This book compares sub-Saharan Africa and the former Soviet Union, two regions beset by the breakdown of states suffering from extreme official corruption, organized crime extending into warlordism, and the disintegration of economic institutions and public institutions for human services. The contributors not only study state breakdown but also compare the consequences of post-communism with those of post-colonialism.

This chapter looks at the processes of state formation in postcolonial Africa and the former Soviet Union and asks whether those processes make African and Eurasian states especially vulnerable to civil war. In particular, we ask whether the experience of Africa's postcolonial states suggests a similar historical trajectory for the new states that emerged in Eurasia at the beginning of the 1990s. We argue that, despite important differences between the two historical experiences, conditions surrounding state formation in Africa and post-Soviet Eurasia have inhibited the formation of stable and legitimate states and have made war more likely.

The chapter beings by outlining three broad explanatory factors that scholars have used in trying to explain civil wars since 1945: ethnicity, nationalism, and globalization. We argue that these explanations neglect what Klaus Gantzel referred to as "the historicity of war," by which he means "the structural dynamics which condition the emergence and behaviour of actors" in any given period (Gantzel 1997, 139). We then suggest that a focus on state formation is helpful in providing the historical context for understanding civil wars. After surveying the experience of state-building in postcolonial Africa and in Eurasia, we conclude with comparisons and contrasts between the regions.

This unique collection of primary documents and important scholarly articles tells the fascinating and tragic story of Russia's twentieth century. Edited by Ronald Grigor Suny, an eminent historian and political scientist, The Structure of Soviet History illustrates both the revolutionary changes and the broad continuities in Soviet history. It discusses the history, not only of the Russian people, but of other Soviet peoples as well--the nationalities that made up the tsarist and Soviet empires and formed independent states in the early 1990s. This volume enables students to delve beyond traditional narratives to look at the building blocks of history--archival documents, memoirs, and interpretive essays by the leading experts in the field. Students will learn about the fall of the tsarist empire, the hopes and aspirations of the revolutionary years, the brutalities of the Stalin years, the attempts to reform the country in the last decades of Soviet power, and finally, the collapse of the USSR and the emergence of fifteen fragile republics. Rather than imposing a single view on students, The Structure of Soviet History allows them to come up with their own, fresh interpretations of a controversial and often misunderstood experience.

Organized chronologically and covering political, social, and cultural history from a variety of viewpoints, the readings examine all of the major events and principal interpretations of Soviet history. Selections include official pronouncements and dissident manifestos, public speeches and private letters, and previously untranslated documents. Suny's introductory essay provides the broad outlines of Soviet history, while the chapter introductions summarize the main features and historical debates of each period. Each document is prefaced by a brief headnote that identifies the author and places the work in context; explanatory notes are also included to define words and events that may not be familiar to students. A truly unique text, The Structure of Soviet History is ideal for use in undergraduate courses on the history of the Soviet Union as well as introductory courses on Soviet politics.

This article presents an overview of the history of development and the current status of the Soviet and Russian early-warning system, which was built to provide the Soviet strategic forces with information about a missile attack in an event of a nuclear conflict with the United States. Two main components of this system are considered--the network of early-warning radars, and the space-based early-warning system, which includes satellites on highly-elliptical and geosynchronous orbits. The system appears to be capable of detecting a massive attack, but cannot be relied upon to detect individual missile launches.

In battles, opponents exhibit positive illusions in both believing they can win. With great costs of failure and uncertain success, this represents extreme risk-taking behaviour. Conflict may be expected if one side is cornered, a sacrificial pawn in an overall war strategy, or demanded into action by politicians. However, in many cases even patently weaker forces fight despite nonviolent options. This is "military incompetence", a failure in the assessment of winning probability. Previous explanations (stupidity, psychological deviance and cognitive constraints) have been rejected. Recently, Wrangham [Evol. Hum. Behav. 20 (1999) 3.] proposed that such risk-taking could be adaptive through one of two effects: (1) Performance Enhancement through exaggerated resolve or (2) Opponent Deception by bluffing. Although adaptive if they confer a tendency to win, both processes promote risk-taking behaviour and are therefore potentially responsible for military incompetence. These hypotheses can be distinguished because the Performance Enhancement hypothesis predicts positive illusions in any type of conflict. In contrast, the Opponent Deception hypothesis predicts them in battles but not in surprise attacks, where lack of communication disables any bluff. We conducted a test of these hypotheses using data collected by the US Historical Evaluation Research Organisation, mainly from the Arab-Israeli and Second World Wars. The Opponent Deception hypothesis is supported over the Performance Enhancement hypothesis, but other explanations are not ruled out.

For centuries, dictators ruled Russia. Tsars and Communist Party chiefs were in charge for so long some analysts claimed Russians had a cultural predisposition for authoritarian leaders. Yet, as a result of reforms initiated by Mikhail Gorbachev, new political institutions have emerged that now require election of political leaders and rule by constitutional procedures. Michael McFaul traces Russia's tumultuous political history from Gorbachev's rise to power in 1985 through the 1999 resignation of Boris Yeltsin in favor of Vladimir Putin.

McFaul divides his account of the post-Soviet country into three periods: the Gorbachev era (1985-1991), the First Russian Republic (1991-1993), and the Second Russian Republic (1993-present). The first two were, he believes, failures--failed institutional emergence or failed transitions to democracy. By contrast, new democratic institutions did emerge in the third era, though not the institutions of a liberal democracy. McFaul contends that any explanation for Russia's successes in shifting to democracy must also account for its failures. The Russian/Soviet case, he says, reveals the importance of forging social pacts; the efforts of Russian elites to form alliances failed, leading to two violent confrontations and a protracted transition from communism to democracy.

McFaul spent a great deal of time in Moscow in the 1990s and witnessed firsthand many of the events he describes. This experience, combined with frequent visits since and unparalleled access to senior Russian policymakers and politicians, has resulted in an astonishingly well-informed account. Russia's Unfinished Revolution is a comprehensive history of Russia during this crucial period.

Russia's first decade after the collapse of the Soviet Union has been simultaneously tumultuous and transformative. For most of the 1990s the Russian economy was in free fall, the legal system in absentia, and the majority of citizens engaged primarily in survival efforts. Not surprisingly, the former superpower also struggled to adapt to its greatly diminished means and status.

Russia after the Fall examines Russian politics, economics, society, and foreign and security policy. Internationally renowned experts provide retrospective analyses of how Russia has fared in its reform efforts and a prospective look at the challenges ahead. This book will be of interest to scholars, students, and a general audience seeking to better understand where Russia has been and where it is going.

The celebration in Prague should have been more raucous. The most successful alliance in world history has extended to corners of Europe unimaginable just a few years ago. The military capacity gained for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization from expansion is minimal but the political returns will be fantastic. More than any other institution, NATO has helped make Europe democratic, peaceful and whole. What is particularly striking about the new members -- Slovenia, Lithuania, Estonia, Latvia, Bulgaria, Romania and Slovakia -- is how many of them emerged from Communist rule with no democratic traditions. The pull of NATO, the desire to join this Western club, created real incentives for democratic consolidation.

Western democracies face increasing constraints on the use of their overwhelming military power. The classical logic, legitimacy and effectiveness of employing force to safeguard national interests apply less and less. State and non-state adversaries threaten important and even vital Western values and interests but are seemingly underterred by - or even inspired by - Western military superiority. At the same time, phenomena such as globalisation, the growing transparency of the battlefield and changing Western value systems subject civilian and military leaders to mounting pressure to wield military power selectively and to use increasing discrimination in choosing means as well as ends.