Winston Churchill once famously said, “There is at least one thing worse than fighting with allies … and that is to fight without them.” Virtually every U.S. leader since World War II has grasped this Churchillian bit of wisdom. They have also understood that, if the United States wants their help, Washington needs to cultivate, consult, respect and listen to allies—even if that takes time and can prove frustrating.

Donald Trump does not understand that. As a result, he finds himself scrambling to find allies to help him out of the dilemma he faces in keeping the Strait of Hormuz open.

The United States has fought four major wars against countries in the broader Middle East region since 1990. In three, America had support from a group of allies and partners.

In 1990, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein sent his army to occupy Kuwait and its oil. President George H. W. Bush worked the phones to allied leaders while Secretary of State James Baker racked up air miles to build a coalition to expel Iraq from Kuwait. That diplomacy culminated in UN Security Council Resolution 678 (1990), authorizing “all necessary means” to liberate Kuwait, as a large multinational military force assembled in the Persian Gulf to do so.

When Desert Storm began in January 1991, the U.S.-led coalition included forces from some 35 countries. True, the United States provided the bulk of the fighting power, but NATO allies such as Britain and France contributed substantial air, land and sea forces, as did regional partners. Total non-American forces numbered some 200,000, with Britain alone contributing 53,000.

President George W. Bush responded to the September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and Washington by attacking the Taliban and al-Qaida in Afghanistan. The United States had NATO backing from the start, with the Alliance invoking Article 5 (an attack against one considered an attack against all) on September 13, the only time NATO has invoked Article 5 in its 77-year history. In 2003, NATO took command of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. During the U.S. surge in 2011, more than 40,000 NATO troops deployed along with American forces in Afghanistan. Some 10,000 NATO and partner troops were there in 2021 when the decision was made to leave.

Twelve years after Desert Storm, Bush launched a second war against Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom. He devoted less effort than his father to securing partners, and it showed. Anxious to portray the assault as enjoying broad international support, the Bush administration exaggerated the contributions of the “coalition of the willing” during the March 2003 assault on Iraq.

Nevertheless, American forces crossed the Iraqi border with British, Polish and Australian troops alongside. Following the defeat of the Iraqi army and Baghdad’s fall, the Pentagon wanted to reduce U.S. forces. American diplomacy sought more troop contributors. In 2004, some 30 allies and partners provided 24,000 troops to the U.S.-led stabilization force.

Working with allies did not always prove easy. The effort to gain support sometimes generated angry spats. Vocal French opposition to Operation Iraqi Freedom led to a period of freedom fries instead of French fries. But a basic level of courtesy and comity usually prevailed.

Not so during the first 14 months of the second Trump administration.

Having joined Israel in attacking Iran, the Trump administration now seeks help from others in ensuring an open Strait of Hormuz, through which 20 percent of the world’s oil and LNG (liquified natural gas) pass. While losing most of their navy, the Iranians can still threaten ships with mines, anti-ship missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles, unmanned suicide and fast attack boats.

Although Trump asserted that opening the Strait would be “a simple military maneuver” with “little risk,” others see a far more difficult operation. Trump seeks allies and partners to ensure the Strait stays open, with the United States providing “help.” But consider how Trump and his administration have treated allies the past 14 months. In no particular order, they have: · hit allies with arbitrary tariffs, · called into doubt the U.S. commitment to NATO, · demeaned NATO allies and denigrated the contribution of their soldiers in Afghanistan, where more than 1,000 allied soldiers died, · threatened to annex Greenland from Denmark, possibly by force, · mused about making Canada the 51st state and referred to its prime minister as “governor,” · pushed the entire financial burden of military and other assistance for Ukraine on to European and other allies, · issued a National Security Strategy that did not depict Russia as a threat, instead focusing on “civilization erasure” and the European Union’s allegedly anti-democratic policies, · blatantly interfered in allies’ domestic politics, and · regularly insulted allies while asking their help with the Strait of Hormuz.

As for consulting allies (other than Israel), there appear to have been no meaningful exchanges in the run-up to the February 28 launch of U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran. Indeed, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth skipped the February meeting of NATO defense ministers. Nothing suggests that Secretary of State Marco Rubio used meetings at the mid-February Munich Security Conference to consult allied officials on U.S. thinking on Iran. After Munich, Rubio traveled to Hungary and Slovakia, allies led by pro-Trump leaders that could contribute nothing regarding Hormuz.

These actions have an impact and erode allied trust. As a former NATO member foreign minister noted, allies “are kept in the dark” regarding U.S. goals and worry that Trump “might suddenly withdraw, leaving Europeans and Gulf countries to deal with the aftermath.”

Trump has provided an object lesson in how not to treat allies. He needs to do better in the future, or he will find that his America First policy increasingly means America alone.