The Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR) was a radical Sunni militant group founded in 1996, during the inter-war period of the Chechen Wars. The group sought to use its Islamic connections and militant tactics to liberate Chechnya from Russian authority.[i] At its peak, the SPIR had over 1,000 fighters who were also members of other Chechen resistance groups, such as the International Islamic Peacekeeping Brigade (IIPB) and Riyadus-Salikhin. During the Second Chechen War, SPIR collaborated with these groups to fight against the Russian Federation. In addition, it trained recruits and conducted joint operations with financial assistance from Al Qaeda (AQ).[ii]

The SPIR's original goal of Chechen independence shifted as a result of increasing jihadist influence and AQ’s financial backing. It aimed not only for independence, but for the creation of an Islamic caliphate encompassing all of the North Caucasus, Abkhazia in Georgia, and parts of Azerbaijan.[iii] The group employed kidnappings, bombings, suicide- and vehicle-based attacks, in addition to extortion and contract killings to achieve its goals.[iv] These tactics contributed significantly to the lawlessness in Chechnya in the interwar period, which saw the rise of Salafi Islam and the increasingly religious character of the previously secular, nationalistic movement for Chechen independence.

Despite sharing the goal of achieving an independent Chechnya, the Special Purpose Islamic Regiment developed a conflictual relationship with the secessionist government of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (CRI). Members of the moderate Chechen group rejected the Islamic fundamentalism of the SPIR. In 1998, SPIR leader Arbi Barayev refused to comply with CRI President Maskhadov’s order that the SPIR disband. SPIR militants and Maskhadov’s forces clashed repeatedly, and Barayev allegedly organized a mass uprising against the CRI government in 1998.[v]

The SPIR conducted its largest attack in October 2002. The SPIR, in conjunction with the IIPB and the Riyadus-Salikhin, took over 800 people hostage in the Dubrovka Theater and threatened to kill them if the Russian Federation did not grant Chechen independence. Russian security forces managed to free the hostages, though around 130 hostages died in the rescue attempt. Movsar Barayev, the SPIR leader and Arbi Barayev’s successor, also died during the attack.[vi]

In March 2003, the UN Security Council designated the SPIR, alongside the IIPB and Riyadus-Salikhin, as supporting or participating in the activities of Al Qaeda.[vii] After the mid-1990s, the SPIR relied on AQ for financial support, ideological backing, and personnel. Osama bin Laden and AQ allegedly sent millions of dollars per month to fund efforts by Islamic militant groups in the region to create a unified Islamic caliphate in the North Caucasus.[viii] This relationship was allegedly reciprocal; Arbi Barayev is reported to have sent groups of SPIR fighters to Afghanistan in 2001 to train and fight with AQ brigades. The extent of Chechen militants’ involvement in Arab conflicts has not been verified.[ix]

The SPIR experienced a decline in activity and membership after the Dubrovka Theater incident and the death of Movsar Barayev. According to the Kavkaz Center, an anti-Russian news site affiliated with North Caucasus militant groups, the SPIR and the IIPB were absorbed into the armed forces of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in 2003.[x]

Barayev was the founder of the SPIR. He fought for the Chechen separatists during the First Chechen-Russian War. In 1998, the CRI stripped him of his title as Brigadier General as he was thought to have undermined the authority of President Maskhadov. He was considered a martyr after Russian security forces killed him in 2001.[i]

Barayev, formerly Movsar Suleimanov, was Arbi Barayev's nephew and successor. He was allegedly one of the primary organizers of the Dubrovka Theater crisis and died on the final day of the attack.[i]

Tazabayev, also known as Abu Sabur, was the successor to Movsar Barayev. After the SPIR was integrated into the armed forces of the CRI, it is unclear how much leadership Tazabayev maintained over the regiment. He was killed by Russian forces in 2004.[i]

2001: 800 fighters (Center for Defense Information)[i]

The SPIR relied on AQ for financial support, ideological backing, and personnel. Osama bin Laden and AQ allegedly sent millions of dollars per month to fund efforts by Islamic militant groups in the region to create a unified Islamic caliphate in the North Caucasus.[i]

Disclaimer: This is a partial list of where the militant organization has bases and where it operates. This does not include information on where the group conducts major attacks or has external influences.

The SPIR operated primarily in Chechnya but reportedly also had bases in northeastern Georgia. The group’s most famous attack, on the Dubrovka Theater, took place in Moscow.[i]

There are no recorded political activities for this group.

The SPIR targeted Russian forces, affiliated groups, and civilian targets. The organization employed kidnappings, bombings, suicide- and vehicle-based attacks, in addition to extortion and contract killings to achieve its goals.[i] These tactics contributed significantly to the lawlessness in Chechnya in the interwar period, which saw the rise of Salafi Islam and the increasingly religious character of the nationalistic movement for Chechen independence.

The SPIR allegedly clashed with mainstream Chechen society, as its radical Sunni ideology conflicted with the moderate Sufi Islam followed by most Chechens.[i]

The SPIR was associated with other prominent militant groups in the North Caucasus, notably Riyadus-Salikhin and the International Islamic Peacekeeping Brigade. The SPIR worked with these groups to conduct attacks against the Russian Federation; several SPIR members were also affiliated with these organizations. The SPIR provided leadership and forces to Riyadus-Salikhin in the lead-up to the Dubrovka Theater attack.

Although the SPIR sought to liberate Chechnya and establish an independent government, the group clashed with the moderate government of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (CRI), which rejected the SPIR’s fundamentalist ideology. In 1997, Barayev refused to obey CRI president Maskhadov’s order that the SPIR disband; subsequently, SPIR militants clashed repeatedly with Maskhadov’s forces. In 1998, the SPIR organized an unsuccessful mass uprising against the CRI. After experiencing a decline in activity and membership after the Dubrovka Theater incident and the death of Movsar Barayev, the SPIR, alongside the IIPB, were allegedly absorbed into the armed forces of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in 2003.[i]

In March 2003, the UN Security Council designated the SPIR, alongside the IIPB and Riyadus-Salikhin, as supporting or participating in the activities of Al Qaeda.[ii] After the mid-1990s, the SPIR relied on AQ for financial support, ideological backing, and personnel. Osama bin Laden and AQ allegedly sent millions of dollars per month to fund efforts by Islamic militant groups in the region to create a unified Islamic caliphate in the North Caucasus.[iii] Several sources suggest that this relationship was reciprocal; SPIR leader Arbi Barayev is reported to have sent groups of SPIR fighters to Afghanistan in 2001 to train and fight with AQ brigades. The extent of Chechen militants’ involvement in Arab conflicts has not been verified.[iv]

Al Qaeda played a critical role in providing the Special Purpose Islamic Brigade with financial resources, personnel, and ideological backing.[i] Saudi militant and IIPB leader Omar Ibn al-Khattab also had an important influence on the SPIR’s ideology; when Khattab introduced a group of Arab jihadist fighters to the North Caucasus, he established close relations with regional militant leaders including SPIR leader Barayev.