Whats the problem?

No country is obligated to fight to defend Taiwan. China has signalled a singular strategic priority to gain control of the island, by force if necessary, and is building a formidable military arsenal for that purpose.1 In response, the US has increasingly signalled its willingness to defend Taiwan—but the timing and scale of an American response remain uncertain political decisions, and its capacity to effectively thwart an attack remains doubtful.2 Japan has a powerful military and vital geography that would be indispensable, but it remains uncommitted.3 Australia provides the US with ever-greater levels of access, basing and military cooperation, although its political leaders remain coy.4 Some others, especially the Philippines, may find themselves drawn into a spreading conflict.5 Most other regional states fear Chinese retaliation and won’t willingly join in direct combat for Taiwan.6 

Dire as the picture may appear, China remains deterrable. A military attack on Taiwan is not inevitable. Beijing’s determination to take control is clear and firm, and it’s working assiduously to create multiple military options, of which a full-scale conventional invasion is only the most extreme alternative.7 It will exercise a military option when it judges that non-military pathways to unification are closed, and when it judges that the chances of its military success are at their highest. By the same token, conflict would be economically devastating, including for China, and would create unpredictable risks for China’s global position—so Beijing would doubtless prefer unification through less risky and disruptive non-military ways. Given the risks of conflict, it will defer any attack until it judges that it has adequately set the political and military conditions for success. Targeted and coordinated international action in peacetime can thus shape Beijing’s decision calculus by convincing it that an attack would be uncertain of success—or at least more uncertain than continuing non-military efforts.

Originally published for the Australian Strategic Policy Institute

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