This February marks three anniversaries relevant to the Russia-Ukraine war: Twelve years since the war’s actual beginning, four years since Russia launched an all-out invasion, and one year since Donald Trump began his bid to mediate a settlement. Here are eight things to know about the conflict, now the largest and bloodiest war in Europe since 1945.

1) The war did not begin in 2022

In late February 2014, following Ukraine’s Maidan Revolution, troops in Russian combat fatigues with identifying insignia removed began seizing Crimea. Russia illegally annexed it in March. One month later, the Russians provoked a supposed “separatist” movement in Donbas in Ukraine’s east. Ukraine resisted but, by the end of 2014, Russian and Russian proxy forces held 40 percent of Donbas. Between 2014 and the end of 2021, more than 13,000 people had been killed in fighting there, and more than 1.5 million Ukrainians had been internally displaced.

By the way, it is not a “war in Ukraine.” It is a Russian war against Ukraine.

2) It is a neo-imperialist war

Russia began preparing forces for an all-out invasion in spring 2021. Three reasons seem to explain the decision to launch the attack. First, growing Kremlin concern that Ukraine was moving, irretrievably, out of Moscow’s orbit. The irony is that nothing has done more to push Ukraine away from Moscow and toward the West than Russian policy over the past 13 years.

Second, politics in Russia. For the Kremlin, a stable, independent, democratic and successful Ukraine poses a nightmare, as such a Ukraine would cause Russians to question why they do not have the same democratic rights as Ukrainians. For the Kremlin, regime preservation is Job #1.

Third, and most importantly, Vladimir Putin. He fundamentally does not accept the right of Ukraine to exist as a sovereign and independent state. He made that clear in a lengthy essay in July 2021. Putin sees himself recovering “historic Russian” lands. This is a neo-imperialist war to regain parts of the Russian Empire lost to Moscow when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991.

3) Russia is far from winning

On February 24, 2022, Russian forces struck from the north, east and south. The attack vectors suggested the Russians’ strategic goals: quickly take Kyiv, depose the Ukrainian government, and occupy the eastern one-half to two-thirds of Ukraine. Russia has achieved none of these.

One month later, Russia occupied about 27 percent of Ukraine. However, by early April 2022, the Ukrainians had pushed the Russians away from Kyiv and out of northern Ukraine, and Moscow said it would focus on taking all of Donbas. Ukrainian counteroffensives later in 2022 liberated further territory in Kharkiv and Kherson provinces.

Thereafter, the war became one largely of trench-fighting and attrition. During the next three years, the Russians captured a little more territory. Today, Russia holds 19-20% of Ukraine—about one-third less than in March 2022. The Russians have failed to take all of Donbas.

4) Ukraine has won the battle of the Black Sea

While mostly a ground war, the conflict has not taken place solely on land. The Ukrainians appear to have won the battle of the Black Sea—quite an achievement for a country whose navy had only one major surface combatant, and they scuttled that ship early on to prevent capture.

Using surface-to-surface missiles and unmanned sea drones, Ukraine has managed to sink or heavily damage 29 Russian Black Sea Fleet ships, including sinking the fleet’s flagship, the Moskva. The Russian Navy has withdrawn most ships from Sevastopol—the headquarters of the Blask Sea Fleet—and rarely operates in western Black Sea waters to avoid Ukrainian attack.

5) Russia’s army has paid dearly

By January 2026, Russia had suffered an estimated 1.2 million casualties, including up to 325,000 killed in action (other estimates are higher), many due to Ukrainian drone attacks. The Russian army has lost huge amounts of equipment, including some 4300 main battle tanks, forcing them to refurbish and send into battle decades-old T-55 and T-64 tanks. Fighting largely on the defensive from trenches and fortifications, the Ukrainians have taken far fewer casualties.

6) The war has broader strategic and economic costs for Russia

The 2022 invasion shocked Europe. Finland and Sweden abandoned years of neutrality to join NATO. NATO is rearming and has raised its target for member spending on defense from 2 percent to 3.5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP), with an additional 1.5 percent devoted to strengthening societal resilience.

The West has imposed a broad set of economic and other sanctions on Russia. While Moscow used a burst of defense spending to avoid the worst in 2023 and 2024, Russian GDP grew by only 1 percent in 2025. The International Monetary Fund projects it will grow by just .8 percent in 2026. Putin may have to face some tough guns-vs-butter decisions.

Russia was a state in decline in 2021. This war will likely accelerate that decline.

7) Negotiations are making little progress

Trump returned to the presidency in January 2025, claiming he could quickly end the war. His mediation bid has not gone well. He began that February and has often appeared to favor Russia, the aggressor, over Ukraine. Among the gifts that Trump awarded Moscow were a face-to-face meeting with Putin (breaking an informal boycott that Western leaders had imposed on such meetings) and, most importantly, ending U.S. military and financial assistance to Ukraine.

The two biggest negotiating issues have been clear since last summer: territory and security guarantees for Ukraine. Kyiv has shown flexibility and indicated a readiness to consider accepting de facto Russian occupation of some Ukrainian territory in the context of an otherwise acceptable settlement. The Ukrainians have insisted, however, that Ukraine needs solid security guarantees to ensure it would not face another Russian attack after Putin has regenerated his military capabilities.

Russian demands, on the other hand, have not significantly changed since 2024. Moscow wants Kyiv to yield territory that the Russian military has never been able to occupy while ruling out certain security guarantees under discussion between the West and Ukraine.

Putin has masterfully gamed Trump, using talks to avoid new sanctions while the Russians fight on. By all appearances, Putin still believes he can achieve his goals on the battlefield.

Unfortunately, Trump has done little to disabuse Putin of that notion. He has not backed his mediation effort with pressure on the Kremlin, such as tightening sanctions on the Russian economy, selling NATO countries more advanced weapons to transfer to Ukraine, e.g., Tomahawk missiles, or taking steps—working with the European Union to seize frozen Russian Central Bank assets or asking Congress to fund new military aid for Ukraine—to make clear the Ukrainian military will have the resources to buy the arms it needs to continue the fight.

8) Prognosis: Continued war

Ukrainians are weary of war and would like a settlement, but they are not prepared to accept onerous terms that would amount to capitulation. They will continue to resist, and Europe is stepping up to fill in the gap left by Trump’s decision to end U.S. assistance for Kyiv.

If Trump increased pressure on Moscow, his mediation effort might have a chance to succeed. But he has proven reluctant to do so. If he does not use his leverage, his mediation effort will fail. The most likely prospect, unfortunately, is that the war will continue.