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The US military is very dependent on satellites. The existing satellite architecture used has single point failures to existing recognized threats. A concept that could provide a significant part of the solution of how the US as well as other states can overcome such vulnerabilities is discussed. The prescription centers on a new satellite architecture --the 'Multi-tiered Microsatellite Constellation Architecture' (MMCA) -- which reduces risks to space assets by increasing system redundancy, modularity and dispersion through the use of microsatellite constellations in several orbital tiers. An example constellation design is given for each of the five major contemporary military space uses -- early warning, reconnaissance, signals intelligence, military communications and navigation. The scheme is placed in the context of other complimentary elements that are likely to be necessary to enable security of space assets, in particular: protection of space systems; responsive space access; terrestrial alternatives; space surveillance; treaties; and verification means thereof. Since the Chinese anti-satellite (ASAT) test, the response of the US military in part has been to re-double efforts to develop Operationally Responsive Space (ORS). Whilst ORS is a key ingredient, it must be complemented by a more secure satellite architecture. In addition to dealing with satellite vulnerabilities, the talk will discuss issues relating to space-based weapons and their effectiveness.

William Marshall is based in the Small Spacecraft Office at NASA's Ames Research Center in California. He holds a PhD in Physics from the University of Oxford, U.K., where his thesis centred on an experimental proposal to create macroscopic mass quantum superposition states. He conducted two years of his research at the University of California in Santa Barbara. He holds a degree in Physics with Space Science and Technology (MPhys) from the University of Leicester, UK. He has held placements at the European Space Agency, NASA's Jet Propulsion Laboratory, Marshall Space Flight Center and the Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology (POST) in London. Will's work at NASA centers on mission planning, in particular trajectory analysis, and spacecraft testing for a variety of microsatellite missions, focusing on lunar orbiters and landers. He is working on a project on the topic of space traffic management. Will serves on the Governance Group of the Space Security Index research project and also holds positions of non-resident fellow at both the Space Policy Institute (SPI) of the George Washington University and the Belfer Centre for Science and International Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University. In these capacities, Will has published on strategic benefits and costs of the deployment of space weapons and more broadly the increasingly important role that space is playing in global security issues. Will is the Global co-Chair of the Space Generation Advisory Council to the United Nations Programme on Space Applications (SGAC), which represents the views of students and young professionals interested in space to the UN and space agencies around the world.

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William Marshall Speaker NASA - Ames Research Center
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David Montague, an independent consultant, is retired President of the Missile Systems Division at Lockheed Martin Missiles and Space. A member of the NAE, his background is in military weapon systems, particularly in regard to guidance and control of submarine-launched weaponry. His experience has focused on both tactical and strategic strike systems, as well as on the requirements for, development of, and policy issues related to defense systems to protect against weapons of mass destruction. His recent research interests include the area of electric vehicles powered by battery or fuel cells integrated with induction drive high-speed highway automatic headway and vehicle control. Mr. Montague is a fellow of the American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics, and has served on numerous scientific boards and advisory committees, to include task forces for both the U.S. Army and Defense Science Board. He currently serves as a member of the Naval Studies Board.

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David Montague CISAC Affiliate Speaker
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Brent Durbin (speaker) is a PhD candidate at the University of California, Berkeley, and a predoctoral fellow at CISAC. He is also a 2007-2008 dissertation fellow at the Institute for Global Conflict and Cooperation. In his dissertation, Durbin explains the political and policy dynamics of U.S. intelligence adaptation. His broader research interests fall at the intersection of organization theory, decision-making, and national security policy. Durbin has served as a visiting fellow at the University of Cambridge (UK) and The George Washington University, and as a senior staff member for U.S. Senator Patty Murray. He holds degrees from Oberlin College, Harvard University, and the University of California, Berkeley.

Paul Stockton (discussant) is a senior research scholar at CISAC. He was formerly the associate provost at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, and was the former director of its Center for Homeland Defense and Security. His teaching and research focuses on how U.S. security institutions respond to changes in the threat (including the rise of terrorism), and the interaction of Congress and the Executive branch in restructuring national security budgets, policies and institutional arrangements. Stockton joined the faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) in August 1990. From 1995 until 2000, he served as director of NPS's Center for Civil-Military Relations. From 2000-2001, he founded and served as the acting dean of NPS's School of International Graduate Studies. He was appointed associate provost in 2001.

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Paul Stockton Senior Research Scholar Commentator CISAC
Brent Durbin Predoctoral Fellow Speaker CISAC
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From the Pulitzer Prize-winning author of The Making of the Atomic Bomb, here is the story of the entire postwar superpower arms race, climaxing during the Reagan-Gorbachev decade when the United States and the Soviet Union came within scant hours of nuclear war--and then nearly agreed to abolish nuclear weapons.

Rhodes reveals how the Reagan administration's unprecedented arms buildup in the early 1980s led ailing Soviet leader Yuri Andropov to conclude that Reagan must be preparing for a nuclear war. In the fall of 1983, when NATO staged a larger than usual series of field exercises that included, uniquely, a practice run-up to a nuclear attack, the Soviet military came very close to launching a defensive first strike on Europe and North America. With Soviet aircraft loaded with nuclear bombs warming up on East German runways, U.S. intelligence organizations finally realized the danger. Then Reagan, out of deep conviction, launched the arms-reduction campaign of his second presidential term and set the stage for his famous 1986 summit meeting with Gorbachev in Reykjavik, Iceland, and the breakthroughs that followed.

Rhodes reveals the early influence of neoconservatives and right-wing figures such as Richard Perle, Donald Rumsfeld, Dick Cheney, and Paul Wolfowitz. We see how Perle in particular sabotaged the Reykjavik meeting by convincing Reagan that mutual nuclear disarmament meant giving up his cherished dream of strategic defense (the Star Wars system). Rhodes' detailed exploration of these and other events constitutes a prehistory of the neoconservatives, demonstrating that the manipulation of government and public opinion with fake intelligence and threat inflation that the administration of George W. Bush has used to justify the current "war on terror" and the disastrous invasion of Iraq were developed and applied in the Reagan era and even before.

Drawing on personal interviews with both Soviet and U.S. participants, and on a wealth of new documentation, memoir literature, and oral history that has become available only in the past ten years, Rhodes recounts what actually happened in the final years of the Cold War that led to its dramatic end. The story is new, compelling, and continually surprising--a revelatory re-creation of a hugely important era of our recent history.

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Alfred A. Knopf
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The U.S. plan to deploy elements of its Ballistic Missile Defense System in Eastern Europe was bound to be controversial. Russia has long been wary of U.S. missile defense plans and skeptical of U.S. claims about the ballistic missile threat from the third countries that missile defense is supposed to counter. The choice of Eastern Europe as the site of the upcoming deployment has made the plan particularly contentious, linking it to the already controversial process of eastward expansion of NATO. As a result, many Russians believe that in reality the missile defense system is directed against Russia.

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Independent Military Review
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Pavel Podvig
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Last year, for the first time, the United States voted in the U.N. General Assembly against a traditional resolution calling for negotiation of legally binding negative security assurances (NSAs) by nuclear-weapon states. These are promises not to use nuclear weapons against nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) states-parties that have promised not to acquire them. In the debate, the U.S. delegation explained that the United States "opposes a treaty on negative security assurances or any other binding instrument on security assurances."

U.S. military officials have long opposed explicit promises not to use nuclear weapons against countries that do not have them. Prior to the current administration, however, the U.S. government had rarely been so clear in stating its opposition. This new position is contrary to U.S. national interests.

U.S. superiority in conventional weapons and the advent of precision-guided munitions means that the United States does not need to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons to achieve its military goals effectively, even against those states that possess chemical or biological weapons. Indeed, the United States needs to be prepared to use nuclear weapons only in response to an attack with nuclear weapons. Moreover, the U.S. refusal to endorse NSAs only encourages additional countries, including U.S. enemies, to acquire nuclear weapons.

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Arms Control Today
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Somalia is once again on the front page--and the news isn't pretty. Since 2003, the country's seaside capital of Mogadishu has served as an arena for a battle of gladiators, pitting U.S.backed warlords against guntoting Islamic revolutionaries. With no capable or legitimate state to counter it, the Union of Islamic Courts emerged victorious last June, only to be felled in December by an enfeebled transitional government, formed in exile and backed by the Ethiopian military. A recent spate of assassinationstyle killings and suicide bombings herald the arrival of a new resistance movement intent on ejecting these foreign forces and the African Union troops now being dispatched to the country. Caught in the midst of this violent morass is Somalia's longsuffering population of 8.5 million, seeking order from whomever can provide it, simply hoping that the bully who comes out on top will care enough to reverse the country's economic collapse.

Somalia may be garnering headlines today, but the country's strife parallels the bloodshed in far too many of Africa's struggling nations.

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Foreign Policy
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On April 19, 2007, the Preventive Defense Project convened a workshop of leading federal government civilian and military officials, scientists, policy experts, and journalists to address the actions that can and should be taken in the 24 hours following a nuclear blast in a U.S. city.

Through efforts like the Nunn-Lugar program, the U.S. government and many of the Day After Workshop participants, including us, have long sought to prevent nuclear weapons and fissile materials from falling into new and threatening hands, especially terrorists. But we all know that these efforts have not reduced the probability to zero. It is also a common refrain among policy thinkers concerned with the growing nuclear threat--again, ourselves included--to frame the issue of prevention in terms of a provocative question, "On the day after a nuclear weapon goes off in a U.S. city, what will we wish we had done to prevent it?"

But our Preventive Defense "Day After Workshop" asked a different question: "What will we actually do on the day after prevention fails?" What will we want to do? How can we prepare now to be able to do it? We asked the distinguished participants in the Workshop to catapult themselves vividly and concretely into the aftermath of a nuclear detonation on a U.S. city. The needed actions by government and the public on the Day After will fall into two categories: actions to recover from the first detonation, and actions to prevent a second detonation. The Workshop addressed both types of action in as much detail, including technical detail, as possible. Topics included emergency response, evacuation and sheltering, immediate radiation effects, follow-on threats to the first nuclear weapon, attribution and retaliation, and the long process of cleanup--especially the uniquely difficult problem of fallout and residual radioactivity.

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Preventive Defense Project, Harvard and Stanford Universities
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William J. Perry
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During the strategic modernization program that the Soviet Union undertook in the 1970s, it deployed a large number of multiple-warhead ballistic missiles. This deployment raised concerns in the United States about vulnerability of its land-based missile force and was one of the factors that contributed to the military buildup that the United States undertook in the late 1970s-early 1980s. The newly available documents that contain evidence of the Soviet missile programs demonstrate that the "window of vulnerability" did not exist and provide some insight into the Soviet modernization program.

Pavel Podvig joined CISAC as a research associate in 2004. Before that he was a researcher at the Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (MIPT). He worked as a visiting researcher with the Security Studies Program at MIT and with the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University, and he taught physics in MIPT's General Physics Department for more than ten years.

Podvig graduated with honors from the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology in 1988, with a degree in physics. In 2004 he received a PhD in political science from the Moscow Institute of World Economy and International Relations.

His research has focused on technical and political issues of missile defense, space security, U.S.-Russian relations, structure and capabilities of the Russian strategic forces, and nuclear nonproliferation. He was the head of the Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces research project and the editor of a book of the same title, which is considered a definitive source of information on Russian strategic forces.

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pavelpodvig2022-11-01.jpg PhD

Pavel Podvig is an independent analyst based in Geneva, where he runs his research project, "Russian Nuclear Forces." He is also a Senior Research Fellow at the UN Institute for Disarmament Research and a researcher with the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University. Pavel Podvig started his work on arms control at the Center for Arms Control Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (MIPT), which was the first independent research organization in Russia dedicated to analysis of technical issues of disarmament and nonproliferation. Pavel Podvig led the Center for Arms Control Studies project that produced the book, Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces (MIT Press, 2001). In recognition of his work in Russia, the American Physical Society awarded Podvig the Leo Szilard Lectureship Award of 2008 (with Anatoli Diakov). Podvig worked with the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University, the Security Studies Program at MIT, and the Center for International Security and Cooperation at Stanford University. His current research focuses on the Russian strategic forces and nuclear weapons complex, as well as technical and political aspects of nuclear nonproliferation, disarmament, missile defense, and U.S.-Russian arms control process. Pavel Podvig is a member of the International Panel on Fissile Materials. He has a  physics degree from MIPT and PhD in political science from the Moscow Institute of World Economy and International Relations.

For a list of publications, please visit http://russianforces.org/podvig/.

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