The papers in this volume are revised versions of presentations made by the authors at a conference on economic reform in Russia, which was held at Stanford University on November 22 and 23, 1993. Professor Kenneth Arrow from Stanford chaired the confer­ence, which was sponsored by the university's Center for International Security and Arms Control ( CISAC), under the auspices of its project on Russian defense conversion, and by the Moscow-based Institute for the Economy in Transition. Speakers included all the authors in this volume, as well as other representatives of the Institute for the Economy in Transition, the World Bank, and the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development ( EBRD).

For more than half a century, we viewed one another through our gunsights.  Our ships passed each other on the tranquil watersof the world's largest ocean without so much as a sailor's traditional greeting.  Wary and suspicious, it was best to keep fingers on the trigger when warships passed in the night.

Now the Cold War is over.  Greater cooperation is evident not only in Europe, but also among the disparate nations of the Pacific Rim.  Despite widely divergent interests and agendas in this, the home of 60 percent of the world's people, trends are already becoming evident that point toward closer collaboration in a number of political, economic, and cultural endeavors.  The intersection of security interests, particularly at sea, suggests that the timing may be right to examine new forms of military cooperation as well.  While different threat perceptions have long militated against multilateralism in Asia, modest yet concrete steps toward naval cooperation inconceivable before the Cold War's thaw are now possible.

Chapter in Democratic Reform and the Position of Women in Transitional Economies, edited by Valentine Moghadam.

Exploring the effects of the post-1989 developments in Eastern and Central Europe on the social and economic position of the women of the region, Valentine Moghadam explains how the economic crisis and subsequent development, social breakdown, and changing institutions and practices of the state have an impact upon women's roles and status. The volume combines a theoretical analysis of fundamental gender specific issues and empirical studies on aspects such as educational attainment, social security provisions, political representation, and level and type of employment. Several papers use comparative analysis, drawing on previous research into women's position during development in the Third World, and under socialism in the years prior to 1989. Countries covered in empirical case studies are Russia, Estonia, Poland, the Czech and Slovak republics, the former East Germany, Hungary, and Bulgaria. The authors draw the conclusion that women are among the principal losers in the restructuring process, both through the rise in conservative cultures, and through the economic imperatives of competing in a market-based system.

Many critics have discussed French military doctrine in terms of its broad social and political contexts. They assess, for example, the endemic political crisis and the pathological civil-military relations characteristic of the Third Republic, the general acceptance of social Darwinistic attitudes to international relations, and the influence of Bergson's élan vital. I shall not survey this wider debate but will concentrate on a careful reading of military doctrine as such. What are its strength? its weaknesses? What are its hidden assumptions?

My reading of French military doctrine will focus on the writings of Ardant du Picq, Ferdinand Foch, and Loyzeau de Grandmaison for two reasons. First, they are most often quoted by critics of the French military.  Second, each of them is interesting in his own right and demonstrates some of the deeper dilemmas of military doctrine. Taken together they span the period from before the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 up to the First World War.  I shall not criticize these military writers for failing to predict the future but will concentrate on their implicit assumptions and logical errors, which in principle could have been identified by an independent and critical observer contemporary with the writers.

The world is facing truly breathtaking changes, in particular from the socialist countries. The traditional rigidity of communist regimes and the preeminence of the communist parties in these countries are breaking down. Strong voices of nationalism within the Soviet Union are challenging the very integrity of the union itself. Thus, a bipolar world--where the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), led by the United States, and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), led by the Soviet Union, represent both .an ideological schism and a superpower confrontation--is no longer the basis or even a dominant force for threatened conflict.

The recognition is growing that such factors as economic strength, abundance of basic resources, productivity, and the health and morale of the population are in many respects stronger bases of national security than are military forces. This recognition conflicts sharply with the concept of national security as defined in the Dictionary of Military Terms (issued by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff) as "a military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations."

In view of all these developments, the realization that military power and national security are not synonymous is becoming more prevalent in the United States.  More attention is focusing on internal threats from deficiencies such as those in education, from erosion of the country's infrastructure, drugs, and problems of the environment. This attention, in turn, has deflected public concern and attention from military issues. The decreased concern not only has diminished the priority given to military preparedness but also, unfortunately, has lessened the concern with arms control.

This paper addresses the steps that the United States should take to insure the continuation of its position of influence and involvement in world commerce and geopolitics in light of the developments in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.  The developments are both positive--prodemocracy movements, lessened tensions--and negative, the latter suggesting that there may well be a period in which pent-up ethnic, ideological, and nationalistic pressures could give rise to local conflicts and regional disputes throughout the world, not just in Eastern Europe.

The neutron bomb is a controversial weapon. Indeed, the public disclosure by the United States of its development in 1977 has provoked sharp and widespread debate that is likely to continue in the future. Although the United States has manufactured and stockpiled neutron bombs, in order to mollify public opposition in Europe it announced in 1981 that these weapons would not be deployed overseas at that time. France has developed and tested a neutron bomb successfully, but it has not yet decided whether to produce and deploy it. The Soviet Union claims that, although it has tested a neutron bomb, it has never started production of that weapon.

What about China? There is little information about the neutron bomb in open literature, yet Chinese Defense Minister Zhang Aiping said recently at a memorial service for China's leading nuclear scientist, Deng Jiaxian, that Deng made important contributions to the theory of atomic and hydrogen bombs and their successful testing as well as major breakthroughs in the principles of new nuclear weapons and their research and testing. What kind of new nuclear weapons? Do they include the neutron bomb? Minister Zhang Aiping did not mention this weapon. Maybe China is not developing the neutron bomb now, but at least we can say that China, as a nuclear country, has the ability to develop it and is interested in it. Does China need neutron bombs? This report reviews U.S. and French plans for deployment of the neutron bomb and, further, evaluates the practicality of neutron bombs for China from the perspective of China's politics, strategy, geography, and technical and economic capabilities.

The U.S. Navy's New Maritime Strategy addresses the navy's role in a nonnuclear U.S.-Soviet conflict in Europe. Rather than protecting the North Atlantic sea-lanes by bottling up the Soviet Navy, it proposes that U.S. naval forces move aggressively into the waters near the Soviet Union and seek out and destroy Soviet warships. In particular, the strategy explicitly calls for destroying Soviet nuclear-powered attack and ballistic-missile submarines (SSNs and SSBNs). It posits that the threat to the SSBNs would accomplish two goals. The first is that the Soviets would not surge their SSNs out into the Atlantic to contest U.S. control of the seas but because of the threat would stay back and protect their highly valued SSBNs. The second is that attrition of their SSBNs by U.S. attack would decrease the incentive for the Soviets to go nuclear in the European war, since the balance of forces would shift to the U.S. side. Much debate has been provoked by the prospects of this strategy's leading instead to nuclear escalation.

Congress is being told that the proposed 600-ship navy is the minimum needed to carry out this mission. The strategy is the justification for both the number and the types of ships that are in the shipbuilding program. This program includes a new class of attack submarines, called the Seawolf, which will cost about $1 billion each and are described as the counter to the increasingly quiet Soviet submarines.

This study examines whether the force structure that is being proposed has a reasonable chance of success. lt explores whether modest changes in the building program can make a significant change in the outcome and considers possible alternative approaches.

This report analyzes a simulation, conducted in the spring of 1984 at Stanford University, of a hypothetical U.S.-Soviet crisis in Germany.  The simulation was organized by the Center for International Security and Arms Control as a part of the course, Political Science 138B, "Arms Control and Disarmament Seminar."

The purpose of this study is not to predict whether or not inadvertent war in Europe will occur but to understand how it might possibly occur and how better to avoid it.  The utility of the crisis simulation lies in the insights it provides regarding (1) difficult policy dilemmas likely to be experienced at many points in a crisis and (2) possibilities for misperception, misjudgment, and escalation that inhere in the process of interaction between the two sides in a crisis.