This analysis argues that the basic purpose of NPT safeguards—to verify compliance with an obligation not to "manufacture" nuclear weapons—could be easily thwarted if a non-nuclear-weapon party is able to produce nuclear-explosive material and build bombs in facilities that are not declared to the IAEA and inspected by IAEA inspectors.  The language of the NPT, its negotiating history, and the subsequent agreement applying its safeguards provisions all support the conclusion that non-nuclear-weapon NPT parties agreed to permit inspection of activities.

This study of the naval-training system grew out of our larger project on the development of China's strategic weapons. After completing work on the history of Beijing's nuclear weapons program, we began research on Project 09, China's development program for nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. This research brought to light important new materials on the overall growth of China's navy and led to interviews with Chinese naval specialists. The new data suggested important insights into questions related to military professionalism and the long-range strategy for Chinese military power. This review of the history of Chinese naval training thus illuminates larger issues of Chinese defense planning and security goals. It also provides a baseline for assessing the missions of the navy and its readiness for carrying out those missions.