Talking to the Enemy: Explaining Diplomatic Strategy in Conflicts in Asia
Wednesday, February 13, 201912:30 PM - 2:00 PM (Pacific)
Encina Hall, Third Floor, Central, C330
616 Jane Stanford Way, Stanford, CA 94305
EMERGING ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY ASIA
A Special Seminar Series
RSVP required by February 12, 2019 to: https://goo.gl/forms/h9RRcz4vR9Ybn5cQ2
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ABSTRACT: Diplomacy plays a critical role in the management and resolution of armed conflict in the international system. After a war breaks out, decision makers see the opening of talks as a constructive step in the conflict’s resolution — dialogue allows for belligerents to broker deals and coordinate the logistics of war termination. However, in modern warfare, states almost always fight initially for period of time without engaging in talks. What factors explain whether states are willing to talk to their enemy while fighting and when might their diplomatic postures change? “Talking to the Enemy” presents a framework to explain variation in countries’ approaches to wartime diplomacy, focusing on the costs of talks and how states mitigate these costs to get to the negotiating table. I test this framework with respect to Chinese decision making in the Korean and Sino-Indian Wars — one in which China was against talks for nine months before opening up and the latter in which China actively pursued talks throughout the whole conflict. The findings have significant implications for crisis management and conflict resolution in U.S.-China relations.