Narrative
Narrative of the Organization's History
Narrative of the Organization's History
Leadership, Name Changes, Size Estimates, Resources, Geographic Locations
Ideology, Aims, Political Activities, Targets, and Tactics
First Attacks, Largest Attacks, Notable Attacks
Foreign Designations and Listings, Community Relations, Relations with Other Groups, State Sponsors and External Influences
Mapping relationships with other militant groups over time in regional maps
TELO, like other Tamil militant groups operating during the 1980s, was fighting for an independent homeland for Sri Lanka’s Tamil Hindus. However, in 1985, TELO scaled back its demands from secession to autonomy because of pressure from RAW and the Indian government.[15] Unlike EROS and PLOTE, TELO did not have a Marxist orientation. According to TELO leader Sri Sabaratnam, the group did not adopt a theoretical approach to Tamil independence: “Our people want Eelam immediately. They are not concerned with Marxism or any other ‘ism.’ It (ideology) is only the next step after Eelam is achieved.”[16]
After the murder of Sri Sabaratnam in 1986 by the LTTE, TELO began to fall apart. Its new leader, Selvam Adaikalanathan, could not hold the group together and in 1987 decided that TELO should be reconstituted as a political party. Today, TELO is a minor, functioning political party.[17]
TELO primarily targeted symbols of government, such as public transportation. TELO also targeted moderate Tamil politicians and other individuals it deemed were in collusion with the Sri Lankan government.[18]
In terms of strategy, the group was much more focused on developing a highly militarized organization like LTTE, whereas other groups like PLOTE and EROS were more concerned with obtaining popular support. TELO also targeted Tamil youth as recruits and attempted to radicalize them through indirect affiliations with the Tamil Youth Front (TYF) and the Tamil Students Federation (TSF).[19]
Disclaimer: These are some selected major attacks in the militant organization's history. It is not a comprehensive listing but captures some of the most famous attacks or turning points during the campaign.
1981: TELO carries out a bank heist in Jaffna that leaves the group with 7.8 million rupees. (Unknown casualties)[20]
November 1984: TELO attacked a police station in Chavakachcheri. (27 killed)[21]
December 3, 1984: TELO attacks a train in Sri Lanka, taking hostages for ransom. (0 killed)[22]
December 3, 1984: TELO attacks a train in Sri Lanka, taking hostages for ransom. (0 killed)[23]
1985: Attack on the Kokkavil Army Base. (Unknown casualties)[24]
January 1985: TELO attacked a train from Annuradhapura to Jaffna. (43 killed, 25 wounded)[25]
May 14, 1985: TELO launches an armed assault against a game sanctuary in Wilpattu. (23 killed)[26]
May 14, 1985: TELO attacks a police station in Nochchiyagama. (1 killed)[27]
July 30, 1986: TELO attacks government forces in the town of Kandikulam. (4 killed, 3 wounded)[28]
TELO did not have much popular support in the Tamil community, due to their use of violent tactics.[29]
Like many other groups, TELO had a somewhat tenuous alliance with the LTTE until the LTTE began systemically eliminating its rivals in mid-1986. From 1978 to 1981, the LTTE and TELO formed a brief coordinating alliance. Distrust between the two groups, however, arose after TELO’s bank heist in 1981. Prabhakaran, the leader of the LTTE, was involved in the heist along with TELO leaders Thangathura and Kuttimani.[30] However, when Sri Lankan forces later captured the two TELO leaders, TELO cadres suspected that Prabhakaran had betrayed them to the police. On April 29, 1986, the LTTE launched an all-out offensive against the LTTE. On May 5, LTTE forces killed TELO’s leader Sri Sabaratnam.[31] By the end of the month, TELO had essentially been eliminated by the LTTE. LTTE justified its attack on TELO by arguing that the group consisted of a collection of criminals and robbers, and that the group was acting as an agent of Indian imperialism.[32]
In 1982, the Tamil Eelam Liberation Army (TELA), the military wing of TELO, split off from the group under the leadership of “Oberoi” Devan. Shortly after the split, TELA aligned itself with PLOTE, another Tamil militant group that had fought both the LTTE and TELO in the past. The group, however, was short-lived; after the death of Devan in 1983 by two suspected LTTE militants, the group went into decline. By 1985, TELA had succumbed to in-fighting, split into two, and was finally disbanded.[33]
In 1985, EPRLF, TELO, LTTE, and TULF joined forces to form the Eelam National Liberation Front (ENLF) to participate in the Thimphu Talks brokered by India. The group, however, was short-lived; in 1986, relations between the groups deteriorated as the EPRLF, TELO, and EROS loosened their demands on the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE undertook a campaign to eliminate these more ‘moderate’ groups.[34] PLOTE was not included.
When Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) landed in Sri Lanka, they attempted to revive the TELO as a fighting force against the LTTE. These efforts were, however, short-lived; the group constantly came under LTTE attack and was never able to re-emerge as a militant organization.
After the anti-Tamil riots in 1983, TELO was one of the first groups to develop a close relationship with RAW, the external unit of India’s Intelligence Services. In 1983, India first chose to train 350 TELO cadres in India because they thought that TELO was the most pro-Indian group.[35] RAW also favored the group because they did not have a Marxist orientation, unlike other Tamil militant groups that it would later support like EROS and PLOTE.[36] TELO benefited greatly from this relationship; from 1983-1986, TELO experienced rapid growth in membership, as well as capabilities. RAW trained and armed TELO cadres, as well as helping them set up their own training camps in Sri Lanka.[37] However, TELO’s over-dependence on RAW eventually contributed to the group’s demise and elimination by the LTTE.
[1] Furtado, Christina S. “Inter-Rebel Group Dynamics: Cooperation or Competition, the Case of South Asia.” University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007.
[2] “TELO Incidents.” Global Terrorism Database. Web. Accessed 2 August 2013. <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2443>
[3] Furtado, Christina S. “Inter-Rebel Group Dynamics: Cooperation or Competition, the Case of South Asia.” University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007.
[4] Furtado, Christina S. “Inter-Rebel Group Dynamics: Cooperation or Competition, the Case of South Asia.” University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007.
[5] Furtado, Christina S. “Inter-Rebel Group Dynamics: Cooperation or Competition, the Case of South Asia.” University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007.
[6] Furtado, Christina S. “Inter-Rebel Group Dynamics: Cooperation or Competition, the Case of South Asia.” University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007
[7] Furtado, Christina S. “Inter-Rebel Group Dynamics: Cooperation or Competition, the Case of South Asia.” University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007.
[8] Furtado, Christina S. “Inter-Rebel Group Dynamics: Cooperation or Competition, the Case of South Asia.” University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007.
[9] Furtado, Christina S. “Inter-Rebel Group Dynamics: Cooperation or Competition, the Case of South Asia.” University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007.
[10] Furtado, Christina S. “Inter-Rebel Group Dynamics: Cooperation or Competition, the Case of South Asia.” University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007.
[11] Furtado, Christina S. “Inter-Rebel Group Dynamics: Cooperation or Competition, the Case of South Asia.” University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007.
[12] Furtado, Christina S. “Inter-Rebel Group Dynamics: Cooperation or Competition, the Case of South Asia.” University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007.
[13] Furtado, Christina S. “Inter-Rebel Group Dynamics: Cooperation or Competition, the Case of South Asia.” University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007.
[14] Samaranayaka, Gamini. Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1971-1987. New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 2008.
[15] Furtado, Christina S. “Inter-Rebel Group Dynamics: Cooperation or Competition, the Case of South Asia.” University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007.
[16] Samaranayaka, Gamini. Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1971-1987. New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 2008.
[17] Krishna, Sankaran. Postcolonial Insecurities: India, Sri Lanka, and the question of nationhood. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999.
[18] Furtado, Christina S. “Inter-Rebel Group Dynamics: Cooperation or Competition, the Case of South Asia.” University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007.
[19] Furtado, Christina S. “Inter-Rebel Group Dynamics: Cooperation or Competition, the Case of South Asia.” University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007.
[20] Furtado, Christina S. “Inter-Rebel Group Dynamics: Cooperation or Competition, the Case of South Asia.” University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007.
[21] Furtado, Christina S. “Inter-Rebel Group Dynamics: Cooperation or Competition, the Case of South Asia.” University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007.
[22] “TELO Incidents.” Global Terrorism Database. Web. Accessed 2 August 2013. <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2443>
[23] “TELO Incidents.” Global Terrorism Database. Web. Accessed 2 August 2013. <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2443>
[24] Samaranayaka, Gamini. Political Violence in Sri Lanka, 1971-1987. New Delhi: Gyan Publishing House, 2008.
[25] Furtado, Christina S. “Inter-Rebel Group Dynamics: Cooperation or Competition, the Case of South Asia.” University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007.
[26] “TELO Incidents.” Global Terrorism Database. Web. Accessed 2 August 2013. <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2443>
[27] “TELO Incidents.” Global Terrorism Database. Web. Accessed 2 August 2013. <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2443>
[28] “TELO Incidents.” Global Terrorism Database. Web. Accessed 2 August 2013. <http://www.start.umd.edu/gtd/search/Results.aspx?perpetrator=2443>
[29] Furtado, Christina S. “Inter-Rebel Group Dynamics: Cooperation or Competition, the Case of South Asia.” University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007.
[30] Furtado, Christina S. “Inter-Rebel Group Dynamics: Cooperation or Competition, the Case of South Asia.” University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007.
[31] Furtado, Christina S. “Inter-Rebel Group Dynamics: Cooperation or Competition, the Case of South Asia.” University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007.
[32] Krishna, Sankaran. Postcolonial Insecurities: India, Sri Lanka, and the question of nationhood. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999.
[33] Marks, Thomas A. “Maoist Insurgency Since Vietnam.” New York: Frank Cass, 1996.
[34] Furtado, Christina S. “Inter-Rebel Group Dynamics: Cooperation or Competition, the Case of South Asia.” University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007.
[35] Furtado, Christina S. “Inter-Rebel Group Dynamics: Cooperation or Competition, the Case of South Asia.” University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007.
[36] Krishna, Sankaran. Postcolonial Insecurities: India, Sri Lanka, and the question of nationhood. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999.
[37] Furtado, Christina S. “Inter-Rebel Group Dynamics: Cooperation or Competition, the Case of South Asia.” University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 2007.