Operational arms control can take many forms, and one of the most important is direct military-to-military talks. The 1989 Dangerous Military Activities agreement, in which military officers headed negotiations for the first time, should not be considered the final step in improving U.S.-Soviet military-to-military relations.  It should be seen instead as a major step forward toward a much deeper and wider network of discussions and agreements which reduce the likelihood of misunderstandings and potential incidents between the militaries of the two states.

After eight years of marathon negotiations, the United States and the Soviet Union are finally close to concluding a strategic-arms-reduction treaty (START). At the 1990 Washington summit, U.S. president George Bush and Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev signed a communique concerning the reduction of strategic nuclear arms. Although the agreement is not the long-awaited START, the two presidents reaffirmed their determination to have the treaty completed and ready for signature by the end of 1990. The marked progress toward nuclear disarmament by the two superpowers has once again caused vast repercussions. While hailing progress, many people show more concern for the implications of the treaty for the future of arms control.

A warning system such as the Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence system (C3I) for the U.S. nuclear forces operates on the basis of various sources of information, among which are signals from sensors. These sensors include, for example, radar receivers and satellites. A fundamental problem in the use of such signals is that the sensors provide only imperfect information. Two kinds of errors are possible: missed signals (Type I errors) and false alerts (Type II errors). Probability is therefore a key concept in the logical treatment of such signals. It is defined, in the Bayesian sense, as a degree of belief in the possibility ofeach event (in this case, attack or no attack, signal or no signal, and action or no action) (Savage 1954). One of the main problems in the use of the Bayesian method is that, because the base of evidence for estimation of these probabilities may be small, the figures may be fuzzy. A first issue is thus how to account, using probabilities, for the primary uncertainties about signals and events. A second issue is how to assess and treat uncertainties about these probabilities (epistemic uncertainties) while preserving probabilistic logic. A third issue is the relevance of these epistemic uncertainties in rational and prudent decision making when the stakes are as high as the possibility of an accidental nuclear attack.

This study of the naval-training system grew out of our larger project on the development of China's strategic weapons. After completing work on the history of Beijing's nuclear weapons program, we began research on Project 09, China's development program for nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. This research brought to light important new materials on the overall growth of China's navy and led to interviews with Chinese naval specialists. The new data suggested important insights into questions related to military professionalism and the long-range strategy for Chinese military power. This review of the history of Chinese naval training thus illuminates larger issues of Chinese defense planning and security goals. It also provides a baseline for assessing the missions of the navy and its readiness for carrying out those missions.

Robert Axelrod's The Evolution of Cooperation has been widely acclaimed in the few years since its publication. Given its promise for promoting cooperation in ‘prisoner's dilemma games' (PDGs), such praise is unsurprising. The purpose of this paper is to consider whether the tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy Axelrod recommends for achieving an evolution of cooperation in PD situations has application to the negotiation of arms control treaties.

ABOUT THE BOOK

We have seen in recent hijackings and other hostage-takings that the mightiest military machine in the world can be tied down like Gulliver. What would happen if tomorrow's Lilliputians had an atomic bomb, or used other means to cause nuclear violence? Preventing Nuclear Terrorism is an insightful and provocative book that provides early warning of a threat that must be stopped from materializing at all costs. It points the way to avoiding a situation in which the world order, not just our nation, would be placed at risk. It warrants close scrutiny.
- Representative Richard Gephardt
Chairman, House Democratic Caucus

The old adage about an ounce of prevention being worth a pound of cure aptly describes the basic thrust of this valuable book. The book begins with a distinguished and balanced International Task Force of experts concluding that 'the probability of nuclear terrorism is increasing' and warning that 'the fact that so far there has been no serious act of nuclear terrorism is no reason for complacency.' The Task Force report is followed by 26 studies that provide valuable insight and perspective into all aspects of a world-threatening problem. This is a unique body of work that offers a realistic and urgently needed roadmap for steering clear of nuclear terrorism.
- Senator Sam Nunn
Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee

There is no greater challenge to the entire world than the prevention of a detonation, accidental or otherwise, of even a single nuclear weapon. Preventing Nuclear Terrorism makes a unique and valued contribution toward that end. It should be widely read, discussed, and acted upon.
- Senator John W. Warner
Secretary of the Navy, 1972-74