When a state develops a nuclear arsenal, these
destructive weapons must be initially integrated into existing military forces
and initially managed through existing civil and military institutions. The
subsequent relationship between nuclear weapons and civil-military relations in
possessor states is complex, however, and presents an important two-way puzzle.
First, it is important to ask how existing patterns of civil-military relations
in nuclear states have influenced the likelihood of nuclear-weapons use. Some
scholars believe that military officers are less war-prone and hawkish than
civilian leaders; others believe the opposite, that the military tends to be
bellicose and biased in favor of aggressive military postures. Which view is
right, especially when nuclear weapons are involved, is a question that has not
been fully addressed in the literature. Second, it is important to flip the
question around and also ask how nuclear weapons have influenced civil-military
relations in the states that have acquired the ultimate weapon. Again, the
answer is not clear. One might expect that the massive destructive power of
these weapons would encourage much greater civilian involvement in military
affairs. Yet, at the same time, one might predict that military organizations
would maintain significant control over nuclear policy as they want to protect their
operational autonomy, and because the perceived need for a prompt response
would mitigate against tight civilian control.