Ukrainians: More Confident in Course of War, less so in U.S. Policy
Ukrainians: More Confident in Course of War, less so in U.S. Policy
Conversations during an April 21-24 visit to Kyiv indicate that, with a brutally cold winter behind them, Ukrainians are more confident than a year ago about the course of the war with Russia.
Conversations during an April 21-24 visit to Kyiv indicate that, with a brutally cold winter behind them, Ukrainians are more confident than a year ago about the course of the war with Russia. They see a front line that is largely stabilized, drones providing the Ukrainian military with new capabilities, and solid support coming from Europe. On the other hand, they have less confidence in the United States and the Trump administration’s bid to mediate an end to the war.
Kyiv’s population faced a miserable winter this past December through February, the coldest in 15 years. Temperatures fell to -20º C (-4º F), and repeated Russian missile and drone strikes on electric generation and city central heating facilities exacerbated the cold, cut water supplies and shut down elevators in high-rise apartment buildings. Temperatures last week, while cool, still were warm by comparison. Kyiv had largely restored power, heat and water, and the city’s streets bustled with traffic and traffic jams.
One Ukrainian commented that the winter had left people exhausted but not prepared to embrace settlement terms that would amount to surrender. He added that, while next winter would likely be difficult—Ukraine will have a hard time restoring all the energy infrastructure that has been destroyed by then—he did not expect the public to press the government to negotiate a bad deal. Ukrainians have shown that, if anything, they have remarkable resilience.
Ukrainian interlocutors noted that the first few months of 2026 have brought relatively good news from the battlefield. The front line appears stable, with the Ukrainians having largely stopped the first Russian spring offensives. Ukrainian officials reported more than 35,000 Russian casualties in March, a record since the February 2022 invasion.
In conversations, Ukrainian military officials said they were expanding the “kill zone” deeper into territory on the Russian side of the line of contact, with the ability provided by drones to rapidly attack targets once they were detected. They expressed certitude about the number of Russian casualties, as most were inflicted by drone strikes that provided video feedback. They added that well over half the casualties were killed in action. One noted that, if the rate of loss per square kilometer gained that the Russian military was suffering in Donetsk province continued, taking the remaining 5,000 square kilometers still in Ukrainian hands would cost Russia more than two million casualties.
Using new technologies, including small anti-drone interceptors, Ukrainian officials confirmed reports that they are now able to down as many as 90 percent of Russian Shahed-type drones. They also report a high success rate at intercepting Russian cruise missiles. Russian Iskandr ballistic missiles pose the primary challenge for Ukraine’s air defenses. They can counter those missiles only with their limited number of Patriot missile interceptors, and the war with Iran has increased the demand for Patriots in the Persian Gulf.
The growing number of longer-range strike drones in the Ukrainian arsenal provides another bright spot. Over the past two months, Ukraine has launched more drones at targets in Russia than Russia has launched against Ukraine. Ukrainian drones have inflicted significant damage on military targets and on oil refineries and oil export terminals in Russia. While the country’s large territorial size usually has proved an advantage for the Russians, it also means that their air defenses have to defend a lot of territory, leaving gaps that the Ukrainians can exploit.
Ukrainian interlocutors said the Europeans were providing strong support, led by the European Commission and Germany. The Europeans had increasingly come to understand Ukraine’s importance to their security, given the broader threat to Europe posed by Russia. April 23 brought more good news when the European Union approved a 90 billion Euro loan ($105 billion) to support Ukraine’s budget and defense needs.
Ukrainians were less confident about U.S. policy. One commented that Washington seemed to send mixed signals. Was the United States a neutral or non-neutral (i.e., pro-Russian) mediator? What kind of security guarantee would the United States agree to provide? (The details apparently remain under negotiation.) He expected that Washington would do no more for Ukraine than continue to provide intelligence support, allow NATO members to buy Patriot missile interceptors to transfer to the Ukrainian military, and hopefully refrain from pressing Kyiv to agree to unacceptable peace terms. A former senior diplomat said that Ukraine apparently “is losing” the United States as a strategic partner.
As the weather improves and the fighting season begins in earnest, Ukrainians are carrying out a largely defensive battle on the ground. They seek to prevent the Russian military from occupying further territory or, at a minimum, to force the Russians to make slow, grinding gains only at great cost in personnel and equipment.
The Ukrainians’ growing ability to strike targets at distance in Russia gives hope that they can inflict greater economic pain on Russia and force the Kremlin to make difficult choices between funding the war and funding social programs at home. The Ukrainian attacks also serve to undermine Vladimir Putin’s narrative that his “special military operation” will have only limited consequences for everyday Russian life.
To be sure, the Ukrainians confront a hard fight with the invading Russians. But they face it this spring with a notable confidence in their ability to resist and a sense that, for all the difficulties before them, they are in a better position than one year ago.