There are no recorded name changes for this group.

• 1972: 200 (Colombia Reports)[1]
• 1973: 65 (Colombia Reports)[2]
• 1990s: 8,000 (Christian Science Monitor)[3]
• 1998: 4,000 (El País)[4]
• 1998: 5,000 (Inside Colombia: Drugs, Democracy and War)[5]
• 2001: 3,500 (Inside Colombia: Drugs, Democracy and War)[6]
• 2006: 2,000 (Christian Science Monitor)[7]
• 2009: 1,500 (BBC)[8]
• 2010: 5,000 (Colombia Reports)[9]
• 2013: 1,380-3,000 (Tracking Terrorism)[10]
• 2013: 3,000 (The Wall Street Journal)[11]
• 2014: 2,500 (Pares)[12]
• 2015: 2,000 (Voice of America News)[13]
• 2015: 2,000 (BBC)[14]
• 2015: 2,000 (Reuters)[15]
• 2015: <2,000 (InSight Crime)[16]
• 2017: 2,000 (Reuters)[17]
• 2018: 3,000 (Colombia Reports)[18]
• 2019: 2,402 (Reuters)[19]

In the ELN’s formative years, Cuba provided the group with weapons and financial support.[1] In the 1970s, the ELN relied on kidnapping for revenue to rebuild after its near destruction by the Colombian military in 1973. Additionally, the ELN profited from protection payments and ransoms.

The ELN increased kidnappings in the 1980s.[2] Throughout the decade, the ELN secured millions of dollars from German oil contractors through extortion and kidnapping threats.[3] In the 1990s, the ELN also began extorting oil company employees. Together, kidnapping and extortion became the ELN’s primary source of revenue, bringing in $225 million in 1998 alone.[4] In the 1990s, the ELN also started taxing coca and marijuana farmers, especially in the Bolivar Province where it had territorial control.[5] Many units of the ELN reportedly established independent relationships with drug trafficking gangs in order to survive economically.[6] The ELN has continued to kidnap for profit in more recent years, even having publicly refused to stop kidnapping in 2012. [7]

Kidnapping and extortion, although acknowledged under different names, were formal components of the ELN’s economic strategy. In 2000, ELN Commander Antonio Garcia said that the group financed its operations four ways: donations, produce sales, voluntary contributions, and taxation.[8] ELN members, who were mostly working, wage-earning people, provided donations. Professional guerrillas who engaged in community activities grew produce to be sold for profit. Voluntary contributions came from people who were not members of the ELN, but who shared the ELN’s ideas. Additionally, “wealthy individuals were taxed to provide another source of the ELN’s income. People who refused to pay the tax faced “Economic Retention,” a policy that was widely understood to be the kidnapping of wealthy individuals.[9] Reports published in the past decade do not indicate whether the ELN has continued to rely on donations, agricultural sales, and taxation for its funding.

Outside of kidnapping and extortion, the ELN has engaged in illegal mining activities in both Colombia and Venezuela. The ELN made an estimated 10 billion Colombian pesos throughout 2016-2018 by forcing illegal miners to turn over 10%-20% of their earnings to the ELN.[10] The ELN has retained a presence in Venezuela since the 1990s, and the group’s territory has expanded significantly since 2000. In particular, ELN-held areas have grown at an increasingly faster rate since 2017. As the ELN has expanded further into Venezuela, it has made money from illegally mining gold throughout the country.[11] In areas along the Colombian-Venezuelan border, the ELN has capitalized on refugees and displaced people who are fleeing internal Venezuelan conflict, as well as poor indigenous populations and at-risk youth. The group has drawn upon these populations to serve as a work force in its mines.[12] In a 2018 interview, an ex-commander of the ELN revealed that the group earns approximately 60% of its total income from illegal gold mining in Colombia and Venezuela.[13]

Disclaimer: This is a partial list of where the militant organization has bases and where it operates. This does not include information on where the group conducts major attacks or has external influences.

The ELN claims to operate in areas of Colombia that are stateless (i.e., areas that receive no government attention or assistance). The ELN had its headquarters in the Bolivar province until 2000, when the AUC seized ELN territory.[1] The group is most present in the Northeast region of Colombia, where there are many oil fields and mining operations.[2] As of July 2019, the ELN reportedly had operations in 9 out of 32 of Colombia’s departments.[3] Since the demobilization of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the ELN has moved into some of the FARC’s former territory in order to control a higher area of cocaine production and trafficking.[4]

The ELN is a transnational organization, and it has been active in Venezuela since 1990.[5] As of June 2019, the ELN had around 45% of their forces stationed in Venezuela, and it had operations in at least 13 of the 24 states in Venezuela.[6] Although the ELN does not have fronts based in Venezuela as it does in Colombia, it has an extensive presence in the countryside and control of illegal operations throughout the country.[7] Through its expanding gold mining operations, the ELN has been pushing its influence eastward across Venezuela toward the Venezuelan-Guyanese border.[8]

The ELN drafted an agreement for a National Convention with the Colombian government in 1998. The group intended for a National Convention to be a venue for popular participation and collective effort to restructure the country and its institutions for greater social justice.[1] However, the death of ELN leader Manuel Perez in 1998 halted the development of the National Convention. In 2000, planning efforts started again in with the aim of creating an inclusive democratic space wherein participants could reach a national consensus on the issues facing Colombia.[2] The ELN hoped the National Convention would take place in a demilitarized “Zone of Encounter” (ZOE), and address human rights, economic policy, drug trafficking, political participation, natural resources, and the armed forces.[3] In 1999, Pastrana’s government rejected the ELN’s proposal to create a ZOE, and, in response, the ELN launched a kidnapping campaign. The group hijacked and kidnapped an Avianca flight of 46 people in April 1999, as well as kidnapped approximately 140 parishioners attending mass in Cali in May 1999.[4] The ELN’s kidnappings caused the government to suspend negotiations. However, the negotiations were restarted in 2000.[5]

Although the ELN and the government resumed negotiations, the 2000 negotiations ended in 2001 without agreement. Both sides blamed the other for the failure. The ELN broke off negotiations due to the government’s campaign against its coca farms and the military’s alleged relationship with paramilitary organizations. Meanwhile, Pastrana’s government suspended the negotiations because of the ELN’s perceived lack of a will for peace and cooperation.[6] When the peace talks failed in 2001, so did the opportunity to create a ZOE or a National Convention.[7]

With the failure of negotiations with Pastrana’s government in 2001, the ELN adopted a new strategy to achieve its political goals. The group recognized and supported the Alternative Democratic Pole (PDA), a joint political party of the Independent Democratic Pole and the Democratic Alternative established in 2005, in opposition to the right wing Colombian government. In 2006, the PDA won 18 seats in the Congress of Colombia, 10 in the Senate and 8 in the House of Representatives.[8] Although it was not as successful in 2007, through Samuel Moreno Rojas, the PDA won Bogotá’s mayoral election.[9] Since 2008, internal conflict and polarity has negatively affected the PDA’s growth. In the 2018 election, the PDA only won 5 seats in the Senate, as well as 2 deputies.[10]

Despite the breakdown of negotiations for continued transitional talks between the Pastrana and Uribe administrations and the ELN in 2002, the ELN entered into both informal talks and formal negotiations with the Colombian government throughout the term of President Uribe (2002-2010).[11] In 2002, the two groups began to plan for talks; however, they suspended the informal negotiations in 2003.[12] In 2005, the ELN and Uribe’s government, with the support of outside parties like Mexico and the Catholic Church, began preliminary talks in the hope of later entering into formal negotiations.[13] The goal of these negotiations was not only the disarmament and demobilization the ELN, but also the implementation of political and socio-economic change on the part of the government.[14] In the lead up to the formal negotiations of 2008, Uribe’s government demanded that the ELN stop its kidnapping and military activities in a ceasefire, a condition that the ELN refused to accept.[15] The government also pushed the ELN to declare a ceasefire, an act that the group saw as tantamount to surrender. Without any promises to halt hostilities and kidnapping, the government refused to initiate talks with the ELN, and the negotiations broke down in 2008.[16]

In 2012, the ELN tried to negotiate a position for itself at a peace conference between the government of former President Santos and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).[17] Timochenko, a leader of the FARC, supported the inclusion of the ELN at the peace talks.[18] The ELN and the Colombian government formally entered peace negotiations in 2017. Anticipating Pope Francis’ visit to Colombia in 2017, the ELN proposed a ceasefire in June 2017, to which the Colombian government agreed in September 2017.[19] In October 2017, Santos’ government and the ELN formally entered into the ceasefire, the first between the two.[20]

The ceasefire between the ELN and the Colombian government ended in January 2019, with the change in power from President Santos to President Duque. In 2019, President Duque demanded the halting of kidnapping and release of the ELN’s hostages as a condition for the continuation of the peace talks, which the ELN refused.[21] The Colombian government then suspended the peace talks indefinitely in January 2019, as a response to the ELN’s attack on a police academy in Bogotá.[22] As of June 2019, President Duque has called for the arrest and extradition of the ELN leadership present at the Havana peace talks.[23]

During its early years, the ELN avoided engaging in illegal activity for ideological reasons. Following the group’s near destruction in 1973, the ELN shifted tactics and began robbing banks, assassinating military personnel, and kidnapping for ransom. By the 1980s, the ELN had become expert kidnappers. Kidnapping and extortion accounted for the majority of the group’s revenue. Then, in the late 1980s and 1990s, the ELN joined the drug trade.[1]

In the 2000s, the ELN used kidnapping, extortion, bombings, assassinations and hijacking to achieve its objectives.[2] The ELN primarily targeted oil company employees for their wealth and because of their foreign identity.[3] In 2013, the ELN declared war on oil companies for allegedly ‘plundering the country’s natural resources.’ The ELN attacked infrastructure of local towns, including oil pipelines and electricity pylons.[4] In 2014, the ELN engaged in preliminary peace talks with the Colombian government. However, the group refused to stop kidnapping, impeding the start of the talks until 2017.[5]

As of 2019, the ELN has continued to use kidnapping as a tactic.[6] The ELN has continued to target oil companies, as well as police officers. Throughout the 2017-2019 peace talks, the ELN simultaneously carried out attacks while calling for peace and the cessation of military activities.[7]

In the 1990s and the early 2000s, the ELN stressed the value of community involvement. The first set of negotiations between the ELN and the Colombian government started in 1991. In 1998, the ELN pushed for a National Convention, which would serve a venue for popular participation to tackle social issues. The ELN met with members of civil society to sign an agreement focusing on humanitarian issues.[1]

Though the ELN aimed to improve civilians’ lives by addressing social issues and encouraging civil involvement, its use of violence was highly controversial. In 1999, over 13 million Colombians marched in the No Más protests in 15 cities calling for peace and demanding a cease-fire between rebel groups, including the ELN, and the Colombian government.[2] The protests served as an illustration of the Colombian people’s dissatisfaction with guerrilla violence. Additionally, support for President Álvaro Uribe throughout his presidency (2002-2010) was an indication of Colombia’s negative sentiments about guerrilla activity in the country. Uribe’s crackdown on leftist guerrillas in Colombia increased his approval rating to 82%, symbolizing the Colombian public’s disapproval of guerrilla activity and organizations, including the ELN.[3]

The ELN damaged its relationship with the Colombian community further through its January 17, 2019 attack on a Colombian police academy. The attack was highly condemned throughout Colombia, and there were widespread protests against the ELN and other guerrilla movements in response.[4]

The ELN’s community involvement is not limited to its engagement with the Colombian populace. As the ELN has spread to other countries, like Venezuela, it has had to form relationships with the local populations. As of June 2019, the ELN has been providing social services, like food programs and infrastructure development programs, to local populations in Venezuela.[5] In return, the ELN has hoped to gain local support and workers for its illegal gold mines.[6]

The ELN has had mixed relationships with several groups. The ELN has been both rivals and allies with the April 19 Movement (M-19), the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), and the People’s Liberation Army (EPL). Between 1987 and 1992, the ELN participated in the Simon Bolivar Guerrilla Coordinating Board (CGSB), an umbrella organization that originally included the M-19, the EPL, the ELN, and the FARC.[1] The CGSB was an ELN initiative, created in 1987, following the ELN’s refusal to join peace talks of 1984.[2] By 1991, the FARC and the ELN were the last remaining members of the CGSB as all of the other groups had demobilized and signed peace agreements with the Colombian government. The CGSB dissolved in 1992 after failed talks between the FARC, the ELN, and the Colombian government.[3]

Since 2008 and until the FARC’s demobilization in 2016, the ELN frequently cooperated with the FARC. In May 2008, the ELN sent a letter to the FARC’s Secretariat, a governing council of the group’s seven highest leaders, expressing its interest in cooperating.[4] The ELN’s choice to continue fighting amidst a hiatus in the 2008 peace talks prompted its decision to reach out to the FARC. The ELN was motivated to collaborate with the FARC because it believed that the two groups had common enemies: the Colombian state and paramilitaries.[5] When the 2012 peace talks began, they excluded the ELN. In response, the FARC’s chief commander, Timochenko, released a statement on the FARC’s website in May 2015 calling for the inclusion of the ELN in the negotiations. Timochenko said the ELN’s involvement was “necessary and urgent for the government and for the Colombian people.”[6]

According to Colombian political publication La Silla, the ELN has been coordinating drug trafficking operations with ex-FARC dissidents (i.e., those FARC members who have refused to demobilize and accept the peace deal).[7] The ELN has been working with the 1^st Front and the 33^rd Front of the ex-FARC dissidents. The ELN and the dissidents met in Venezuela in 2019, with top leaders allegedly attending the meeting.[8] Analysts speculate that they have agreed to a non-aggression pact after years of competition in the Arauca region of Colombia.[9]

In addition to coordinating with ex-FARC dissidents, the ELN also has been recruiting these former FARC members.[10] Since the FARC’s peace deal with the Colombian government in 2016, the ELN has grown by 1,000 combatants, many of whom were FARC members who refused to disarm and demobilize.[11]

The ELN has turned to other partners in the drug trade, beyond former FARC members, since the FARC’s demobilization in 2016. Beginning in 2016-2017, the ELN has been collaborating with drug cartels, like Los Rastrojos, in order to maintain its income from illegal drug trafficking.[12] The ELN has also been both cooperating and competing with Los Urabeños, a paramilitary group in Colombia that engages in drug trafficking. From February to March 2019, clashes between the ELN and Los Urabeños forced the confinement of approximately 2800 people in Bojayá, a city along two major drug trafficking routes in northern Colombia.[13]

With its increasing presence in Venezuela, the ELN has been in greater contact with local Venezuelan groups. The ELN’s growing presence in the Venezuelan illegal gold mining industry has created competition with sindicatos, or Venezuelan gangs.[14] The ELN has pushed the sindicatos from their former mining territories, as well as taxed and bought the gold produced under the groups.[15] The ELN therefore has both cooperative and competitive relationships with the Venezuelan sindicatos.[16]

Although the ELN has faced some competition from sindicatos, it has cooperated with Venezuelan colectivos, or the paramilitary groups that support Maduro’s regime.[17] The ELN and members of colectivos have engaged in militant operations together, such as their attack on a demonstration hosting self-declared President Juan Guaido in January 2019.[18] The colectivos and the ELN have also been threatening aid shipments along the Colombian-Venezuelan border.[19]

The Catholic Church has influenced the ELN since the ELN’s creation in 1964. In its founding ideology, the ELN subscribed to Catholic Liberation Theology, a doctrine that combines Marxism with Jesus’ focus on the poor and the oppressed to stress the needs of those communities and of social and political action in the world.[1] Although the ideology and actions of the ELN have changed over the group’s lifetime, the ELN remains influenced by the Catholic Church. The ELN has historically called upon the Catholic Church to help it negotiate with the Colombian government. During the ELN’s on and off talks with President Uribe’s government from 2002-2008, the Catholic Church acted as a guarantor.[2] In 2015, the ELN asked the Catholic Church in Colombia to help it negotiate a ceasefire with the Colombian government.[3] In 2017, the ELN initiated a ceasefire in anticipation of Pope Francis’ visit to Colombia.[4] The Catholic Church has continued to act as a monitoring mechanism for ceasefires and negotiations between the ELN and the Colombian government.[5]                       

Cuba has supported the ELN both financially and politically. During the ELN’s early years, Cuba supported the group financially by providing weapons to ELN militants.[6] However, Cuba stopped providing weapons and training to the ELN in 1991.[7] More recently, Cuba has supported the ELN politically. Cuba hosted peace talks between the ELN and the Colombian government from 2017-2019. As of June 2019, Cuba has been protecting the ELN’s peace delegation from arrest and extradition to Colombia.[8]

The government of Ecuador has supported negotiations between the ELN and the Colombian government. Ecuador hosted peace talks between the ELN and Duque’s government in 2016.[9] However, the Ecuadorian government decided to stop hosting the peace talks in 2018 due to security concerns after the ELN held hostage and killed three Ecuadorian journalists. Consequently, the talks moved from Quito, Ecuador to Havana, Cuba.[10]

The ELN also has an extensive political history with the Venezuelan government. During the peace talks with the Colombian government in the mid-2000s, the ELN received support and assistance from former Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez. In January 2008, Chavez publically declared the ELN, along with the FARC, to be “insurgent forces that have political protection” as opposed to their common designation as terrorist organizations.[11] In response, the ELN thanked the Venezuelan government for its recognition and legitimization of the ELN’s political motivations.[12] More recently, in February 2019, the ELN promised to defend Maduro’s government from a U.S. military intervention and to protect Venezuela in the case of an American invasion.[13] Mirroring concerns about the ELN’s relationship with Maduro’s government, Venezuelan lawmakers have worried about an alleged relationship between the ELN and the Venezuelan armed forces, the Bolivarian National Guard (GNB). Although the ELN and the GNB have acted as unofficial allies since Chavez’s government, there were clashes between the two groups in 2018.[14]

Analysts are concerned about the ELN’s external relations transforming into a larger conflict. In particular, analysts speculate that the ELN’s operations along the Colombian-Venezuelan border could generate tensions between Venezuela and Colombia, countries that have been historically hostile with each other. Experts worry that Colombian counterinsurgency operations against the ELN in the Colombian-Venezuelan border region may escalate into an interstate conflict between Colombia and Venezuela, as Venezuela might perceive them as an invasion of its territory.[15]