Many critics have discussed French military doctrine in terms of its broad social and political contexts. They assess, for example, the endemic political crisis and the pathological civil-military relations characteristic of the Third Republic, the general acceptance of social Darwinistic attitudes to international relations, and the influence of Bergson's élan vital. I shall not survey this wider debate but will concentrate on a careful reading of military doctrine as such. What are its strength? its weaknesses? What are its hidden assumptions?

My reading of French military doctrine will focus on the writings of Ardant du Picq, Ferdinand Foch, and Loyzeau de Grandmaison for two reasons. First, they are most often quoted by critics of the French military.  Second, each of them is interesting in his own right and demonstrates some of the deeper dilemmas of military doctrine. Taken together they span the period from before the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871 up to the First World War.  I shall not criticize these military writers for failing to predict the future but will concentrate on their implicit assumptions and logical errors, which in principle could have been identified by an independent and critical observer contemporary with the writers.

During the most recent Russian-American summit in Vancouver, Canada in April 1993, President Clinton announced a major new initiative to assist Russia's transition to a market economy. In discussing how to aid the process of Russia's economic reform in ways of mutual benefit to both the United States and Russia, both President Yeltsin and President Clinton underscored the importance of promoting the conversion and privatization of state enterprises of the Russian military-industrial complex.

While most agree that conversion and privatization of these enterprises are laudable goals, few have discussed concrete methods of achieving these ends at the level of individual enterprises. By focusing on the actual experiences of one Russian enterprise that has both converted to almost 100% civilian production and, at the same time, become a private company, this report seeks to expand the discussion of the means and models for achieving conversion and privatization of the Russian military industrial complex.

This report covers work on conversion and privatization in the former Soviet Union that has been conducted over the past two years by the Center for International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) at Stanford University. In it, we explore the process of conversion and privatization through employee ownership. The report contains one chapter each on the major issues surrounding conversion and privatization, followed by a detailed explanation of the employee ownership method of privatization. The report concludes with the description and analysis of a case study of privatization through employee ownership: the Saratov Aviation Plant.

Stanford University's Center for International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) started a project on defense conversion in the Soviet Union in early 1990. Following the breakup of the Soviet Union, the project has concentrated on defense conversion in Russia. The objectives of the project are to study and assist the process of demilitarization through the diversion of military production assets, broadly interpreted (facilities, personnel, technology, etc.), and building a civilian industry and infrastructure.

As a part of this project, CISAC sponsored an international conference on defense conversion on December 1-2, 1992. This report summarizes the authors' impressions, following the conference, of the status of privatization and conversion in Russia, and of U.S. government and business involvement in those processes. The conclusions drawn and the recommendations made are our own, based on both conference presentations and our own research.

The purpose of this document is to explore a plan for the application of cooperative naval measures in the Pacific to meet political, economic, and military changes and to serve the interests of all countries in the region.

Stanford University's Center for International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) has undertaken a project to work with elements of the Soviet defense industry to help them convert production from military to civilian uses. In this project we refer to conversion as the use of defense industry facilities, personnel, and/or technology for the production of nondefense products and services. One aspect of this work is to facilitate cooperation between U.S. and Soviet companies. Representative Les Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee (HASC), asked the Center to initiate this project. The Institute of U.S.A. and Canada Studies (ISKAN) of the Soviet Academy of Sciences is coordinating the Soviet Union's participation.

In recent years issues in international security have been increasingly influenced by economic factors. This is evident in the defense budgets of the major powers as well as in arms transfers to regions such as the Middle East. Furthermore, arms control has taken on a broader meaning, involving unilateral cuts and confidence-building measures to supplement negotiated structural arms-control agreements.

The principal objective of this project is to assist the Soviet defense industry in their defense conversion activities by:

• Analyzing the conversion problem in the Soviet Union and, if appropriate, extracting lessons from the U.S. experience.
• Assisting the Soviets in contacting and exploring cooperative ventures with appropriate U.S. companies.
• Stimulating discussions among Soviet defense experts and U.S. government officials and academics on appropriate changes to trade policy.

This paper deals with defense conversion (broadly interpreted) in the newly independent states (NIS) of the former Soviet Union (FSU), with emphasis on the situation in Russia. Our premise is that economic progress is a sine qua non for political stability and the growth of democratic institutions, and hence for international security. Therefore it is in the best interests of all countries, and primarily the United States, to assist the economic reforms in the NIS. We further believe that the efficient use of a considerable portion of the assets of the military-industrial complex is necessary if the economic reforms are to succeed.

In this paper we analyze some of the major barriers to conversion, and the incentives and problems involved in providing external assistance for this conversion, as well as steps that can only be accomplished internally. The paper includes a description of a project on conversion in the Soviet Union and later in Russia, undertaken in early 1990, at the Center for International Security and Arms Control (CISAC). The work has included interactions between Soviet and Russian industrialists, government officials, and scholars with their counterparts, as well as with members of the legal and financial communities, in the United States. The report also contains a case study of conversion and privatization at one enterprise, the Saratov Aviation Plant. The report concludes with recommendations (summarized below) to both industry and government in the United States and in the NIS. This work has been supported by the Carnegie Corporation of New York.

Since this paper was drafted many of our recommendations have been adopted through policy statements; however, in many cases, realization of these policies is still subject to final congressional action, administrative implementation, IMF negotiations with the governments of the NIS, and legislation by the NIS.

Stanford University's Center for International Security and Arms Control (CISAC) started a project in early 1990 following a proposal from Marshal Akhromeyev,specialadvisor to President Gorbachev and Les Aspin, chairman of the House Armed Services Committee.  The intent was to bring a delegation of Soviet defense executives, government officials and academicians to the United States. The objectives of the project were to study and assi§t the process of demilitarization through the diversion of military production assets, broadly interpreted (facilities, personnl., technology, etc.), and to building a civilian industry and infrastructure. In spite of changes in the project agenda, the objectives remain the same. These objectives are being addressed by informing the debate in the Russian and American
governments as well as in the international financial institutions, recommending innovative conversion efforts, interacting directly with Russian defense enterprises and American companies interested in cooperative business activities, and participating in scholarly analyses through publications and topical conferences.

In recent years, world attention has been drawn to the acquisition by developing countries of delivery systems for nuclear weapons as distinct from the nuclear warheads themselves. In particular, concerns have been raised about the spread of ballistic-missile systems and technologies to areas such as theMiddle East, in which there are strong regional tensions.  The extensive use of ballistic missiles in the "war of the cities" in 1988 during the Iran-Iraq War and the use of Scud missiles by Iraq against Israel and Saudi Arabia during Desert Storm highlighted the rapid proliferation of these weapons, and served as a premonition of worse things to come if and when developing states deploy ballistic missiles armed with weapons of mass destruction.  The ballistic missiles of concern have ranges of a hundred to a few thousand kilometers (km) and can carry payloads of up to one or two thousand kilograms (kg). These systems are becoming increasingly prominent in Third World arsenals, and are perceived as threatening stability and regional military balances.

This study examines the impact of ballistic-missile proliferation, focusing on sixteen regional states which have or soon could have ballistic-missile capabilities.  Specifically, the study: (1) evaluates the military effectlveness of ballistic missiles in comparison with advanced strike aircraft, (2) identifies trends in the supply of and demand for ballistic missiles, (3) identifies key technologies and systems whose control is essential to a successful missile non-proliferation regime, (4) reviews the relevancy and effectiveness of present control mechanisms including the MlssiIe Technology Control Regime (MTCR), and (5) offers policy options for strengthening controls on the acquisition by developing states of longer-range ground strike delivery systems, including ballistic missiles and advanced combat aircraft.

Operational arms control can take many forms, and one of the most important is direct military-to-military talks. The 1989 Dangerous Military Activities agreement, in which military officers headed negotiations for the first time, should not be considered the final step in improving U.S.-Soviet military-to-military relations.  It should be seen instead as a major step forward toward a much deeper and wider network of discussions and agreements which reduce the likelihood of misunderstandings and potential incidents between the militaries of the two states.

The world is facing truly breathtaking changes, in particular from the socialist countries. The traditional rigidity of communist regimes and the preeminence of the communist parties in these countries are breaking down. Strong voices of nationalism within the Soviet Union are challenging the very integrity of the union itself. Thus, a bipolar world--where the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), led by the United States, and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO), led by the Soviet Union, represent both .an ideological schism and a superpower confrontation--is no longer the basis or even a dominant force for threatened conflict.

The recognition is growing that such factors as economic strength, abundance of basic resources, productivity, and the health and morale of the population are in many respects stronger bases of national security than are military forces. This recognition conflicts sharply with the concept of national security as defined in the Dictionary of Military Terms (issued by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff) as "a military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations."

In view of all these developments, the realization that military power and national security are not synonymous is becoming more prevalent in the United States.  More attention is focusing on internal threats from deficiencies such as those in education, from erosion of the country's infrastructure, drugs, and problems of the environment. This attention, in turn, has deflected public concern and attention from military issues. The decreased concern not only has diminished the priority given to military preparedness but also, unfortunately, has lessened the concern with arms control.