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Please join us on The Great Tohoku, Japan Disaster - Symposium Iand The Great Tohoku, Japan Disaster - Symposium II for two evenings devoted to an examination of and conversation about the March 11, 2011 Tohoku earthquake in northern Honshu, Japan, and the subsequent tsunami and nuclear accident. In talks and panel discussions, experts from the School of Earth Sciences and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies will focus on what happened, the impacts of the events, and what the future holds for Japan and other earthquake- and tsunami-zone regions of the world.

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Please join us on April 25 and 26 for two evenings devoted to an examination of and conversation about the March 11, 2011 Tohoku earthquake in northern Honshu, Japan, and the subsequent tsunami and nuclear accident. In talks and panel discussions, experts from the School of Earth Sciences and the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies will focus on what happened, the impacts of the events, and what the future holds for Japan and other earthquake- and tsunami-zone regions of the world.


APRIL 25 PARTICIPANTS

Moderator:

Pamela A. Matson is the Chester Naramore Dean of the Stanford University School of Earth Sciences, Richard and Rhoda Goldman Professor of Environmental Studies at Stanford, and senior fellow at the Woods Institute for the Environment.

Panelists:

Gregory Beroza is the Wayne Loel Professor in the Stanford University School of Earth Sciences and chair of the Department of Geophysics. He works to develop and apply techniques for analyzing seismograms—recordings of seismic waves—in order to understand how earthquakes work and the hazard they pose to engineered structures.

Gregory G. Deierlein is the John A. Blume Professor in the Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering and director of the Blume Earthquake Engineering Center at Stanford. His research focuses on improving limit states design of constructed facilities through the development and application of nonlinear structural analysis methods and performance-based design criteria.

Katherine Marvel is the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) Perry Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI) at Stanford. Her research interests include energy security and nuclear nonproliferation, renewable energy technologies, energy security, nuclear power and nonproliferation, sustainable development, and public understanding of science.

For more information, please visit the symposium website.

William R. Hewlett Teaching Center
Auditorium 200
370 Serra Mall
Stanford Campus

Pamela A. Matson Dean of the School of Earth Sciences, Goldman Professor of Geological and Environmental Sciences and FSI Senior Fellow Moderator Stanford University
Gregory Beroza Chair Panelist Department of Geophysics, Stanford University
Gregory G. Deierlein Director Panelist Blume Earthquake Engineering Center, Stanford University
Katherine D. Marvel Perry Fellow Panelist Center of International Security and Cooperation, Stanford University
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As Russia and the United States reduce their nuclear arsenals, their relationship has undergone a complex transformation toward cooperation and partnership mixed with suspicion and rivalry, writes Pavel Podvig in a new paper. "The focus of Russia’s nuclear policy, however, has remained essentially unchanged."

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Pavel Podvig
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Matthias Englert is a postdoctoral fellow at CISAC. Before joining CISAC in 2009, he was a researcher at the Interdisciplinary Research Group Science Technology and Security (IANUS) and a PhD student at the department of physics at Darmstadt University of Technology in Germany.

His major research interests include nonproliferation, disarmament, arms control, nuclear postures and warheads, fissile material and production technologies, the civil use of nuclear power and its role in future energy scenarios and the possibility of nuclear terrorism. His research during his stay at CISAC focuses primarily on the technology of gas centrifuges for uranium enrichment, the implications of their use for the nonproliferation regime, and on technical and political measures to manage proliferation risks.

Englert has participated in projects investigating technical aspects of the concept of proliferation resistance with topics including the conversion of research reactors, uranium enrichment with gas centrifuges, reducing plutonium stockpiles with reactor-based options,  spallation neutron sources and fusion power plants. Additional research topics have included fissile material stockpiles, fuel-cycles and accelerator driven systems.

Although a substantial part of his professional work recently has been technical he is equally interested in and actively studies the historical, social and political aspects of the use of nuclear technologies. Research interests include the dispute about Article IV of the NPT, the future development of the NPT regime, possibilities for a nuclear weapons-free world, preventive arms control, and the history and development of proliferation relevant programs. By studying contemporary theory in philosophy through the interaction of science, technology and society, Englert has acquired analytical tools to reflect on approaches describing or addressing the problem of ambivalent technology.

Englert is a vice speaker of the working group Physics and Disarmament of the German Physical Society (DPG) and a board member of the  German Research Association for Science, Disarmament and Security (FONAS).

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Matthias Englert Postdoctoral Fellow, CISAC Speaker
David Elliott Affiliate, CISAC Commentator
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This talk reviews three decades of Indian nuclear decision-making. It argues that India’s slow pace of weaponization in the face of Pakistani nuclearization and Sino- Pakistani nuclear cooperation in the 1980s, the slack in building an institutional capacity to wield nuclear weapons after they came into existence in the 1990s, and the reluctant attempts at developing an operational arsenal even after formally claiming nuclear power status and almost going to war with a nuclear Pakistan in the last decade, constitute puzzling behavior. Existing proliferation models explain facets of Indian nuclear behavior. However, they don’t explain it in its totality. The different facets of Indian nuclear decision making in the last three decades can be collapsed into a single dependent variable: the lag in strategic decision-making. This talk operationalizes the concept of ‘lag’, critically reviews existing explanations of Indian nuclear behavior, and offers an alternative framework for understanding Indian nuclear decision-making.

Gaurav Kampani is a sixth year doctoral student at Cornell University's Department of Government. His major and minor fields are International Relations and Comparative Politics. Kampani's research interests cover international security and focus on the relationship between domestic institutions and strategic policy, military strategy, operations planning, and weapons development.

Kampani's dissertation project studies Indian civil-military institutions and nuclear weapons-related operational practices in the decade prior 1998 and the decade since.

Between 1998-2005, Kampani worked on South Asia-related nuclear and missile proliferation issues at the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey CA.

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Gaurav Kampani Nuclear Security Fellow Keynote Speaker CISAC
Paul Kapur Associate Professor, U.S. Naval Postgraduate School; Faculty Affiliate, CISAC Commentator
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John Downer received his MA/MPhil in the History and Philosophy of Science from Cambridge University, his MA in Sociology from the University of Edinburgh, and his doctorate in Science and Technology Studies at Cornell University. His dissertation was on "The Burden of Proof: Regulating Ultra-High Reliability in Civil Aviation." Downer then worked at the London School of Economics' Centre for Analysis of Risk and Regulation (CARR), where he began re-working his dissertation for publication as a book titled "Black Box/Check Box: Assessing Critical Technologies" (forthcoming from MIT Press's Inside Technology series). Downer brings the sociology of knowledge to bear on discourses about technology policy and governance, taking insights from a close empirical study of technological knowledge-production-the US Federal Aviation Administration's assessment of new aircraft designs-and drawing out implications for broader questions about risk and governance in a world of pacemakers and nuclear power-stations. At CISAC, Downer is exploring the sociology and epistemology of failure and its implications for the governance of nuclear technologies.

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John Downer Postdoctoral Fellow, Zukerman Fellow Keynote Speaker CISAC
Charles Perrow (DISCUSSANT) Visiting Professor, CISAC; Professor Emeritus of Sociology, Yale University Commentator
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As Japan's troubles continue, CISAC's Thomas Isaacs discusses the future of the nuclear industry.

CISAC: My understanding is that Three Mile Island set back the industry because afterward there was no appetite for building new reactors.

Thomas Isaacs: It's not clear that it was Three Mile Island. It was certainly in that time frame. Others would say it was a combination of a reduction in the demand for electricity at that time and the emergence of alternative energy sources that were less expensive to get started. You saw less of an appetite not just because of the concern about Three Mile Island -- although that was probably a contributing factor -- but because it just no longer made sense to build new, huge, expensive power plants, particularly nuclear power plants.

CISAC:  Experts now say that what's going on in Japan is worse than Three Mile Island. If so, how might that affect the building of nuclear reactors in the future?

Isaacs: The effects are probably unknown and unknowable now. We'll need to have a much better idea of what actually transpires, and how it is handled by the Japanese. We'll also have to see what the consequences are and what the perceived consequences are, and the ability of the Japanese government and utilities to generate a sense of confidence, which is lacking right now. All of that will have an effect and it will be different for a variety of countries, but it's hard to speculate. My own assumption is that in countries where there is more of a national, organized effort to build nuclear, principally in places like China and India, you might not see as much effect as you might see in countries where nuclear has been much more of a controversial issue, and where the public has much more engagement in the decision-making process. In emerging countries that now have no or very few plants, you might see much more controversy. 

CISAC: What about regulation? Might there be more regulation, both here and in China, India, and elsewhere?

Isaacs: I think we don't know that yet either. You would hope that people would view this as a sobering event -- an opportunity to learn lessons for the future. As a result of Three Mile Island and then Chernobyl we have organizations like the World Association of Nuclear Operators, who come together from all over the world to share lessons learned. This will be an example of a place where you would hope they will take this very seriously -- I'm sure they will -- and they will ask very searching questions about whether our regulations or anybody's regulations are appropriate given what we've experienced. There's no question that the track record for U.S. reactors has been outstanding and getting better over the last 20 to 30 years. Should that lead to a sense of comfort? No. It should lead to a sense that we've always had an obligation to ask ourselves if we're doing everything that makes sense, and we can continue to learn from experience and improve.

CISAC: The issue of nuclear waste is important in this country and elsewhere. How might it fit into what we're seeing in Japan right now?

Isaacs: There is spent nuclear fuel, which is a waste form if it's not reprocessed. That's what would ultimately go into the repository, and that potentially is one of the problems that's causing the release of radioactivity at some of these plants. More broadly, you need to feel confident you know how to handle waste, both in the short term and in the very long term, because it is potentially hazardous for geologic time periods. Most people who work in that business believe that disposing of it in a geologic repository, in a stable geologic formation that has the right characteristics, is a very fine way to solve that problem, and pretty much every country that has decided to move toward nuclear waste disposal has chosen that approach. But from a societal point of view and a political point of view, it's a very tough problem. It's not just the science and technology problem.

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As Japan's nuclear troubles continue, CISAC's Alan Hanson discusses the range of scenarios and how to prevent catastrophe.

CISAC: What is the range of events that could happen over the next several days and weeks?

Alan Hanson: The earthquake and resulting tsunami that hit northern Japan last Friday are unprecedented in modern times. These two nearly simultaneous natural disasters did significant damage to the Fukushima nuclear power stations operated by the Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO). Despite this damage, including a total loss of off-site power and emergency backup power, TEPCO personnel have been making a heroic effort to bring the situation under control. To date off-site releases of radiation appear not to have had severe effects to the local population; because of prevailing westerly winds, the radiation releases have not been in the direction of major population centers.

It is impossible to predict the sequence of events that will unfold over the next few days and weeks. Under the best of circumstances, TEPCO will continue to take actions limiting further releases. To do so they must continue to cool the nuclear fuel in two separate regions of each reactor in the two stations; these regions are the reactor core itself and the used fuel storage pool. This means that enough water must be continually injected to keep the fuel covered. More dire circumstances could occur if the nuclear fuel is uncovered for a lengthy period of time. In the reactor core, this could lead to partial or total fuel melting, followed by failure of the primary steel containment due to excessive heat and pressure. Since some fuel has been uncovered for some time intervals, it is believed that partial melting may have already occurred and that the primary containment has been damaged in one or two of the reactors. If used fuel in the storage pools is uncovered, it could lead to fuel cladding failures from high temperatures releasing radioactive gases directly into the atmosphere. In a very unlikely scenario burning of the fuel cladding would release more gases and also particulate matter into the atmosphere. The reactor cores are of immediate concern because that is where the highest temperatures are located. The fuel pools become of greater concern over the intermediate term as water is boiled off or if some other event causes draining of a pool.

CISAC: What can be done to prevent the worst?

Hanson: Both worst-case scenarios described above can be prevented by keeping the nuclear fuel covered with water by any means available including the use of sea water, which has been initiated already. The weather will play an important role, too. As long as winds blow radioactive gases off shore and away from population centers, the public health effects should be minimal; if winds shift and blow toward Japanese cities, the situation would be significantly worse.

CISAC: How can we prevent this sort of thing from happening again?

Hanson: It is too early to speculate about the possibility of future accidents such as this one. Suffice it to say that the combination of a magnitude 9.0 earthquake and a 30-plus foot tsunami is a highly unlikely event. If early reports from the site turn out to be true, the reactors rode out the earthquake reasonably well and all of them shut down in the orderly fashion planned for an earthquake. Without the subsequent tsunami, it is very doubtful that the ongoing crisis at Fukushima would be anywhere near the magnitude we are witnessing. The nuclear industry has a good record of learning from accidents and making the appropriate changes to prevent reoccurrence or to at least mitigate the consequences should something similar happen in the future. Actions will certainly be taken by the industry and regulatory bodies in this vein once the immediate emergency is behind us.

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