Forum Choice for Terrorism Suspects

Aziz Huq earned his BA summa cum laude in International Studies and French from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill in 1996 and his law degree from Columbia Law School in 2001, where he was awarded the John Ordronaux Prize. He clerked for Judge Robert D. Sack of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (2001–02) and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg of the Supreme Court of the United States (2003–04). After clerking he worked as Associate Counsel and then Director of the Liberty and National Security Project of the Brennan Center for Justice at NYU School of Law. He has also been a Senior Consultant Analyst for the International Crisis Group.

His research and teaching interests include constitutional law, national security and counterterrorism, federal jurisdiction, legislation, human rights, and comparative constitutional law.

Abstract

What forum should be employed to adjudicate the status of persons suspected of involvement in terrorism? Recent clashes between Congress and the President as to whether the status of terrorism suspects should be determined via Article III criminal process or military commissions have revived debate on this venue question. The problem is typically framed as a simple matter of law on the assumption that existing statutory and doctrinal rules already furnish dispositive guidance for sorting suspects between civilian and military venues. This article takes issue with that assumption. It argues that the choice of forum question can more profitably be understood as a problem of institutional design rather than a choice of law puzzle. A key institutional design decision that to date has been ignored is whether or when to create jurisdictional redundancy: When, that is, should overlapping jurisdictions vest the government with a choice of forums or an option to retry a suspect acquitted in an initial process? Such redundancy is currently pervasive. But conventional wisdom suggests that it both risks abuse and is needlessly costly. This Article demonstrates that jurisdictional redundancy has complex direct and indirect effects on the accuracy and cost of terrorism-related adjudication. It presents a comprehensive framework for analyzing jurisdictional redundancy by exploring how the latter influences error rates, system maintenance costs, externalities, information production, and incentives. Applying that framework, I suggest the current status quo of pervasive redundancy has surprising merit in contrast to two leading reform proposals.