The October 7 attack and Hamas nuclear logic

The October 7 attack and Hamas nuclear logic

Hamas’s invasion of Israel on the morning of October 7, 2023, operation ‘Al Aqsa flood’, marked a rupture in Israel’s national security concept. In the period preceding the attack, both the political and military echelons appear to have operated on the assumption that Hamas was deterred and had little interest in an all-out confrontation. October 7 proved that Israel failed both to deter Hamas and to detect this failure.

An earlier version of this article appeared in the September 2026 issue of ‘The Arena’ Magazine, published by the Abba Eban Institute for Diplomacy & Foreign Relations at Reichman University, Israel. This English version has been revised and adapted from the Hebrew original.

Hamas’s invasion of Israel on the morning of October 7, 2023, operation ‘Al Aqsa flood’, marked a rupture in Israel’s national security concept. In the period preceding the attack, both the political and military echelons appear to have operated on the assumption that Hamas was deterred and had little interest in an all-out confrontation. October 7 proved that Israel failed both to deter Hamas and to detect this failure. This compounded failure has another angle that has received limited attention: a possible nuclear angle. Newly surfaced evidence indicates that for almost two decades Yahya Sinwar, the Hamas leader who masterminded the October 7 attack, explicitly contemplated Israel’s nuclear weapons, their presumed ability to prevent Israel’s ‘dismantlement,’ in his words, and what he saw as a potential Israeli nuclear retaliation against Hamas in the wake of the planned attack. Thus, beyond the glaring failure of Israel’s conventional deterrence, in this case, lies a less-examined question: whether October 7 also exposed a failure of the nuclear deterrence component within Israel’s broader, multilayered deterrence posture, as projected towards Hamas, Hezbollah and Iran.

Two recently resurfaced Sinwar media interviews show that he was preoccupied for almost two decades with Israel’s nuclear capabilities and their role in Israel’s national security doctrine. In these two interviews, Sinwar linked his alleged support for a truce with the idea that Israel’s nuclear weapons guarantee that it could not be ‘dismantled’ militarily. While it is impossible to know whether his support for a truce reflected a sincere view or served propaganda purposes, his nuclear comments show that these capabilities preoccupied him.

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