Belarusian strongman Alexander Lukashenko’s role in ending the June 24 military mutiny in Russia undoubtedly scored him points with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Still, Lukashenko should worry about another aspect of his closeness to Putin and Russia.

Russian foreign policy expert Sergey Karaganov recently called, in essence, for Russia to launch a nuclear war against the West. Fortunately, it appears more sober minds prevail in Moscow. However, should Karaganov’s idea gain traction in the Kremlin, Lukashenko should understand that he has made Belarus a prime nuclear target. 

Karaganov, honorary chair of a Moscow think tank, wrote in mid-June that Russia needed to lower the threshold for use of nuclear weapons in order to break Western support for Ukraine. If the West did not back down, Karaganov opined that “we will have to hit [with nuclear weapons] a group of targets in a number of countries,” adding that, if Russia did not use “God’s weapon” for this, “not only may Russia perish, but most likely the whole of human civilization will end.”

Serious-minded analysts in Moscow quickly took issue with Karaganov’s argument. Asked about the possible use of tactical nuclear weapons as suggested by Karaganov, Putin said “I reject this. … First, we see no need to use it [a tactical nuclear strike]; and second, considering this, even as a possibility, factors into lowering the threshold for the use of such weapons.”

Over the past sixteen months since launching its massive invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin has rattled the nuclear saber. But the Russian leadership appears to understand that actually using nuclear weapons would not change attitudes in Ukraine, which already regards this war as existential, and would lead to a harsh Western response. Moreover, such threats do not go down well with audiences that matter to Moscow, including in Beijing and New Delhi.

Nevertheless, on March 25, Putin announced that Russia would place tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus. They will remain under Russian control but could be turned over for use by the Belarusian military. On June 16, Putin noted that the first tactical warheads had arrived in Belarus, with deployment of the rest to be completed by the end of the year.

Given the large number of Russian tactical nuclear arms and their possible deployment in the Kaliningrad exclave, nuclear weapons in Belarus do not materially increase the threat to Ukraine or NATO. While NATO might not like it, it has a weak basis for criticizing Russia, as the United States maintains nuclear arms on the territory of NATO members for their possible use.

This new development should worry Lukashenko. His agreement to host Russian nuclear arms makes his country a more likely target were a conflict to erupt between NATO and Russia.

And he already had grounds for serious concern.

NATO policy during much of the Cold War envisaged the use of nuclear weapons, either in response to first use by the Soviet military or deliberate escalation if NATO defenses failed at the conventional level. That posed a question: which targets in what countries to strike? Some allies favored nuclear strikes against targets in the Soviet Union. Others thought that too provocative and escalatory and argued instead for striking non-Soviet Warsaw Pact allies — East Germany, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Bulgaria. Happily, NATO and the Soviet Union never ran the experiment.

If Russia were to use nuclear weapons now, a contemporary version of that debate within NATO could turn out badly for Minsk. All the former non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries have joined NATO, and NATO members presumably would not favor nuclear attacks on their own territory. If the Russian military conducted a nuclear strike against NATO, the Kremlin certainly could not rule out the possibility of a NATO nuclear retaliatory strike against Russia itself, and that would weigh heavily on any Russian decision to use nuclear weapons in the first place. However, if striking Russian territory were deemed too incendiary, Lukashenko has offered up Belarus.

A war game in which I took part several years ago centered on a Russian invasion of the Baltic states. The Russian military used a single tactical nuclear weapon against U.S. Navy ships ferrying Marines across the Baltic Sea to help defend Latvia. The game participants favoring a nuclear response ruled out striking a target in Russia (too escalatory) and instead opted for a retaliatory nuclear attack on a Russian army brigade in — you guessed it — Belarus.

A Washington think tank organized that game. However, senior administration officials during the Obama administration in another war game came to a similar conclusion. In their game, Russia used a couple of tactical nuclear weapons. The players concluded there had to be a nuclear response, but striking Russia itself could be too provocative, so they used nuclear weapons against two military targets in Belarus.

This should be sobering for Lukashenko, who should pray that Karaganov’s bizarre idea has no real influence in Moscow. Lukashenko has quite likely ensured that, should Russia use tactical nuclear weapons, retaliatory ground zeros will be located in Belarus.

Find the original article at brookings.edu

Impacts on Russia, Ukraine, and Beyond

Michael McFaul

The implications of the 72-hour mutiny will last much longer and extend much further beyond Rostov and Moscow, says FSI Director and former U.S. ambassador to Russia Michael McFaul.

Speaking with Madeline Brand of KRCW, McFaul outlined the difficult situation Putin now finds himself in.

“This whole series of events has made Putin look a lot weaker than he looked three or four days ago. The very fact that the Wagner group exists is a sign of weakness. Putin needs them because he couldn’t rely on his armed forces.”

Elaborating further on Putin’s dilemma, McFaul says:

“As those mercenaries were getting closer to Moscow, Putin went on TV and sounded very macho, calling Prigozhin’s men traitors and promising to crush them, but then four hours later, he capitulates and starts to negotiate. And now he’s given another speech where it sounds like he’s pleading with these mercenaries to lay down their weapons and join the Russian forces. That clearly shows he hasn’t resolved this Wagner crisis yet.”

McFaul predicts that Putin’s remaining partners are also taking note of his fumbled reaction to the rebellion.

“​​If you’re Xi Jinping watching this, the big bet you made on Putin as a partner in opposing the West is looking really problematic right now.”

What Chinese officials fear most, McFaul explained to MSNBC’s Jonathn Capehart, is instability and dissolution, both internally and amongst their neighbors. Historically, the collapse of the Soviet Union was a catastrophic event for Chinese Communist Party officials, and a lesson the current leadership is loath to repeat.

McFaul asserts that, “The longer Putin’s war in Ukraine goes, the more probable it becomes that Russia becomes more unstable. The longer this war goes on, the more likely it is we could see something like this play out over and over again. So I would hope that Xi Jinping understands that putting pressure on Putin to end the war in Ukraine is the best way to prevent chaos on China's borders.”

There are also important lessons the United States and its allies need to consider when evaluating the kind of support they are willing to give Ukraine as the war wears on.

“Putin capitulated very fast, and I think that says a lot about how he’s going to fight in Ukraine and whether he needs an ‘off ramp’ like we’ve been saying. We’ve heard all of these arguments that if he’s backed into a corner he’ll never negotiate. Well, this weekend Putin was in a corner, and he didn't double down. He didn't escalate. He negotiated,” McFaul observes.

Continuing this thought on his Substack, McFaul emphasized that, “The lesson for the war in Ukraine is clear. Putin is more likely to negotiate and end his war if he is losing on the battlefield, not when there is a stalemate. Those who have argued that Ukraine must not attack Crimea for fear of triggering escalation must now reevaluate that hypothesis. The sooner Putin fears he is losing the war, the faster he will negotiate.”

Or, as McFaul writes in Journal on Democracy, “Anything that weakens Putin is good for Ukraine. It is as simple as that.”  

Fallout on Nuclear Security and Norms

Rose Gottemoeller

Throughout the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, there have been concerns about nuclear sabre rattling by Putin and Kremlin-backed propagandists. Writing in the Financial Times, Rose Gottemoeller, the Steven C. Házy Lecturer at CISAC and former Deputy Secretary of NATO offered this insight:

“The fixation with nuclear apocalypse seems to be the symptom of a wider anxiety that the west is bent on Russian dismemberment because of its aspirations in Ukraine. The Kremlin argues that it only wanted to resume its ancestral right to a Slavic heartland, but that the U.S. and NATO are seeking as punishment Russia’s full and complete destruction as a nation state.”

Gottemoeller has been quick to condemn Putin’s casual threats of nuclear use and clear in her recommendations to the U.S. administration and its allies to find constructive ways to keep nuclear arms talks open despite the war in Ukraine and setbacks like Russia’s suspension of its participation in the New START Treaty.

The Wagner takeover of Rostov-on-Don adds a new layer to the security concerns surrounding Russia’s nuclear posture. Looking at the evolution of Putin’s nuclear rhetoric over the last 18 months, Gottemoeller writes:

“Putin embraced nuclear weapons to keep the United States and its NATO allies off his back and out of his way as he pursued his adventure in Ukraine. It did not work out that way. The United States and NATO were not ready to fight inside Ukraine, but they were willing to do everything else to support Kyiv’s cause — economic, political, security and military assistance to ensure Russia’s defeat. Nuclear weapons failed Putin as a guarantee against external meddling.”

Turning to the events of the last week, Gottemoeller continues:

“We learned on June 24 that they are no help to him internally, either. He could not brandish nuclear weapons in the face of the Wagner Group uprising . . . Nuclear weapons are not the authoritarian’s silver bullet when his power is strained to the breaking point — far from it. In fact, they represent a consummate threat to national and global security if they should fall into the wrong hands in the course of domestic unrest.”

In light of Prigozhin’s mutiny, she urges global leaders to “focus on the problem, stop loose nuclear talk, and put new measures in place to protect, control and account for nuclear weapons and the fissile material that go into them.” 

The Unknown Unknowns of the Settlement

Steven Pifer

Major questions remain about the deal struck between Putin, Prigozhin, and Lukashenko. While Lukashenko has confirmed that the Wagner boss is now in Belarusian territory, it is unclear — and many feel, unlikely — that he will stay there in quiet retirement. 

Weighing in on Twitter, Steven Pifer, an affiliate at the Center for International Cooperation and Security and The Europe Center, and a former U.S. Ambassador to Ukraine, acknowledged, “We likely do not know all carrots and/or sticks that were in play to lead to Prigozhin’s decision to end his mutiny . . . Something does not add up.”

Following up in Politico, Pifer added:

“The ‘settlement’ supposedly brokered by President Alexander Lukashenko of Belarus leaves Putin, who was invisible during the day except for a short morning TV broadcast, as damaged goods. It provided the impression that all was forgiven, likely because the Russian president feared the prospect of Prigozhin’s troops parading in Moscow — even if they lacked the numbers to take control of the capital. It is harder to understand Prigozhin. His demands went unmet, yet he ordered his troops back to garrison, accepted that they might join the Russian army that he detests, and meekly set off for Belarus. There clearly is more behind this ‘settlement’ than we understand.”

North Korea remains a puzzle to Americans. How did this country—one of the most isolated in the world and in the policy cross hairs of every U.S. administration during the past 30 years—progress from zero nuclear weapons in 2001 to a threatening arsenal of perhaps 50 such weapons in 2021?

Hinge Points brings readers literally inside the North Korean nuclear program, joining Siegfried Hecker to see what he saw and hear what he heard in his visits to North Korea from 2004 to 2010. Hecker goes beyond the technical details—described in plain English from his on-the-ground experience at the North's nuclear center at Yongbyon—to put the nuclear program exactly where it belongs, in the context of decades of fateful foreign policy decisions in Pyongyang and Washington.

Describing these decisions as "hinge points," he traces the consequences of opportunities missed by both sides.The result has been that successive U.S. administrations have been unable to prevent the North, with the weakest of hands, from becoming one of only three countries in the world that might target the United States with nuclear weapons. Hecker's unique ability to marry the technical with the diplomatic is well informed by his interactions with North Korean and U.S. officials over many years, while his years of working with Russian, Chinese, Indian, and Pakistani nuclear officials have given him an unmatched breadth of experience from which to view and interpret the thinking and perspective of the North Koreans.

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