At the end of July, Dan Coats, the U.S. director of national intelligence (DNI), announced his resignation. When he leaves office on August 15, the U.S. intelligence community will be left with two crises to confront. One is obvious and immediate: how to protect the objectivity and professionalism of the intelligence agencies against the rising tide of politicization by the White House.
For U.S. intelligence agencies, the twenty-first century began with a shock, when 19 al Qaeda operatives hijacked four planes and perpetrated the deadliest attack ever on U.S. soil. In the wake of the attack, the intelligence community mobilized with one overriding goal: preventing another 9/11. The CIA, the National Security Agency, and the 15 other components of the U.S. intelligence community restructured, reformed, and retooled. Congress appropriated billions of dollars to support the transformation.
Offensive cyber operations have become increasingly important elements of U.S. national security policy. From the deployment of Stuxnet to disrupt Iranian centrifuges to the possible use of cyber methods against North Korean ballistic missile launches, the prominence of offensive cyber capabilities as instruments of national power continues to grow. Yet conceptual thinking lags behind the technical development of these new weapons. How might offensive cyber operations be used in coercion or conflict? What strategic considerations should guide their development and use?
Abstract: The Founding Fathers relied on deceit in championing American independence—and that has lessons for the present.
NATO leaders have a lot to worry about. The U.K. government is a Brexit hot mess. Germany’s Angela Merkel, who has been holding a unified Europe together on her shoulders like Atlas, may not be able to last much longer. Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been channeling his inner authoritarian, and he’s not the only one. And then there’s President Donald Trump.
From New York Times bestselling author and former U.S. secretary of state Condoleezza Rice and Stanford University professor Amy B. Zegart comes an examination of the rapidly evolving state of political risk, and how to navigate it.
The world is changing fast.
Drones are considered poor coercion tools: They cannot operate in contested airspace and they offer low-cost fights instead of more credible, costly signals. However, this article finds that technological advances will soon enable drones to function in hostile environments. Moreover, drones offer three unique coercion advantages that theorists did not foresee: sustainability in long duration conflicts, certainty of precision punishment which can change the psychology of adversaries, and changes in the relative costs of war.
Nations around the world recognize cybersecurity as a critical issue for public policy. They are concerned that their adversaries could conduct cyberattacks against their interests—damaging their military forces, their economies, and their political processes. Thus, their cybersecurity efforts have been devoted largely to protecting important information technology systems and networks against such attacks.
For 25 years now, a weak-state fixation has transfixed U.S. foreign policy, Amy Zegart writes in this Foreign Policy piece. But Washington's paranoia over weak and failing states is distracting it from the real national security threats looming on the horizon.
CISAC Faculty Member Amy Zegart discusses the confirmation hearings of CIA Director nominee John Brennan. Brennan has been subjected to increased scrutiny due to a leaked Obama administration paper concerning drone strikes. Zegart called Brennan's performance a "masterpiece of political maneuvering."
CISAC Faculty Member Amy Zegart discusses how changing American attitudes towards torture have impacted presidential appointments to key intelligence positions, such as the Obama administration's appointment of John Brennan to lead the CIA. Four years ago, he withdrew from consideration for the position because of his role as a senior CIA official during the Bush administration and his association with enhanced interrogation techniques. His nomination as CIA Director is much less contentious this time around.
Foreign Policy blogger and CISAC Faculty Member Amy Zegart explains the good, the bad, and the ugly of aviation security. She notes that the increased use of bomb-sniffing dogs and LAX's ARMOR program, which uses an algorithm to conduct random times and locations for searches, are two examples of positive developments in the TSA's airline security measures.
Foreign Policy blogger and CISAC Faculty Member Amy Zegart explains how major private companies are increasingly developing their own intelligence that conduct surveillance and analyze information that places the reputation, personnel or business interests of their company. These units look and act like government intelligence agencies, and are staffed with former CIA, FBI, and military professionals that maintain their government ties. Companies operating globally cannot afford to ignore political events, natural disasters, and other risks.
CISAC Faculty Member Amy Zegart explains the politics behind leading the CIA: winning trust and support within the organization and with outsiders. David Petraeus excelled at maintaining outside support for the CIA, but could not win over the intelligence community.
Thee next CIA director will need to address major problems such as the military's increasing influence over the "spying business" and the agency's role in the tactical operations, all while the DoD increases its own intelligence activity.
In this blog post for Foreign Policy, Zegart discusses how the military's organizational and operational culture clashes with that of intelligence agencies. When military leaders are tasked with running an intelligence agency, three distinct concerns arise. The first is that a military leader will focus on short-term tactical operations over long-term strategic assessments. Military leaders are also accustomed to a hierarchical structure where orders from leaders are rarely questioned-- this clashes directly with the CIA's analytical culture.
CISAC Faculty Member Amy Zegart outlines how the CIA's mindset has not changed since the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962. Fifty years since the crisis, the CIA and other intelligence agencies still operate in an organizational and psychological mindset that favors consensus and consistency. Zegart argues that these "invisible pressures" led to intelligence failures in Cuba in 1962 and Iraq in 2002, where dissenting opinions or internal disagreements were downplayed.
According to Amy Zegart, CISAC faculty member, Americans have become more hawkish on counterterrorism policy since Barack Obama took office. In a blog post for Foreign Policy, Zegart conducted an online poll and found that 25 percent of Americans would stop a terrorist attack by using a nuclear weapon. Support for harsh interrogation techniques and assassination have also increased since similar polls were conducted in 2005 and 2007.
Article excerpt:
Last week, the shooting rampage by an American soldier in Afghanistan prompted renewed debate about why U.S. forces are there and how fast they should come home. As the withdrawal date nears, troops are racing to stabilize security and shore up the Afghan government to withstand a Taliban resurgence and prevent the re-emergence of terrorist safe havens. Nobody mentions “winning” the war. Instead, our goal is resilience: We are training Afghans to soldier on without us.
An excerpt from "Implementing Change: Organizational Challenges" (pp. 309-310):