Renowned scholars Gabrielle Hecht and Paul N. Edwards joined Stanford’s Center for International Security and Cooperation this summer.

Hecht was named the Frank Stanton Foundation Professor of Nuclear Security, and Edwards is the William J. Perry Fellow in International Security. Until recently, Hecht and Edwards taught at the University of Michigan. They boost CISAC’s faculty prowess on nuclear, climate, and computer issues, and in the more general domain of science, technology and society.

Hecht: nuclear perspectives

Hecht also will serve as a senior fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, and as a professor in Stanford’s Department of History. She taught at the University of Michigan for the past 18 years, where she was director of the Program in Science, Technology, and Society, and associate director of the African Studies Center, among other highlights.

Before joining the University of Michigan, she taught at Stanford from 1991 to 1998. Hecht has been a visiting scholar at universities in Africa, Europe and Australia.

Hecht has written two award-winning books on nuclear issues: Being Nuclear: Africans and the Global Uranium Trade (2012), which offers new perspectives on the global nuclear order, and The Radiance of France: Nuclear Power and National Identity (1998 & 2009), which explores how complex relationships among technology and politics shaped early French nuclear policy.

Among other issues, Hecht studies the wastes produced by nuclear development. “Scholars and policymakers have long focused on the what-if scenarios of nuclear war,” she said. “But it’s equally vital to understand the environmental and human security damage that has actually occurred during seven-plus decades of nuclear weapons and power.”

Hecht’s teaching addresses such concerns on a global level. Her research focuses on Africa, long left out of nuclear histories.

In any given year of the Cold War, mines in Africa provided between 20 and 50 percent of the capitalist world’s uranium, including much of the material for nuclear weapons in the U.S., France and Britain. These sites continue to produce toxic and radioactive contamination in South Africa, Namibia, Gabon, Niger, and elsewhere, said Hecht. They pose significant security concerns at the local, regional, and global levels.

Studying these sites also offers a window onto the Anthropocene, a concept now used by natural scientists, social scientists, and humanists to describe how human activity has affected the Earth’s geological and biophysical properties, Hecht said.

“In order for the concept to have real planetary significance, we must see it from a variety of perspectives – including those originating in African societies and environments, which are on the front lines of global climate change and other environmental catastrophes,” she said.

The CISAC opportunity gives Hecht the chance to extend her scholarly research into the world of policy in the U.S. She’s already made these inroads into the French policy community by, for example, serving on several advisory boards, including for the Andra, France’s national radioactive waste management agency.

Hecht earned a doctorate in history and sociology of science from the University of Pennsylvania (1992), and a bachelor’s degree in physics from MIT (1986).

Edwards: knowledge and information infrastructures

Edwards, a professor in University of Michigan’s School of Information and history department, studies the history, politics, and cultural aspects of computers, information infrastructures, and global climate science.

“I’m interested in how we know what we know about climate change,” Edwards said in an interview.

After this spring’s U.S. retreat from the 2015 Paris climate change agreement, Edwards has seen heightened interest in how knowledge about climate change is created, conveyed, disputed, and used. He is keenly intrigued by the “historical trajectory of knowledge infrastructures,” and how they unfold in the Anthropocene era.

He also plans to work on a nuclear security project with CISAC’s William J. Perry and Scott Sagan on the legality of nuclear war. Modern climate models show that the climatic effects (“nuclear winter”) of even a relatively small nuclear war could be severe enough to affect noncombatant nations worldwide, he noted.

“So, we are asking, is it even legal to start a nuclear war?” he said.

In the year ahead, Edwards will be co-teaching a course on “averting near-term human extinction” and undertaking another on “techno-metabolism.” The latter concerns how human technological systems, much like biological organisms, consume energy and materials and excrete waste — but unlike ecosystems, obtain most energy from unrenewable fossil sources and fail to recycle wastes.

At Michigan, he served as the director of the university’s Science, Technology & Society Program. His award-winning books include A Vast Machine: Computer Models, Climate Data, and the Politics of Global Warming (2010) and The Closed World: Computers and the Politics of Discourse in Cold War America (1996).

Edwards also previously taught at Stanford, from 1992 to 1998. He earned a doctorate in the history of consciousness at UC Santa Cruz (1988) and a bachelor’s degree in language and mind at Wesleyan University (1980).

Hecht and Edwards met in 1992 while co-teaching a course in Stanford’s Program in Science, Technology, and Society. They have taught together many times since then, most notably inaugurating a course on nuclear and climate catastrophes at the Paris Institute of Political Studies (Sciences Po). They have also co-authored several essays, including an article on the technopolitics of apartheid and its opponents, which appeared in the leading Journal of Southern African Studies.

MEDIA CONTACT:

Clifton B. Parker, Center for International Security and Cooperation: (650) 725-6488, cbparker@stanford.edu

Published in the journal Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, this new article by Siegfried Hecker and Paul C. White below is based on content in Hecker's 2016 book, Doomed to Cooperate: How American and Russian Scientists Joined Forces to Avert Some of the Greatest Post-Cold War Nuclear Dangers:

“Nuclear weapons stink when taken apart,” a Russian nuclear weapons engineer told his audience. The year was 2000, and he spoke to a group of Russian and American experts who were attending a workshop in Sarov, the Russian Los Alamos, on how to safely dismantle nuclear weapons. The engineer was right: Nuclear weapons being disassembled smell like rotten eggs or a high-school chemistry lab gone bad. They can contain high explosives, organic substances, uranium, plutonium, and many other materials. Over the years, these materials interact, outgas, corrode, and are subject to irradiation, producing a foul smell. Hardly anyone outside the room would have had any reason to be aware of this, so the engineer’s words inspired knowing nods, and acted like a wink or a secret handshake: The Russian and American nuclear scientists in the room shared a common bond.

It was a strange phenomenon. Until just 10 years previously, the experts’ respective governments had been adversaries. But Russian and American nuclear scientists shared ties that no one else in the world could appreciate. Working far apart, they and their forebears had ushered into existence the world’s most destructive weapon, the atom bomb. They had worked to improve it, manage it, and make sure it was reliable. Now, they were trying to keep nuclear weapons safe from accidents and secure against theft and sabotage as the two superpowers downsized their arsenals. The scientists and engineers knew something that few others understood: That the most dangerous time in a typical nuclear weapon’s life cycle is not when it is being created, transported, or readied for launch. Rather, it is when it is being taken apart. Corrosion, changes in the sensitivity of chemical high explosives, outgassing of various compounds, radiation damage, and dimensional changes all challenge the skills of weapons engineers and scientists. The experts in the room might once have been one another’s opponents in some sense, but many on each side had intimate knowledge of weapons disassembly—who else could better understand what their counterparts were going through? 

An urgent problem

The story of how the United States and Russia worked together to address weapons safety had begun years before, and represents a remarkable tale of once-mortal-adversaries cooperating on matters that took them right to the edges of their respective countries’ most sensitive nuclear secrets.

It started with the disastrous Chernobyl nuclear reactor accident in April 1986. After briefly denying it had occurred, Moscow reached out to the international nuclear community for help mitigating the tragic consequences. Washington assisted quickly and effectively. Years later, Russian nuclear weapon scientists told their American counterparts (including the authors of this column) that the Chernobyl accident had happened because the Soviet Union was isolated. That is, Russian nuclear reactor designers, engineers, and operators had not had the opportunity to learn from their international peers. The weapon scientists assured us that the safety of nuclear bombs had always been much more rigorous. Yet the memory of the Chernobyl tragedy, and the enormous increase in the number of weapons being moved and disassembled, made Russian nuclear scientists keen to discuss concerns and safety practices with American counterparts.

The end of the Cold War all but eliminated immediate fears of a nuclear war. In an ironic twist of fate, though, it dramatically increased the risk of nuclear accidents and the potential for theft or diversion of nuclear weapons and materials. When the Soviet Union collapsed, Russia had to transport unprecedented numbers of weapons from former Soviet republics to Russia for dismantlement. No one was as sharply aware of the risks as Russia’s nuclear weapons personnel.

In the wake of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives launched by George H.W. Bush and Mikhail S. Gorbachev in September and October of 1991, which promised transparency and dialogue on safe warhead transportation and storage, the Russians gave voice to their concerns. In Washington in November 1991, Viktor N. Mikhailov, later Russia’s minister of atomic energy, specifically requested help with weapon safety and security, as well as help storing the huge excess of fissile material that would result from the accelerated dismantlement of his country’s nuclear stockpile. The US Congress responded to these requests promptly by way of the Nunn-Lugar cooperative threat reduction legislation.

The scope and timing of the Nunn-Lugar efforts matched the urgency of Russian requests. To deal with security concerns related to the surge in warhead transportation, the United States cooperated to develop accident-resistant transportation containers. It provided armored Kevlar blankets to shield warheads and warhead containers from terrorist bullets, and smart rail cars that enabled secure monitoring of warhead shipments. Washington also helped meet the new storage requirements (resulting from increased dismantlement rates) by providing containers and technical and financial support for the construction of a state-of-the-art fissile material storage facility at the Mayak site in Russia.

These Nunn-Lugar-sponsored efforts, managed by the US Defense Department and supported by the US national nuclear labs, were a good beginning, but the Russian nuclear weapons experts wanted to do more to mitigate the dangers. The extraordinary number of nuclear weapons returning from the field and waiting to be disassembled included some past their certified lifetime. During one of the first meetings of Russian and American nuclear experts at Los Alamos in December 1992, Rady I. Ilkaev, the deputy scientific director of the Russian national nuclear lab VNIIEF, proposed direct, unclassified consultations on nuclear weapon safety.

The Russians not only sought bilateral technical cooperation, but also believed that Russian-American teamwork would demonstrate an unparalleled level of transparency about nuclear safety, which would help reassure their own citizens and a worried world that remembered the Chernobyl tragedy all too well.

Ilkaev and his Russian colleagues took advantage of the lab-to-lab scientific collaborations that blossomed during the early 1990s to explore much closer cooperation on safety—an approach that resonated strongly with their US lab counterparts. Yet no government agreements were in place to allow such cooperation. So two tracks were pursued in parallel: The governments prepared for formal negotiations, while simultaneously allowing the labs to exchange sensitive but unclassified nuclear-weapon safety and security concerns and practices. This sharing took the form of symposia called the Security Technology Exchanges. 

Four such symposia were held between October 1993 and March 1994, two in each country, at which American and Russian scientists, engineers, and government officials compared experiences on a range of topics. Subjects included analyzing nuclear risk; mitigating risks posed by hazardous materials; understanding the response of engineered systems to abnormal environments; and communicating the content of technical documents. 

One of the most important topics discussed in these symposia and later exchanges was human reliability. The economic and political crisis resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union severely strained one of the foundations of nuclear weapon safety: people. One of the authors of this piece (Paul C. White) recalls that at a July 1993 planning meeting in Ekaterinburg, his Russian counterpart asked, “What do you do when you can no longer count on people to do what they’re supposed to do—to obey the rules?” Although the Russians’ confidence in the loyalty and patriotism of their nuclear workers remained high, they expressed concern that the fraying of the decades-old system of authority could give rise to insider threats.

A mutual strategic interest

These symposia opened doors, established a foundation for building trust, and nurtured professional and personal friendships that endure to this day. They also helped pave the way for government negotiations on the Weapons Safety and Security Exchange agreement, or WSSX, which the US energy secretary and Russian minister of atomic energy signed in December 1994. It entered into force in June 1995. 

In a March 1996 directive, US President Bill Clinton stated that cooperation on weapons safety and security was necessary to facilitate other US policy objectives, such as getting Russia to agree and comply with a true zero-yield Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty. Clinton authorized lab-to-lab collaboration between the three Russian and three US nuclear weapons labs, with the goal of sustaining the scientific competence of those responsible for the two countries’ respective nuclear stockpiles. His statement was remarkable for declaring that maintaining the expertise of Russian nuclear weapons scientists—America’s Cold War adversaries—was now a US strategic interest.

Although WSSX was an agreement between governments, the nuclear labs provided the driving energy and remained the centers of engagement for all related activities. Over the life of the agreement, which was renewed for five years in 2000, the two sides organized dozens of technical interactions, including symposia, joint studies, workshops, and exchanges of technical papers. The participants completed more than 100 collaborative projects on far-reaching and mutually beneficial topics. Among them were projects on accident response, responding to wildfires near nuclear facilities, and safety during warhead dismantlement. When Americans shared their experience of using a well-known industrial solvent—DMSO, or dimethyl sulfoxide—instead of mechanical methods to remove high explosives that had bonded to metal weapon parts, a Russian participant stood up and declared, “you have just given us a gift!” Such “gifts” were exchanged reciprocally to improve warhead disassembly on both sides.

The discussions on responding to wildfires would also prove mutually beneficial. It wasn’t just technical staff from Los Alamos and Sarov who got to participate in exchange visits. So, too, did the fire departments of the two cities. In May 2000, Los Alamos experienced a devastating fire that burned more than 400 residences and 30 percent of the lab’s real estate, and threatened facilities that housed high explosives, plutonium, and tritium. In 2010, Sarov had to battle a peat fire at the boundary of its nuclear complex. Los Alamos experienced another serious wildfire in 2011. 

The WSSX exchanges allowed experts to learn new ways of looking at similar problems, unquestionably benefiting each country’s handling of the safety and security of its nuclear weaponry. In the book Doomed to Cooperate, one Russian nuclear safety expert said the exchanges led his country to adopt new federal regulations on nuclear weapons safety and emergency response. 

Sadly, the WSSX agreement was not extended in 2005. The end of this remarkable period of cooperation came at the hands of governments, not scientists. Washington imposed more legal and bureaucratic strictures on joint projects, and veered away from prioritizing nuclear safety to promote an agenda of arms control and transparency. Moscow became increasingly resistant to the presence of US technical personnel at its nuclear facilities. During the last three years, as relations between the US and Russian governments have seriously deteriorated, virtually all nuclear cooperation has ended.

Nuclear safety has become more challenging as the designers and engineers who developed the weapons in today’s arsenals retire, and the experience of nuclear testing fades into distant memory. The older generation has passed on as much experience as possible to the younger engineers—particularly the idea that ensuring nuclear safety is a never-ending job. The WSSX projects demonstrated that cooperation has great safety benefits, and can be accomplished without jeopardizing either side’s nuclear secrets. The scientists and engineers on both sides are prepared to resume cooperation. The bonds they forged endure, reflecting a unique like-mindedness, a sort of simpatico professional relationship (or sympatiya in Russian) that helped make scientific engagement such a success and the world a safer place.

CISAC senior fellow Scott Sagan co-authored the following article with Benjamin A. Valentino, an associate professor of government at Dartmouth College. They write that it's time to educate the public about the dangers of nuclear weapons after the United Nations recently voted to permanently ban nuclear weapons. The essay was published July 16 in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists:

On July 7, almost 72 years after the first atomic bomb was detonated in the New Mexico desert, 122 nations voted at the United Nations headquarters in New York to permanently ban nuclear weapons under international law. None of the nine states that possess nuclear weapons even attended the negotiations. The Netherlands was the sole NATO member to participate, and it cast the sole no vote. The ban treaty will be open for signatures from all UN member states beginning in September and will officially enter into force after 50 states have accepted it.

With not a single nuclear weapons state signing up as a member, even the treaty’s strongest proponents acknowledge that it is a largely an aspirational document designed to promote disarmament by delegitimizing nuclear weapons. “Weapons that are outlawed are increasingly seen as illegitimate, losing their political status and, along with it, the resources for their production, modernization, and retention” the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN) has claimed. The treaty does not really “outlaw” or make nuclear weapons “illegal” under international law, however, because any state that is not a member of the treaty is not bound by its terms. Indeed, the United States, France, and the United Kingdom issued a joint statement following the vote: “We do not intend to sign, ratify or ever become party to it. Therefore, there will be no change in the legal obligations on our countries with respect to nuclear weapons. For example, we would not accept any claim that this treaty reflects or in any way contributes to the development of customary international law.”

The treaty, however, does stand as a symbol of missed opportunities. The energy, organization, and genuine passion that eventually resulted in the ban treaty were assets that might have been used to address dangerous realities about nuclear weapons that are too often ignored: the human costs of clean-up of waste sites and production facilities and the potential for nuclear winter or other environmental effects. These issues were front and center agenda items for the “humanitarian impact” movement that spawned the treaty and in the movement’s early meetings, but these critical concerns were sidelined as the push for a nuclear ban gathered steam. All that remains of these original objectives is a short section in the treaty (Article 6) requiring parties to the convention to remediate any environmental contamination caused by the use, production, or testing of nuclear weapons and to assist people who may have suffered harm from them. But since the nuclear weapons states have not signed the treaty, they are not under pressure to address these problems.

Since nuclear weapons will be with us for many years to come, it is critical that we work now to minimize the risks they pose to humanity. Proponents of the ban treaty were right to criticize the nuclear weapons states for sometimes failing to live up to their pledge under Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Treaty “to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” But that progress has been slow because states still rely on nuclear weapons for deterrence and because it has been difficult for states to imagine a way that global nuclear disarmament could be verified and enforced. The ban treaty does nothing to address these disarmament dilemmas.

International concerns about reducing the risks of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons or to minimizing the past and future environmental impact of nuclear weapons infrastructure ought to be relatively easy to address. No country, after all, wants to suffer a nuclear accident (particularly since it would most likely occur on its own soil), or to leave their weapons vulnerable to theft or unauthorized use. Nor does any state wish to see its natural environment spoiled or the health of its citizens undermined, either by its own nuclear material or by contamination from a nuclear-armed neighbor.

There are good reasons to believe that these kinds of concerns represent the most pressing threats presented by nuclear weapons today. The United States and the Soviet Union came dangerously close to catastrophic nuclear accidents on multiple occasions during the Cold War. Although the safety of US nuclear weapons has improved in many respects, reports of serious mismanagement and lax security at nuclear sites continue. The United States spends between $5 billion and $6 billion a year on environmental restoration and waste management related to its nuclear weapons program and has paid out over $15 billion in compensation to nuclear weapons workers and “downwinders” exposed to radiation from early atmospheric tests. The total costs of the cleanup in the United States are estimated to eventually reach $347 billion—much more than the costs of producing the weapons in the first place.

All of these problems, unfortunately, are far worse in most other nuclear weapons states, where weapons safety technology, security procedures, and environmental protections lag far behind American standards. Cooperative efforts to address these problems are something that all states, both with and without nuclear weapons, should have been able to agree upon. The decision to use the momentum generated by concern for these humanitarian impacts to push instead for a divisive and ultimately ineffective ban, therefore, was a missed opening to make meaningful progress to reducing these hidden risks posed by nuclear weapons.

Proponents of the ban treaty nevertheless argue that by cementing the prohibition on nuclear weapons in international law they will intensify the stigma against nuclear weapons, discouraging new states from building them and eventually pressuring existing nuclear powers to disarm. “By stigmatizing nuclear weapons—declaring them unacceptable and immoral for all—the international community can start demanding and pressuring the nuclear-armed states and their military alliances to deliver what they’ve actually promised: a world free of nuclear weapons,” Beatrice Fihn, the executive director of ICAN, has written.

We see several serious problems with this approach.

First, the ethical and legal foundation for the treaty’s stigmatization of nuclear weapons is fundamentally flawed. The treaty explicitly notes that “any use of nuclear weapons would be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict” since the use of such weapons would invariably violate the Geneva Convention’s “rule of distinction, the prohibition against indiscriminate attacks, the rules on proportionality and precautions in attack, the prohibition on the use of weapons of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, and the rules for the protection of the natural environment.” In fact, it is conceivable that nuclear weapons could be used in a manner consistent with international law and these principles of just war doctrine. For example it is possible that, in 2001, the use of a low yield nuclear weapon against the remote, deeply buried Al Qaeda caves in Tora Bora might have met the legal criteria of necessity and proportionality. If Al Qaeda had been preparing a WMD there, as some suspected, the legal case might have been even stronger. In our opinion, using nuclear weapons in that situation would have been exceptionally imprudent—ending the 70-year old tradition of the non-use of nuclear weapons would have set a precedent that could encourage others to use nuclear weapons in less discriminating ways— but it probably would not have been illegal. Although the list of scenarios in which the use of nuclear weapons might be legal and ethical is not long, a complete ban on the possession of nuclear weapons is simply not supported by reference to existing international law.

Second, the ban is likely counterproductive when it comes to increasing compliance with existing laws of war. The United States had already been moving in recent years to help bring its nuclear doctrine in line with international law. The official US Nuclear Employment Guidance rules now state explicitly that “the United States will not intentionally target civilian populations or civilian objects” with nuclear weapons and that “all plans must be consistent with the fundamental principles of the Law of Armed Conflict” including the “principles of distinction and proportionality.” A debate (see here and here) has begun in the United States about how best to ensure that the US armed forces properly implement this guidance. The humanitarian impact movement could have focused on pressuring other states to adopt similar restrictions in targeting policies, but if possession itself is outlawed, discussions regarding the ethics and legality of nuclear use doctrine are no longer possible.

Finally, there is simply no evidence to suggest that the ban’s approach to stigmatizing nuclear weapons will be an effective path to disarmament. Research on compliance with norms and laws ranging from tax evasion and other illegal behaviors, to excessive drinking, and on to energy conservation shows that one of the strongest predictors of compliance is an individual’s belief about the probability that others in the appropriate reference group will also comply. In the case of the ban, all nuclear weapons states know that the rate of compliance among other nuclear weapons states is zero. Such a ban, therefore, might ultimately do more to undermine the gradual and step-by-step disarmament norm rather than strengthen it.

This highlights another opportunity missed by the ban movement: the opportunity to educate the public about the dangers of nuclear weapons. Public education is vital to addressing nuclear dangers because proponents of the ban may have overestimated the degree to which an anti-nuclear norm has taken root. Public opinion polls do show high levels of opposition to nuclear use and strong support for the principle of nuclear disarmament, even among nuclear states. For example, a 2008 poll of 21 countries found that majorities (or a plurality in the case of Pakistan) favored an international agreement in which “all countries with nuclear weapons would be required to eliminate them according to a timetable. All other countries would be required not to develop them. All countries … would be monitored to make sure they are following the agreement.” Seventy-seven percent of Americans, 86 percent of French, and 81 percent of Britons favored the agreement. Polls like this, however, almost never provide subjects with specific information about the scenarios in which nuclear weapons might be used or whether and how a disarmament treaty might be enforced. In the United States, where the most extensive polling on nuclear issues has been conducted, a separate poll found that only 25 percent of Americans agreed that “the total elimination of all nuclear weapons is possible,” and in another poll only six percent agreed that “nuclear weapons are morally wrong, and the United States should proceed to eliminate its arsenal whether or not others follow our lead.”

Our own public opinion research shows that significant majorities of the American public are willing to use nuclear weapons first when they are perceived as providing significant advantages over conventional weapons or when they might save large numbers of American soldiers’ lives by eliminating the need for a bloody ground war. We found similar results in a public opinion survey in India in 2015. Support for nuclear use in both countries remained high even when respondents were reminded that nuclear weapons were estimated to kill tens of thousands of civilians or more. These findings suggest that we cannot count on grassroots, mass public campaigns to pressure the governments of nuclear weapons states to disarm. Instead, we need to better educate the public about the dangers of nuclear weapons and how they might undermine rather than guarantee the safety of nations. Ironically, that was exactly what the humanitarian impact movement initially set out to do.

CISAC co-director Amy Zegart wrote this July 11 essay in The Atlantic on what the Donald Trump Jr. emails mean:

Line by ugly line, Donald J. Trump Jr.’s emails with British-born former tabloid reporter and Russian intermediary Rob Goldstone are now plastered on The New York Times website. They reveal an astounding set of communications. Goldstone promises incriminating information about Hillary Clinton that could be used in the campaign—with the Kremlin’s backing. Junior’s response should have been to speed dial the FBI. Instead, he writes three little words with big, big consequences: “I love it.”

It’s quite a turn for the First Son. Just a few months ago, The New York Times gave him a fawning spread replete with woodsy photos. Now his association with dirt doesn’t look quite so good.

My three big takeaways from this breaking story:

1) The key word in The New York Times piece is “flurry.” There isn’t one email exchange. There are many. Trump Jr.’s email “dump” will not be the end of the story. Instead, as Churchill once said, it’s just the end of the beginning. Investigators and journalists will be following the email trail.

2) Even the emails released so far paint a damning portrait. The “we didn’t know better, we’re just amateurs” defense with respect to foreign policy—which the White House has been using to this point—will not hold up. Campaign chairman Paul Manafort attended the now-infamous June 9, 2016 meeting with Kremlin-connected lawyer Natalia Veselnitskaya. Manafort is no neophyte in this world. He has worked on multiple Republican presidential campaigns over decades. What’s more, the red line, whether it’s a legal or political one, is: “Thou shalt not work with foreign powers to gain advantage in a U.S. election.” As former FBI director Jim Comey would put it, there is no fuzz on this whatsoever. Even if the foreign power involved were the Brits and not the Russians, meeting with a foreign government to get opposition dirt for a U.S. presidential election is wrong and probably illegal.

3) It is telling that every new piece of hard information major newspapers have reported recently about the Russian meddling in the 2016 election—every single one—supports the Intelligence Community’s conclusions about it. In January, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence released the community's assessment that “Russian president Vladimir Putin ordered an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the U.S. presidential election,” and that he and his government “aspired to help president-elect Trump's election chances when possible by discrediting Secretary Clinton.” The reporting has yet to implicate Putin himself, but Goldstone’s email citing a Russian official’s offer to “provide the Trump campaign with some official documents and information that would incriminate Hillary and her dealings with Russia,” as part of “Russia and its government’s support for Mr. Trump” is the clearest public evidence yet of the IC’s conclusion. And the emails were released by Trump Jr. himself—right before The New York Times posted them.

We need to stop saying of the intelligence community—as Donald Trump Sr. has encouraged—“These are the people who brought us Iraq WMD” and start saying, “These are the same people who found bin Laden.” In fact, Donald Trump Jr. proudly displays an American flag signed by members of SEAL Team Six—the unit that took out bin Laden—in his office. Junior should have thought harder about the kind of intel that helped the SEALs succeed—and what it might mean for his father.

Amy Zegart is co-director of the Center for International Security and Cooperation and Professor of Political Science, by courtesy. She is also the Davies Family Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution and directs the Cyber Policy Program. She is a contributing editor to The Atlantic.

On July 7, the William J. Perry Project issued the following statement from CISAC's William J. Perry regarding the adoption of the UN Treaty to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons, which was approved by the UN on the same day: 

"The new UN Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is an important step towards delegitimizing nuclear war as an acceptable risk of modern civilization. Though the treaty will not have the power to eliminate existing nuclear weapons, it provides a vision of a safer world, one that will require great purpose, persistence, and patience to make a reality. Nuclear catastrophe is one of the greatest existential threats facing society today, and we must dream in equal measure in order to imagine a world without these terrible weapons."

The UN treaty places a strong moral imperative against possessing nuclear weapons and gives a voice to some 130 non-nuclear weapons states who are equally affected by the existential risk of nuclear weapons. There is no one solution to this global threat, and there is much more work to be done beyond this treaty to reduce this risk. I call on nuclear-armed states to step up their participation in the fight against the nuclear threat by securing the eight remaining ratifications to enact the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, extending the New START agreement, continuing the critical work of the Nuclear Security Summits, and avoiding the unnecessary risk posed by introducing destabilizing new nuclear weapons. My hope is that this treaty will mark a sea change towards global support for the abolition of nuclear weapons. This global threat requires unified global action."

Read more about the treaty here.

William J. Perry, a former U.S. Secretary of Defense, recently joined other nuclear and diplomatic experts in writing a letter to President Trump urging diplomatic talks with North Korea; wrote a Politico op-ed on how to make a deal with North Korea; and delivered the 2017 Barnett-Oksenberg Lecture on issues between China and the United States. Perry is the director of the Preventive Defense Project at CISAC.

CISAC's Rodney Ewing and co-author Allison Macfarlane explain in this commentary article in Science magazine how the U.S. can overcome major obstacles to its current nuclear waste program. They note, "Nuclear facilities, whether for disposal or interim storage, take decades to plan, license, and build. Moreover, sustained opposition to a nuclear facility can prevail, simply because opponents only need to succeed occasionally to derail large, complicated projects. The United States needs a strategy that can persist over decades, not just until the next election." Read more.

The CISAC Fellowship Program is training and educating the next generation of thought leaders and policy makers in international security.

Our fellows spend the academic year engaged in research and writing, and participate in seminars and collaborate with faculty and researchers. Every summer, many complete their fellowships and move on to new career endeavors. For the 2016-17 academic year, CISAC hosted 21 fellows (the center has 399 former fellows).

Some of our fellows, in their own words, explain what they will be doing next:

Andreas Lutsch

Having spent two years as a nuclear security postdoctoral fellow at CISAC, I return to my home institution, the Julius-Maximilians-University of Würzburg, Germany. As a historian of late modern history, I do so in great gratitude for an excellent and abundantly rich scholarly experience at Stanford. Once I am back in Germany, I will publish my first book early next year, the manuscript of which I finalized at CISAC. I will also proceed to publish the manuscript of my second book, which I wrote entirely at Stanford. And I will move towards the pursuit of the so-called “habilitation,” which is required (in Germany) to qualify for a position as a full professor in my home country. 

It is not easy to put into a few words how much my CISAC experience has helped me with making progress at a crucial juncture of my career. CISAC fellowships offered me a transformative opportunity to make my research more rigorous, to think more creatively and more carefully, to appreciate interdisciplinary approaches in addressing complex problems, to improve my teaching abilities, and to establish relationships with leading scholars and specialists, which I hope will be long-lasting ties to communities at CISAC, Stanford, and the U.S.

Anna Péczeli

I have a tenured position at my institute in Hungary so I will move home in August and get back to teaching and research.

My CISAC experience was amazing, from the beginning I felt that I was part of a community here. I got much useful feedback on my research, and I really feel that my work improved in quality and I became a better researcher. I learned a lot about how to present my ideas so that it would be relevant for policy makers, and my fellowship opened new doors for me. I am grateful for this opportunity, and I am certain that I will continue to be an active member of the CISAC community wherever I go.

Eric Min

During the 2017-2018 academic year, I will remain at CISAC. As a social sciences postdoctoral fellow, I will study how international actors and third parties utilize diplomacy to manage and resolve interstate conflicts. This builds upon my broader research agenda, which uses new quantitative data and statistical methods to analyze the strategic logic of negotiations during war. 

Given that I came from a predominantly social science background, my year at CISAC was invaluable in helping me to understand the policymaking world and how my research could more effectively communicate the technicalities of my research to a broader informed yet general audience. I also learned about what kinds of pressing questions concern policymakers, which I will use to shape my future work. I look forward to meeting another group of diverse and knowledgeable individuals next year. 

Jennifer L. Erickson

This fall, I will return to my regular life at Boston College, where I am an associate professor of political science and international studies. In the upcoming academic year, I will continue to work on the research I worked on at CISAC on new weapons and the laws and norms of war and the nuclear weapons portion of my project in particular. I will also teach two sections of the Introduction to International Studies for BC undergraduates and the Field Seminar in International Politics for BC graduate students. In the fall, I also look forward to being affiliated with the Security Studies Program at MIT. 

CISAC has been a tremendous source of academic support for my research. Not only has it given me time and resources to do research and write, but it has also introduced me to new colleagues, who have generously provided insights and expertise that have improved that research. It also made it possible for me to attend events like a conference on New Dilemmas in Ethics, Technology, and War at the Air Force Academy in April 2017, the Military Immersion Map Exercise at RAND in May 2017, and the UN Conference to Negotiate a Legally Binding Instrument to Prohibit Nuclear Weapons in June 2017.

These experiences, as well as all of the opportunities to attend events and meet people at CISAC itself, will continue to shape how I think about my research and teaching and have helped me build new professional networks for the long term.

Cameron Tracy

In the next academic year, I will be a postdoc in Stanford’s Department of Geological Sciences. There, I will continue my work on the role of geologic disposal (burial) of weapons plutonium in the global arms control and disarmament regimes. I will also conduct scientific research on the manner in which nuclear materials change in response to their environments. For example, I am currently starting a project in which I attempt to determine the conditions in which uranium-bearing materials have been stored by studying the oxidation and hydration of their surfaces. This could help to determine the provenance of smuggled uranium that has been interdicted by law enforcement or security authorities. 

My fellowship at CISAC has allowed me to translate my scientific skills to the policy realm, and to greatly expand the impact of my work. I have long been interested in science policy, but lacked the resources, connections, and experience necessary to effectively analyze critical issues and to communicate the results to both scholarly and governmental audiences. Through interactions with CISAC’s resident policy experts, I learned about the role that technical analysis can play in the policymaking process.

While my transition to policy-relevant work is ongoing, my efforts have already yielded some impact on international policy, with an Australian Royal Commission report citing my work on quantifying the long-term risks associated with the burial of nuclear materials. I expect that the valuable experience and mentorship I received over the course of my CISAC fellowship will continue to inform and enhance my work at the interface of nuclear science and policy.

Jooeun Kim

I will become the Jill Hopper Memorial Fellow at Georgetown University and will be teaching a course, the History and Politics of Nuclear Proliferation, in spring 2018. From August this year, I will be a visiting scholar at the Institute for Security and Conflict Studies at George Washington University. CISAC provided me with amazing resources. I loved my intellectually stimulating meetings with my mentor Scott Sagan and other amazing scholars who opened their office doors to me. CISAC is an ‘intellectual candy store.’ I am grateful to everyone there for creating such a special environment.

Andrea Gilli

Starting July 1, I will be a postdoctoral fellow at Harvard University's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs where I will keep working on my research about technology and international security.

The CISAC experience helped my career in three main ways. First, CISAC is a fantastic academic environment where young researchers can deal with leading scholars in a plurality of fields: the constant interactions between different views and expertise represent a unique source of intellectual growth that has helped me develop new ideas and identify new questions in my field.

Second, CISAC's activities and professional growth initiatives help fellows gain the skills and acquire the knowledge to succeed not only as an academic but also, more broadly, as public intellectual. CISAC has helped me improve my understanding of policy dynamics as well as my capacity to present to non-experts the findings of my research. Third, CISAC's "be-good" motto combined with its strong mentorship provides fellows with a perfect working environment.

Eva C. Uribe

This fall, I will be starting my position as a systems research analyst at Sandia National Lab. For my research here at CISAC, I have taken a broad, holistic look at the proliferation impact of the thorium fuel cycle. Therefore, CISAC has given me valuable experience in thinking through difficult problems using a systematic, top-down approach, which is a skill that I will take with me to my next position.

Accepting a postdoctoral fellowship with CISAC was an unconventional career move for me, personally. I got my doctorate in chemistry from UC Berkeley in 2016. Most of my peers in the chemistry department went on to conduct postdoctoral research at another university, a national lab, or in industry. A few made the leap into science policy fellowships in Washington, D.C. For me, CISAC provided a happy compromise between these two options. It allowed me the freedom to continue conducting technical research (albeit outside the chemistry lab), while still exploring the policy implications of my research.

My experience at CISAC helped my career progression in two ways. First, through targeted workshops, reading groups, and less formal daily interactions, CISAC provided me with the opportunity to view my research and interests from a different lens, that of the policymaker.  It was interesting to see my fellow fellows, of all academic backgrounds, struggling with how to translate the finer points of their academic research into policy-relevant media. I learned a lot from their experiences and challenges. The second way that CISAC has helped my career progression was through exposure to others who have done this transition successfully. This was achieved through fantastic seminar series, as well as through daily interaction with faculty and fellows here at CISAC. Speaking with people who have worked at high levels in Washington, D.C. made me realize that I would prefer to continue doing policy-relevant academic and technical research in nuclear science, rather than to transition to policy completely.

Fellowship information

Current fellowship opportunities at CISAC include: 

•  Social Sciences or Humanities International Security Fellowship

•  Natural Sciences or Engineering International Security Fellowship

•  Cybersecurity and International Security Fellowship

•  Law and International Security Fellowship

•  Nuclear Security Fellowship

•  William J. Perry Fellowship in International Security

For more information about CISAC fellowships, email cisacfellowship@stanford.edu.

Congratulations to CISAC honors program Class of 2017! On June 16, students in the CISAC Interschool Honors Program in International Studies graduated in a conferral of honors ceremony on the front lawn of Encina Hall. 

We are proud to add our 12 new graduates to our expanding list of graduates from the program since it began in 2001. In total, CISAC has 193 alumni in honors. For the students, their graduation reflects an intellectual adventure that included a two-week honors college program in Washington D.C., tours of government agencies, meetings with influential policy makers, and weekly seminars with CISAC faculty. Honors students are also required to research and complete an original thesis on an important national security issue.

The 2017 program was co-directed by Martha Crenshaw and Chip Blacker. Crenshaw said, "We stress hard work, independent thinking, intellectual honesty, and courtesy and civility.  Our students are critical without being disrespectful, open to new ideas and ways of thinking, and self-made experts in the subjects they have chosen."

In his remarks, Blacker said several features of the CISAC program make it distinctive. "These include the diversity of the disciplines represented by the student's major fields of study, which range this year from political science, history and international relations, on the one hand, to computer science, energy systems engineering, and materials science and engineering, on the other. ..." 

While each project is different, "they all share the unifying and overarching themes of advancing the international security agenda and having value and utility in policy terms," Blacker said. The program, he added, places a "premium on knowledge of the real world, and of the art and science of policymaking in particular, coupled with intensive training in research and writing."

During the conferral ceremony, CISAC honors teaching assistant Shiri Krebs read statements from the students' thesis advisors regarding their final papers. Read below for those comments:

Ken-Ben Chao

A New Journey to the West: The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Chinese Foreign Policy

Thesis Advisor: Coit. D. Blacker

"What is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and, to be blunt, why should we care? In essence, this is the question that Ben Chao seeks to answer in this thoughtful, comprehensive and well-written senior thesis. Ben’s answer, like the question, comes in two parts. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization, he tells us, is neither an emerging alliance nor a diplomatic “talk shop.” Rather, it has been – and it continues to be – a subtle instrument of Chinese foreign policy that has waxed and waned in importance since its creation in 2001 depending on Beijing’s assessment of the international security environment. In Ben’s judgment, this is reason enough for us to care and for us to pay attention. Ben’s thesis is a superior piece of scholarship that tells us a great deal about something most of us know little about and does so in an informed and wonderfully entertaining way."

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Marina Elmore

When Things Are Not What They Seem: Explaining the Success of Countering Violent Extremism in Los Angeles

Thesis Advisor: Martha Crenshaw

"A policy of countering violent extremism and radicalization, known as “CVE,” was a hallmark of the Obama Administration as it struggled to respond to the threat of “homegrown” jihadist terrorism. But what is CVE? And is it effective? These questions motivated Marina Elmore’s fascinating inquiry into the apparent success of the Los Angeles program, highly praised as a model on the national level. Marina probed deeply into the case to discover that special circumstances predetermined the outcome and that the model was not easily transferable to other cities. For one thing, Los Angeles did not actually face a challenge of violent extremism because it lacked a population susceptible to the appeal of jihadist propaganda. For another, the city had already implemented most of the newly prescribed CVE “best practices,” such as community policing, in efforts to solve earlier social and political problems. Marina’s conclusions are astute, balanced, and fair, and she persuasively demonstrates both how important it is to test commonly held assumptions and how difficult it is to establish standards for policy effectiveness in the counterterrorism field."

Gabbi Fischer

Towards DIUx 2.1 or 3.0? Examining DIUx’s Progress Towards Procurement Innovation

Thesis Advisors: Herb Lin, Dan Boneh

"In 2015, Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter announced the creation of Defense Innovation Unit Experimental (DIUx).  Through some great case-based work, Gabbi cuts through the complexity of the traditional acquisition system to observe that DIUX fills two important niches in the defense innovation ecosystem: it facilitates connections between DoD users and the tech community and it exercises non-traditional acquisition authority (called Other Transaction Authorities (OTAs)) to expedite contracting.  But she also cautions that the use of OTA may not be compatible in the long run with the traditional acquisition system, and suggests that future DIUX efforts may have to take advantage of other existing acquisition authorities (which do exist but which are rarely used) to make further progress in improving the coupling between the tech sector and the DoD.  She makes also substantive recommendations that DIUX should take seriously if it wants to survive in the long term."

Wyatt Horan

Evaluating the U.S. Foreign Policy Institutions in Permitting a Coercive Russian Energy Policy

Thesis Advisor: Coit D. Blacker

"Following the twin “oil shocks” of the 1970s, the U.S. Government moved effectively to reduce the potential economic and political impact of any future such events by reorienting and reshaping key foreign policy institutions. When, thirty years later, the Russian government under Vladimir Putin began to manipulate Russian deliveries of natural gas to its customers in Europe, the U.S. failed to respond in a focused, deliberate and coordinated way. In this provocative senior thesis, Wyatt asks whether the clumsy American response to Russia’s manipulation of this vital energy resource contributed to Moscow’s alarming behavior. He answers in the affirmative and by so doing forces us to think hard about how seemingly obscure organizational issues impact the effectiveness of U.S. foreign policy. Wyatt’s thesis is bold and a little unsettling. It also reads like a detective novel, which is a tribute to the author’s willingness to run risks in search of a good story."

Tori Keller

The Rise and Fall of Secular Politics in Iraq

Thesis Advisor: Lisa Blaydes

"As you know from interacting with Tori over the past year(s), she is a passionate – almost obsessively curious – student of contemporary Iraqi politics. Her drive to understand the case has led her to write a normatively-motivated, policy-relevant thesis on the failure of democratic consolidation in Iraq. Her research suggests that a non-sectarian political future for Iraq was possible; the historical antecedents for such a vision existed. But as a result of a combination of US missteps, Iranian interference and, most importantly, the way these factors manifested into an insecure security environment, secular parties never really had a real chance to succeed even if a plurality of voters supported such an outlook. To write this thesis, Tori invested in her own human capital development in impressive ways. She studied Arabic, learned ArcGIS mapping software, collected original data, and undertook statistical analysis – deploying the skills she had acquired in her four years at Stanford with the goal of answering this research question. In the end, I believe she has the right answer as well. If there was any doubt left in her mind about whether she got it “right,” I feel confident that she would still be puzzling through the research today."

Alexander Lubkin

Plutonium Management and Disposition in the United States: History and Analysis of the Program

Thesis Advisor: Rod Ewing

"Alex’s thesis examines the issues related to the failure of the U.S. program for the disposition of excess plutonium from dismantled nuclear weapons. Based on his survey of the literature and interviews with key actors in this program, Alex analyzed the U.S. program and has made a number of important observations and conclusions concerning the causes for the failure of the U.S. program. His most significant conclusion is that one of the major causes of failure was that the U.S. program to use irradiated MOX fuel for the disposition of the plutonium was not consistent with U.S. nuclear policy. The U.S. is pursuing an open nuclear fuel cycle, and thus has limited experience with large scale processing of radioactive materials and the fabrication of MOX fuel. Alex was able to identify a number of other issues, such as over reliance on cost and schedule estimates of the different strategies and a failure to utilize advances in materials science for the development of actinide waste forms. I am very impressed with Alex’s dedication to this research project, and his persistence in the review of an often confusing and obscure literature. We have met regularly over the past year. I outline broad areas that he might investigate, but then he took these ideas and developed them according to his on evaluation of a variety of different sources. He also did an exceptional job of synthesizing the information from the interviews into an interesting and informative chapter in his thesis. Alex’s research will be the basis for a publication, but most importantly, he has opened the door to a whole series of policy issues that require more detailed analysis. He has certainly educated me on a number of these issues."

Jian Yang Lum

To Bomb or Stab? The Impact of Ideology and Territorial Control on Rebel Tactics

Thesis Advisors: Joseph Felter, Jeremy Weinstein

“Lumpy” as we know him- explores how rebel groups’ ideology and degree of territorial control affect the type of violence they choose to employ in pursuit of their aims. Using fine grained conflict data and case studies from thirty-six years of insurgency and counterinsurgency in the Philippines, Lumpy finds both quantitative and qualitative evidence in support of the predictive model he develops in his thesis. In sum, rebel groups with weaker ideological commitment and more limited control of the territory they operate in are more likely to initiate indiscriminate attacks such as bombings and employment of improvised explosive devices. More ideologically committed rebels, and those exercising greater territorial control, initiate violence that is comparatively more discriminate such as targeted raids and assassinations. The human toll and economic costs incurred by civil war and insurgency around the world are staggering and continuing to mount. There is an urgent need for policy relevant scholarship that increases our understanding of the local level violence associated with these deadly conflicts and how states can better anticipate and respond to these threats. Lumpy’s thesis makes a significant contribution to these important ends."

Elizabeth Margolin

Should I Retweet or Should I Go? Pro-ISIS Twitter Communities and American Decapitation Strategy

Thesis Advisors: Martha Crenshaw, Justin Grimmer

"There are many studies of the U.S. Government’s use of military force in “decapitation” strikes against terrorist leaders, particularly the effects of these strikes on levels of violence and degree of organizational cohesion. Researchers have also analyzed the relationship between social media and terrorism generally. But the specific question of the social media reactions of jihadist sympathizers to decapitation strikes directed against Islamic State leaders was neglected until the idea occurred to Eli Margolin, who took it up as the subject of her honors thesis. This difficult, demanding, and often frustrating research project required Eli to master new cutting-edge analytical methodologies and struggle to acquire elusive data from the archived Twitter accounts of now banned users, obstacles that she overcame with impressive ability, determination, and sophistication. After extensive and thoughtful consideration of three carefully selected cases, she found that Twitter followers of jihadist causes react quite differently to the deaths of different types of terrorist leaders. Her intellectual ambition and tenacity produced a thesis that is excellent in terms of conceptualization, analytical rigor, and empirical foundation."

Lauren Newby

From Zero to Sixty: Explaining the Proliferation of Shi’a Militias in Iraq after 2003

Thesis Advisor: Martha Crenshaw

"Why has there been a sharp increase in the number of Shia militias in Iraq, a troubling development that may jeopardize Iraqi progress toward stability and democracy? Lauren Newby could not find a good answer in her review of the theoretical literature, so she proposed an original one of her own. Most scholars attribute the proliferation of violent non-state actors to the fragmentation of existing groups through splintering and splitting, whereas Lauren shows that in Iraq the increase is due to the emergence of new groups. Researchers typically focus on groups directly opposing the state, whereas the Iraqi militias side with the incumbent government. Most studies are limited to groups operating in a single bounded conflict zone, whereas the politics of Iraq and Syria are linked. Lauren concludes that the Syrian civil war has been a major impetus for the formation of Shia militias in Iraq and that most are established by Iraqi political parties. Her thesis is exemplary in making a clear and convincing claim, contrasting it to alternative explanations, and providing new supporting evidence from primary sources."

AnhViet Nguyen

Territorial Disputes in Court: Power, Compliance, and Defiance

Thesis Advisor: Kenneth Schultz

"In the wake of the arbitration ruling over the China-Philippines dispute in the South China Sea, AnhViet wanted to understand what the prospects were for this ruling to help resolve the conflict. To do so, he placed this case in the context of other territorial disputes that have involved great powers or states who were significantly more powerful than their adversaries. This led to the central research questions: why and under what conditions do great powers comply with adverse court rulings over territorial issues? The thesis draws nicely on the existing literature to articulate several hypotheses and then tests these hypotheses using a variety of methods. Case studies of the US-Mexico dispute over the Chamizal tract and the Nigeria-Cameroon dispute over the Bakassi Penninsula show that great powers who initially reject adverse court decisions might later find these rulings to be a convenient basis for settlement. He also makes a very important and sophisticated point that great power compliance with court rulings may reflect their ability to keep high salience issues off the agenda. The conclusion is mildly optimistic about the prospects for (eventual) compliance while remaining appropriately clear-eyed about the limits of international law in this context. Overall, AnhViet does an admirable job blending theoretical material, historical case studies, and large n data to develop his argument. Moreover, his application of these lessons to the contemporary case of the South China Sea dispute is nuanced and compelling. In short, AnhViet’s thesis represents an excellent example of how academic research can be made relevant to current policy issues."

Thu-An Pham

On Treaties and Taboos: U.S. Responses to International Norms in the NPT and Genocide Convention (1945-1999)

Thesis Advisor: David Holloway

"Thu-An Pham has written an outstanding thesis on the role of norms in international relations. The United States has not tried strenuously to enforce the Genocide Convention of 1948, which calls for the prevention and punishment of genocide. It has, however, actively sought to enforce the nonproliferation norm expressed in the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty of 1968. What explains the difference? On the basis of a subtle theoretical analysis and detailed empirical research, Thu-An offers three answers. First, the Nonproliferation Treaty is better supported than the Genocide Convention by institutions that monitor and enforce compliance. Second, the United States has regarded the norm of nuclear nonproliferation as more important for its national security than the ban on genocide. And third, the nonproliferation norm supports the current international order, which is based on the primacy of states in international relations. The Genocide Convention, by contrast, threatens to weaken the foundations of that order by challenging the primacy of states. Thu-An’s thesis suggests that there are limits on the role that international norms can play in a system of states. This is a wonderful thesis on a crucial issue in international security."

Jack Weller

Counting the Czars: Extra-Bureaucratic Appointees in American Foreign Policy

Thesis Advisor: Amy Zegart

"White House czars are frequently discussed in the press, but most people don’t really know what they are and very few scholars have studied them. Yet the use of czars has serious implications for the presidency—signaling when the regular bureaucracy cannot get the job done. Jack Weller’s thesis provides a novel and important contribution to the study of the American presidency. He compiles an original dataset of every foreign policy czar created during the past 100 years and examines alternative explanations for why some presidents used czars more than others. He finds something surprising: czar creation is NOT driven by the individual management style of the president. Instead, it is driven by the external threat environment. Presidents facing simultaneous wars – as FDR did in World War II and George W. Bush did after 9/11 – are more likely to create czars than others. Jack’s thesis is beautifully written and masterfully argued, earning him the honor of being Stanford’s czar of czars."

Siegfried Hecker won a national award this week from the American Association for State and Local History for his book, Doomed to Cooperate. Subtitled "How American and Russian Scientists Joined Forces to Avert Some of the Great Post–Cold War Nuclear Dangers," the work tells the story of nuclear scientists from two former enemy nations who reached across political, geographic and cultural divides to solve the new nuclear threats that resulted from the collapse of the Soviet Union. 

The two-volume set, edited by Hecker, a CISAC senior fellow and Los Alamos National Laboratory director emeritus, describes the lab-to-lab collaboration involving more than 100 scientists and leaders through papers, vignettes, and interviews. The book illustrates the challenges they faced, the friendships resulting from the collaborations, and the team's ultimate success in rendering Russian's nuclear materials and facilities safe for the world.

In a press release, Trina Nelson Thomas, the association's awards chair and director, said, “The Leadership in History Awards is AASLH’s highest distinction and the winners represent the best in the field."  

The American Association for State and Local History's awards program was initiated in 1945 to establish and encourage standards of excellence in the collection, preservation, and interpretation of state and local history throughout the United States. More information is available in this article in the Los Alamos Daily Post.