Formed: 1977 

Disbanded: Group is active, but reportedly in the process of disarmament 

First Attack: September 7, 1986: MILF operatives threw a grenade into a wedding at a Catholic church in Salvador, Philippines. (10 killed, 90 wounded)[1] 

Last Attack: April 17, 2017: The MILF claimed responsibility for two attacks coordinated in Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat, Philippines. One explosive device detonated near a gas station and a second device targeted police personnel responding to an earlier blast.  There were no casualties, but 5 civilians and 9 police officers were wounded. (0 killed, 14 injured)[2]

Executive Summary

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) is the largest militant organization in the Philippines and seeks autonomy for Filipino Muslims. The MILF split from the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in 1977, although it was generally inactive and did not call itself the MILF until 1984. The MILF controls territory in the southern Philippines, governing by Shariah law. It has generally focused on political negotiation, but it has a significant history of terrorism and militancy. In 2014, the MILF concluded peace negotiations with the Philippine government for an autonomous region in the southern Philippines, to be called the Bangsamoro. The MILF is in the process of gradual disarmament. 

Group Narrative

The Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), formerly known as the New Moro National Liberation Front, is an Islamic separatist organization based in the southern Philippines. It seeks an independent Islamic state or autonomous region for the Filipino Muslim minority, known as the Moro people, who live primarily in the Philippines’ Mindanao region. The MILF is chiefly located in central Mindanao and is the Philippines’ largest separatist group; it is also considered the strongest group in Mindanao.[3]

The MILF originated as a splinter group of the Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) in the 1970s. Hashim Salamat, an MNLF co-founder, began to have ideological and political disagreements with Nur Misuari, his fellow co-founder and MNLF’s key leader. Salamat charged that Misuari was not pursuing truly Islamic goals in conjunction with his quest for Moro independence, and in December 1977, Salamat led a group of MNLF members in an attempt to take control from Misuari. When the attempt failed, Salamat established a splinter group called the New MNLF, which broke completely from the MNLF.[4]

During the late 1970s and early 1980s, Salamat and the New MNLF’s leadership traveled to various Muslim countries, including Egypt and Pakistan, in order to gain support. They portrayed their new organization as a moderate alternative to the MNLF, which at the time was demanding complete independence from the Philippines. The New MNLF expressed its readiness to accept significant regional autonomy, believing that this position would be more likely to garner support from foreign states and non-state actors that shied away from the MNLF. This attitude may have been a ploy at the time, since the group would later also state that its goal was full independence. Generally, the New MNLF was unsuccessful in securing material foreign support. Most foreign states and non-state actors involved in the Moro separatist movement were already backing the MNLF.[5]

There is almost no reporting of the New MNLF’s activities during its first few years. In the early 1980s, several groups of New MNLF commanders attended military training camps in Afghanistan. Three hundred sixty or more commanders trained there for one year, and nearly 200 fought as members of the mujahedeen against the Soviets in Afghanistan. Their experiences abroad introduced the New MNLF fighters to more extreme Islamist ideologies, and the fighters brought these ideas back to the Philippines. In 1984, the New MNLF officially changed its name to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in order to distinguish itself completely from the MNLF and indicate its Islamic focus. Most reports designate 1984 as the founding date of the MILF although it existed in 1977 under the New MNLF name following its split from the MNLF. The MILF began to be more active at around this time; its first recorded attack—bombing a Catholic wedding—occurred in 1986. However, its next recorded attack did not take place until the following year. Conducting attacks was not the MILF’s initial priority. Instead, it focused on strengthening its organization through economic  self-reliance, increasing Islamization, and military buildup of its armed wing, the Bangsamoro Islamic Armed Forces (BIAF).[6] Drawing on its Islamic orientation to gain support among Moros, the MILF continued to present itself to the Philippine government as a more reasonable negotiating partner than the MNLF concerning the status of Moros. Salamat and the MILF leadership met with Philippine government officials several times in an attempt to negotiate an autonomy arrangement, but were unsuccessful.[7]

However, in the late 1980s, the Philippine government was simultaneously meeting with both the MILF and the MNLF as a strategy to exacerbate tensions between the two organizations and split the Moro separatist movement. In January 1987, the MILF conducted attacks throughout Mindanao – mostly bombings to damage property – to demonstrate its strength and to force the government to negotiate seriously with the MILF. After an unofficial truce, MILF talks with the Philippine government restarted.[8]

Throughout the late 1980s and the 1990s, the MILF’s political tactics gained strong support in the Philippines’ southernmost regions. The MILF established a parallel government throughout Mindanao, claiming to liberate various zones from the Philippine government by instituting a Moro-run system. Because of the Philippines’ weak state capacity in those regions, the MILF was able to take control of territory with minimal violence by coopting the local population. While the MILF likely used some level of force to gain territory and certainly employed armed members to police and defend this territory, accounts of the MILF’s territorial expansion do not mention violence. Instead, the MILF seemingly enjoyed popular support and cultivated further favor by assuming many government functions. The group offered services such as issuing marriage and birth certificates to Moros, which the Philippine government sometimes failed to do.[9] The MILF engaged Moro communities through a consultative committee system, in contrast to the MNLF’s more centralized system. Its leadership actively sought supporters’ input by convening assemblies to discuss policy ideas, especially at local levels.[10] MILF-controlled zones included military bases as well as communities that encompassed various villages. The MILF’s Camp Abubakar, for example, covered approximately forty miles and included a mosque, a religious school, commercial and residential areas, a weapons factory, a solar energy system, and segments of seven different villages.[11]

The MILF used its Islamic focus and popular support to substantiate its claim to lead the Moros. Within the areas under its control, the MILF sought to create an independent Islamic state, and it enforced its rigid interpretation of Islamic law.[12] For example, the MILF based its judiciary system on Islamic tenets and created an Internal Security Force (ISF) to maintain order and enforce Koranic teachings within MILF-controlled zones. While the MILF-controlled zones had already been dominated by Moros, some Moros opposed the imposition of the MILF’s fundamentalist interpretation of Islam which clashed with the less strict, more popular interpretations practiced in the Philippines. Generally, however, the MILF’s effective community engagement, allocation of government services, and dedication to Islam seemed to have won them broad support.[13]

The Philippines’ 1996 peace agreement with the MNLF – which extended and adjusted the existing, unpopular Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) – ultimately brought the MILF an increase in regional popularity and dominance. Almost immediately after the agreement, the MNLF’s Misuari was elected the new governor of the ARMM with government support. However, many MNLF members viewed the agreement and the election as driven by Misuari’s thirst for personal gain at the expense of meaningful change for the Moros. This disillusionment with the MNLF boosted the MILF’s recruitment and eventually led the MILF to overtake the MNLF in size and capacity. With the integration of many MNLF members into the Philippine political and social system after the agreement and the defection to MILF of others, the MILF became the dominant Moro militant force. MILF members, angry with the 1996 agreement’s concessions to the Philippine government, demanded full independence and increased their attacks against government targets.[14]

Following the spike in violent clashes after the 1996 agreement, the MILF and the Philippine government signed a ceasefire agreement in 1997. The ceasefire stipulated that Philippine forces be repositioned away from MILF areas and required that Philippine law enforcement coordinate with MILF operatives before conducting operations in MILF-controlled areas.[15] After 1997, the MILF began to emphasize the role of government negotiations in its strategy, although it simultaneously continued to develop its armed force.[16] Some MILF units still conducted attacks, and, in 1999, the organization founded its Special Operations Group (SOG), which has carried out bombings and other terrorist activities. The SOG has been called the MILF’s terrorist division.[17]

In 2000, violent MILF activity interrupted the ceasefire and led to a shift in government strategy. Then-President Joseph Estrada declared all-out war against the MILF and against the separatist movement more generally. This offensive had enormous consequences for the MILF. During this fighting, the MILF lost Camp Abubakar and several other camps in battles with Philippine forces. In response to Estrada’s offensive, the MILF declared jihad against the Philippine government. The war in 2000 caused major suffering and displacement of civilian populations. When Gloria Macapagal Arroyo assumed the presidency in 2001, she ended the war and changed government policy to one of “all-out peace.” This shift illustrated the disjointedness of Philippine policy toward the MILF, since new presidents tended to establish very different policies. By this time, the MILF was considered the major organization in the Moro separatist movement. As the Philippines’ largest, strongest militant group, the MILF had eclipsed the MNLF in importance and viability as a negotiating partner for the government.[18]

With Arroyo’s election, the Philippine government and the MILF resumed peace talks. To encourage progress in the negotiations, the Arroyo administration convinced the United States not to designate the MILF as a Foreign Terrorist Organization in the early 2000s, as then-President George W. Bush had wanted to do.[19] While MILF operatives allegedly have still been involved in scattered attacks and kidnappings and have cooperated with other militant groups in the region such as Jemaah Islamiyah (JI), the organization’s leadership claims that these incidents are due to rogue units rather than general policy. In 2003, Salamat reiterated the MILF’s commitment to the 1997 ceasefire and officially rejected the use of terrorism by the MILF. He also disavowed the group’s relationships with terrorist organizations like JI or the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). However, the continuation of reported links between MILF members and those other groups undermines Salamat’s statement.[20]

After Salamat died in 2003 of natural causes, Al Haj Murad Ebrahim became the MILF’s leader. Ebrahim is seen as a more moderate figure than Salamat, and under his leadership, the peace process has made significant progress.[21] In 2008, the Philippine government and the MILF signed the Memorandum of Agreement for Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD), which would have extended the 1996 ARMM boundaries and eventually replaced the ARMM completely. The MOA-AD would have allowed for greater independence for the Moro regions and a power-sharing arrangement among the various parties. Public outcry and opposition by the MNLF – which believed that its own 1996 agreement with the government was final and that the Philippine Supreme Court’s ruling of the MOA-AD was unconstitutional – nullified the arrangement.[22]

Under President Benigno Aquino III, who assumed office in 2010, peace negotiations to replace the unpopular ARMM accelerated. Talks occurred between the Philippine government and the MILF, marginalizing the MNLF. The MILF officially dropped its demand for full independence in 2010, seeking regional autonomy instead.[23] The Philippine government and the MILF signed the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) in 2012 and the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro (CAB) in 2014. Under these agreements, a new autonomous region called the Bangsamoro will replace the ARMM with new wealth- and power-sharing arrangements between the Bangsamoro government and the Philippine government. The agreements allow for Shariah courts to oversee judicial processes for Muslims, while the judicial needs of non-Muslims are processed in civil courts. Additionally, the agreements detail the Bangsamoro’s sources of revenue and nautical jurisdiction, as well as outline the transition of MILF fighters to civilian life.[24] The MILF has already begun decommissioning some of its armed members and surrendering weapons in accordance with the negotiations.[25] 

The MNLF has continued to oppose the MILF-Philippine government agreements on the grounds that its own 1996 agreement had already settled the question of the status of Muslims in the Philippines.[26] While one MNLF faction did express support for the proposed Bangsamoro region, several other MNLF representatives have appeared before the Philippine Senate and the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) to argue against the MILF-Philippine government proposal.[27]  

On July 27, 2015, the Philippine House of Representatives began deliberations on the Basic Law on the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region (BLBAR), also known as the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL).[28] If ratified, this law would officially abolish the ARMM and provide for transition to a Bangsamoro government, which would likely be led by MILF members.[29] However, the failure since 2015 to pass the law has created opportunities for conflict. The feeling of disenfranchisement among some members of the MILF has led to a split, resulting in the formation of a breakaway group called the Bangsamoro Islamic Freedom Fighters (BIFF). In March 2018, government forces conducted a raid on BIFF fighters, killing at least 44 and wounding 26 others. One week after the offensive, MILF vice-chairman Ghazali Jaafar argued that the Philippine government’s inability to pass the law has instigated more conflict in Mindanao as some groups, like the BIFF, once again favor violent means of ending the conflict. [30]

Nevertheless, there remains some spirit of cooperation with the government. In 2017, the MILF cooperated with government forces in their campaign against the IS presence in the Philippines.[31] In April 2017, Philippine President Rodrigo Duterte called for the law to be passed and signed into force before the end of 2018, vowing to fulfill the long-standing agreement.[32] A setback occurred in May 2018, when, as part of President Duterte’s violent campaign to end drug use and trafficking in the country, government forces on a counter-drug mission killed nine members of the MILF. A MILF spokesman denied that the MILF took part in the drug trade and claimed that the fighters had surrendered before being executed.[33]

In June 2018, both the Senate and House approved versions of a BBL, though the versions required reconciliation before they could be signed into effect.[34] On July 10, the two legislative chambers began a bicameral conference to reconcile conflicts in the two versions, aiming to have a law signed into effect before the opening of the legislature’s regular session on July 23.[35] However, several pieces of the deal remained contentious, including the area boundaries it outlined, its policies of taxation and resource-sharing, and the manner for localities within the proposed boundaries to opt in or out of the deal. Wary of these disagreements, lawmakers expected a challenge in the nation’s Supreme Court., Nonetheless, on July 24, 2018, the Philippine House of Representatives passed the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL), the final name of the former BBL.[36] President Rodrigo Duterte signed the bill into law, creating a Muslim regional entity in Mindanao. With the bill’s passing, the MILF, representatives of which were present during the signing of the bill in Manila, declared its support. MILF leader Ebrahim declared that 30,000-40,000 fighters would be decommissioned.[37] The BIFF expressed distaste for the agreement, stating that it would only benefit the MILF and promised future attacks in retaliation.[38] As of July 2018, no response from the BIFF has yet been reported.

[1] Rubin, Barry and Judith Colp Rubin. Chronologies of Modern Terrorism. New York: Routledge, 2008. Print.

[2] "Incident Summary: Moro Islamic Liberation Front 4/17/17." County-Level Correlates of Terrorist Attacks in the United States | START.umd.edu. July 2018. Accessed November 30, 2018. https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=2017041….

[3] Santos, Jr., Soliman M. and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print., “In the Southern Philippines, the Peace Process Stumbles Forward.” Stratfor. 14 Sept. 2014. Web. 24 June 2015.

[4] Bale, Jeffrey M. “The Abu Sayyaf Group in its Philippine and International Contexts.” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.

[5] Bale, Jeffrey M. “The Abu Sayyaf Group in its Philippine and International Contexts.” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.

[6] Bale, Jeffrey M. “The Abu Sayyaf Group in its Philippine and International Contexts.” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey., “Search Results: Incidents Perpetrated by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.” National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, n.d. Web. 22 July 2015.

[7] Bale, Jeffrey M. “The Abu Sayyaf Group in its Philippine and International Contexts.” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey., “Search Results: Incidents Perpetrated by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.” National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, n.d. Web. 22 July 2015.

[8] Bale, Jeffrey M. “The Abu Sayyaf Group in its Philippine and International Contexts.” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey., “Search Results: Incidents Perpetrated by the Moro Islamic Liberation Front.” National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, n.d. Web. 22 July 2015. 

[9] Wilson, Jr., Thomas G. “Extending the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front a Catalyst for Peace.” Monograph. School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2009. Web. 10 July 2015.

[10] Van Engeland, Anisseh, and Rachael M. Rudolph. From Terrorism to Politics. Burlington, Vermont: Ashgate Publishing Group, 2008. Print.

[11] Bale, Jeffrey M. “The Abu Sayyaf Group in its Philippine and International Contexts.” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.

[12] Wilson, Jr., Thomas G. “Extending the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front a Catalyst for Peace.” Monograph. School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2009. Web. 10 July 2015.

[13] Bale, Jeffrey M. “The Abu Sayyaf Group in its Philippine and International Contexts.” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.

[14] Bale, Jeffrey M. “The Abu Sayyaf Group in its Philippine and International Contexts.” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey., Caculitan, Ariel R. “Negotiating Peace with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Southern Philippines.” Diss. Naval Postgraduate School, 2005. Web. 10 July 2015.

[15] “Agreement by the Government of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).” Peace Agreements Digital Collection. United States Institute of Peace, 3 Sept. 1997. Web. 22 July 2015.

[16] Santos, Jr., Soliman M. and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.

[17] Bale, Jeffrey M. “The Abu Sayyaf Group in its Philippine and International Contexts.” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.  

[18] Taya, Shamsuddin L. “The Political Strategies of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front for Self-Determination in the Philippines.” International Discourse 15.1 (2007): 59-84. Web. 10 July 2015., “In the Southern Philippines, the Peace Process Stumbles Forward.” Stratfor. 14 Sept. 2014. Web. 24 June 2015.

[19] Bale, Jeffrey M. “The Abu Sayyaf Group in its Philippine and International Contexts.” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.

[20] Abuza, Zachary. “The Moro Islamic Liberation Front at 20: State of the Revolution.” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism 28 (2005): 453-479. Web. 10 July 2015. Burgos, Arlene. "Hopes Pinned on Bangsamoro Law as Extremists Continue to Recruit in PH." ABS-CBN News. September 14, 2017. Accessed January 18, 2019. https://news.abs-cbn.com/focus/09/14/17/hopes-pinned-on-bangsamoro-law-….

[21] Tan, Andrew T.H. Security Strategies in the Asia-Pacific: The United States’ “Second Front” in Southeast Asia. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011. Print.

[22] Wilson, Jr., Thomas G. “Extending the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front a Catalyst for Peace.” Monograph. School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2009. Web. 10 July 2015.

[23] Teves, Oliver. “Philippine Muslim Rebels Drop Independence Demand.” Associated Press, 23 Sept. 2010. Web. 10 July 2015.

[24] Sabillo, Kristine Angeli. “What is the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro?” Inquirer, 26 Mar. 2014. Web. 10 July 2015.

[25] “MILF rebels hand over arms in the Philippines.” BBC, 16 June 2015. Web. 10 July 2015.

[26] Wilson, Jr., Thomas G. “Extending the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front a Catalyst for Peace.” Monograph. School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2009. Web. 10 July 2015., “In the Southern Philippines, the Peace Process Stumbles Forward.” Stratfor. 14 Sept. 2014. Web. 24 June 2015.

[27] Gonzales, Yuji. “BBL is ‘best chance for peace,’ says MNLF.” Inquirer, 15 May 2015. Web. 27 July 2015., Casauay, Angela. “MILF, sultans want out of Bangsamoro.” Rappler, 14 May 2015. Web. 27 July 2015., Pareño, Roel. “MNLF opposes BBL in international meeting.” Philstar, 20 Apr. 2015. Web. 27 July 2015.

[28] Arcangel, Xianne. “BBL tops House’s agenda 16th Congress’ 3rd and final session.” GMA News, 6 July 2015.

[29] Philippines. Bangsamoro Transition Commission. “Primer on the proposed Bangsamoro Basic Law.” Web. 10 July 2015.

[30] “Philippines Muslim leaders ‘tired of waiting’ for Bangsamoro law.” Al Jazeera, 13 Mar. 2018. Web. 9 July, 2018. < https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/03/philippines-muslim-leaders-tired…;

[31] Villamor, Felipe. “Philippines Agents Kill Militants Who Helped Fight ISIS-Linked Forces”. New York Times, 28 May 2018. Web. 9 July, 2018. < https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/28/world/asia/philippines-kill-milf-mil…;

[32] Romero, Alexis. “Duterte wants Bangsamoro Basic Law passed within 2018.” Philstar, 3 Apr. 2018. Web. 6 July, 2018. <https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2018/04/03/1802238/duterte-wants-ban…;

[33] Villamor, Felipe. “Philippines Agents Kill Militants Who Helped Fight ISIS-Linked Forces”. New York Times, 28 May 2018. Web. 9 July, 2018. < https://www.nytimes.com/2018/05/28/world/asia/philippines-kill-milf-mil…;

[34] Marcelo, Ver. “Senate, House approve their versions of proposed BBL on third and final reading”. CNN Philippines, 2 June, 2018. Web. 9 July, 2018. <http://cnnphilippines.com/news/2018/05/30/house-senate-bbl-third-final-…;

[35] Romero, Paolo. “Bicameral conference on Bangsamoro Basic Law starts”. Philstar, July 10, 2018. Web. 10 July, 2018. <https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2018/07/10/1832193/bicameral-confere…;

[36] Diaz, Jess. “House ratifies Bangsamoro Organic Law”. Philstar, 25 July, 2018. Web. 24 July, 2018 (Manila time is +1 day). <https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2018/07/25/1836632/house-ratifies-ba…;.

[37] Associated Press, “Philippine rebel chief: 30,000 rebels to be disarmed in deal”. Philstar, 25 July, 2018. Web. 24 July, 2018 (Manila time is +1 day). <https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2018/07/25/1836474/philippine-rebel-…;.

[38] Lischin, Luke. "IS in the Philippines and the Battle of Marawi: A New Appraisal." New Mandala. September 14, 2018. Accessed January 18, 2019. https://www.newmandala.org/battle-marawi-new-appraisal/.

Disclaimer: These are some selected major attacks in the militant organization’s history. It is not a comprehensive listing but captures some of the most famous attacks or turning points during the campaign.

February 25, 2000: Bombs exploded on one or more buses aboard the M/V Our Lady of Mediatrix ferry that was traveling to Ozamiz City. MILF commanders were among those blamed for the attack (39-44 killed, 41-50 injured).[1]

February 27, 2000: A bomb exploded outside dxMS, a Catholic radio station in Cotabato City. The attack was blamed on the MILF, especially because one dxMS host had received MILF death threats. The organization denied involvement (unknown killed, 7 wounded).[2]

March 17, 2000: A MILF commander named Abdullah Macapaar, also known as Commander Bravo and generally considered rogue, led an assault on Kauswagan Municipal Hall, reportedly taking 294 hostages and leaving several dead (unknown killed, unknown wounded, 294 hostages).[3]

March 3, 2003: A bomb exploded at Davao City International Airport. The MILF was allegedly responsible for the attack. The Philippine government subsequently ordered the arrest of various MILF leaders, although the organization denied involvement (22 killed, 148 wounded).[4]

July 10, 2007: Philippine Marines were attacked in a MILF-controlled zone while trying to rescue an Italian hostage from the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Several Marines were decapitated. The MILF admitted to the attack, and the attacking group also reportedly included ASG members (18-43 killed, 9+ wounded).[5]

January 25, 2015: Philippine Special Action Force (SAF) troops targeted two key bomb-makers in an operation in Maguindanao. During the pursuit, the troopers were attacked by rebel forces that included MILF members. The MILF acknowledged the involvement of its members, although it also stated that the SAF operation was not coordinated with them as required by a ceasefire agreement with the government. Consideration of the BLBAR was temporarily suspended after this attack (approximately 55 killed, 12+ wounded).[6] 

April 17, 2017: The MILF claimed responsibility for two attacks coordinated in Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat, Philippines. One explosive device detonated near a gas station and a second device targeted police personnel responding to an earlier blast.  There were no casualties, but 5 civilians and 9 police officers were wounded (0 killed, 14 injured).[7]

[1] De La Cruz, Lino. “Victims of Ozamis ship blast still cry for justice.” Philstar, 27 Feb. 2003. Web. 10 July 2015., “Incident Summary.” National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, n.d. Web. 10 July 2015.

[2] “Philippines: Catholic radio station bombed in Mindanao.” Committee to Protect Journalists, 3 Mar. 2000. Web. 10 July 2015., “Incident Summary.” National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism. National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, n.d. Web. 10 July 2015.

[3] “The Philippines: The Collapse of Peace in Mindanao.” International Crisis Group, 23 Oct. 2008. Web. 10 July 2015., Philippines. Armed Forces of the Philippines, Office of Strategic and Special Studies. In Assertion of Sovereignty, Volume One: The 2000 Campaign against the MILF. Quezon City: Armed Forces of the Philippines, Office of Strategic and Special Studies, 2008. Web. 10 July 2015.

[4] “Airport bomb: Islamic group blamed.” CNN, 6 Mar. 2003. Web. 10 July 2015., “Lives Destroyed: Attacks on Civilians in the Philippines.” Human Rights Watch, July 2007. Web. 10 July 2015.

[5] “MILF admits attack against Marines, says 23 troops dead.” GMA News, 11 July 2007. Web. 10 July 2015., “Rebels behead Philippine troops.” BBC, 11 July 2007. Web. 10 July 2015.

[6] Samson-Espiritu, Arlene and Tim Hume. “Philippines honors 44 slain commandos with day of mourning.” CNN, 30 Jan. 2015. Web. 20 July 2015., Casauay, Angela. “MILF conducts own probe into Maguindanao clash.” Rappler, 28 Jan. 2015. Web. 20 July 2015., Fernandez, Amanda. “Roxas: 44 killed, 12 wounded in Mamasapano ‘misencounter.’” GMA News, 27 Jan. 2015. Web. 10 July 2015., Unson, John and Alexis Romero. “Iqbal justifies attack; toll soars to 49.” The Philippine Star, 27 Jan. 2015. Web. 10 July 2015., Geronimo, Jee Y. “‘Should we disregard history, hard work on Bangsamoro law?’” Rappler, 28 Mar. 2015. Web. 10 July 2015.

[7] "Incident Summary: Moro Islamic Liberation Front 4/17/17." County-Level Correlates of Terrorist Attacks in the United States | START.umd.edu. July 2018. Accessed November 30, 2018. https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/IncidentSummary.aspx?gtdid=2017041….