A look at experience in Iran and North Korea--and the origins of the NPT and safeguards in the 1960s--offers insights into the authority of IAEA nuclear inspectors.
On Oct. 9, 2006, North Korea conducted a nuclear test and proclaimed itself a world nuclear power. The explosion yield was less than one kiloton, much less than the first nuclear test of other states and even less than the expected yield of four kilotons that North Korean officials forecast to their Chinese counterparts.
Nonetheless, the test demonstrated Pyongyang's mastery of the nuclear fuel cycle and at least rudimentary nuclear-weapon design and manufacturing capabilities.
On Feb. 13, North Korea signed a six-party agreement to take initial actions to implement a Sept. 19, 2005 Joint Statement for the eventual abandonment of its nuclear weapons program. While this is welcome news, the road to the abandonment of North Korean nuclear weapons and capabilities will be long and arduous, and success is far from guaranteed. Its nuclear program still poses significant risks to international security, the most serious of which is the export of nuclear materials, expertise or technologies to states such as Iran and the potential for subsequent proliferation to terrorists.
The White House still avoids the label, but by any reasonable historical standard, the Iraqi civil war has begun. The record of past such wars suggests that Washington cannot stop this one -- and that Iraqis will be able to reach a power-sharing deal only after much more fighting, if then. The United States can help bring about a settlement eventually by balancing Iraqi factions from afar, but there is little it can do to avert bloodshed now.
Chapter 4 in Terrorism Financing and State Responses: A Comparative Perspective (Stanford 2007), edited by Harold Trinkunas and Jeanne K. Giraldo.
This chapter uses a rational choice approach to examine the political economy of terrorist financing. To date, much of the theoretical literature and almost all government-sponsored reports discuss terrorist organizations as though they are made up of ideologically driven purists who share a uniform commitment to the cause. This assumption is needed to explain how these organizations can both (1) efficiently distribute funds and (2) operate covertly without the checks and balances most organizations require. However, upon closer inspection, one often sees substantial differences in the preferences of key players in terrorist networks. Two selection processes explain why these differences exist, and a principal-agent framework shows how these differences lead to inefficiencies in terrorist financial systems. Terrorist organizations face a trade-offbetween enduring the inefficiency or employing corrective strategies that create vulnerabilities. Governments can undertake specific actions to make this trade-offmore problematic.
The book examines financial and material resources, correctly perceived as the life blood of terrorist operations. Governments have determined that fighting the financial infrastructure of terrorist organizations is the key to their defeat. Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, a good deal has been learned about sources and mechanisms used to finance the "new" terrorism, which is religiously motivated and exponentially more deadly than previous generations of terrorist organizations. New policies have been devised to combat the threat and existing policies have been enacted with greater vigor than ever before. Five years into the battle against terrorist financing, it is time to take stock of the emerging literature on terrorist financing, cut through a number of myths that have developed around the issue, and assess the current policy debates.
Through a series of thematic chapters and organizational and regional case studies--examining terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda and Hezbollah, and regions such as East Africa, Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, and South East Asia--the authors provide a comprehensive assessment of the state of our knowledge about the nature of terrorism financing, and the evolution and effectiveness of terrorist strategies and government responses. This volume focuses on the preferences of major actors within terrorist networks and government agencies and the domestic and international contexts in which they make decisions and execute their strategies. It argues that both terrorism financing and government responses face problems of coordination, oversight, and information asymmetries that render them vulnerable to disruption.
William J. Perry, former secretary of defense and Iraq Study Group member, was joined by Larry Diamond, former Coalition Provisional Authority advisor, and James D. Fearon, professor of political science at Stanford, for a Jan. 22 panel discussion on "Iraq: The Way Forward." In the discussion, which took place at FSI, Perry, Diamond, and Fearon all argued against sending more troops to Iraq, with Perry noting that the "cumulative effect of all these strategic errors has been a disastrous security situation."
The speaker, Macartan Humphreys, is an assistant professor of political science at Columbia University and a visiting professor at CISAC. He is a research scholar at the Center for Globalization and Sustainable Development at the Earth Institute at Columbia and a member of the Millennium Development goals project poverty task force, where he works on conflict and development issues. Overall his research is on African political economy and formal political theory. His dissertation on the politics of factions developed game theoretic models of conflict and cooperation between internally divided groups. More recent research focuses on rebellions in West Africa, where he has undertaken field research in the Casamance, Mali, and Sierra Leone. Ongoing research now includes experimental work on ethnic politics, econometric work on natural resource conflicts, game theoretic work on ethnic politics and large N survey work of ex-combatants in Sierra Leone. Humphreys' work is motivated by concerns over the linkages between politics, conflict and human development. He received his PhD in government from Harvard in 2003 and his MPhil in economics from Oxford in 2000.
The respondent, David Patel, is a 2006-2007 predoctoral fellow at CDDRL (fall quarter) and CISAC (winter and spring quarters). He is completing a dissertation looking at questions of religious organization and collective action in the Middle East, with a theoretical focus on the relationship of organization and information in particular. Empirically, his study looks at Islamic institutions and their role in political action in a wide range of settings including 7th century garrison cities of the early Islamic empire, through the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq. Patel has spent a great deal of time in the Middle East over the last several years, including extended visits to Yemen, Morocco, Jordan, and Iraq, where he spent seven months in Basra conducting research beginning in the fall of 2003. He works with David Laitin, Jim Fearon, and Avner Greif at Stanford. In fall 2007 he will join the faculty at Cornell University as an assistant professor of political science.
Reuben W. Hills Conference Room
Testimony before the U.S. Senate Armed Services Committee on Jan. 27, 2007, on the situation in Iraq and the Bush administration's strategy. The full committee heard testimony from William Perry, co-director of the Preventive Defense Project at CISAC and former secretary of defense; Ambassador Dennis B. Ross, counselor and Ziegler Distinguished Fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, former director for policy planning in the Department of State, and former special Middle East coordinator; and General John M. Keane (retired, U.S. Army), former Army vice chief of staff.
It has become clear to the American public that we need a new way forward in Iraq. In December 2006, the Iraq Study Group (ISG), a bipartisan group formed by the Congress, concluded nine months of study and proposed a new way forward. The ISG proposal recognized that the key actions needed in Iraq must be taken by the Iraqi government and the Iraqi Army, and provided the incentives for those actions. The ISG proposal also recognized that the U.S. needed to begin the redeployment of its overstretched ground forces in order to meet its security responsibilities outside of Iraq.
Perhaps, most importantly, the recommendations of the bipartisan ISG provided an opportunity for the nation to come together on Iraq. Last week, President Bush announced what he called a 'New Way Forward' in Iraq that does not follow the ISG ecommendations. He has instead chosen a course of action that I believe is not likely to succeed because it is tactical, not strategic; because it does not entail real conditionality for the Iraqi government; and because it will only deepen the divide in the country. So in my testimony today I will explain the differences in the two approaches, and why I believe that the ISG proposals better serve the interests of the United States.
Andrew Bennett is a professor of government at Georgetown University. He is the co-author, with Alexander George, of Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences (MIT, 2005), and the author of Condemned to Repetition? The Rise, Fall, and Reprise of Soviet-Russian Military Interventionism 1973-1996 (MIT Press, 1999). Bennett served as a Council on Foreign Relations fellow at the Department of Defense in 1994-1995, and is a former fellow at the Center for International Security and Arms Control at Stanford University and the Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University.
CISAC Conference Room
Testimony before the U.S. House of Representatives' Armed Services Committee on alternative perspectives on the president's strategy for Iraq. The full committee heard from the following witnesses: William J. Perry, CISAC; Lawrence J. Korb, Center for American Progress; and Frederick W. Kagan, American Enterprise Institute.
The Iraq Study Group (ISG) proposal recognized that the key actions needed in Iraq must be taken by the Iraqi government and the Iraqi Army, and provided the incentives for those actions. The ISG proposal also recognized that the U.S. needed to begin the redeployment of overstretched ground forces in order to meet security responsibilities outside of Iraq. Perhaps most importantly, the recommendations of the bipartisan ISG provided an opportunity for the nation to come together on Iraq. Last week, President Bush announced a new way forward in Iraq that does not follow the ISG recommendations. He has chosen a course of action unlikely to succeed because it is tactical not strategic; because it does not entail real conditionality for the Iraqi government, which will only deepen the divide in the country.
