The tasks of preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention are neither self-evident nor value-neutral, as some of their proponents seem to believe. Diplomacy that aims to resolve long-standing conflicts may have to take sides and coerce powerful parties into concessions. Diplomacy that aims to manage conflict so that it does not become violent may have to sacrifice a quest for justice in deference to the powerful. Prevention might conflict with important national and even global interests. If, as President Clinton has suggested many times, the primary American interest in Bosnia is thwarting the spread of the war, then the arms embargo has been an unqualified success. If, however, the primary American and global interest has been denying Serbian aggression and upholding the principle of Bosnian sovereignty, then the embargo has failed.

A focus on prevention ignores the role that conflict plays in driving political change in societies. For grievances to be redressed, they must be vocalized. If they are vocalized, those with a stake in the status quo will attempt to suppress them. Often the balance of change depends on the ability of the grieved to amplify the conflict to increase their support. If we have learned anything from the disparate cases of conflict resolution in recent decades -- the civil rights movement in the United States, the fight for human rights in Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, the fight for national self-determination in the Middle East, the fight against apartheid in South Africa -- it is that some conflicts must be intensified before they are resolved.

Preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention do not lessen the difficulty of choices for leaders, nor do they really lessen costs. For either to succeed, policymakers must still spell out their interests, set priorities among cases, and balance goals with resources. The president will still need to educate the American people about the rationale behind a policy and convince them of the need for action. Absent well-defined interests, clear goals, and prudent judgment about acceptable costs and risks, policies of preventive diplomacy and conflict prevention simply mean that one founders early in a crisis instead of later.

The end of the Cold War has fundamentally altered the international system, as well as the major threats to global peace and security. The ideologically driven competition between the superpowers which was the defining feature of the Cold War, with its attendant dangers of nuclear confrontation, has been replaced with a whole array of new challenges. Among the most critical is the challenge of dealing with the consequences of the collapse of the USSR.

The emergence of fifteen independent states with uncertain identities, contested boundaries, weak institutions, and enormous political and economic problems carries with it considerable potential for future instability. Although the level of both inter-state and interethnic conflict in this vast region has thus far remained relatively low, and its scope contained, the tragic conflicts in Tajikistan, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Chechnya, among others, are a reminder, if any is needed, that the dangers of serious escalation are very real. Moreover, the political, economic, and security environment of the entire region is critically dependent on the future evolution of Russia itself.

The rapid and unexpected demise of the Soviet system gave rise to overly optimistic expectations of Russia's rapid transition to a democratic polity, market economy, and constructive partnership with its new neighbors and with the West. It is now abundantly clear that the formulation of effective policies for dealing with this region requires a serious reassessment of these initial premises as well as the elaboration of new institutional arrangements, norms, incentives, and constraints capable of contributing to conflict prevention as well as to the more effective management of those conflicts which have already erupted in the region.

This essay by Ambassdor Maresca, presented at the Center for International Security and Arms Control in January 1995, and the varied responses it invited, are intended to stimulate further discussion of these central issues by the larger academic and policy community.

In April 1994, black and white South Africans for the first time will vote for a nonracial government. This watershed election is one of many recent profound changes in Southern Africa, including independence in Namibia, democratic elections in Zambia, a peace agreement in Mozambique, and renewed civil war in Angola.

The authors explore the sources and dynamics of the political, economic, and diplomatic transformations taking place in Southern Africa. They recount how Southern Africa has long endured costly, violent domestic and interstate conflicts, often complicated and intensified by external interventions and interests. They also analyze the various attempts to resolve Southern Africa's conflicts. They suggest that the democratic transition in South Africa opens the possibility to create a secure Southern Africa, but they also note that past conflict legacies and new unanticipated conflicts could stand in the way. The challenge ahead will be to create new institutions at the national and regional levels that can help political players resolve conflict without resorting to violence.

With the ending of the Cold War, regional conflicts have come increasingly to the fore.  U.S. foreign policy goals in such areas continue to involve a mix of U.S. self-interest (as perceived by governing elites, Congress, and sometimes the electorate directly) and a desire to see conflicts in the world resolved more peacefully.  Both of these factors have led and will probably continue to lead to U.S. military interventions in some of these conflicts.

This paper addresses the issue of what role--if any--U.S. nuclear weapons should play in these interventions.  We focus on the following questions: given a military regional confrontation between the United States and a regional power, under what circumstances if any should nuclear weapons be used?  What arguments militate for and against their use? Can one come to an overall policy recommendation in this regard?

We are well aware that the best way to deal with military confrontations is to prevent them. To some degree, military confrontations represent a failure of policy.  Nevertheless, these confrontations do occur, and on occasion, the use of nuclear weapons has been and may again be contemplated.  The paper reviews some such possible occasions.

Challenging the literatures on war termination, civil war, and revolution--which typically dismiss the possibility of negotiated settlement--Stephen Stedman examines the problem of negotiations during civil wars and demonstrates that third party mediation can help resolve such conflicts.

Stedman analyzes four international attempts to mediate a settlement to the Zimbabwean civil war of the 1970s and compares the three failed negotiations--the 1974-1975 Kenneth Kaunda/John Vorster "detente" exercise, the Henry Kissinger mediation that led to the Geneva conference of 1976, and the Anglo-American initiatives of David Owen and Cyrus Vance in 1977-1978--with the successful 1979 Lancaster House Conference on Rhodesia, chaired by Lord Carrington. Drawing on primary sources not available previously, his discussion of the factors that distinguish the failures from the successful attempt is a major contribution to conflict resolution theory, particularly with reference to the work of William Zartman. A final chapter considers the lessons of the Zimbabwe experience for South Africa today.

The world is facing truly breathtaking changes, in particular from the socialist countries. The traditional rigidity of communist regimes and the preeminence of the communist parties in these countries are breaking down. Strong voices of nationalism within the Soviet Union are challenging the very integrity of the union itself. Thus, a bipolar world--where the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), led by the United States, and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), led by the Soviet Union, represent both .an ideological schism and a superpower confrontation--is no longer the basis or even a dominant force for threatened conflict.

The recognition is growing that such factors as economic strength, abundance of basic resources, productivity, and the health and morale of the population are in many respects stronger bases of national security than are military forces. This recognition conflicts sharply with the concept of national security as defined in the Dictionary of Military Terms (issued by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff) as "a military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations."

In view of all these developments, the realization that military power and national security are not synonymous is becoming more prevalent in the United States.  More attention is focusing on internal threats from deficiencies such as those in education, from erosion of the country's infrastructure, drugs, and problems of the environment. This attention, in turn, has deflected public concern and attention from military issues. The decreased concern not only has diminished the priority given to military preparedness but also, unfortunately, has lessened the concern with arms control.

The Korean Peninsula is one of the areas of acute political instability and conflict in the Asian-Pacific region. This is partly but not exclusively because of the unsettled problems between the two parts of Korea. The international environment could be more conducive to an inter-Korean dialogue, to national reconciliation, and to reunification. Without interfering in the internal affairs of the Korean nation, the United States and the Soviet Union, and other major powers of the region, could create more-favorable conditions settling the Korean problem, understanding always that the principal aspects of the problem are internal and must be solved by the two Korean states themselves.