The Center for International Security and Cooperation (CISAC) offers a rich variety of fellowships for scholars to focus on a variety of security topics and participate in seminars to interact and collaborate with leading faculty and researchers. 

In this Q&A, Sitara Noor reflects on the ideas and experiences that have shaped her work in international security. Drawing on years of research and policy engagement, she discusses how her thinking has evolved alongside today’s changing geopolitical landscape and the challenges it presents for international security. 

In your article, From Euro-Atlantic to the Indo-Pacific: Assessing NATO’s Evolving Policy on China, you discuss how NATO members differ in their perceptions of China. How do these differing threat perceptions among U.S. and European allies shape the alliance’s ability to develop a cohesive strategy?

This research was conducted during my fellowship at the NATO Defense College in Rome in 2023-24.  The paper explored the evolution of NATO’s threat perception of China, especially the differences between American and European positions, and analysed the underlying factors that contributed to this shift. It looked at how China maintained its status as an economic partner among many EU states, before growing scepticism gradually led to Beijing being viewed as a rival or potential rival, alongside a growing consensus within Europe on reducing the EU’s dependency on China for critical supplies.

The study argued that the U.S.-China contestation is likely to intensify over the next few years, especially as a result of the steady alignment of China-Russia interests and interdependence. While NATO’s geographic priorities are likely to remain Eurocentric, there will be growing pressure on NATO’s European members to respond to the direct and indirect implications of Chinese actions due to perceived interlinkages between Euro-Atlantic and Indo-Pacific security. These pressures will pave the way for a more cohesive strategy. Although recent tensions between the US and its European partners over Greenland have generated unexpected strains in transatlantic trust, the broader arguments of the paper still hold.

Your article A Decade After the Nuclear Security Summits: How to Deal with New Nuclear Security Challenges? looks back at the achievements of Nuclear Security Summit Process and stresses the need to carrying forward the NSS momentum through other available avenues. What are the emerging nuclear security risks in your view and what are the best ways to address them?

This recent publication commemorates the 10th anniversary of the nuclear security summit process and takes stock of global nuclear security practices and emerging challenges.  It underlines that some of the key nuclear security challenge include the evolving nature of design basis threat as many nuclear power plants are in the midst of an active warzone, as well as the incorporation of emerging technologies that entail cross-domain and cross sectoral functions. It recalls that one of the important contributions of the Nuclear Security Summit process was a change of pace from what was once a slow process of development on strengthening nuclear security measures. Now, when we look back at the NSS process, we realize that it was made possible due to the direct involvement of the heads of the states, especially President Obama’s leadership on this serious issue. Another key feature of the NSS process was its ability to remain sufficiently focused to achieve substantive progress on critical issues for example minimization of HEU and bringing renewed commitment to international legal instruments that subsequently led to entry into force of the Amendment to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) in 2016, while also maintaining enough flexibility to deflect criticism and not becoming entangled in complex issues that would impede any progress, such as addressing nuclear weapons and military stockpiles security.

While nuclear security momentum at the political and leadership level has waned to a greater extent after the fourth summit in March 2016 in Washington DC, the NSS process helped sustain the work beyond its conclusion. After the final meeting, the work of the NSS summits gravitated towards five international organizations, including the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The NSS agenda was embedded into these organization’s existing mandates, where IAEA was in the leading role and responsible for the main tasks, including technical assistance and international cooperation and coordination.

The article highlights that ten years down the line, nuclear security risks have evolved significantly, and the emerging challenges demand more focus and attention. In that regard, the article refers to two main processes that are currently facilitating renewed attention and concrete development on nuclear security at the IAEA. First is the review conference of the A/CPPNM, which was first held in 2022. Although the first review conference largely focused on political reaffirmations by the member states and did not lead to any new commitments or assessment of existing measures, the decision to periodically review the Convention’s progress will help in sustaining the NSS momentum, to some extent,  at the political level. Second is the initiation of the review process for four key publications of the Nuclear Security Series, including the NSS No 13 (INFCIRC 225 Rev 5), with the aim to determine the need for its revision. These two avenues offer an opportunity, albeit with some inherent limitations, to take stock of the existing measures, assess their efficacy against the emerging risks, and propose amendments and upgrades.

In your research on South Asian strategic stability, you highlight rising India–Pakistan tensions and the limits of third-party mediation. What do you see as the most pressing new risks to regional stability, and what feasible measures could meaningfully reduce the risk of escalation of conflict?

The role of third-party mediators has historically been significant during crises in South Asia, with the United States effectively serving as a de facto crisis manager since the 1999 Kargil conflict. However, the two most recent crises, the 2019 Pulwama-Balakot crisis and the 2025 Pahalgam crisis, appeared to reflect a different trend, as Washington was perceived as being less willing to assume its traditional crisis-management role from the outset.

It highlights the fact that outsourcing crisis management in a nuclear environment to a third party is inherently destabilizing, as it is based on potentially misplaced trust that the third party will intervene before the crisis becomes out of control. This can also lead the competing states to feel more incentivized to engage in a policy of brinkmanship. In addition, a third party’s motivation to intervene in a crisis may be different at any given point in time, hence increasing the chance of miscalculation by the competing states that in turn would challenge the strategic stability in the region.

While one would expect that these crises could be India and Pakistan’s Cuban Missile crisis moment, and realizing the risks, they would engage in some risk reduction measures, but that was not the case. On the contrary, India and Pakistan learnt divergent lessons that challenge the existing deterrence equation, where India believes that it has found space to fight a conventional war under Pakistan’s nuclear threshold, whereas Pakistan believes that its response has plugged any perceived gaps. This behavior indicates that there could be another episode of what I call “controlled escalation.” Therefore, there will be an incessant risk of any future crisis spiraling out of hand, advertently or inadvertently.

However, both countries have had moments of peace in the past and have developed and worked on various confidence building measure in the past that have withstood the pressure of crises. As an incorrigible optimist myself, I am inclined to believe in the continuous possibility of a peaceful future for the region, despite current negative trends.

In terms of success, which accomplishments are you most proud of?

I am proud of my academic and professional trajectory, which has provided opportunities to live and work across different continents and work alongside some exceptional mentors, colleagues, and friends. I take particular pride in having the opportunity to work and study at various prestigious institutions including Harvard and Stanford University which have been deeply meaningful milestones in my academic and professional journey.

I also believe that every accomplishment carries a responsibility toward those who come after us. In this spirit, I am particularly proud of helping to establish a small endowment fund, together with my siblings, at my alma mater, Quaid-i-Azam University in Islamabad. The fund, created in memory of my late parents, provides need-based scholarships to female students.

What is something that people would be surprised to learn about you?

Well, mentioning my interest in some creative/performing art forms would perhaps not be too surprising. However, what is less known within my academic circle is my engagement with politics, including my selection as Youth Coordinator for a leading political party in my home district.