global Democracy and Emerging Technology The Brookings Institution
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Michal Smetana is an Associate Professor at the Institute of International Studies of the Faculty of Social Sciences, Charles University, Director of the Peace Research Center Prague (PRCP), and Head Researcher at the Experimental Lab for International Security Studies (ELISS). Previously, he was a Fulbright Scholar at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC), Stanford University, and a Visiting Research Fellow at the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and Peace Research Institute Frankfurt (PRIF). His main research interests lie at the intersection of security studies, international relations, and political psychology, with a specific focus on nuclear weapons in world politics, arms control and disarmament, contestation of international norms, and the use of experimental survey methodology to study public and elite attitudes towards foreign policy. His articles have been published in International Studies Quarterly, Security Studies, Journal of Conflict Resolution, International Affairs, Journal of Peace Research, International Studies Review, Contemporary Security Policy, Survival, Conflict Management and Peace Science, and many other scholarly and policy journals. He is the author of Nuclear Deviance. In addition to his academic work, he is frequently invited to talk about international security matters in the media and conducts policy analyses for NATO, the Czech Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Czech Ministry of Interior. 

 

Selected publications:

Michal Smetana. 2023. Microfoundations of Domestic Audience Costs in Nondemocratic Regimes: Experimental Evidence from Putin’s Russia. Journal of Peace Research. Forthcoming in 2023.

Ondrej Rosendorf, Michal Smetana, and Marek Vranka. 2023. “Algorithmic Aversion? Experimental Evidence on the Elasticity of Public Attitudes to ‘Killer Robots’” Security Studies. Forthcoming in 2023.

Michal Smetana, Marek Vranka, and Ondrej Rosendorf. 2023. “The “Commitment Trap” Revisited: Experimental Evidence on Ambiguous Nuclear Threats.” Journal of Experimental Political Science. First view: March 2023, 1–14.

Michal Smetana and Michal Onderco. 2023. “From Moscow with a Mushroom Cloud? Russian Public Attitudes to the Use of Nuclear Weapons in a Conflict with NATO.” Journal of Conflict Resolution. 67(2–3), 183–209.

Michal Smetana, Marek Vranka, and Ondrej Rosendorf. 2023. “The Lesser Evil? Experimental Evidence on the Strength of Nuclear and Chemical Weapon “Taboos.” Conflict Management and Peace Science. 40(1), 3–21.

Michal Onderco, Michal Smetana, and Tom Etienne. 2023. “Hawks in the making? European public views on nuclear weapons post-Ukraine.” Global Policy. 14(2), 305–317.

Michal Smetana and Michal Onderco. 2022. “Elite-Public Gaps in Attitudes to Nuclear Weapons: New Evidence from a Survey of German Citizens and Parliamentarians.” International Studies Quarterly. 66(2), 1–10.

Michal Smetana and Joseph O’Mahoney. 2022. “NPT as an Antifragile System: How Contestation Improves the Nonproliferation Regime.” Contemporary Security Policy. 43(1), 24–49.

Michal Onderco, Tom Etienne, and Michal Smetana. 2022. “Ideology and the Red Button: How Ideology Shapes Nuclear Weapons Use Preferences in Europe.” Foreign Policy Analysis. 18(4), 1–20.

Ondrej Rosendorf, Michal Smetana, and Marek Vranka. 2022. “Autonomous Weapons and Ethical Judgments: Experimental Evidence on Attitudes towards the Military Use of ‘Killer Robots.’” Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology. 28(2), 177–183.

Ondrej Rosendorf, Michal Smetana, and Marek Vranka. 2021. “Disarming Arguments: Public Opinion and Nuclear Abolition.” Survival. 63(6), 183–200.

Michal Smetana and Carmen Wunderlich. 2021. “Forum: Nonuse of Nuclear Weapons in World Politics: Toward the Third Generation of ‘Nuclear Taboo’ Research.” International Studies Review. 23(3), 1072–1099.

Kamil Klosek, Vojtech Bahensky, Michal Smetana, and Jan Ludvik. 2021. “Frozen Conflicts in World Politics: A New Dataset.” Journal of Peace Research58(4), 849–858.

Michal Smetana, Michal Onderco, and Tom Etienne. 2021. “Do Germany and the Netherlands Want to Say Goodbye to US Nuclear Weapons?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 77(4), 215–221.

Michal Onderco and Michal Smetana. 2021. “German Views on US Nuclear Weapons in Europe: Public and Elite Perspectives.” European Security. 30(4), 630–648.

Michal Smetana and Marek Vranka. 2021. “How Moral Foundations Shape Public Approval of Nuclear, Chemical, and Conventional Strikes: New Evidence from Experimental Surveys.” International Interactions47(2), 374–390. 

Michal Onderco, Michal Smetana, Sico van der Meer, and Tom Etienne. 2021. “When do the Dutch Want to Join the Nuclear Ban Treaty? Findings of a Public Opinion Survey.” The Nonproliferation Review. 28(1–3), 149–163.

Hana Martinkova and Michal Smetana. 2020. “Dynamics of Norm Contestation in the Chemical Weapons Convention: The Case of ‘Non-lethal Agents.’” Politics. 40(4), 428–443.

Michal Smetana. 2020. “(De-)stigmatising the outsider: nuclear-armed India, United States, and the global nonproliferation order.” Journal of International Relations and Development. 23, 535–558.

Michal Smetana and Jan Ludvík. 2019. “Theorising Indirect Coercion: The Logic of Triangular Strategies.” International Relations. 33(3), 455–474.

Michal Smetana and Jan Ludvík. 2019. “Between War and Peace: A Dynamic Reconceptualization of ‘Frozen Conflicts.’” Asia-Europe Journal. 17(1), 1–14.

Sumit Ganguly, Michal Smetana, Sannia Abdullah, and Ales Karmazin. 2019. “India, Pakistan, and the Kashmir Dispute: Unpacking the Dynamics of South Asian Frozen Conflict.” Asia-Europe Journal17(1), 129–143.

Michal Smetana and Michal Onderco. 2018. “Bringing the Outsiders in: An Interactionist Perspective on Deviance and Normative Change.” Cambridge Review of International Affairs31(6), 516–536.

Michal Smetana. 2018. “A Nuclear Posture Review for the Third Nuclear Age.” The Washington Quarterly41(3), 137–157.

Michal Smetana2018. “The Prague Agenda: An Obituary?” New Perspectives: Interdisciplinary Journal of Central & East European Politics and International Relations. 26(1), 16–22.

Michal Smetana and Jan Ludvík. 2017. “Correspondence – Nuclear Proliferation, Preventive Strikes, and the Optimist-Pessimist Divide.” The Nonproliferation Review. 23(5–6), 535–536. 

Michal Smetana. 2016. “Stuck on Disarmament: The European Union and the 2015 NPT Review Conference.” International Affairs92(1), 137–152.

Michal Smetana and Ondrej Ditrych. 2015. “The More the Merrier: Time for a Multilateral Turn in Nuclear Disarmament.” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists. 71(3), 30–37.

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Dr. Melissa K. Griffith is a Lecturer in Technology and National Security at the Alperovitch Institute for Cybersecurity Studies at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies and a Non-Resident Research Fellow at the University of California, Berkeley’s Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity (CLTC). She works at the intersection between technology and national security, specializing in cybersecurity, semiconductors, and 5G networks with a focus on national risk and resilience models. Prior to joining Johns Hopkins SAIS, Griffith was the Director of Emerging Technology and National Security and a Senior Program Associate with the Woodrow Wilson Center’s Science and Technology Innovation Program (STIP); a Pre-Doctoral Fellow at Stanford University’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC); a Visiting Scholar at George Washington University's Institute for International Science and Technology Policy (IISTP); a Visiting Research Fellow at the Research Institute on the Finnish Economy (ETLA) in Helsinki, Finland; and a Visiting Researcher at the Université Libre de Bruxelles (ULB) in Brussels, Belgium. Griffith holds a Ph.D. and an M.A. in Political Science from the University of California, Berkeley and a B.A. in International Relations from Agnes Scott College.

For additional information (including a comprehensive list of publications, prior positions and affiliations, presentations and public appearances, and teaching experience) please visit www.melissakgriffith.com.

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Dr. Daniel Metlay is now an independent researcher who is working on a book dealing with the institutional and technical challenges of developing a deep-mined, geologic repository for high-activity radioactive waste in the United States and abroad.  In addition to his Stanford affiliation, Dr. Metlay is a Senior Fellow at B. John Garrick Institute for Risk Sciences located at the University of California, Los Angeles, and is a Visiting Senior Scholar at George Washington University in Washington, DC.

Dr. Metlay recently retired after 24-years of service on the senior professional staff of the Nuclear Waste Technical Review Board.  Prior to joining the NWTRB, Dr. Metlay taught organizational theory and public policy in the political science departments of Indiana University, Bloomington, and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.  He also worked as a Research Scientist at Brookhaven National Laboratory, investigating operational and organizational issues at nuclear power plants.  In addition, Dr. Metlay served as a Task Force Director on the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board and has testified before Congress and state legislatures.  He holds Bachelor of Science degrees from Caltech in molecular biology and medieval history and his Master's and Doctoral degrees in public policy from the University of California, Berkeley.

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Max Smeets
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Max Smeets is a Senior Researcher at the Center for Security Studies (CSS) at ETH Zurich and Director of the European Cyber Conflict Research Initiative. He is the author of ‘No Shortcuts: Why States Struggle to Develop a Military Cyber-​Force’ (Oxford University Press & Hurst, 2022) and co-​editor of ‘Deter, Disrupt or Deceive? Assessing Cyber Conflict as an Intelligence Contest’ (Georgetown University Press, 2023), with Robert Chesney, and published widely on cyber statecraft, strategy and risk.

He was previously a postdoctoral fellow and lecturer at Stanford University CISAC and a College Lecturer at Keble College, University of Oxford. He has also held research and fellowship positions at New America, Columbia University SIPA, Sciences Po CERI, and NATO CCD COE. Before his academic career, Max worked in finance in London and Amsterdam.

He received a BA in Economics, Politics and Statistics summa cum laude from University College Roosevelt, Utrecht University and an M.Phil (Brasenose College) and DPhil (St. John’s College) in International Relations from the University of Oxford.

 

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