FSI researchers work to understand continuity and change in societies as they confront their problems and opportunities. This includes the implications of migration and human trafficking. What happens to a society when young girls exit the sex trade? How do groups moving between locations impact societies, economies, self-identity and citizenship? What are the ethnic challenges faced by an increasingly diverse European Union? From a policy perspective, scholars also work to investigate the consequences of security-related measures for society and its values.
The Europe Center reflects much of FSI’s agenda of investigating societies, serving as a forum for experts to research the cultures, religions and people of Europe. The Center sponsors several seminars and lectures, as well as visiting scholars.
Societal research also addresses issues of demography and aging, such as the social and economic challenges of providing health care for an aging population. How do older adults make decisions, and what societal tools need to be in place to ensure the resulting decisions are well-informed? FSI regularly brings in international scholars to look at these issues. They discuss how adults care for their older parents in rural China as well as the economic aspects of aging populations in China and India.
The Politics and Ethics of Nonproliferation
A lasting legacy of the Cold War is the continued existence of weapons of mass destruction--uniquely, nuclear arms. The context in which they exist has been drastically changed in the realm of international politics. Father Hehir will probe the changed context of proliferation, as he addresses the continuing ethical and strategic challenges inherited from the past and now reshaped in this century.
Drell Lecture Recording: NA
Drell Lecture Transcript:
Speaker's Biography: J. Bryan Hehir is the Parker Gilbert Montgomery Professor of the Practice of Religion and Public Life at Harvard University and the Secretary for Social Services and the President of Catholic Charities for the Archdiocese of Boston. Father Hehir's research focuses on ethics and foreign policy, and the role of religion on world politics and in American society. His writings include The Moral Measurement of War: A Tradition of Continuity and Change and Military Intervention and National Sovereignty.
Oak Lounge
Best hope for Hussein trial is to validate rule of law in Iraq
The prosecution of Saddam Hussein and his co-defendants is off to a rocky start. As of last week, the trial has been adjourned twice after only a day and a half of proceedings; two of the defense lawyers have been murdered, perhaps by Iraqi security agents; and Hussein has showered the judges with contempt and challenged the legitimacy of the tribunal.
Can the trial in fact succeed? That depends on what we think are its goals.
The principal rationale for criminal justice is retribution--to punish those who have harmed others and violated society's norms. But retribution--or revenge--could be achieved without courts and due process. Trials also ordinarily produce reliable determinations of guilt or innocence, but few people, either inside or outside Iraq, have genuine doubts about Hussein's guilt.
The success of the Hussein trial, then, should be judged by whether it can also accomplish any of the broader goals that criminal prosecutions can serve in societies that have experienced widespread atrocities:
1) Providing justice for victims and documenting history. Trials enable victims to confront their abusers, a psychologically important step in the social re-integration of victimized groups. Trials also generate an authoritative record of the crimes committed by a previous regime. This can compel other groups in society--including perpetrators--to acknowledge that abuses occurred and can refute subsequent attempts at historical revisionism. This is today viewed as one of the important legacies of the Nuremberg trials.
The Hussein trial could provide a forum for victims, but only if the tribunal is allowed to address the full range of atrocities perpetrated by his regime. At this point, Hussein is being tried only for crimes committed in connection with a single episode--the killing and torture of residents of the village of Dujail after an assassination attempt on Hussein in 1982. Iraqi prosecutors have said that, after the Dujail case, they will pursue other cases involving the killings of tens of thousands of Shiites and Kurds.
A full airing of the vast tableau of Hussein's crimes, however, could take years; the trial of former Balkan strongman Slobodan Milosevic on crimes of comparable scope before the Yugoslavia War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague has been underway for almost four years. Such a timeline is unlikely to satisfy Iraqi street protesters demanding a swift trial and hanging of Hussein. Prime Minister Ibrahim Jafari's declaration that the Hussein trial "is not a research project" suggests the Iraqi government may feel pressure to sacrifice the goal of giving Hussein's victims a chance to record the atrocities they suffered in the interests of swift retribution.
2) Contributing to peace and reconciliation. Particularly in societies emerging from ethnic or sectarian conflicts, criminal trials individualize responsibility for abuses. They thus allow victims of atrocities to move beyond collective condemnation of the ethnic or religious groups from which their abusers came, enabling once-divided groups to begin to reconcile.
But the Hussein trial seems more likely to inflame sectarian tensions than to soothe them, at least in the short term. It gives Hussein a platform from which to challenge the Shiite-dominated government and to rally Sunni insurgents. Shiites and Kurds, frustrated by delays in having Hussein face the justice they believe he deserves, may escalate attacks against Sunni or Baathist targets. The net result may be a spiraling pattern of vigilantism and counter-vigilantism.
3) Promoting the rule of law. Subjecting a former dictator to a court of law, rather than a firing squad, can commit a transitional regime to due process and the rule of law. But early indications do not give hope that the Hussein trial will promote this goal. Last-minute legal changes--such as the elimination of the right of defendants to represent themselves--have been made for political, rather than legal, reasons. Tribunal officials have been selectively targeted for dismissal by the de-Baathification Commission headed by Ahmad Chalabi.
Moreover, Iraq's president announced in September that he had learned from one of the tribunal's investigating judges that Hussein had confessed to ordering executions during the notorious Anfal campaign, raising further questions about the judicial independence of the tribunal. Even the decision to try Hussein for the Dujail killings before the completion of investigations of more serious atrocities appears to be politically motivated. The government hopes to demoralize Hussein loyalists by securing a swift conviction on the easiest charges to prove.
Even under the best of circumstances, the Hussein trial could not possibly accomplish all three of these goals simultaneously. Hussein's crimes are so numerous that no trial can produce both a full historical accounting and swift justice. Iraq may be better served by establishing a truth commission to write a comprehensive history of the abuses of the Hussein era. Efforts to manage the trial to promote political stability in Iraq are unlikely to succeed and will only reflect a continuation of the Hussein-era tradition of executive branch manipulation of the courts. Addressing Sunni grievances, protecting minority rights and sharing Iraq's wealth is the way to promote reconciliation.
The best hope for the Hussein trial to be meaningful is for the Iraqi government to accord him full due-process rights and to refrain from further interference and manipulation. If the Iraqi government accepts the constraints of the rule of law, the Hussein trial can teach Iraq the valuable lesson that the state may punish citizens, even one as detested as Hussein, solely on the basis of laws impartially applied, not on the whims or caprice of the ruler.
The Bush Doctrine in Historical Perspective: The United States and Preventive War, 1941-1994
Marc Trachtenberg, a historian by training, now teaches political science at UCLA. He's the author of a number of works on twentieth century international politics, including most notably A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963. He just finished a book due to come out this spring called The Craft of History: A Guide to Method.
Reuben W. Hills Conference Room
Katrina: Redefining the Essence of Homeland Security
Paul Stockton is the associate provost at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California, and is director of its Center for Homeland Defense and Security. Stockton is the editor of Homeland Security (forthcoming from Oxford University Press in 2005). His research has appeared in Political Science Quarterly, International Security and Strategic Survey. He is co-editor of Reconstituting America's Defense: America's New National Security Strategy (1992). Stockton has also published an Adelphi Paper and has contributed chapters to a number of books, including James Lindsay and Randall Ripley, eds., U.S. Foreign Policy After the Cold War (1997). Stockton received a BA summa cum laude from Dartmouth College in 1976 and a PhD in government from Harvard University in 1986. He served from 1986-1989 as legislative assistant to U.S. Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan. Stockton was awarded a postdoctoral fellowship for 1989-1990 by CISAC. In August 1990, he joined the faculty of the Naval Postgraduate School. From 1995 until 2000, he served as director of the NPS Center for Civil-Military Relations. From 2000-2001, he founded and served as the acting dean of the NPS School of International Graduate Studies. He was appointed associate provost in 2001.
Reuben W. Hills Conference Room
Beauty and Terror: Does Mathematics Have a Role to Play in Winning the Shadow War?
How do you stop a terrorist?
You can work hard: Post men and equipment at every street corner, every port, every bay, every slip of beach, every straight stretch of asphalt long enough to land a plane.
You will spend billions, and your lines will be thin. All you've done is build the "impregnable" Atlantic Sea Wall--which the Allies punched through in hours on D-Day.
You've got to work smarter, not harder.
The opening line of the Oscar-winning movie A Beautiful Mind is "Mathematicians won the war." During World War II, the mathematics underlying cryptography played an important role in military planning.
Thereafter came a new kind of war. After the first frosts descended in the Soviet East, perhaps $2 billion were spent in the development of Game Theory.
Now again we face a new kind of war. And we need a new kind of mathematics to fight it.
Since 2001, tremendous amounts of information have been gathered regarding terrorist cells and individuals potentially planning future attacks. There is now a pressing need to develop new mathematical and computational techniques to assist in the analysis of this information, both to quantify future threats and to quantify the effectiveness of counterterrorism operations and strategies. Concepts and techniques from mathematics--specifically, from Lattice Theory and Reflexive Theory--have already been applied to counterterrorism and homeland security problems. The following is a partial list of such problems.
1. Strategies for disrupting terrorist cells
2. Data analysis of terrorist activity
3. Border penetration and security
4. Terrorist cell formation
Jonathan Farley is a CISAC science fellow and a professor in the Department of Mathematics and Computer Science at the University of the West Indies, Jamaica. His work focuses on applying lattice theory and other branches of mathematics to problems in counterterrorism and homeland security.
In 2001-2002 he was one of four Americans to win a Fulbright Distinguished Scholar Award to the United Kingdom. In the calendar years 2003 and 2004 he taught as a professor in the Department of Applied Mathematics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. In 2004 he received the Harvard Foundation's Distinguished Scientist of the Year Award, a medal presented on behalf of the president of Harvard University for "outstanding achievements and contributions in the field of mathematics." The City of Cambridge, Mass., declared March 19, 2004, to be "Dr. Jonathan David Farley Day."
He obtained his doctorate in mathematics from Oxford University in 1995, after winning Oxford's highest mathematics awards, the Senior Mathematical Prize and Johnson University Prize, in 1994. He graduated summa cum laude from Harvard University in 1991 with the second highest average in his graduating class.
Farley's work includes the solution of a problem posed by universal algebraist George Gratzer that remained unsolved for 34 years, and the solution (published in 2005) of a problem posed in 1981 by MIT mathematics professor Richard Stanley.
Reuben W. Hills Conference Room
Bastards of the Bomb: Development of the Civilian Nuclear Industry in the Soviet Union
Sonja Schmid is a science fellow at the Center for International Security and Cooperation, and affiliated with the Program in Science, Technology, and Society at Stanford University. She received her Ph.D. in Science & Technology Studies from Cornell University earlier this year. Her research has focused on understanding complex decision-making processes at the interface between science, technology, and the state in the Cold War Soviet context, and is based on extensive archival research and narrative interviews with nuclear energy specialists in Russia. Apart from the history and sociology of Soviet and post-Soviet science and technology, her research interests include risk communication, the popularization of science and technology, and international technology transfer.
Reuben W. Hills Conference Room
Panel Discussion: Hurricane Katrina and Homeland Security: What are the Connections and Research Implications?
Lynn Eden is associate director for research/senior research scholar at CISAC. Eden received her Ph.D. in sociology from the University of Michigan, held several pre- and post-doctoral fellowships, and taught in the history department at Carnegie Mellon before coming to Stanford. Her book Whole World on Fire: Organizations, Knowledge, and Nuclear Weapons Devastation won the American Sociological Association's 2004 Robert K. Merton Award for best book in science, knowledge, and technology.
Michael May is professor emeritus (research) in the Stanford University School of Engineering and a senior fellow with the Freeman Spogli Institute for Intenrational Studies. He is the former co-director of Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, and a director emeritus of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, where he worked from 1952 to 1988.
Charles Perrow is professor emeritus of sociology at Yale University. His current interests are in managing highly interactive, tightly-coupled-systems (including hospitals, nuclear plants, chemical plants, power grids, aviation, the space program, and intelligent transportation systems). These interests grew out of his work on "normal accidents," with its emphasis upon organizational design and systems theory. An organizational theorist, he is the author of a number of award winning books in the field of sociology.
Reuben W. Hills Conference Room
Lynn Eden
Not in residence
Lynn Eden is a Senior Research Scholar Emeritus. She was a Senior Research Scholar at Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation until January 2016, as well as was Associate Director for Research. Eden received her Ph.D. in sociology from the University of Michigan, held several pre- and post-doctoral fellowships, and taught in the history department at Carnegie Mellon before coming to Stanford.
In the area of international security, Eden has focused on U.S. foreign and military policy, arms control, the social construction of science and technology, and organizational issues regarding nuclear policy and homeland security. She co-edited, with Steven E. Miller, Nuclear Arguments: Understanding the Strategic Nuclear Arms and Arms Control Debates (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1989). She was an editor of The Oxford Companion to American Military History (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), which takes a social and cultural perspective on war and peace in U.S. history. That volume was chosen as a Main Selection of the History Book Club.
Eden's book Whole World on Fire: Organizations, Knowledge, and Nuclear Weapons Devastation (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2004; New Delhi: Manas Publications, 2004) explores how and why the U.S. government--from World War II to the present--has greatly underestimated the damage caused by nuclear weapons by failing to predict damage from firestorms. It shows how well-funded and highly professional organizations, by focusing on what they do well and systematically excluding what they don't, may build a poor representation of the world--a self-reinforcing fallacy that can have serious consequences, from the sinking of the Titanic to not predicting the vulnerability of the World Trade Center to burning jet fuel. Whole World on Fire won the American Sociological Association's 2004 Robert K. Merton Award for best book in science, knowledge, and technology.
Eden has also written on life in small-town America. Her first book, Crisis in Watertown (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1972), was her college senior thesis; it was a finalist for a National Book Award in 1973. Her second book, Witness in Philadelphia, with Florence Mars (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1977), about the murders of civil rights workers Schwerner, Chaney, and Goodman in the summer of 1964, was a Book of the Month Club Alternate Selection.
Michael M. May
Michael May is Professor Emeritus (Research) in the Stanford University School of Engineering and a senior fellow with the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University. He is the former co-director of Stanford University's Center for International Security and Cooperation, having served seven years in that capacity through January 2000.
May is a director emeritus of the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, where he worked from 1952 to 1988, with some brief periods away from the Laboratory. While there, he held a variety of research and development positions, serving as director of the Laboratory from 1965 to 1971.
May was a technical adviser to the Threshold Test Ban Treaty negotiating team; a member of the U.S. delegation to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks; and at various times has been a member of the Defense Science Board, the General Advisory Committee to the AEC, the Secretary of Energy Advisory Board, the RAND Corporation Board of Trustees, and the Committee on International Security and Arms Control of the National Academy of Sciences. He is a member of the International Institute on Strategic Studies, and a Fellow of the American Physical Society and the American Association for the Advancement of Science.
May received the Distinguished Public Service and Distinguished Civilian Service Medals from the Department of Defense, and the Ernest Orlando Lawrence Award from the Atomic Energy Commission, as well as other awards.
His current research interests are nuclear weapons policy in the US and in other countries; nuclear terrorism; nuclear and other forms of energy and their impact on the environment, health and safety and security; the use of statistics and mathematical models in the public sphere.
May is continuing work on creating a secure future for civilian nuclear applications. In October 2007, May hosted an international workshop on how the nuclear weapon states can help rebuild the consensus underlying the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). Proceedings and a summary report are available online or by email request. May also chaired a technical working group on nuclear forensics. The final report is available online.
In April 2007, May in cooperation with former Secretary of Defense William J. Perry and Professor Ashton Carter of Harvard hosted a workshop on what would have to be done to be ready for a terrorist nuclear detonation. The report is available online at the Preventive Defense Project. A summary, titled, "The Day After: Action Following a Nuclear Blast in a U.S. City," was published fall 2007 in Washington Quarterly and is available online.
Recent work also includes a study of nuclear postures in several countries (2007 - 2009); an article on nuclear disarmament and one on tactical nuclear weapons; and a report with Kate Marvel for the American Academy of Arts and Sciences on possible game changers in the nuclear energy industry.
The Antiplague System of the Former Soviet Union
The USSR's anti-plague system had four main responsibilities: monitor natural foci of endemic dread diseases such as plague, tularemia, anthrax, and Crimean-Congo hemorrhagic fever; protect the nation from imported exotic diseases (e.g., cholera and smallpox); protect the nation from biological warfare; and perform tasks for the Soviet offensive biological weapons program. Although the anti-plague system appears to have had successes in public health, its work undoubtedly was compromised by excessive secrecy, which led to anti-plague scientists having to overcome substantial barriers before being able to communicate with colleagues in other Soviet public health agencies, publish the results of their work, and undertake travel to non-socialist countries. This system disintegrated after December 1991, but was resurrected as elements of the newly independent states' health systems.
Reporting on the findings of a recently concluded project carried out by the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), I will discuss: (1) the threats that the anti-plague systems' human resources, pathogen culture collections, and equipment pose to international security; (2) the promises these systems hold, should they regain their former level of scientific/technical capability, for enhancing international public health; and (3) current activities by U.S. government agencies to lessen the security and safety threats of these systems and, simultaneously, increase their public health capabilities. As appropriate, I will illustrate the presentation with photos taken by CNS personnel in the course of having visited more than 40 anti-plague institutes and stations.
Dr. Raymond Zilinskas worked as a clinical microbiologist for 16 years, after graduating from California State University at Northridge with a BA in Biology, and from University of Stockholm with a Filosofie Kandidat in Organic Chemistry. He then commenced graduate studies at the University of Southern California. His dissertation addressed policy issues generated by recombinant DNA research, including the applicability of genetic engineering techniques for military and terrorist purposes. After earning a PhD, Dr. Zilinskas worked at the U.S. Office of Technology Assessment (1981-1982), United Nations Industrial Development Organization (1982-1986), and University of Maryland Biotechnology Institute (UMBI) (1987-1998). In addition, he was an Adjunct Associate Professor at the Department of International Health, School of Hygiene and Public Health, Johns Hopkins University, until 1999.
In 1993, Dr. Zilinskas was appointed William Foster Fellow at the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA), where he worked on biological and toxin warfare issues. In 1994, ACDA seconded Dr. Zilinskas to the United Nations Special Commission (UNSCOM), where he worked as a biological analyst for seven months. He participated in two biological warfare-related inspections in Iraq (June and October 1994) encompassing 61 biological research and production facilities. He set up a database containing data about key dual-use biological equipment in Iraq and developed a protocol for UNSCOM's on-going monitoring and verification program in the biological field.
After the fellowship, Dr. Zilinskas returned to the UMBI and Johns Hopkins University. In addition, he continued to serve as a long-term consultant to ACDA (now part of the U.S. Department of State), for which he carried out studies on Cuban allegations of U.S. biological attacks against its people, animals, and plants and investigations carried out by the United Nations of chemical warfare in Southeast Asia and the Arabian Gulf region. Dr. Zilinskas also is a consultant to the U.S. Department of Defense.
In September 1998, Dr. Zilinskas was appointed Senior Scientist at the Center for Nonproliferation Studies (CNS), Monterey Institute of International Studies. On September 1, 2002, he was promoted to the Director of the Chemical and Biological Weapons Nonproliferation Program at the CNS. His research focuses on achieving effective biological arms control, assessing the proliferation potential of the former Soviet Union's biological warfare program, and meeting the threat of bioterrorism. Dr. Zilinskas' book Biological Warfare: Modern Offense and Defense, a definitive account on how modern biotechnology has qualitatively changed developments related to biological weapons and defense, was published in 1999. In 2005, the important reference work Encyclopedia of Bioterrorism Defense, which is co-edited by Richard Pilch and Dr. Zilinskas, was published by Wiley. He currently is writing a book on the former Soviet Union's biological warfare program, including its history, organization, accomplishments, and proliferation potential, which will be published in 2006.
Reuben W. Hills Conference Room, East 207, Encina Hall