Fifty years ago this month, President Dwight D. Eisenhower gave his "Atoms for Peace" address to the UN General Assembly. He proposed to share nuclear materials and information for peaceful purposes with other countries through a new international agency. That speech led to negotiations which, several years later, created the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). In the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) of 1968, the IAEA gained authority for policing the nuclear activities of member countries to ensure that those without nuclear weapons did not acquire them. The worldwide treaty bans all members except the United Kingdom, China, France, Russia, and the United States from having nuclear weapons and commits those five states to eventually eliminating their atomic arsenals. The treaty provides the norm and the foundation for an international regime to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons around the world. Yet, many believe that the NPT regime is battered and in need of strengthening. Given the more difficult nonproliferation and security challenges of today, it is vital that U.S. leadership be used to strengthen, not to weaken or abandon, the nuclear nonproliferation regime.

The history of the October 1969 alert demonstrates that even in this high-politics arena of nuclear diplomacy, presidential orders were actively fought against, sometimes manipulated or ignored, and often honored only in part. Other orders were interpreted and implemented in a more vigorous manner that best suited the organizational interests of the military commanders doing the interpretation. The result was that many important details of the military activities undertaken in October 1969 reflected the operational interests of the military commanders and the goals of lower-level bureaucratic actors as much as the strategic objectives of the president. In this important sense, the nuclear alert was loosely coupled to the president´s orders.

This unique collection of primary documents and important scholarly articles tells the fascinating and tragic story of Russia's twentieth century. Edited by Ronald Grigor Suny, an eminent historian and political scientist, The Structure of Soviet History illustrates both the revolutionary changes and the broad continuities in Soviet history. It discusses the history, not only of the Russian people, but of other Soviet peoples as well--the nationalities that made up the tsarist and Soviet empires and formed independent states in the early 1990s. This volume enables students to delve beyond traditional narratives to look at the building blocks of history--archival documents, memoirs, and interpretive essays by the leading experts in the field. Students will learn about the fall of the tsarist empire, the hopes and aspirations of the revolutionary years, the brutalities of the Stalin years, the attempts to reform the country in the last decades of Soviet power, and finally, the collapse of the USSR and the emergence of fifteen fragile republics. Rather than imposing a single view on students, The Structure of Soviet History allows them to come up with their own, fresh interpretations of a controversial and often misunderstood experience.

Organized chronologically and covering political, social, and cultural history from a variety of viewpoints, the readings examine all of the major events and principal interpretations of Soviet history. Selections include official pronouncements and dissident manifestos, public speeches and private letters, and previously untranslated documents. Suny's introductory essay provides the broad outlines of Soviet history, while the chapter introductions summarize the main features and historical debates of each period. Each document is prefaced by a brief headnote that identifies the author and places the work in context; explanatory notes are also included to define words and events that may not be familiar to students. A truly unique text, The Structure of Soviet History is ideal for use in undergraduate courses on the history of the Soviet Union as well as introductory courses on Soviet politics.

This article presents an overview of the history of development and the current status of the Soviet and Russian early-warning system, which was built to provide the Soviet strategic forces with information about a missile attack in an event of a nuclear conflict with the United States. Two main components of this system are considered--the network of early-warning radars, and the space-based early-warning system, which includes satellites on highly-elliptical and geosynchronous orbits. The system appears to be capable of detecting a massive attack, but cannot be relied upon to detect individual missile launches.

For centuries, dictators ruled Russia. Tsars and Communist Party chiefs were in charge for so long some analysts claimed Russians had a cultural predisposition for authoritarian leaders. Yet, as a result of reforms initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev, new political institutions have emerged that now require election of political leaders and rule by constitutional procedures. Michael McFaul traces Russia's tumultuous political history from Gorbachev's rise to power in 1985 through the 1999 resignation of Boris Yeltsin in favor of Vladimir Putin.

McFaul divides his account of the post-Soviet country into three periods: the Gorbachev era (1985-1991), the First Russian Republic (1991-1993), and the Second Russian Republic (1993-present). The first two were, he believes, failures--failed institutional emergence or failed transitions to democracy. By contrast, new democratic institutions did emerge in the third era, though not the institutions of a liberal democracy. McFaul contends that any explanation for Russia's successes in shifting to democracy must also account for its failures. The Russian/Soviet case, he says, reveals the importance of forging social pacts; the efforts of Russian elites to form alliances failed, leading to two violent confrontations and a protracted transition from communism to democracy.

McFaul spent a great deal of time in Moscow in the 1990s and witnessed firsthand many of the events he describes. This experience, combined with frequent visits since and unparalleled access to senior Russian policymakers and politicians, has resulted in an astonishingly well-informed account. Russia's Unfinished Revolution is a comprehensive history of Russia during this crucial period.

The celebration in Prague should have been more raucous. The most successful alliance in world history has extended to corners of Europe unimaginable just a few years ago. The military capacity gained for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from expansion is minimal but the political returns will be fantastic. More than any other institution, NATO has helped make Europe democratic, peaceful and whole. What is particularly striking about the new members -- Slovenia, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia -- is how many of them emerged from Communist rule with no democratic traditions. The pull of NATO, the desire to join this Western club, created real incentives for democratic consolidation.

"Why the major reversal in Bush's thinking on Russia? Most have attributed this amazing transformation to September 11. . . . But September 11 is only part of the story."