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In a paper prepared for the Nonproliferation Policy Education Center, CISAC research assistant Reid Pauly and senior fellow Scott Sagan share new evidence of instances when nuclear test sites, weapons in transit and deployed weapons were threatened during times of political instability.

 

 

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Nonproliferation Policy Education Center
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Scott D. Sagan
Scott D. Sagan
Reid Pauly
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For the past two decades China has been a poster child of successful globalization, integrating with the world and in the process lifting millions of citizens out of poverty. But China’s integration into the world economy and global trends drive and constrain Beijing’s ability to manage growing social, economic and political challenges. 

Global trends affect all nations, but China may be uniquely vulnerable to developments beyond its borders and beyond its control. Chinese leaders recognize the diversity and complexity of the challenges they face but appear determined to confront them individually and incrementally. How – and how well – they respond to those challenges will have significant consequences of China and the world. 

Many of these challenges center on rising expectations in the face of increasing competition.

Thanks to a fortuitous combination of wise decisions and good timing, China has made phenomenal progress in the three decades since Deng Xiaoping launched the policy of reform and opening to the outside world in 1978. More Chinese citizens live better today than ever before and many more expect to join the privileged ranks of the middle class. Aspirations and expectations have never been higher. That’s a very good situation to be in, but it also entails enormous challenges for China’s leaders because several trends indicate that meeting expectations could become increasingly difficult.

Chinese aspirations have never been higher, but meeting expectations could get increasingly difficult.

Specifically, China will find it increasingly difficult to sustain past rates of growth and improvements in living standards.

One visible trend results from the strategic decision to take on the easiest tasks first in order to produce an “early harvest” of tangible benefits that build experience and confidence to tackle the next set of challenges. By design, each successive set of challenges is more difficult than the ones that preceded it. There are many different manifestations of this phenomenon, including the decision to focus on the more developed coastal areas and move inward to less-developed regions characterized by less infrastructure, poorer nutrition and less education. Other manifestations include the consequences of joining international production chains as low-cost assemblers of goods that are designed, manufactured and marketed elsewhere. Sustained success requires moving up technical and managerial ladders to perform more demanding and better paying tasks. Other daunting challenges result from policies that have deliberately constrained domestic demand with predictable consequences that include increasing inflationary pressures and a nationwide property bubble.

A second category of challenges results from the fact that China now has, and will continue to have, more competition than in the past. When Deng announced the decision to pursue the longstanding goal of self-strengthening by following the model of Japan, Taiwan and other rapid modernizers, he was responding to a de facto invitation from the Carter administration for China to take advantage of “free world” economic opportunities without becoming an ally or having to change its political system. This gave China a 10-year head start with virtually no competition until the Soviet Union collapsed and the Cold War ended. China made good use of this opportunity and has since taken advantage of experience and ties forged with foreign partners before Central European states and the states of the former Soviet Union joined the game. 

India, Brazil, Indonesia and other “non-aligned” states stayed out of the game for a few years longer, thereby increasing China’s advantages. Now there are more players and potential competitors climbing the learning curve more rapidly than they otherwise might have done because they can learn from China’s experience. Foreign investors and international production chains now have far more options than they did when China was essentially the only large developing country in the game.

China now has, and will continue to have, more competition than in the past from other emerging economies.

A third set of challenges centers on demographic trends and implications. One is the oft-cited but nonetheless extraordinary challenge of being the first country in history to have a population that becomes old before it becomes rich. Many countries have graying populations – Japan and South Korea in Northeast Asia and most of Western Europe – but the others are much more highly developed than China and have extensive social safety nets to meet the needs of their senior citizens. China’s one-child-per-couple-policy has accelerated a demographic shift that normally occurs in response to higher standards of living, greater educational and employment opportunities for women, and the independent choices of millions of people. 

China must put in place an extensive and costly system to support its elderly – reducing the amount of money and other resources available for other goals – or live with the consequences of making individuals and couples responsible for the wellbeing of parents and grandparents. This challenge is compounded by the broader consequences of becoming a society in which there are few siblings, cousins, aunts, uncles or other relatives beyond the nuclear family.

A fourth challenge derives from the highly centralized character of China’s political system. For three decades, China arguably has been able to develop as quickly as it has because it is a unitary state – not a federal system in which the provinces have significant independent authority – with a single-party regime. This facilitates timely and decisive action in response to perceived needs and opportunities and makes it easier to coordinate multiple components of an increasingly complex system. There are advantages to this type of system, but also risks and costs. One set of risks results from the fact that “all” key decisions must be made at the apex of the system by a relatively small number of officials who have only finite time, attention and knowledge. As China has become more modern and prosperous, it has also become more diverse. Different locales, sectors of the economy, interest groups and other constituencies have diverse expectations of the political system. Keeping the many concerns and requirements straight, and successfully juggling and balancing competing demands, will continue to become more complex and difficult.

Looming challenges are under study, increasing the likelihood of avoiding the most negative consequences.

As this happens, it will intensify another challenge, namely, the challenge of being “right” most of the time with little to no cushion for error. Systems with distributed authority are more cumbersome, but they avoid single points of failure. The danger of single-point failure increases as the complexity of issues, number of competing viewpoints and volume of information increases. Logically, the chance of mistakes increases as decisions become more demanding. Theoretically, there exists a point in any system at which the system can be overwhelmed by the magnitude of the task. The eurozone crisis may be a cautionary example.

Recognizing these challenges should not be read as a pessimistic prediction of inevitable failure. Indeed, the fact that looming but not yet imminent challenges are already the subject of study, deliberation and debate around the world increases the likelihood of avoiding the most negative or disruptive consequences; mitigating those that cannot be avoided entirely; and capitalizing on the many positive trends toward greater cooperation, acceptance of interdependencies and ability to learn from others’ experiences. 

Clearly discernible trends point to common interests and opportunities for cooperation as well as to challenges of unprecedented complexity. Whether China continues to eschew active engagement to address challenges at the global level in order to concentrate on domestic problems will shape possibilities for international cooperation. So, too, will actions of other nations that help or hinder China’s ability to solve its problems.

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YaleGlobal Online
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Thomas Fingar
Thomas Fingar
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Zittrain will discuss the false starts in understanding the simultaneously underappreciated and overhyped fields of cybersecurity and cyberwarfare, and offer a view on where the deepest problems lie -- and how to address them.


About the speaker: Jonathan Zittrain is a Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and the Kennedy School of Government, Professor of Computer Science at Harvard’s School of Engineering and Applied Sciences, and a co-founder of the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University. Previously, he was Professor of Internet Governance and Regulation at Oxford University and a principal of the Oxford Internet Institute. He was also a visiting professor at the New York University School of Law and Stanford Law School.

Zittrain’s research interests include battles for control of digital property and content, cryptography, electronic privacy, the roles of intermediaries within Internet architecture, and the useful and unobtrusive deployment of technology in education. He was co-counsel with Lawrence Lessig in Eldred v. Ashcroft, challenging the Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998. The case lost 7-2 at the Supreme Court.

He also performed the first large-scale tests of Internet filtering in China and Saudi Arabia in 2002, and as part of the OpenNet Initiative, he has co-edited studies of Internet filtering by national governments, Access Denied: The Practice and Policy of Global Internet Filtering and Access Controlled: The Shaping of Power, Rights, and Rule in Cyberspace. His brainchild Herdict – a website that collects and tracks self-reported inaccessible sites from around the world- was launched in February, 2009. His book about the future of the now-intertwined Internet and PC, “The Future of the Internet — And How to Stop It,” came out in April 2008 from Yale University Press and Penguin UK — and under a Creative Commons license.

Zittrain holds a bachelor’s degree in cognitive science and artificial intelligence from Yale University, a J.D. from Harvard Law School, and a master’s in public administration from Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of Government. He is a member of the Board of Trustees of the Internet Society, the Board of Directors of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, and a faculty fellow and Young Global Leader of the World Economic Forum, where he also chairs the Global Agenda Council on the Future of the Internet.

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Jonathan Zittrain Professor of Law at Harvard Law School and Professor of Computer Science at the Harvard School of Engineering and Applied Sciences Speaker
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When Asia’s leaders gather in Honolulu next week for the annual Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, Americans will get a glimpse of the Obama administration’s hyperactive Asia agenda. While America has always been a Pacific nation, the Obama administration is now beginning to match the world’s most populous and economically dynamic region with America’s own brand of energy and leadership.

Before President Barack Obama alights on the tarmac in Honolulu, he will have prepared the way to lead anew in Asia. Among a number of significant “firsts” for our nation in the region are:

  • President Obama in 2009 became the first U.S. president ever to attend a meeting with all 10 leaders of the nations that comprise the Association of South East Asian Nations.
  • The United States in 2010 became the first non-ASEAN country to establish a dedicated Mission to ASEAN in Jakarta.
  • Hillary Clinton was the first secretary of state in a generation to make Asia the destination of her first foreign trip.
  • Secretary Clinton also launched the “Lower Mekong Initiative,” a first-of-its-kind agreement between Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, and the United States to enhance cooperation in the areas of water and forest management, education, and health.

Now, President Obama will arrive in Honolulu to, among other things, attempt to get APEC nations to agree to lower tariffs on renewable energy products. He will also continue to negotiate the so-called Trans-Pacific Partnership, an Obama administration initiative with eight Asian nations, with the objective of shaping a broad-based regional trade pact that would include Australia, Brunei, Chile, Malaysia, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, and Vietnam. Look for announcements of Japanese participation and a framework for the TPP agreement to be announced alongside the APEC summit.

After the APEC summit, President Obama will travel to Bali and attend the East Asia Summit, a fairly new 18-nation security forum—becoming the first U.S. president to attend this annual meeting.

All this activity is especially dramatic following eight years of low-key engagement where Asians griped about missed meetings and America’s strategic attention was focused almost exclusively in the Middle East. But most importantly, there is a well-thought out strategy for re-engagement—a strategy based on renewing long-time allies, engaging seriously newly emerging powers with an eye on preserving stability in the Pacific, while building stronger economic ties to boost American trade, job creation, and long-term economic prosperity at home.

Our stalwart ally Japan was rocked by this year’s devastating earthquake and tsunami, and America is assisting in its recovery. Our alliance remains strong, and Japan continues to be an increasingly active U.S. partner in global affairs.

Relations with South Korea are better than they have ever been. The U.S. Congress just passed a historic free trade agreement, opening the South Korean market for a wealth of American goods. Twice in two years the Obama administration (over Chinese objections) deployed the USS George Washington to the Yellow Sea and the Sea of Japan to conduct exercises with South Korea in response to North Korean aggression. Last month, President Obama welcomed President Lee Myung-bak for a state visit, the first in 10 years by a South Korean president.

President Obama will visit Australia next week to announce a deepened military cooperation pact—building once again on a long-standing alliance. This follows on Secretary of State Clinton’s signing last year of the Wellington Declaration, a roadmap for deepening and expanding the bilateral relationship between the United States and New Zealand.

The Obama administration also is engaging more closely with emerging powers.

The administration in 2010 launched the U.S.-India Strategic Dialogue, which has broadened and deepened relations with New Delhi to include issues from cybersecurity and terrorism to negotiations over a bilateral investment treaty and energy cooperation. Obama also launched the U.S.-Indonesia Comprehensive Partnership, including a series of agreements that will help defense and trade relations. The administration is also working carefully behind the scenes with Myanmar’s new leadership to urge liberalization there.

All of this brings us to China. The flurry of Asian activity makes sense in its own right to further U.S. economic, cultural, and strategic interests, but it is also a component of U.S. policy toward China. The Obama administration’s China policy involves increasing America’s ability to compete with China, working with China where fruitful, and pushing back when China’s actions cross the line. While the U.S.-China relationship is never easy, the administration has avoided major crises and managed to sell Taiwan the largest arm sales packages in any two-year period over the past 30 years without a major breach of relations with Beijing.

Indeed, where cooperation is possible, it is underway. A joint clean energy research center with China is now open, more U.S. Food and Drug Administration officials are based in China to monitor the safety of food and drugs coming to the U.S. market. What’s more, the Obama administration has had some significant success working with Beijing on the nuclear activities of North Korea and Iran, though it has followed a one step forward, two steps back pattern.

The U.S. needs to be engaged in Asia to ensure that China’s rise contributes to stability and prosperity in the region. In 2010, for example, when China made a series of aggressive moves related to the South China Sea, Secretary of State Clinton joined with her counterparts from Southeast Asia, including countries close to China such as Vietnam in what has been called a “showdown,” to make clear their desire for a peaceful, multilateral approach to the conflicting territorial claims there. China backed off its more forward actions and most strident rhetoric.

Similarly, the United States is creating incentives for China to conform to international law and standards. That’s why the Obama administration is negotiating the Trans-Pacific Partnership—a trade pact with high standards to join. The idea is build consensus in the region about a coherent set of regulations that might push China in a helpful direction. TPP rules, for example, are likely to prohibit state-owned enterprises from getting government subsidies not available to privately owned companies, an issue on which Washington has been pushing Beijing hard, with only slow progress to show for it.

These sorts of initiatives are not part of a strategy of “containment” of China, which is not possible or desirable. No Asian country would ever sign up to an anti-China alliance—each, in fact, wants to strengthen its relationship with Beijing. But at the same time, they want America to stick close by. Even if containment were possible, America benefits more from a strong, prosperous China than a weak and resentful one.

Can America afford all this Asian engagement? We have to and we will. The coming years will demand strategic choices. The next time you hear someone complaining about U.S. troops leaving Iraq, remind them that the United States is now investing more wisely and more constructively in the most important region of the world.

Nina Hachigian is a Senior Fellow at the Center for American Progress.

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The Center for American Progress
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Nina L. Hachigian
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An excerpt from "Spytainment: The Real Influence of Fake Spies" (pp. 599-600):

For avid fans of the now-departed television show 24, a visit to Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) headquarters will be disappointing. The visitors’ center looks nothing like the ultra high-tech rooms of CTU, Jack Bauer’s fictitious counterterrorist agency.

Instead, the entry to America’s best-known intelligence outfit has more of a shabby, post office feel. There are soda vending machines and an old pay phone against the back wall, with customer service–like teller windows in front. Once cleared by security, visitors can walk ten minutes down a winding road or take a rambling shuttle bus to the old Headquarters building. The lobby has no retina scans or fancy fingerprint devices, just a few turnstiles and a kind, elderly security guard who takes cell phones and hands out claim checks. Even the suite of executive offices where the CIA director sits seems strangely ordinary. The only clue that this is not a typical government building is the desks. They are all bare. Not a visible paper in sight. Documents are either locked away or burned at the end of each day.

Most people know deep down that real spying is different than what is portrayed on television and in the movies. But how different? And how much does it matter?

Today, the facts and fiction of the spy business are blurring, with important consequences for intelligence policy. In the past two decades, the Spytainment industry has skyrocketed. Government over-classification has continued to keep vital and timely public information about U.S. intelligence agencies out of the public domain. And Political Science professors have been busy researching and teaching about seemingly everything except intelligence. The results are serious. As the nonpartisan, expert Intelligence Science Board concluded in a 2006 report, spy-themed entertainment has become adult education. American citizens are steeped in misperceptions about what intelligence agencies actually do, and misplaced expectations about how well they can do it. Perhaps even more disturbing, evidence suggests that policymakers—from cadets at West Point to senators on the Intelligence Committee to Supreme Court Justices—are referencing fake spies to formulate and implement real intelligence policies.

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International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence
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Amy Zegart
Amy Zegart
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The Battle of Chernobyl

(Russian/Ukraine/USA, 2006; dir. Thomas Johnson; 93 min.)

Wednesday, May 25, 2011

7:00 pm - 9:00 pm (*NEW TIME*)
Cubberly Auditorium


Free and open to the public 

On April 26, 1986, a reactor at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Plant in the Ukrainian city of Pripyat exploded and began spewing radioactive smoke and gas. More than 40,000 residents in the immediate area were exposed to fallout a hundred times greater than that from the two atomic bombs dropped on Japan. Based on top-secret government documents that came to light only after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1999, The Battle of Chernobyl reveals a systematic cover-up of the true scope of the disaster, including the possibility of a secondary explosion of the still-smoldering magma, whose radioactive clouds would have rendered Europe uninhabitable.

Co-sponsored by the School of Education, Crothers Global Citizenship, Stanford Continuing Studies, Center for Russian, East European and Eurasian Studies, Department of Slavic Languages and Literatures, and the Stanford Film Society

 

For more information, visit the CREEES Event Website.

Cubberley Auditorium

Jasmina Bojic Lecturer in International Relations and UNAFF Founder and Director Moderator
Masahiko Ichihara Japanese Visiting Scholar at Stanford Panelist
Herbert L. Abrams Professor Emeritus of Radiology, Stanford School of Medicine; Member-in-residence, CISAC Panelist
Thomas Johnson Filmmaker Panelist
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Abstract

The case studies in this special issue demonstrate that the Obama administration's 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and related nuclear policy initiatives encouraged a number of other nuclear weapon states to likewise reduce the role of nuclear weapons in their national security doctrines and helped pave the way with non-nuclear weapon states for a successful 2010 Review Conference of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. This article reviews the contributing authors' case study findings regarding key foreign governments that applauded the 2010 NPR and were receptive to President Barack Obama's vision of a world free of nuclear weapons as well as governments that remained skeptical about US disarmament and arms control initiatives. We conclude with an analysis of the lessons that should be learned from the 2010 NPR process: the need for consistent implementation of changes in nuclear weapons doctrine, improved coordination and consultation with allies and other states, and further global education about the likelihood and consequences of nuclear terrorism.

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The Nonproliferation Review
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Scott D. Sagan
Scott Sagan
Jane Vaynman
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Christina Farr
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There are more laws and international treaties designed to protect human rights in conflict zones than ever before. Yet civilians continue to pay the ultimate price, with women and children frequently caught in the crossfire. At the beginning of the 20th century, there was one civilian casualty for every eight or nine military casualties, said Richard Goldstone, the South African jurist who played a key role in helping his country overcome apartheid, served as the chief prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunals on Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, and became a household name in 2009 for his controversial fact-finding mission after an Israeli offensive in the Gaza Strip. During World War II, the ratio increased to 1-to-1. Today, after what was, Goldstone said, a "very bloody century," every combatant casualty is matched by nine civilian deaths.

What explains this? Goldstone joined Stanford historian James Campbell and Peter Berkowitz, a political scientist, to grapple with this paradox as part of Stanford's Ethics and War Series, co-sponsored by the Center for International Security and Cooperation.

One reason behind this seeming disconnect is that gaping anomalies remain in the international legal system. It is a "very recent development that international laws have been designed to protect civilians and civilian objects," said Goldstone. Another cause of the paradox is that the most critical issue in determining whether the death of a civilian constitutes a war crime is highly subjective. The so-called principle of proportionality, defined by the Law of Armed Conflict, requires that parties refrain from attacks resulting in excessive civilian casualties. But it is up to "reasonable commanders" to judge whether such violence is justified, said Berkowitz, a senior fellow at the Hoover Institution.

Compounding the problem is that in many of the nations where crimes against civilians may have been committed, there is little interest or even open hostility toward allowing international fact-finding missions to make an assessment. Moreover, many of the transnational organizations designed to help protect civilians simply fail to do so. Goldstone said the UN should be commended for assisting the injured in Gaza but "stands condemned for ignoring the plight of Tamils."

A better system might include requiring greater education in military affairs for human rights lawyers, Berkowitz said. Goldstone's report on the Gaza conflict, Berkowitz argued, failed to properly evaluate whether the civilian cost was a military necessity, noting that Goldstone did not assess whether "reasonable" Israeli commanders had intended to avoid civilian casualties. A better understanding of military procedure, Berkowitz suggested, might have helped Goldstone and others in a similar situation make that kind of assessment.

The United States may also have a role to play in filling in the gaps in the international justice system. Campbell said that the Geneva Convention of 1949, which extended legal protection to war victims, was largely an American construction. Indeed, Berkowitz said that America has "special burdens" to spread liberal democracy across the world. However, the U.S. was reluctant to sign the Convention on the Rights of the Child, ratified by 194 U.N. nations that would protect women and children, said Helen Stacy, a senior fellow at the Center for Democracy, Development, and the Rule of Law.

How some of these issues will be resolved is still an open question. Human rights laws are complex and evolving, said Campbell. "Just as freedom is a constant struggle, so is international humanitarian law," he said. The important part was that the legal system continues to grapple with these issues. The struggle toward an effective system of international justice is being "waged in our country," he said, "in dialogues like the ones we are having today."

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Michael Sulmeyer is currently a pre-doctoral fellow at CISAC and a JD candidate at Stanford Law School, where he co-chairs the Stanford National Security Law Society and is a member of the Afghanistan Legal Education Project. He is also completing a DPhil in Politics at Oxford University about the termination of major weapons systems. As a Marshall Scholar, he received his Masters in War Studies with Distinction from King's College, London in 2005. From 2003-2004, Sulmeyer served as Special Assistant to the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy at the U.S. Department of Defense. Before that, he worked as a Research Assistant at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington D.C.

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Michael Sulmeyer Pre-doctoral Fellow, CISAC; JD candidate, Stanford Law School Speaker
Henry Rowen Co-Director, Stanford Program on Regions of Innovation and Entrepreneurship Commentator
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Gerald Warburg earned his BA in Political Science and Education at Hampshire College and MA in Political Science at Stanford in 1979, where he worked closely with CISAC fellows. He is now Executive Vice President of Cassidy & Associates, a prominent public affairs firm in Washington DC, and has served as a visiting professor at Georgetown University, Penn, Stanford, and Hampshire. He has also recently been appointed Professor of Practice of Public Policy at the University of Virginia’s Frank Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy. Warburg has more than a decade of experience as a senior aide to members of both the U.S. House and Senate leadership. As Legislative Assistant to U.S. Senate Democratic Whip Alan Cranston on Trade, Defense, and Foreign Policy, he coordinated the Senator’s work on the Committees on Foreign Relations, Intelligence, and the International Finance and Monetary Policy Subcommittee of the Banking Committee. Previously, Mr. Warburg served as Legislative Assistant for Energy, Environment and Trade issues to U.S. Representative Jonathan B. Bingham, Chairman of the International Economic Policy and Trade Subcommittee of the House Foreign Affairs Committee. Mr. Warburg was also an aide to U.S. Senator John Tunney on the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy. He is the author of Conflict and Consensus: The Struggle Between Congress and the President Over Foreign Policymaking (Harper & Row, 1989), and a novel (about Stanford China scholars) entitled The Mandarin Club, (Bancroft Press, 2006).

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Gerry Warburg Executive Vice President Speaker Cassidy & Associates
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