Biosecurity

Scholarly Publications

On Defining Global Catastrophic Biological Risks

July 2017

The Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security has formulated an encompassing working definition of global catastrophic biological risks (GCBRs) that reflects diverse sources of risk and mechanisms...

A More Systematic Approach to Biological Risk

December 2015

Management of emerging risks in life science and technology requires new leadership and a sober assessment of the legacy of Asilomar.

How likely is it that biological agents will be used deliberately to cause widespread harm?

December 2015

The fact that biological weapons have never been used—at least in recent history—is not sufficient reason to dismiss concerns that terrorists or nations could acquire and use dangerous pathogens as...

Other Publications

Editing Biosecurity: Needs and Strategies for Governing Genome Editing

December 2018

This study’s purpose was to highlight the changing safety and security landscape engendered by the emergence of new genome editing technologies, help policy-makers and other stakeholders navigate...

Five- and Ten-Year Homeland Security Goals

January 2007

Testimony before the Homeland Security Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee on "Five- and Ten-Year Homeland Security Goals." In the afternoon session on 30 January 2007, the...

Microbe Warfare Hides the Enemy

August 2001

STANFORD, Calif.- For the past seven years, the United States has been negotiating a verification protocol to the Biological Weapons Convention of 1972, hoping to put teeth into the convention's...

News

Daniel Greene accepted into 2022 Emerging Leaders in Biosecurity Fellowship Program

July 2022

Dr. Daniel Greene has been accepted as a 2022 Emerging Leaders in Biosecurity fellow from the Center for Health Security at John Hopkins University.

Can Synthetic Biology Save Us? This Scientist Thinks So.

November 2021

Drew Endy is squarely focused on the potential of redesigning organisms for useful purposes. He also acknowledges significant challenges.

A View from the CT Foxhole: Drew Endy, Associate Chair, Bioengineering, Stanford University

October 2020

Drew Endy argues the United States urgently needs a bio strategy to take advantage of rapid advances in biotechnology, protect against the growing danger posed by its potential malevolent use, and...

Old Events

Good Science and Silenced Security: On Anticipatory Governance in Biobanking

January 15, 2020

Seminar Recording: https://youtu.be/P1-Q0OSo4yM About this Event: The governance of big data and the prevention of their misuse is among the most topical issues in current debates among security...

At life’s frontiers: the case for epistemic subsidiarity

March 17, 2018

Abstract: International cooperation has long been founded on the idea that securing a common factual understanding of things in the world is a prerequisite for deciding how to act in concert....

Evolving perspectives on risk in biology and the life sciences

September 27, 2017

Abstract: Against a backdrop of emerging and reemerging infectious diseases of natural origin, fueled by changes in land use and global climate, there is an ongoing revolution in the life sciences...

Multimedia

Ebola Panel

September 2014

Video of Ebola-Stanford Panel  The Ebola epidemic, which could affect hundreds of thousands of West Africans, can only be contained by rebuilding public trust and local health systems decimated by years of neglect, according to a panel convened by...

People

1 RSD13 085 0052a 001 David Relman Senior Fellow Professor, Medicine, Professor, Microbiology and Immunology