The U.S. Senate summary report on the allegations of CIA torture during the "war on terror" failed to live up to its original purpose, according to Amy Zegart, co-director of Stanford's Center on International Security and Cooperation (CISAC).

In a new journal article, Zegart wrote that the report has "not changed minds on either side of the torture debate and is unlikely to do so."

In December 2014, after five years of research, the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence issued a summary report of its investigation into the Central Intelligence Agency's terrorist detention and interrogation program between 2001 and 2006.

As Zegart noted, the Senate's summary released to the public amounted to less than a tenth of the full report, most of which remains classified. In an interview, she said the issue at hand should concern all Americans.

"How do secret agencies operate in a democratic society? Were the CIA's interrogation methods effective? Were they legal or moral? What role should the Congress have played when decisions about detainees were being made? All of these are vital questions which, sadly, remain unanswered and hotly contested – in large part because they have been caught in the maw of politics on both sides," said Zegart, the co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution.

'A tiny portion of the full study'

Zegart explained that four key errors have doomed the Senate report to "eternal controversy."

"It was not bipartisan, took too long to write, made little effort to generate public support along the way and produced a declassified version that constituted a tiny portion of the full study," she said.

In contrast, Zegart said, the U.S. Senate's 1975-76 Church Committee investigation of intelligence abuses made different calls on all four issues, which helped it achieve significantly more impact. That committee was formed in the wake of Watergate and disclosures in the New York Times that U.S. intelligence agencies had engaged in a number of illegal activities for years, including widespread domestic surveillance on American citizens.

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Zegart wrote, "This was deliberate: As one Church Committee source told the New York Times in December 1975, 'If you wait too long, both the public and the members of Congress forget what you're trying to reform.' He was right."

On the other hand, she said, the Senate committee investigating CIA torture consisted entirely of Democrats and took five years to deliver what turned out to be a heavily redacted report. U.S. Sen. Dianne Feinstein (D-Calif.) chaired the committee.

While Feinstein's staff worked from 2009 to 2014, Zegart said, public outrage about torture faded – in fact, public support for coercive techniques actually increased. According to Zegart, a 2007 Rasmussen poll showed that 27 percent of Americans said the U.S. should torture captured terrorists, while 53 percent said the U.S. should not. A 2012 YouGov national poll conducted by Zegart found that support for torture rose 14 points while opposition fell 19 points.

Another problem was that the investigation did not hold a single public hearing to generate public attention or support, she said. In contrast, Church's investigation held 21 public hearings in 15 months.

Finally, the Senate report is still almost entirely classified, Zegart said.

"The 'report' released in December 2014 was a redacted executive summary of 500 pages – that's less than 10 percent of the 6,700-page report. No one knows when the other 6,200 pages will see the light of day," she wrote.

'Extraordinary resistance'

The aforementioned factors gave CIA defenders the upper hand when the report was eventually issued, she said.

"When the summary was released, former CIA officials launched an unprecedented public relations campaign replete with a web site, op-ed onslaught, and even a 'CIAsavedlives' Twitter hashtag," Zegart wrote.

And so, the episode represented one of the controversial episodes in the history of the CIA's relationship with the U.S. Senate, Zegart said.

"They [the Senate] faced extraordinary resistance from the CIA that included spying on the investigation; stonewalling and whittling away what parts of the report would be declassified; and a publicity campaign to discredit the study as soon as it was released," she wrote.

Zegart said the Feinstein investigation serves as a "cautionary tale" for Congress in its constitutional role of intelligence oversight.

"Even those who consider the interrogation and detention programs a dark mark on American history should be wary of calling the Senate report the definitive account of the subject or a model of intelligence oversight success," she wrote.

The deadly terrorist attacks in Paris last Friday that killed 129 people and wounded around 350 more signaled a significant change in strategy for the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), the radical jihadist organization that has claimed responsibility.

“It underscores that this threat is real and that ISIS is not going to be content to consolidate its power in Iraq and Syria,” said Joe Felter, a former Colonel in the U.S. Army Special Forces and senior research scholar Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC).

“They have demonstrated their ability to project power into foreign countries and conduct what I would call an “asymmetric strategic bombing capacity” in the form of these home-grown Western citizens who are willing to strap on suicide vests and blow up targets in support of ISIS directed objectives.

“They’re able to launch attacks with centralized planning and decentralized execution in a way that makes anticipating and interdicting them very difficult.”

French President François Hollande said that the attacks were “planned in Syria, organized in Belgium, perpetrated on our soil with French complicity.”

CISAC senior fellow Martha Crenshaw said the Paris attacks represented “a shift in strategy” for ISIS with the group “taking a more Al Qaeda-like stance and striking Western countries.”

However, she emphasized that the carefully planned nature of the coordinated strikes, where multiple teams carried out simultaneous attacks in three locations across downtown Paris, indicated that this new strategy had been secretly underway for some time.

“These attacks were planned a long time ago,” said Crenshaw, whose Mapping Militants Project includes more information on groups like ISIS.

“You shouldn’t think they’re reacting to very recent circumstances…It’s not like we bombed them one day and the next day they planned these attacks.”

Apocalyptic visions

ISIS has long advocated a plan of provoking the West into a larger confrontation that would lead to an apocalyptic victory for Islam, according to Abbas Milani, director of Iranian studies at Stanford and an affiliate at the Center for Democracy Development and the Rule of Law.

“There’s a lot of method to this madness,” Milani said.

“If you read their literature, they have always talked about creating this sort of mayhem.”

ISIS’s propaganda magazine Dabiq, which is available online in Arabic and English, is named after a village in Syria with important symbolism for jihadists.

“They claim that the prophet has predicted that if you can get the West to come and fight the Muslims at Dabiq, then Islam will conquer the world,” Milani said.

Unlike France’s earlier battles against extremists in Algeria, it cannot rely on a proxy state to take the fight to the terrorists, according to Crenshaw.

“When terrorism in France has its origins in Algeria, France could rely on the Algerian state to crack down on these groups,” she said.

“Now you’ve got a situation where the planners are in a country where you don’t have a reliable state to go in and get them for you and wrap up their networks.”

With French warplanes already bombing targets in the Syrian city of Raqqa, Felter warned against the limits of air power in the fight against ISIS.

“There’s a risk that as we ramp up the bombing campaign and increase civilian casualties, this does play into the narrative of these extremists,” he said.

“It’s a very difficult targeting process. ISIS has occupied urban areas full of non-combatants and civilians…It’s the ultimate human shield.”

Felter acknowledged that increasing the number of US ground forces sent to interdict ISIS in Iraq and Syria may ultimately be necessary, but also that this increased presence, if not managed carefully, could backfire.

“At some level, they want to bring Western military forces to occupy these lands, because that will help turn popular opinion against the West and aid in their propaganda and recruitment,” he said.

The fight against ISIS is not limited to the territories it claims in the Middle East. It must be a global effort and include increased international cooperation and information sharing across intelligence, law enforcement and other agencies around the world, Felter said.

ISIS wants to drive a wedge between Europeans and the growing Muslim communities in their countries, so recruiting French citizens to participate in the Paris attacks served a dual purpose, Milani said.

“Using French citizens helps them with logistics, but it also helps them in terms of their strategy in that it makes it difficult for Muslims to live in a non-caliphate context,” he said.

Failed states problem

In the wake of the attacks, European nations are working to create legislation that would toughen criminal penalties for citizens who travel abroad to fight with designated terrorist organizations such as ISIS, or strip them of their citizenship, according to CISAC affiliate Anja Dalgaard-Nielsen, a former executive director of the Danish Security and Intelligence Service.

Individuals who are seen as inciting people to travel to Syria and Iraq to join the jihad could also face tougher sanctions, she said.

The emergence of ISIS and its nihilistic theology is a symptom of broader underlying problems in the Middle East, which is grappling with failed and failing states across North Africa and in Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Pakistan, according to Milani.

“ISIS is the most militant and brutal manifestation of something deeper that’s going wrong,” he said.

“I honestly have never seen the Middle East as perilously close to complete chaos as it is now… [and] I don’t think we’ve seen the worst of it yet.”

Resources & links

Get more background on the Islamic State and its leaders from Martha Crenshaw’s Mapping Militants Project

Is There a Sunni Solution to ISIS? – The Atlantic | By Lisa Blaydes & Martha Crenshaw

Airstrikes Can Only Do So Much to Combat ISIS – New York Times | By Joe Felter

The Super Smart Way to Dismantle ISIS – The National Interest | By Eli Berman, Joe Felter & Jacob Shapiro

The Rise of ISIS and the Changing Landscape of the Middle East – Commonwealth Club of California | Abbas Milani

U.S. national security faces rising challenges from insider threats and organizational rigidity, a Stanford professor says.

Amy Zegart, co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford and a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution, wrote in a new study that in the past five years, seemingly trustworthy U.S. military and intelligence insiders have been responsible for a number of national security incidents, including the WikiLeaks publications and the 2009 attack at Fort Hood in Texas that killed 13 and injured more than 30.

She defines "insider threats" as people who use their authorized access to do harm to the security of the United States. They could range from mentally ill people to "coldly calculating officials" who betray critical national security secrets.

In her research, which relies upon declassified investigations by the U.S. military, FBI and Congress, Zegart analyzes the Fort Hood attack and one facet of the insider threat universe – Islamist terrorists.

In this case, a self-radicalized Army psychiatrist named Nidal Hasan walked into a Fort Hood facility in 2009 and fired 200 rounds, killing 13 people and wounding dozens of others. The shooting spree remains the worst terrorist attack on American soil since 9/11 and the worst mass murder at a military site in American history, she added.

Insights and lessons learned

Zegart's study of insider and surprise attacks as well as academic research into the theory of organizations led her to some key insights about why the Army failed to prevent Hasan's attack when clues were clear:

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In the Fort Hood case, she said, bureaucratic procedures kept red flags about Hasan in different places, making them harder to detect.

• Career incentives and organizational cultures often backfire. As Zegart wrote, several researchers found that "misaligned incentives and cultures" played major roles in undermining safety before the Challenger space shuttle disaster.

Zegart's earlier research on 9/11 found the same dynamic played a role in the FBI's manhunt for two 9/11 hijackers just 19 days before their attack. Because the FBI's culture prized convicting criminals after the fact rather than preventing disasters beforehand, the search for two would-be terrorists received the lowest priority and was handled by one of the least experienced agents in the New York office.

• Organizations matter more than most people think. Robust structures, processes and cultures that were effective in earlier periods for other tasks proved maladaptive after 9/11.

In the case of the Fort Hood attack, the evidence suggests that government investigations, which focused on individual errors and political correctness (disciplining or investigating a Muslim American in the military) identified only some of the root causes, missing key organizational failures.

Hasan slipped through the cracks not only because people made mistakes or were prone to political correctness, but also because defense organizations "worked in their usual ways," according to Zegart.

Adapting to a new threat

In terms of organizational weaknesses, Hasan's Fort Hood attack signaled a new challenge for the U.S. military: rethinking what "force protection" truly means, Zegart said. Before 9/11, force protection reflected a physical protection or hardening of potential targets from an outside attack. Now, force protection has evolved to mean that the threats could come from within the Defense Department and from Americans, she added.

"For half a century, the department's structure, systems, policies and culture had been oriented to think about protecting forces from the outside, not the inside," Zegart wrote.

In the case of Hasan, the Defense Department failed in three different ways to identify him as a threat: through the disciplinary system, the performance evaluation system and the counter-terrorism investigatory system run jointly with the FBI through Joint Terrorism Task Forces.

"Organizational factors played a significant role in explaining why the Pentagon could not stop Nidal Hasan in time. Despite 9/11 and a rising number of homegrown Jihadi terrorist attacks, the Defense Department struggled to adapt to insider terrorist threats," Zegart wrote.

Difficult to change

Another problem was that the Pentagon faced substantial manpower shortages in the medical corps – especially among psychiatrists. So the Defense Department responded to incentives and promoted Hasan, despite his increasingly poor performance and erratic behavior.

In addition, Zegart found the Defense Department official who investigated Hasan prior to the attack saw nothing amiss because he was the wrong person for the job – he was trained to ferret out waste, fraud and abuse, not counterterrorism, which is why he did not know how to look for signs of radicalization or counterintelligence risk.

"In sum, the Pentagon's force protection, discipline, promotion and counter-terrorism investigatory systems all missed this insider threat because they were designed for other purposes in earlier times, and deep-seated organizational incentives and cultures made it difficult for officials to change what they normally did," she wrote.

Zegart acknowledges the difficulties of learning lessons from tragedies like 9/11, the NASA space shuttle accidents and the 2009 Fort Hood shooting.

"People and organizations often remember what they should forget and forget what they should remember," she said, adding that policymakers tend to attribute failure to people and policies. While seemingly hidden at times, the organizational roots of disaster are much more important than many think, she added.