While researchers race to produce vaccines for COVID-19, countries around the world are already jockeying for what comes next.

A potentially intense competition to get their hands on them.

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President Volodymyr Zelensky and his government in Ukraine face two fundamental challenges: ending the conflict with Russia and implementing domestic reform. Overcoming these challenges appeared hard enough at the start of 2020. COVID-19 is only making that more difficult.

Ukraine finds itself in the seventh year of a war imposed on it by the Kremlin. Russian troops seized Crimea in March 2014, and Russian and Russian proxy forces have sustained a conflict in the eastern Ukrainian region of Donbas, which has claimed some 13,000 lives.

While Moscow has sought to draw Ukraine back into Russia’s orbit, there is little reason to believe that it will succeed. Nothing has done more than Kremlin policy over the past six years to push Ukraine toward the West and away from Russia. Moscow thus has used the Donbas conflict to destabilise Kyiv—to make it more difficult for Ukraine to succeed and pursue its goal of integrating with Europe.

As COVID-19 hit both Ukraine and Russia in March, some (this author included) hoped it might change some of the calculations in the Kremlin. Faced with a pandemic, falling prices for its energy exports, and an economy tumbling into recession, might Moscow rethink its policy in Donbas? A settlement would ease Russia’s political isolation and lead to a lifting of Western sanctions, which some economists estimate have cut Russian gross domestic product by 1.0-1.5% per year over the past six years.

As of June, however, Moscow’s policy appears unchanged. Russian and Russian proxy forces continue low-intensity fighting in Donbas. The appointment of a new Kremlin point-person on Ukraine did not visibly affect policy, which is determined by Vladimir Putin.

German Chancellor Angela Merkel and French President Emmanuel Macron, both grappling with COVID-19 and its economic consequences, have not followed up on the December ‘Normandy format’ summit with Zelensky and Putin. As the pandemic consumes the leaders’ attention, they and others – such as senior U.S. officials – show little bandwidth or readiness to press to change the cost-benefit calculation in the Kremlin and persuade Moscow to take up a different course that might bring peace in Donbas.

Therefore there is little reason to expect a diplomatic breakthrough, a fact that Zelensky and his team increasingly seem to recognise. The Ukrainian president has raised the idea of a “Plan B” if no progress is made by the end of the year. One suggested variant for a “Plan B” would entail virtually walling off the occupied part of Donbas and pushing the entire economic and social burden on to Russia.

The sad reality is the likely near-term scenario for Donbas is continuing simmering conflict. (As for Crimea, while not a hot conflict, it will burden Ukrainian-Russian and West-Russian relations for years if not decades to come.)

COVID-19 has made matters more complex, both for Zelensky politically on the domestic front as well as sinking the economy into recession. Kyiv recognised the need for an IMF stand-by program and access to low-interest credits. The Rada (parliament) enacted legislation to lift the moratorium on the sale of agricultural land and safeguard nationalised banks from efforts by former owners to regain control—both key conditions for an IMF stand-by agreement worth up to $5 bn. On June 9, the IMF executive board approved the agreement.

While the long-needed reforms on agricultural land and banking were most welcome, it was not clear whether their adoption reflected a genuine commitment to dramatic reform or, as with past Ukrainian leaders, the need to secure IMF credits. Both Ukrainians and the country’s friends in the West are looking for signs Zelensky will carry out the transformational agenda that carried him to an electoral landslide in April 2019, particularly with respect to curbing corruption.

Zelensky attaches priority to ending the conflict and restoring Ukrainian sovereignty in Donbas. But Kyiv cannot do that by itself. Moscow gets a vote, and the vote thus far favours keeping the conflict simmering. Whether Ukraine’s Western partners can mobilise additional pressure to change the Kremlin’s cost-benefit calculation at this point appears doubtful, at least in the near term.

If stalemated by Russia on Donbas, Zelensky can still take action on anti-corruption measures and other reforms to position the Ukrainian economy for strong growth as the pandemic eases. These are measures that he and his government control. To do so would deliver on the promises made to Ukrainian voters last year and solidify his reform credentials with his Western partners. Moreover, a more robust economy would bolster Zelensky’s position vis-à-vis the Kremlin, which hopes that domestic weakness will force him to compromise key Ukrainian principles and settle the Donbas conflict on Moscow’s terms.

Originally for Europe's World

Rashid Al-Abri did not anticipate that one of the most impactful classes he would take at Stanford his first year would be about threats to human existence. But now that he is one of only a few hundred students remaining on campus due to the outbreak of COVID-19, the existential threat of a pandemic – one of the four threats outlined in the freshman course Preventing Human Extinction – is easier to conceive.

Read the rest at Stanford News

Fred Cohen was the first person to introduce the term “computer virus.” In a 1984 paper, he defined it as “a program that can ‘infect’ other programs by modifying them to include a possibly evolved copy of itself. With the infection property, a virus can spread throughout a computer system or network using the authorizations of every user using it to infect their programs. Every program that gets infected may also act as a virus and thus the infection grows.” (The original 1984 paper was eventually published in 1987.) Since then, the security company Kaspersky claims, rightly so, that “when it comes to cybersecurity, there are few terms with more name recognition than ‘computer viruses.’”

This bit of history has taken on new meaning now that the world is in the midst of a global pandemic caused by a biological virus, the novel coronavirus, that induces an unusual and novel disease, COVID-19.

Read the rest at Lawfare Blog

The novel coronavirus (COVID-19) is a global public health disaster of almost biblical proportions. It is a once-in-a-century occurrence that threatens to destroy countless lives, ruin economies, and stress national and international institutions to their breaking point. And, even after the virus recedes, the geopolitical wreckage it leaves in its wake could be profound.

Many have understandably drawn comparisons to the influenza pandemic of 1918 and 1919. That pandemic, which began in the final months of World War I, may have infected 500 million people and killed 50 million people around the globe. As the grim toll of COVID-19 mounts, it remains to be seen if that comparison will prove apt in terms of the human cost.

But, if we want to understand the even darker direction in which the world may be headed, leaders and policymakers ought to pay more attention to the two decades after the influenza pandemic swept the globe. This period, often referred to as the interwar years, was characterized by rising nationalism and xenophobia, the grinding halt of globalization in favor of beggar-thy-neighbor policies, and the collapse of the world economy in the Great Depression. Revolution, civil war, and political instability rocked important nations. The world’s reigning liberal hegemon — Great Britain — struggled and other democracies buckled while rising authoritarian states sought to aggressively reshape the international order in accordance with their interests and values. Arms races, imperial competition, and territorial aggression ensued, culminating in World War II — the greatest calamity in modern times.

In the United States, the interwar years also saw the emergence of the “America First” movement. Hundreds of thousands rallied to the cause of the America First Committee, pressing U.S. leaders to seek the false security of isolationism as the world burned around them. President Franklin Delano Roosevelt pushed back, arguing that rising global interdependence meant no nation — not even one as powerful and geographically distant as the United States — could wall itself off from growing dangers overseas. His warning proved prescient. The war eventually came to America’s shores in the form of the attack on Pearl Harbor.

Even before COVID-19, shadows of the interwar years were beginning to re-emerge. The virus, however, has brought these dynamics into sharper relief. And the pandemic seems likely to greatly amplify them as economic and political upheaval follows, great-power rivalry deepens, institutions meant to encourage international cooperation fail, and American leadership falters. In this respect, as Richard Haas notes, the COVID-19 pandemic and the aftershocks it will produce seem poised to “accelerate history,” returning the world to a much more dangerous time.

However, history is not destiny. While COVID-19 worsens or sets in motion events that may increasingly resemble this harrowing past, we are not fated to repeat it. Humans have agency. Our leaders have real choices. The United States remains the world’s most powerful democracy. It has a proud legacy of transformational leaps in human progress, including advances that have eradicated infectious diseases. It is still capable of taking urgent steps to ensure the health, prosperity, and security of millions of Americans while also leading the world to navigate this crisis and build something better in its aftermath. America can fight for a better future. Doing so effectively, however, requires understanding the full scope of the challenges it is likely to face.

Read the rest at War on the Rocks

In March 2011, a post-earthquake tsunami triggered nuclear meltdowns, hydrogen-air explosions and the release of radioactive materials from the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Plant in Fukushima Prefecture, Japan. The Fukushima disaster has been called the most significant nuclear incident since the 1986 Chernobyl disaster. Professor Rodney C. Ewing, Frank Stanton Professor in Nuclear Security and co-director at the Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) in the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (FSI), as a member of a team of Japanese researchers, today published a report on the details of what exactly — at the particle level — was released into the air after the disaster.

In the discussion that follows, Ewing explains the team’s findings and why they are important for health and environmental safety.

Why did you decide to study the Fukushima disaster?

The Fukishima Daiichi event surprised me. I now teach a freshman seminar on this event. I am particularly interested to understand why the accident occurred and what the long-term impact will be on the environment. This research paper reflects my interest in answering these questions.

We’ve heard lots about possible health effects from contaminated water after the Fukushima disaster, but less about particulates in the air. What did you find?

During the core melt-down events at Fukushima Daiichi, radioactivity was released as fine particulates that traveled in the air, sometime for distances of tens of kilometers, and settled onto the surrounding countryside.

In order to understand the health risk, it is very important to understand the form and chemistry of these particulates.

Recently, in a previous paper we have described a new type of particulate that is Cs-rich (some Cs isotopes are highly radioactive). The highly radioactive Cs-rich particles formed in the reactor by condensation from a silica-rich vapor, formed from the melting of core and concrete structures. In this paper, we describe the first identification of fragments of the melted core that were entrapped by the Cs-particles and transported away from the reactor site, some 4 kilometers. This is an important discovery because this provides us with samples of the fuel and melted core.

This is a special contribution because it uses very advanced electron microscopy techniques that allow for imaging of individual atoms or clusters of atoms. This advanced technique is required because the particles are so small — nanometers in size.

How did you come to work with your collaborators in Japan?

I have had long standing collaborations with Japanese scientists for decades. The lead researcher for the group, Professor Satoshi Utusunomiya, was once a member of my research group when I was at the University of Michigan. We have always collaborated on topics that involve radioactive materials and the use of electron microscopy. This collaboration is an entirely natural outgrowth of previous collaborations.

What, if any, policy recommendations would you suggest based on your findings?

The most direct result would be to design monitoring systems so that we have a good record of released particulates. Also, we need to push the development of advanced analytical techniques so that these particulates can be quickly identified and characterized.