Sonja Schmid is a social science research associate at Stanford University. Having received her Ph.D. in Science & Technology Studies from Cornell University, she is now a science fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, and affiliated with the Program in Science, Technology and Society at Stanford. Her research has focused on understanding complex decision-making processes at the interface between science, technology, and the state in the Cold War Soviet context, and is based on extensive archival research and narrative interviews with nuclear energy specialists in Russia. She is currently working on a book about reactor design choices and the development of the civilian nuclear industry in the Soviet Union. In addition, she is involved in an international research project on Cold War Technopolitics and Colonialism, where she works on Soviet technology transfer to Central and Eastern Europe. Her research interests also include risk communication, and the popularization of science and technology, subjects on which she has published in the past.

The disarmament euphoria of the first post-Cold War years has been replaced with enhanced attention to nuclear weapons. In the place of traditional missions assigned to nuclear weapons during the Cold War, new ones have emerged or became relatively more prominent--limited use in primarily conventional conflicts. The enhanced role of nuclear weapons is likely a result of the emergence of a new international system following the hiatus of the post-Cold War period. With the end of the Cold War, the primary mission of nuclear weapons, mutual strategic deterrence of two opposing poles of the international system, largely exhausted itself, leading to hopes that nuclear weapons would lose relevance. The disarmament momentum has, however, largely exhausted itself, at least in its traditional forms and priorities, as the emerging new international system is giving rise to threats and challenges that seem to require a "nuclear response". The emergence of a new, limited-use mission assigned to nuclear weapons increases the likelihood of actual use of nuclear weapons. The increase is modest--perhaps from effectively zero in the last years of the Cold War to maybe 2-3 percent in the future--but an increase nonetheless.

Nikolai Sokov is a senior research associate at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies. He graduated from Moscow State University in 1981 and subsequently worked at the Institute of USA and Canadian Studies and the Institute of World Economy and International Relations in Moscow. From 1987-92 he worked at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Soviet Union and Russia, dealing with nuclear arms control; he participated in START I and START II negotiations as well as in a number of summit and ministerial meetings. Sokov has a Ph.D. from the University of Michigan (1996) and a Soviet equivalent of a Ph.D. (Candidate of Historical Sciences degree) from the Institute of World Economy and International Relations (1986). Sokov has published extensively on international security and arms control; he is the author of "Russian Strategic Modernization: Past and Future" (Rowman and Littlefield in 2000) and co-author and co-editor of the first college-level textbook on nuclear nonproliferation regime in Russian (PIT-Center, 2000 and 2002).

Michael May is emeritus professor Emeritus (research) in the Stanford University School of Engineering and a senior fellow with FSI. He is the former co-director of CISAC, having served seven years in that capacity through January 2000.

May is emeritus director of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, where he worked from 1952 to 1988, with some brief periods away from the laboratory. While there, he held a variety of research and development positions, serving as director of the laboratory from 1965 to 1971. May was technical adviser to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty negotiating team; a member of the U.S. delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks; and at various times has been a member of the Defense Science Board, the General Advisory Committee to the AEC, the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, the RAND Corporation Board of Trustees, and the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the National Academy of Sciences. He is a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and the Pacific Council on International Policy, and a Fellow of the American Physical Society and the American Association for the Advancement of Science.

May received the Distinguished Public Service and Distinguished Civilian Service Medals from the Department of Defense, and the Ernest Orlando Lawrence Award from the Atomic Energy Commission, as well as other awards. May's current research interests are in the area of safeguarding the nuclear fuel cycle, nuclear terrorism, energy, security and environment, and the relation of nuclear weapons and foreign policy.

Chaim Braun is a vice president of Altos Management Partners, Inc., and a CISAC science fellow and affiliate. He is a member of the Near-Term Deployment and the Economic Cross-Cut Working Groups of the Department of Energy (DOE) Generation IV Roadmap study. He conducted several nuclear economics-related studies for the DOE Nuclear Energy Office, the Energy Information Administration, the Electric Power Research Institute, the Nuclear Energy Institute, Non-Proliferation Trust International, and others.

Braun has worked as a member of Bechtel Power Corporation's Nuclear Management Group, and led studies on power plant performance and economics used to support maintenance services. Braun has worked on a study of safeguarding the Agreed Framework in North Korea, he was the co-leader of a NATO Study of Terrorist Threats to Nuclear Power Plants, led CISAC's Summer Study on Terrorist Threats to Research Reactors, and most recently co-authored an article with CISAC Co-Director Chris Chyba on nuclear proliferation rings. His research project this year is entitled "The Energy Security Initiative and a Nuclear Fuel Cycle Center: Two Enhancement Options for the Current Non-Proliferation Regime."

John Harvey has served since March 2001 as director of the Policy Planning Staff of the National Nuclear Security Administration. In this role he advises the NNSA Administrator on major policy and program decisions. He is responsible for analysis of program and policy options relating to NSC-directed policy reviews, the work of the Nuclear Weapons Council, external advisory boards, and interagency working groups. He has the lead in developing NNSA's long-range planning guidance--the so-called "front end" of the Program, Planning Budgeting and Execution process currently being implemented in NNSA. Of note, Harvey has been "point" for NNSA on the President's NSPD-4 Strategic Review, the Nuclear Posture Review and its associated implementation, the interagency review of nuclear testing issues, and on the drafting and implementation of National Security Presidential Directive (NSPD)-28 on Nuclear Weapons Command, Control, Safety, and Security. From March 1995 to January 2001, Harvey served as Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear Forces and Missile Defense Policy where he developed and oversaw implementation of U.S. defense policy governing strategic and theater nuclear forces and ballistic missile defense.

Sigfried Hecker is a visiting professor at CISAC and an emeritus director of Los Alamos National Laboratory. A metallurgist, he focuses on plutonium science and nuclear weapons stockpile stewardship, while working closely with the Russian Academy of Sciences and the Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy on a variety of cooperative threat reduction programs. He is actively involved with the U.S. National Academies, serving on the Council of the National Academy of Engineering, as chair of the newly established Committee on Counterterrorism Challenges for Russia and the United States, and as a member of the National Academies Committee on Nuclear Nonproliferation. At CISAC, he also contributes regularly to seminars and to the popular undergraduate course, Technology and National Security, taught by William Perry and Elisabeth Paté-Cornell.

Directing Los Alamos National Laboratory from 1986 through 1997, Hecker was named Laboratory Director of the Year by the National Laboratory Consortium in 1998. He has devoted most of his career to providing technical and leadership expertise to the laboratory, beginning with summer graduate school and postdoctoral assignments there. After a three-year stint as a senior research metallurgist with the General Motors Research Laboratories, he returned to Los Alamos in 1973 as a technical staff member in the laboratory's Physical Metallurgy Group. Later he led the Science and Technology Division and chaired the Center for Materials Science before becoming director.

Among his professional distinctions, Hecker is a member of the National Academy of Engineering; a foreign member of the Russian Academy of Sciences; a fellow of the TMS, or Minerals, Metallurgy and Materials Society; a fellow of the American Society for Metals; an honorary member of the American Ceramics Society; and a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences. His achievements have been recognized with the American Nuclear Society's Seaborg Medal and many other awards, including the Alumni Association Gold Medal and the Undergraduate Distinguished Alumni Award from Case Western Reserve University, where he earned his bachelor's, master's, and doctoral degrees in metallurgy.

During the Cold War the United States and the Soviet Union made launch-on-warning an important part of their nuclear strategies. To achieve the launch-on-warning capability both countries deployed networks of early-warning satellites and radars as well as command and control systems that allowed them to launch a retaliatory strike in response to a ballistic missile attack. These systems, which remain operational to this day, are believed to support the "hair-trigger alert" posture of strategic nuclear forces.

This presentation will consider the current status of the U.S. and Russian early-warning systems and the extent to which characteristics of these systems can contribute to the danger of an accidental ballistic missile launch. It will also analyze various proposals that aim at reducing the danger of accidental launch--de-alerting, reduction of strategic forces, repairing the Russian early-warning system, etc. It will be shown that most of these measures are inadequate and some may in fact increase the danger of an accident.

Pavel Podvig joined CISAC as a research associate in 2004. Before that he was a researcher at the Center for Arms Control, Energy and Environmental Studies at the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology (MIPT). He worked as a visiting researcher with the Security Studies Program at MIT and with the Program on Science and Global Security at Princeton University, and he taught physics in MIPT's General Physics Department for more than ten years. Podvig graduated with honors from the Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology in 1988, with a degree in physics. In 2004 he received a PhD in political science from the Moscow Institute of World Economy and International Relations.

His research has focused on technical and political issues of missile defense, space security, U.S.-Russian relations, structure and capabilities of the Russian strategic forces, nuclear nonproliferation. He was the head of the Russian Strategic Nuclear Forces research project and the editor of a book of the same title, which is considered a definitive source of information on Russian strategic forces.