Formed: January 26, 2015

Disbanded: Group is active.

First Attack: April 18, 2015: IS-KP conducted a suicide bombing outside a bank in Jalalabad, Afghanistan (33 killed, 100+ wounded).[1]

Last Attack: April 30, 2018: IS-KP conducted two suicide bombings in Kabulm Afghanistan (29 killed, 50 wounded).[2]

Executive Summary

The Islamic State in Khorasan Province (IS-KP) is a branch of the Salafi militant organization, the Islamic State, that is active in Afghanistan and Pakistan.[3] IS-KP’s main goal is to establish and maintain Khorasan as a wilayat (province) of the global IS caliphate.[4] IS-KP’s primary militant adversary is the Afghan Taliban, with which it frequently engages in battles for territorial control over Afghanistan.[5] The hostility between the two groups stems both from ideological differences and competition for resources. IS-KP is strongest in the Nangarhar Province of eastern Afghanistan, particularly in the Chaprarhar, Nazyan, and Deh Bala districts. However, as of 2017, U.S. and Afghan forces have rolled back the group’s reach by capturing significant portions of IS-KP territory.[6] Although U.S. and Afghan forces have killed the first tier of IS-KP leadership and 75% of its fighters, the group has proven resilient.[7] Since spring 2017 and continuing through 2018, IS-KP has launched several major assaults in Kabul, Herat, and Jalalabad. U.S. experts estimate that IS-KP will continue to recruit militants, disseminate propaganda, and launch attacks on urban centers as long as IS exists.[8]

Group Narrative

Before 2010, many of the militants who currently belong to IS-KP fought for other militant organizations, such as the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). In 2010, the majority of these militants fled Orakzai Agency, Pakistan for Nangarhar province, Afghanistan, in order to escape the Pakistan Army’s major anti-terror operation, Khwakh Ba dee Sham.[9] After arriving in Nangarhar with their families, the militants claimed to be refugees, or muhajerin, and demanded hospitality from the local Pashtun population. As they settled into their new home, the muhajerin continued to carry weapons and display their allegiance to Pakistani militant groups such as the TTP. However, after TTP leader Hakimullah Mehsud died in November 2013, the TTP fragmented. As a result, many of the muhajerin militant groups in Nangarhar began to operate autonomously, splitting into smaller, more ruthless factions.[10]

Throughout 2014, these groups operated in Afghanistan and Pakistan as apolitical armed gangs, extorting money from villagers and conducting kidnappings for ransom. The mujaherin’s predatory behavior further strained their relationship with the TTP and the Taliban. In 2014, IS propaganda began to circulate throughout the Afghanistan-Pakistan region. Leaflets encouraging militants to defect to IS were found in multiple rural provinces, as well as in larger cities such as Kabul, Afghanistan, and Jalalabad, Pakistan.[11] One sign of the IS’s growing influence in Afghanistan came in March that year, when nine former Yemeni and Saudi Al Qaeda leaders defected to IS, while hiding along the Afghanistan-Pakistan border.[12] Shortly thereafter, several other militant groups operating in Pakistan and Afghanistan, including the Al Tawhid Brigade, Ansar ul-Khilafat Wal-Jihad, and Jundullah, pledged allegiance to IS.[13] However, IS’s position in Afghanistan did not solidify until July 1, 2014, when Afghan national Rahim Muslim Dost, a former Guantanamo Bay detainee with connections to Al Qaeda and the Taliban, publicly declared his allegiance to IS.[14] This announcement coincided with the release of a booklet called Fata (victory), which advocated for the violent establishment of an IS in Nangarhar and Kunar provinces.[15]

In the months to follow, the Khorasan chapter grew in strength as TTP commanders defected from the TTP to join IS, following the contentious appointment of Mullah Fazlullah as the leader of the TTP.[16] For example, in October 2014, Hafiz Saeed Khan (originally considered to succeed the TTP’s Hakimullah Mehsud) and Shahidullah Shahid (the main spokesman of the TTP) both pledged allegiance to IS. Additionally, the TTP chiefs of Kurram Agency, Khyber Agency, Peshawar, and Hanugu district, who collectively maintained TTP control over the central FATA, also defected to IS. This loss for the TTP was an extremely valuable victory for IS, as it provided the group control over the strategic travel and trade routes stretching from Peshawar to Khyber Pass.[17]

On January 10, 2015, Hafiz Saeed, Shahid, and the four former TTP chiefs of the central FATA released a video in conjunction with an expanded group of former Taliban commanders and leaders from other jihadi groups in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The video reaffirmed their allegiance to Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and declared themselves to be the new administrators of the official IS province in Afghanistan. The men, who had appointed Hafiz Saeed Khan as their leader, also claimed to be backed by an even broader network of groups in Khyber, Kunar, and Dir. Immediately after the release of the video, 50 militants from the Amr Bil Maroof group joined the ranks of Hafiz Saeed’s group. On January 26, Abu Muhammad al-Adnani backed this statement, and subsequently named Hafiz Saeed as the emir for the Islamic State in Khorasan Province (IS-KP).[18] Adnani encouraged all militants in Khorasan (a historic name for the region including Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Central Asia) to unite under IS-KP.[19] Hafiz Saeed and his deputy, Mullah Abdul Rauf Khadim, utilized their existing connections to militant networks to recruit from the eastern and southern provinces of Afghanistan. IS-KP quickly attracted new recruits, due to the appeal of its international reputation.[20]

One notable effect of the official establishment of IS-KP is that it spurred IS and the Afghan Taliban to declare war on one another in January 2015. The hostility between the two groups arose both from ideological differences and competition for resources. IS accused the Taliban of drawing its legitimacy from a narrow ethnic and nationalistic base, rather than a universal Islamic creed.[21] Meanwhile the Taliban continued to suffer as large numbers of its militants defected from the Taliban to join IS-KP.[22]

Within Nangarhar, the franchise first took root in the Mamand area of Achin district near the strategically advantageous Tirah Valley corridor, a popular and relatively unregulated militant crossing between Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, by February 2015, locals were flying the black IS flag from residences in seven districts in southeastern Nangarhar. In the following month, IS-KP also expanded into Logar province, establishing a training base and attacking multiple Sufi shrines.[23]

Meanwhile, about five hundred miles southwest of Nangarhar, Abdul Rauf Khadim was leading a parallel effort to establish an IS front in Helmand province. Although Khadim’s cell was well-financed and approximately three hundred men strong, the Taliban surrounded its position. Without access to open supply routes and safe havens in Pakistan, the cell fell to the Taliban by early February 2015.[24]

As the Taliban began to realize the potential threat IS-KP posed to its control over the Nangarhar region, it attempted to shut down muhajer madrassas, and confiscated a shipment of weapons in Mamand. In March and April 2015, the Taliban entered into a brief period of negotiations with IS-KP. However, the militants refused to leave Nangarhar, resulting in a series of violent clashes with the Taliban. By mid-May 2015, the Taliban had become the minority group in the Mamand Valley, Achin, Deh Bala, Kot, and Nazian districts, and was forced to withdraw and regroup.[25]

In May 2015, IS-KP established its headquarters in Mamand under the supervision of visiting IS leaders.[26] During the initial months of IS-KP’s rule in Mamand, specifically from mid-May to early July 2015, villagers viewed the group as a benign and positive alternative to the Taliban. Unlike the Taliban, which forcibly took from the local population, IS-KP provided its own food and shelter, and did not impose a tax. It also initially allowed both male and female schools to remain open.[27] Furthermore, IS-KP commanders claimed that the group had no quarrel with the Afghan government and was instead focused on opposing the Taliban and its link to the ISI. With IS-KP in power, Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) and government personnel enjoyed newfound freedom of movement, unhindered by the persecution of the Taliban. Viewing IS-KP as a valuable counterweight to its longtime enemy, the Taliban, the Afghan government refrained from challenging IS-KP for its first two formative months after its emergence in Nangarhar. In return, IS-KP launched no attacks against ANSF and Afghan government personnel during May and June 2015.[28]

By the end of June 2015, IS-KP had captured or contested much of the Taliban’s territory in Nangarhar and was in control of eight of the 22 districts. IS-KP subsequently attempted to expand and consolidate its control through a variety of cruel tactics, including summary justice, forced displacement, and executions of clerics and elders.[29] Despite both forcible and diplomatic attempts by the Taliban to convince IS to leave Afghanistan, local and top-level leadership insisted that the Taliban disband itself and pledge allegiance to the IS caliphate. In response to these failed negotiations, the Taliban issued a fatwa and gathered new support from local tribal elders and political elites in order to launch a defensive campaign against IS-KP in late June 2015. In less than two weeks, the Taliban seized most of IS-KP’s territory in the southwestern districts of Nangarhar. However, its campaign was largely unsuccessful in the southeastern districts of Nangarhar. On July 3, 2015, the Taliban took IS-KP by surprise and successfully ousted the militants from Mamand. However, this victory was short lived. On July 16, the eve of the Muslim holiday, Eid-ul-Fitr, IS-KP militants returned and retook Mamand. After killing a dozen Taliban soldiers and detaining 80 locals, IS-KP slaughtered an additional ten tribal elders accused of supporting the Taliban.[30] This execution, during which the men were blindfolded and then blown up in a field of explosives, brought IS-KP international attention when IS-KP released the gruesome footage from the attack in a propaganda video.[31]

As IS-KP grew more violent, villagers not aligned with IS-KP fled their homes for safer locations, such as Jalalabad or Taliban-controlled areas in western Nangarhar. Once the original residents had been displaced, IS-KP confiscated abandoned property and allowed IS-KP affiliated militants from Kunduz and Helmand to resettle the area.[32]

As a result, IS-KP became so entrenched in Nangarhar that it was virtually impossible for the Afghan government and security forces to exercise any degree of control over the area. From this secured position, IS-KP’s ranks continued to grow as Afghan and Pakistani Taliban militants defected to the group in order to escape the pressure of counterinsurgency operations, such as the Pakistani military’s operation Zarb-e-Azb. Furthermore, IS-KP also partnered with Lashkar-e-Islam (LeI) in order to increase its operational capacity and broaden the base of its support across the Afghanistan and Pakistan border.[33]

Once it had secured power in Nangarhar, IS-KP changed its policy of tolerance toward the Afghan government to one of open aggression. This shift followed the Afghan government’s decision in July 2015 to begin combatting the spread of IS-KP. The government’s new strategy coincided with the series of lethal U.S. airstrikes against three top IS-KP leaders in July 2015, for which the Afghan government claimed to have provided intelligence support. The Afghan government subsequently announced its official plan to unite with the United States in combatting IS-KP, and unveiled a new unit tasked with fighting the group. In addition to blaming the Afghan government for this increased targeting, IS-KP condemned the Afghan government for its persecution of Pakistani militants, its cooperation with the Pakistan Army and ISI, and its support of local, Taliban-backed uprisings against IS-KP. However, despite IS-KP’s declared hostility against the Afghan government, most of its resources were directed at combatting the Taliban. Throughout late 2015 and into 2016, the two groups battled for control over territory in Nangarhar, each time brutally executing and banishing the fighters and sympathizers of the losing group. Certain districts, such as Chaparhar, changed hands multiple times, as the Taliban and IS-KP took turns executing elaborate counterattacks.[34]

By early autumn of 2015, IS-KP had lost much of its popularity among the Nangarhari locals. Although the leniency of IS-KP’s early rule was initially promising, citizens became disenchanted with the group as it began to engage in violent guerilla tactics and enforce Shariah law with brutal punishments. Examples of IS-KP’s brutal governance included school and clinic closures, public executions, killings of tribal elders, kidnappings for ransom, destruction of Sufi shrines, and cigarette bans.[35]

One of IS-KP’s most unpopular policies was its ban on poppy cultivation, which was an extremely important source of income for many families in Nangarhar. Additionally, rumors also began to circulate that local families would be forced to provide IS-KP militants with brides, without dowry payments or consideration for tribe and family lineage. Ultimately, the threats IS-KP posed to the physical, economic, and social wellbeing of the citizens of Nangarhar incited public support for the return of the Taliban.[36]

Recognizing the waning public support of IS-KP as an opportunity to strike, the Taliban launched counter-offensives against the group during summer and autumn of 2015. On January 4, 2016, the Taliban initiated a large-scale operation against IS-KP. Operating with a strength of over 3,000 militants, the Taliban succeeded in expelling IS-KP from Chaparhar and Bati Kot in only three days. Furthermore, from December 2015 through February 2016, the combined effectiveness of Taliban attacks, local uprisings, U.S. drone strikes, and ANSF and pro-Afghan government militia operations halted IS-KP’s territorial expansion. Although IS-KP still controlled Achin, Deh, Bala, Kot, and Nazian, the group’s control over Afghanistan significantly diminished.[37]

By March 2016, a large number of IS-KP fighters and their families had begun to retreat into Pakistan’s Khyber and Orakzai agencies. At the same time, Afghan President Ashraf Ghani announced to the Afghan Parliament that IS-KP had been defeated in eastern Afghanistan. However, toward the end of March, locals in Achin and Nazyan reported that IS-KP fighters had begun to return to Nangarhar.[38]

In late June 2016, IS-KP used its strongholds in Achin, De Bala, and Pakistani sanctuaries to launch a large offensive against ANSF in central Nangarhar. Operating with a strength of approximately 600 fighters, IS-KP overran six ANSF posts in Kot. However, it suffered severe casualties (estimates ranging from 50 to 250 killed) during these attacks, overwhelmed by the combination of ground combat with the ANSF and U.S. airstrikes. In July 2016, the ANSF launched a series of offensive operations against IS-KP. These ANSF operations were met with varying levels of success. Some resulted in reclaimed territory from IS-KP, while others yielded no significant or lasting gains. In addition to deploying ANSF soldiers, the Afghan government partnered with local militias to halt further IS-KP advances.[39]

Throughout the remainder of 2016, IS-KP dug into its remaining districts in Achin, Kot, Nazyan and Deh Bala. The group’s hold over these districts remained firm until mid-March, when U.S. and Afghan special forces ramped up their joint offensives against IS-KP. In April 2017, the combined special forces launched a new campaign, Operation Hazma, which targeted IS-KP in both Nangarhar and Kunar provinces. Although IS-KP remained entrenched primarily in southern Nangarhar, it began to use Kunar as a source of recruitment and safe haven.[40]

As part of Operation Hazma, the U.S. military coupled ground offensives and night raids with heavy air strikes. This combination was particularly effective in weakening IS-KP in its Mamand stronghold. In their 2017 campaign, Afghan and U.S. forces were almost completely successful in clearing Kot of IS-KP forces. This was a major blow to IS-KP’s territorial control and logistics. Specifically, by capturing Kot, Afghan and U.S. forces succeeded in cutting off one of IS-KP’s main supply lines, through which it previously supplied its fighters with weapons and ammunition.[41]

While Afghan and U.S. forces were successful in Kot, they were less effective in capturing Mamand and Pekha. This was primarily due to the fact that IS-KP was able to avoid penetration by entrenching itself into the valleys’ caves and mountainous terrain.[42] In addition to losing territory to Afghan and U.S. forces, IS-KP suffered an increase in casualties of both low-level militants and high-level leaders. In spring of 2017, IS-KP reportedly lost 300 fighters, and endured two of the deadliest U.S/Afghan attacks to date. On April 13, 2017, the United States dropped the most powerful conventional bomb its arsenal, the “mother of all bombs,” on an IS-KP cave complex. The strike killed an alleged 94 IS-KP militants, including four commanders.[43] Then, on April 27, 2017, U.S. and Afghan special forces launched a particularly successful operation in the heart of IS-KP territory, killing over 30 with bombings and commando raids. Although the U.S. and Afghan forces were successful in removing several high-value IS-KP targets, such as emir Abdul Haseeb Logari, IS-KP used the raids as material for propaganda. Specifically, IS-KP exaggerated the collateral damage of the raids in an attempt to turn locals against the Afghan government.[44]

Although IS-KP experienced setbacks in the east in Achin and Kot, in 2017, it made significant advances into Chaprarhar. This was notable due to the fact that IS-KP and the Taliban have fought for control over this district since 2015. On April 2, 2017, IS-KP captured nearly half of Chaprarhar in a coordinated offensive against the Taliban. Meanwhile, IS-KP retains control over most of the Nazyan and Deh Bala districts.[45] According to U.S. military estimates, the first tier of IS-KP leadership and 75% of its fighters have been killed since 2015.[46] Despite these setbacks, the group has proven its ability to remain active. In 2016, IS-KP killed over 800 people in more than 100 attacks.[47] Since then, IS-KP has showcased its ability to strike the Afghan state while enduring continuous airstrikes by the U.S. government. For example, in October of 2017 the U.S. and its Afghan military partners dropped 653 bombs and missiles on targets within Afghanistan.[48] The group has continued launching major assaults in Kabul, Heart, and Jalalabad in 2018, particularly on high-profile targets including voter registration centers and Shiite religious and cultural centers .In December of 2017, General Nicholson, Commander of U.S. and NATO troops in the region, claimed that another 1,600 IS-KP fighters had been removed from the battlefield, particularly in eastern Afghanistan.[49] Despite the loss of territory and continuous military assaults by the U.S. government and its Afghan allies, IS-KP has increased the scale and number of suicide bombings in Kabul, specifically on Shiite neighborhoods. U.S. experts estimate that IS-KP will continue to recruit militants, disseminate propaganda, and launch attacks on urban centers when possible.[50]

[1] Popalzai, Masoud, and Saleem Mehsud. “ISIS militant bomber on motorbike kills 33 at bank in Afghanistan.” CNN, 19 Apr. 2015, http://edition.cnn.com/2015/04/18/asia/afghanistan-violence/index.html.

[2] “Kabul Bombings: Journalists Targeted in Blast Which Killed 26.” BBC News, BBC, 30 Apr. 2018, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-43946539

[3] Johnson, Casey Garret. “The Rise and Stall of the Islamic State in Afghanistan.” United States Institute of Peace: Special Report 395, 16 Nov, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR395-The-Rise-and-Stall-of-th….

[4] “Islamic State Khorasan Province. Australian National Security, n.d., https://www.nationalsecurity.gov.au/Listedterroristorganisations/Pages/….

[5] Osman, Borhan. "The Islamic State in 'Khorasan': How it began and where it stands now in Nangarhar." Afghanistan Analysts Network, 27 July, 2016, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-islamic-state-in-khorasan-how-it-began-and-where-it-stands-now-in-nangarhar/; Johnson, Casey Garret. “The Rise and Stall of the Islamic State in Afghanistan.” United States Institute of Peace: Special Report 395, 16 Nov, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR395-The-Rise-and-Stall-of-the-Islamic-State-in-Afghanistan.pdf.

[6] Osman, Borhan. “The Battle for Mamand: ISKP under strain, but not yet defeated.” Afghan Analysts Network, 23 May, 2017, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-battle-for-mamand-iskp-under-s….

[7] Osman, Borhan. “The Battle for Mamand: ISKP under strain, but not yet defeated.” Afghan Analysts Network, 23 May, 2017, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-battle-for-mamand-iskp-under-strain-but-not-yet-defeated/; Wright, Robin. “The Ignominious End of the ISIS Caliphate.” The New Yorker, 17, Oct. 2017. https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-ignominious-end-of-the-isis-caliphate.

[8] Osman, Borhan. “The Battle for Mamand: ISKP under strain, but not yet defeated.” Afghan Analysts Network, 23 May, 2017, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-battle-for-mamand-iskp-under-s….

[9] Shah, Tayyab Ali. “Pakistan’s Challenges in Orkazai Agency.” Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, 3 July, 2010, https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/pakistan%E2%80%99s-challenges-in-orakzai-agency; Osman, Borhan. “The Islamic State in ‘Khorasan’: How it began and where it stands now in Nangarhar.” Afghanistan Analysts Network, 27 July, 2016, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-islamic-state-in-khorasan-how-it-began-and-where-it-stands-now-in-nangarhar/.

[10] Osman, Borhan. "The Islamic State in 'Khorasan': How it began and where it stands now in Nangarhar." Afghanistan Analysts Network, 27 July, 2016, <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-islamic-state-in-khorasan-how-…;.

[11] McNally, Lauren, Alex Amiral, Marvin Weinbaum, and Antoun Issa. “The Islamic State in Afghanistan: Examining Its Threat to Stability.” Middle East Institute Policy Focus Series 2016-11, May 2016, http://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/publications/PF12_McNallyAmiral_ISISAfghan_web.pdf.

[12] Rassler, Don. “Situating the Emergence of the Islamic State of Khorasan.” Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, 18 Mar. 2015. https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/situating-the-emergence-of-the-islamic-state-of-khorasan;  Johnson, Casey Garret. “The Rise and Stall of the Islamic State in Afghanistan.” United States Institute of Peace: Special Report 395, 16 Nov, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR395-The-Rise-and-Stall-of-the-Islamic-State-in-Afghanistan.pdf.

[13] McNally, Lauren, Alex Amiral, Marvin Weinbaum, and Antoun Issa. “The Islamic State in Afghanistan: Examining Its Threat to Stability.” Middle East Institute Policy Focus Series 2016-11, May 2016, http://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/publications/PF12_McNallyAmiral_ISISAfghan_web.pdf.

[14] “Abdul Rahim Muslim Dost.” Counter Extremism Project, n.d., https://www.counterextremism.com/extremists/abdul-rahim-muslim-dost; Roggio, Bill. “Ex-Gitmo ‘poet’ and committed jihadist denounces Islamic State for attacks on civilians.” FDD’s Long War Journal, 20 July, 2016. https://www.longwarjournal.org/tags/abdul-rahim-muslim-dost.

[15] Johnson, Casey Garret. “The Rise and Stall of the Islamic State in Afghanistan.” United States Institute of Peace: Special Report 395, 16 Nov, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR395-The-Rise-and-Stall-of-the-Islamic-State-in-Afghanistan.pdf.

[16] McNally, Lauren, Alex Amiral, Marvin Weinbaum, and Antoun Issa. “The Islamic State in Afghanistan: Examining Its Threat to Stability.” Middle East Institute Policy Focus Series 2016-11, May 2016, http://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/publications/PF12_McNallyAmiral_….

[17] Rassler, Don. “Situating the Emergence of the Islamic State of Khorasan.” Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, 18 Mar. 2015. https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/situating-the-emergence-of-the-islamic-state-of-khorasan; Shah, Tayyab Ali. “Pakistan’s Challenges in Orkazai Agency.” Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, 3 July, 2010, https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/pakistan%E2%80%99s-challenges-in-orakzai-age…; “The Khyber Pass.” National Geographic, n.d., https://www.nationalgeographic.org/media/khyber-pass/.

[18] Rassler, Don. “Situating the Emergence of the Islamic State of Khorasan.” Combatting Terrorism Center at West Point, 18 Mar. 2015. https://ctc.usma.edu/posts/situating-the-emergence-of-the-islamic-state-of-khorasan.

[19] McNally, Lauren, Alex Amiral, Marvin Weinbaum, and Antoun Issa. “The Islamic State in Afghanistan: Examining Its Threat to Stability.” Middle East Institute Policy Focus Series 2016-11, May 2016, http://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/publications/PF12_McNallyAmiral_ISISAfghan_web.pdf.

[20] McNally, Lauren, Alex Amiral, Marvin Weinbaum, and Antoun Issa. “The Islamic State in Afghanistan: Examining Its Threat to Stability.” Middle East Institute Policy Focus Series 2016-11, May 2016, http://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/publications/PF12_McNallyAmiral_…

[21] Pillalamarri, Akhilesh. “Revealed: Why ISIS Hates the Taliban.” The Diplomat, 29 Jan. 2016, https://thediplomat.com/2016/01/revealed-why-isis-hates-the-taliban/.

[22] Dawood, Azami. “Why Taliban special forces are fighting Islamic State.” BBC News, 18 Dec. 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35123748.

[23] Johnson, Casey Garret. “The Rise and Stall of the Islamic State in Afghanistan.” United States Institute of Peace: Special Report 395, 16 Nov, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR395-The-Rise-and-Stall-of-the-Islamic-State-in-Afghanistan.pdf.

[24] Johnson, Casey Garret. “The Rise and Stall of the Islamic State in Afghanistan.” United States Institute of Peace: Special Report 395, 16 Nov, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR395-The-Rise-and-Stall-of-the-Islamic-State-in-Afghanistan.pdf

[25] Osman, Borhan. "The Islamic State in 'Khorasan': How it began and where it stands now in Nangarhar." Afghanistan Analysts Network, 27 July, 2016, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-islamic-state-in-khorasan-how-it-began-and-where-it-stands-now-in-nangarhar/; Johnson, Casey Garret. “The Rise and Stall of the Islamic State in Afghanistan.” United States Institute of Peace: Special Report 395, 16 Nov, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR395-The-Rise-and-Stall-of-the-Islamic-State-in-Afghanistan.pdf; Johnson, Casey Garret. “The Rise and Stall of the Islamic State in Afghanistan.” United States Institute of Peace: Special Report 395, 16 Nov, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR395-The-Rise-and-Stall-of-the-Islamic-State-in-Afghanistan.pdf.

[26] Johnson, Casey Garret. “The Rise and Stall of the Islamic State in Afghanistan.” United States Institute of Peace: Special Report 395, 16 Nov, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR395-The-Rise-and-Stall-of-the-Islamic-State-in-Afghanistan.pdf.

[27] Johnson, Casey Garret. “The Rise and Stall of the Islamic State in Afghanistan.” United States Institute of Peace: Special Report 395, 16 Nov, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR395-The-Rise-and-Stall-of-the-Islamic-State-in-Afghanistan.pdf.

[28] Osman, Borhan. "The Islamic State in 'Khorasan': How it began and where it stands now in Nangarhar." Afghanistan Analysts Network, 27 July, 2016, <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-islamic-state-in-khorasan-how-…;.

[29] Johnson, Casey Garret. “The Rise and Stall of the Islamic State in Afghanistan.” United States Institute of Peace: Special Report 395, 16 Nov, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR395-The-Rise-and-Stall-of-the-Islamic-State-in-Afghanistan.pdf.

[30] Johnson, Casey Garret. “The Rise and Stall of the Islamic State in Afghanistan.” United States Institute of Peace: Special Report 395, 16 Nov, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR395-The-Rise-and-Stall-of-the-Islamic-State-in-Afghanistan.pdf.

[31] Osman, Borhan. "The Islamic State in 'Khorasan': How it began and where it stands now in Nangarhar." Afghanistan Analysts Network, 27 July, 2016, <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-islamic-state-in-khorasan-how-…;.

[32] Johnson, Casey Garret. “The Rise and Stall of the Islamic State in Afghanistan.” United States Institute of Peace: Special Report 395, 16 Nov, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR395-The-Rise-and-Stall-of-the-Islamic-State-in-Afghanistan.pdf.

[33] Johnson, Casey Garret. “The Rise and Stall of the Islamic State in Afghanistan.” United States Institute of Peace: Special Report 395, 16 Nov, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR395-The-Rise-and-Stall-of-the-Islamic-State-in-Afghanistan.pdf.

[34] Osman, Borhan. "The Islamic State in 'Khorasan': How it began and where it stands now in Nangarhar." Afghanistan Analysts Network, 27 July, 2016, <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-islamic-state-in-khorasan-how-…;.

[35] McNally, Lauren, Alex Amiral, Marvin Weinbaum, and Antoun Issa. “The Islamic State in Afghanistan: Examining Its Threat to Stability.” Middle East Institute Policy Focus Series 2016-11, May 2016, http://www.mei.edu/sites/default/files/publications/PF12_McNallyAmiral_ISISAfghan_web.pdf; Johnson, Casey Garret. “The Rise and Stall of the Islamic State in Afghanistan.” United States Institute of Peace: Special Report 395, 16 Nov, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR395-The-Rise-and-Stall-of-the-Islamic-State-in-Afghanistan.pdf

[36] Johnson, Casey Garret. “The Rise and Stall of the Islamic State in Afghanistan.” United States Institute of Peace: Special Report 395, 16 Nov, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR395-The-Rise-and-Stall-of-the-Islamic-State-in-Afghanistan.pdf

[37] Osman, Borhan. "The Islamic State in 'Khorasan': How it began and where it stands now in Nangarhar." Afghanistan Analysts Network, 27 July, 2016, <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-islamic-state-in-khorasan-how-…;.

[38] Johnson, Casey Garret. “The Rise and Stall of the Islamic State in Afghanistan.” United States Institute of Peace: Special Report 395, 16 Nov, https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/SR395-The-Rise-and-Stall-of-the-Islamic-State-in-Afghanistan.pdf.

[39] Osman, Borhan. "The Islamic State in 'Khorasan': How it began and where it stands now in Nangarhar." Afghanistan Analysts Network, 27 July, 2016, <https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-islamic-state-in-khorasan-how-…;.

[40] Osman, Borhan. “The Battle for Mamand: ISKP under strain, but not yet defeated.” Afghan Analysts Network, 23 May, 2017, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-battle-for-mamand-iskp-under-strain-but-not-yet-defeated/

[41] Osman, Borhan. “The Battle for Mamand: ISKP under strain, but not yet defeated.” Afghan Analysts Network, 23 May, 2017, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-battle-for-mamand-iskp-under-s….

[42] Osman, Borhan. “The Battle for Mamand: ISKP under strain, but not yet defeated.” Afghan Analysts Network, 23 May, 2017, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-battle-for-mamand-iskp-under-strain-but-not-yet-defeated/.

[43] Cooper, Helene, and Mujib Mashal. “U.S. Drops ‘Mother of All Bombs’ on ISIS Caves in Afghanistan.” The New York Times, 13 Apr. 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/13/world/asia/moab-mother-of-all-bombs-afghanistan.html; Popalzai, Ehsan. “’Mother of all bombs’ killed 94 ISIS fighters, Afghan official says.” CNN, 15 Apr. 2017, http://www.cnn.com/2017/04/15/asia/afghanistan-isis-moab-strike/index.html.

[44] Osman, Borhan. “The Battle for Mamand: ISKP under strain, but not yet defeated.” Afghan Analysts Network, 23 May, 2017, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-battle-for-mamand-iskp-under-s….

[45] Osman, Borhan. “The Battle for Mamand: ISKP under strain, but not yet defeated.” Afghan Analysts Network, 23 May, 2017, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-battle-for-mamand-iskp-under-s….

[46] Osman, Borhan. “The Battle for Mamand: ISKP under strain, but not yet defeated.” Afghan Analysts Network, 23 May, 2017, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-battle-for-mamand-iskp-under-s….

[47] Wright, Robin. “The Ignominious End of the ISIS Caliphate.” The New Yorker, 17, Oct. 2017. https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-ignominious-end-of-the-isis-caliphate.

[48] Calamur, Krishnadev. “ISIS in Afghanistan Is Like a Balloon That Won't Pop.” The Atlantic, Atlantic Media Company, 28 Dec. 2017, www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/12/afghanistan-isis/549311/.

[49] Nordland, Rod, and Zabihullah Ghazi. “ISIS Leader in Afghanistan Is Killed in U.S. Airstrike.” The New York Times, The New York Times, 9 Apr. 2018, www.nytimes.com/2018/04/09/world/asia/afghanistan-isis-leader.html.

[50] Osman, Borhan. “The Battle for Mamand: ISKP under strain, but not yet defeated.” Afghan Analysts Network, 23 May, 2017, https://www.afghanistan-analysts.org/the-battle-for-mamand-iskp-under-strain-but-not-yet-defeated/.

Disclaimer: These are some selected major attacks in the militant organization's history. It is not a comprehensive listing but captures some of the most famous attacks or turning points during the campaign.

April 18, 2015: IS-KP conducted a suicide bombing outside a bank in Jalalabad, Afghanistan (33 killed, 100+ wounded).[1]

May 13, 2015: 6 gunmen allegedly associated with IS-KP attacked a bus in Karachi, Pakistan. Although IS claimed the attack, Jundullah (a group allegiant to IS) and the TTP also claimed responsibility. If IS-KP’s claim is accurate, this attack would be its first in Pakistan (45 killed, 13 wounded).[2]

July 23, 2016: IS-KP conducted a dual suicide bombing in Kabul, Afghanistan, on a group of demonstrators from Afghanistan’s Shiite Hazara minority. The bombing was one of the deadliest attacks in Afghanistan since the invasion of the United States in 2001 (80+ killed, 230+ wounded).[3]

August 8, 2016: IS-KP conducted a suicide bombing at a civil hospital in Quetta, Pakistan. The attack took place after a number of lawyers and journalists had gathered at the hospital to mourn the death of the president of the Balochistan Bar Association in a separate shooting incident earlier that day. Although the attack is attributed to IS-KP, Jamaat-ul-Ahrar (JA) also claimed responsibility (93 killed, 120 wounded).[4]

October 24, 2016: Three IS-KP militants attacked 700 unarmed, sleeping cadets at a police training center in Quetta, Pakistan. At least 260 cadets were rescued by Special Services Group commandos in a counter-offensive against the attackers. Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) also claimed responsibility for the attack (61 killed, 165 injured).[5]

November 12, 2016: IS-KP conducted a suicide bombing on civilians gathered for a religious ceremony at a Sufi shrine in Balochistan, Pakistan (52+ killed, 100+ wounded).[6]

February 16, 2017: IS-KP conducted a suicide bombing at a Sufi shrine in Sehwan, Pakistan, where hundreds of devotees had gathered to perform a religious ritual. The attack appeared to be concentrated on the portion of the shrine reserved for women (100 killed, 250 wounded).[7]

March 8, 2017: IS-KP militants dressed as doctors stormed the largest military hospital in Kabul, Afghanistan. The militants, armed with guns and grenades, opened fire on staff and patients after detonating explosives at the hospital gate. After several hours of fighting, Afghan commandos killed all four IS-KP attackers (49 killed, 90 wounded).[8]

August 1, 2017: Two IS-KP suicide bombers attacked a Shiite Mosque in Herat, Afghanistan. The militants shot at worshipers inside the mosque (29 killed, 64 injured).[9]

December 28, 2017: An identified IS-KP militant attacked a Shiite cultural center in Kabul, Afghanistan. Many casualties included students attending a conference in the vicinity. Two other car bombs were detonated in the same zone (41 killed, 84 wounded).[10]

March 21, 2018: A suicide bombing later claimed by IS-KP detonated near a Shiite shrine in Kabul, Afghanistan during Persian New Year celebrations (33 killed, 65 wounded).[11]

April 22, 2018: An IS-KP militant attacked a voter registration center in Kabul, Afghanistan using a suicide bomb. The casualties were all identified as civilian, most of whom had been waiting to apply for state-issued IDs in order to register to vote in the upcoming elections (57 killed, 119 injured).[12]

[1] Popalzai, Masoud, and Saleem Mehsud. “ISIS militant bomber on motorbike kills 33 at bank in Afghanistan.” CNN, 19 Apr. 2015, http://edition.cnn.com/2015/04/18/asia/afghanistan-violence/index.html.

[2] “Pakistan gunmen kill 45 on Karachi Ismaili Shia bus.” BBC News, 13 May, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-32717321.

[3] Harooni, Mirwais. “Islamic State claims responsibility for Kabul attack, 80 dead.” Reuters, 23 July, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-protests/islamic-state-claims-responsibility-for-kabul-attack-80-dead-idUSKCN1030GB?il=0.

[4] Dua, Ruchi. “93 killed, over 120 injured in bomb attack at hospital in Pakistan’s Quetta. India Today, 8 Aug, 2016. http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/quetta-bomb-explosion-civil-hospital-balochistan/1/734741.html; Shas, Syed Ali. “70 dead as blast hits Quetta Civil Hospital after lawyer’s killing. Dawn, 8 Aug. 2016, https://www.dawn.com/news/1276183/70-dead-as-blast-hits-quetta-civil-ho….

[5] Zafar, Mohammad. “61 killed, at least 165 injured as militants storm police training centre in Quetta. The Express Tribune, 24, Oct. 2016, https://tribune.com.pk/story/1208735/militants-attack-police-training-centre-quetta/; Shah, Syed Ali. “61 killed in twin suicide attacks as terrorists storm police training college in Quettta.” Dawn, 24 Oct. 2016, https://www.dawn.com/news/1291999/60-killed-in-twin-suicide-attacks-as-terrorists-storm-police-training-college-in-quetta.

[6] Shas, Syed Ali, Sophia Saifi, and Susanna Capelouto, “52 killed at religious shrine in Pakistan by ISIS suicide bomber.” CNN, 12 Nov. 2016, http://edition.cnn.com/2016/11/12/world/sufi-attack-pakistan-isis/.

[7] Latief, Samiya. “Pakistan: 100 killed in bombing at Shahbaz Qalandar shrine; US, UN condemn attack.” India Today, 16 Feb. 2017, < http://indiatoday.intoday.in/story/12-dead-50-injured-in-suicide-attack…;.

[8] “Afghanistan: IS gunmen dressed as medics kill 30 at Kabul military hospital. BBC News, 8 Mar. 2017, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-39202525; “Death toll from Kabul hospital attack rises to 49.” Reuters, 9 Mar. 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-blast/death-toll-from-kabul-hospital-attack-rises-to-49-idUSKBN16G0RO.

[9] Dwyer, Colin. “Suicide Attack On Shiite Mosque Leaves At Least 29 Dead In Afghanistan.” NPR, NPR, 1 Aug. 2017, www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/08/01/540962593/suicide-attack-on-shiite-mosque-leaves-at-least-29-dead-in-afghanistan; “Herat Mosque Blast Kills Dozens in Afghanistan.” BBC News, BBC, 1 Aug. 2017, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-40797016.

[10] Ibrahimi, Abdul Aziz. “Suicide Bombers Kill Dozens at Shi'ite Center in Afghan Capital.” Reuters, Thomson Reuters, 28 Dec. 2017, www.reuters.com/article/us-afghanistan-blast/blast-at-afghan-news-agency-office-in-kabul-casualties-feared-idUSKBN1EM0F5.

[11] Press, Associated. “ISIS Suicide Bomber Kills 33 in Kabul as Afghans Celebrate New Year.” Fox News, FOX News Network, 21 Mar. 2018, www.foxnews.com/world/2018/03/21/suicide-bomber-kills-26-as-afghans-celebrate-new-year.html.

[12] “Afghanistan: Kabul Voter Centre Suicide Attack Kills 57.” BBC News, BBC, 22 Apr. 2018, www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-43855884.