Nuclear Risk
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Lauren Sukin
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The 10th Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference—a meeting normally held every five years—was intended to celebrate the cornerstone treaty’s 50th year. But United Nations officials postponed the April 2020 event due to the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Then, as coronavirus cases rose in October 2020, the United Nations delayed the conference again, setting August 2021 as the new target date. Enter the delta variant, which pushed the gathering back to January 2022. When the omicron variant emerged in late 2021, the NPT member states set a new target date for some time between August and September 2022.

Read the rest at the The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

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CTBTO Executive Secretary Lassina Zerbo
CTBTO Executive Secretary Lassina Zerbo speaking at the Seventh Ministerial Meeting on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) in 26 September 2014 - UN, New York. | The Official CTBTO Photostream. Accessed via Wikimedia Commons.
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Today’s security environment calls for a renewed commitment to nonproliferation. No country alone can reverse adverse developments in Iran and dissuade others from seeking nuclear arsenals. Effective nonproliferation efforts must be global. But distrust among NPT members may prevent the necessary coordination.

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Listen on the BBC The Inquiry

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BEIJING, CHINA - OCTOBER 01: Chinese rocket launchers are seen at a parade to celebrate the 70th Anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949 , at Tiananmen Square on October 1, 2019 in Beijing, China.
BEIJING, CHINA - OCTOBER 01: Chinese rocket launchers are seen at a parade to celebrate the 70th Anniversary of the founding of the People's Republic of China in 1949 , at Tiananmen Square on October 1, 2019 in Beijing, China. | Kevin Frayer / Getty Images
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Following a recent test in China, Cameron Tracy talks to the BBC about a new breed of hypersonic missiles and whether they will make the world a more dangerous place.

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Sanne Verschuren
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This summer, China conducted a series of tests with nuclear-capable hypersonic weapons systems that have clearly gotten the attention of officials across the U.S. government. The tests included a hypersonic glide vehicle — a delivery mechanism that can maneuver through the Earth’s atmosphere towards its target — and also incorporated a fractional orbital bombardment system. Because a fractional orbital bombardment system can deliver its payload by entering into lower orbit and then “dropping” it on the target, it could reach the U.S. homeland via the South Pole, bypassing U.S. early warning systems and missile defenses, which are primarily geared towards the interception of ballistic missiles from the north.

Read the rest at War on the Rocks

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China conducted a series of tests with nuclear-capable hypersonic weapons systems that have gotten the attention of officials across the U.S. government. The tests included a hypersonic glide vehicle — a delivery mechanism that can maneuver through the Earth’s atmosphere towards its target — and incorporated a fractional orbital bombardment system.

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Rose Gottemoeller
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Emerging and disruptive technologies spell an uncertain future for second-strike retaliatory forces. New sensors and big data analysis may render mobile missiles and submarines vulnerable to detection. I call this development the “standstill conundrum”: States will no longer be able to assure a nuclear response should they be hit by a nuclear first strike. If the nuclear weapons states can manage this vulnerability, however, they might be able to escape its worst effects. “Managing” could mean shoring up nuclear deterrence; it could mean focusing more on defenses; or it could mean negotiating to ensure continued viability of second-strike deterrent forces.

Read the rest at Texas National Security Review

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Emerging and disruptive technologies spell an uncertain future for second-strike retaliatory forces. New sensors and big data analysis may render mobile missiles and submarines vulnerable to detection. I call this development the “standstill conundrum”: States will no longer be able to assure a nuclear response should they be hit by a nuclear first strike.

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Siegfried S. Hecker
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What we know for sure is that North Korea can build the bomb because the tremors from deep inside the Punggye-ri nuclear test-site tunnels have been detected around the world six times. The most recent blast in September 2017 was more than 10 times the size of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki nuclear explosions. With these explosions, North Korea joined seven other countries known to have detonated nuclear devices.

Read the rest at Global Asia

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Facts are difficult to come by, myths are deeply ingrained, and uncertainties lurk everywhere — that, in short, is the nature of North Korea’s nuclear program.

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Steven Pifer
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Thirty years after the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons pose a far greater threat to the safety and security of Americans than is reflected in our public discourse. While the United States must maintain a strong nuclear deterrent as an important tool of U.S. foreign and defense policy, an oversized global arsenal of nuclear weapons makes Americans equally unsafe. It is time to reinvigorate arms control discussions to seek reasonable reductions that will make us all more secure.

Too many nuclear weapons increase the risk of theft by terrorists or other nefarious actors, encourage more countries to develop nuclear arms, and raise the risk of nuclear war. Reasonable arms control measures, taken in conjunction with adversaries like Russia, make Americans safer by diminishing the large Russian nuclear arsenal, reinforcing norms against the development and use of nuclear arms, securing or eliminating nuclear material from theft or misuse by terrorists, and saving money that can be used to strengthen the United States military’s conventional deterrence against costly and destructive wars. 

In order to achieve those goals, Washington and Moscow have cut their strategic nuclear weapons since the height of the Cold War. Through the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, or New START, which the U.S. and Russia recently extended, both countries each reduced their nuclear arsenals to no more than 1,550 deployed strategic warheads arming no more than 700 deployed strategic ballistic missiles and bombers.

Yet, despite these historic cuts, the United States and Russia each still have far more nuclear weapons than either side could conceivably use in a conflict, and at least ten times more weapons than any other country in the world. This actually makes Americans less safe, rather than the other way around.

In 2013, the Joint Chiefs of Staff concluded that the United States could safely reduce the number of deployed strategic warheads by one-third. The Biden administration should use that study—along with the current Nuclear Posture Review– to set the United States on the path to reasonable reductions. 

The Biden administration should aim for new negotiations between the United States and Russian to limit each country’s armed forces to 1,000 deployed strategic warheads. The agreement can be executed incrementally, and the sides might informally agree once negotiations began to deploy no more than 1,400 strategic warheads, as an early confidence-building measure. This first step is an easy and safe one to take, as there have been times over the past decade when both countries already deployed fewer than 1,400 strategic warheads.

As part of a bold new vision for arms control and strategic stability, U.S. negotiators should seek an agreement that encompasses all U.S. and Russian nuclear warheads, including reserve (non-deployed) strategic warheads, and non-strategic nuclear weapons. Negotiators should work to limit all nuclear warheads to no more than 2,500 each, with an embedded sub-limit of 1,000 deployed strategic warheads within the overall aggregate limit. Even with the dramatic arsenal reductions outlined here, the United States would maintain the ability to deter and, if necessary, defend against any global adversary.

Such a nuclear arms reduction agreement would have significant additional advantages for the United States:

First, it could position Washington and Moscow to press China to freeze or limit its build-up of nuclear arms as long as the United States and Russia are reducing their nuclear arsenals. 

Second, such an agreement could give the Pentagon additional resources to support wider force modernization requirements for nuclear and conventional forces alike, including new ballistic missile submarines and the B-21 bomber. If we have the forces to deter conventional conflict, we dramatically reduce the prospect of nuclear war.

Third, such an agreement would bolster America’s non-proliferation credentials and leadership. A new U.S.-Russia nuclear arms reductions treaty may not lead North Korea to abandon its nuclear program overnight, but it would increase the ability of U.S. diplomats to urge third countries to pressure and sanction outliers such as North Korea.

Right-sizing U.S. and global nuclear arsenals strengthens deterrence, reduces proliferation risks, and lowers the threat of nuclear war to the United States and our allies. The Biden administration has an opportunity to reduce that risk. It should seize it.

Rep. Ami Bera, D-Calif., is chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, Central Asia, and Nonproliferation. Steven Pifer is a William J. Perry Research Fellow at Stanford's Center for International Security and Cooperation.

Originally for Defense One

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Guided missile submarine USS Ohio (SSGN 726). | Dave Fliesen/U.S. Navy via Getty Images
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Biden has an opportunity to bolster deterrence, reduce proliferation risks, and lower the risk of nuclear war.

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Rose Gottemoeller
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President Biden is reviewing America’s nuclear posture. By January, we should know what he thinks about U.S. nuclear weapons, what policies should govern them and how many we need. Congress is watching closely, and the Senate and House of Representatives are sure to debate the results; they always do. 

But this year will be different. A new player has entered the field — China. 

Read the rest at The Hill

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President Biden is reviewing America’s nuclear posture. By January, we should know what he thinks about U.S. nuclear weapons, what policies should govern them and how many we need. Congress is watching closely; senators and representatives always do. But this year will be different. A new player has entered the field — China.

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This article presents the first reassessment of the strategic rationality and credibility of French nuclear weapons policy before 1974. Building on untapped primary material from across the world as well as technical analysis, it shows that early Cold War French nuclear weapon procurement and deployment are incompatible with a precise grand design and the requirements of strategic rationality. The first generation of French nuclear forces also lacked technical credibility, despite reliance on outside help. Several French officials knew about it, as did their allies and adversaries. These findings de-exceptionalise French nuclear history and challenge conventional wisdom about Cold War nuclear history.

Read the rest at Cold War History

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This article presents the first reassessment of the strategic rationality and credibility of French nuclear weapons policy before 1974.
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Cold War History
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Benoît Pelopidas
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In February 2020, French president Emmanuel Macron invited all interested European states to a “strategic dialogue” on the supposed contribution of France’s nuclear arsenal to European collective security. While certain media commentators relayed Macron’s intervention with approbation and excitement, framing the proposal as an exciting new idea that, if implemented, might boost Europe’s clout on the world stage, the dominant reaction was one of ennui. After all, the argument for Euro-nukes is far from new. In fact, several (mostly French) actors have unsuccessfully attempted to persuade European policymakers of the necessity of European nuclear weapons cooperation for more than half a century. In this article, we investigate the history, merits, and longevity of the case for European nuclear arms. Drawing on secondary literature, policymakers’ writings, and two hitherto untapped surveys of European public opinion conducted by one of the authors, we argue that the case for Euro-nukes is critically flawed with respect to security, strategic autonomy, futurity, and democratic good governance. We maintain that the continuous resurfacing of the “zombie” case for Euro-nukes is made possible by powerful organisational interests, as well as conceptual reversification resulting in enduring contradictions between nuclear vulnerabilities and claims of protection and autonomy.

Read the rest at European Security

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In February 2020, French president Emmanuel Macron invited all interested European states to a “strategic dialogue” on the supposed contribution of France’s nuclear arsenal to European collective security.
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European Security
Authors
Benoît Pelopidas
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Rose Gottemoeller
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Most eyes are on the nuclear agenda as Biden and Putin prepare to meet in Geneva on June 16. Fair enough: The presidents already set it as a priority from the moment they extended the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) in February. They agreed to start working on a replacement for New START and to renew talks on strategic stability. These plans create hope that although the US-Russian relationship is in dire shape, our two countries can continue to work together to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons.

Read the rest at Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists

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From the moment, President Biden and President Putin extended the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) in February, they created hope that although the US-Russian relationship is in dire shape, our two countries can continue to work together to reduce and eliminate nuclear weapons.

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