Narrative
Narrative of the Organization's History
Narrative of the Organization's History
Leadership, Name Changes, Size Estimates, Resources, Geographic Locations
Ideology, Aims, Political Activities, Targets, and Tactics
First Attacks, Largest Attacks, Notable Attacks
Foreign Designations and Listings, Community Relations, Relations with Other Groups, State Sponsors and External Influences
Mapping relationships with other militant groups over time in regional maps
The Special Purpose Islamic Regiment was a radical Sunni militant group that sought to use its Islamic connections and militant tactics to liberate Chechnya from Russian authority and establish an independent republic. The group also sought to establish an Islamic caliphate based on Wahhabism, encompassing the North Caucasus, parts of Azerbaijan, and Abkhazia in Georgia.[19] The SPIR was strongly influenced by the goals of its Al Qaeda financiers and the Saudi militant Omar Ibn al-Khattab, leader of the IIPB.[20] The SPIR played an important role in shifting the Chechen insurgency from a secular, nationalist movement to one dedicated to Islamic jihad.
There are no recorded political activities for this group.
The SPIR targeted Russian forces, affiliated groups, and civilian targets. The organization employed kidnappings, bombings, suicide- and vehicle-based attacks, in addition to extortion and contract killings to achieve its goals.[21] These tactics contributed significantly to the lawlessness in Chechnya in the interwar period, which saw the rise of Salafi Islam and the increasingly religious character of the nationalistic movement for Chechen independence.
Disclaimer: These are some selected major attacks in the militant organization's history. It is not a comprehensive listing but captures some of the most famous attacks or turning points during the campaign.
December 17, 1996: The SPIR claimed responsibility for the killing of 6 foreign Red Cross workers at the Red Cross hospital in Novye Atagi, the home village of CRI President Maskhadov (6 killed, unknown wounded).[22]
December 1998: The SPIR tortured and brutally executed 4 foreign telephone engineers from the UK and New Zealand. SPIR militants were allegedly responsible for abducting the civilians earlier in October (4 killed, 0 wounded).[23]
December 9, 2000: The SPIR conducted an attack on a Russian military convoy in Alkhan-Yurt, Chechnya (20 killed, 17 wounded).[24]
June 16, 2001: The SPIR allegedly executed a local mayor appointed by the Russian government in the village of Gekhi (3 killed, unknown wounded).[25]
October 23, 2002: The SPIR collaborated with Riyadus-Salikhin and the IIPB to attack Moscow's Dubrovka Theater. The groups held over 800 people hostage and threatened to kill them if the Russian Federation did not recognize Chechnya's independence. Russian security forces were able to free the hostages; however, around 130 hostages, all of the attackers, and SPIR leader Movsar Suleimanov Barayev were killed during the rescue attempt (170 Killed, unknown wounded).[26]
The SPIR allegedly clashed with mainstream Chechen society, as its radical Sunni ideology conflicted with the moderate Sufi Islam followed by most Chechens.[30]
The SPIR was associated with other prominent militant groups in the North Caucasus, notably Riyadus-Salikhin and the International Islamic Peacekeeping Brigade. The SPIR worked with these groups to conduct attacks against the Russian Federation; several SPIR members were also affiliated with these organizations. The SPIR provided leadership and forces to Riyadus-Salikhin in the lead-up to the Dubrovka Theater attack.
Although the SPIR sought to liberate Chechnya and establish an independent government, the group clashed with the moderate government of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria (CRI), which rejected the SPIR’s fundamentalist ideology. In 1997, Barayev refused to obey CRI president Maskhadov’s order that the SPIR disband; subsequently, SPIR militants clashed repeatedly with Maskhadov’s forces. In 1998, the SPIR organized an unsuccessful mass uprising against the CRI. After experiencing a decline in activity and membership after the Dubrovka Theater incident and the death of Movsar Barayev, the SPIR, alongside the IIPB, were allegedly absorbed into the armed forces of the Chechen Republic of Ichkeria in 2003.[31]
In March 2003, the UN Security Council designated the SPIR, alongside the IIPB and Riyadus-Salikhin, as supporting or participating in the activities of Al Qaeda.[32] After the mid-1990s, the SPIR relied on AQ for financial support, ideological backing, and personnel. Osama bin Laden and AQ allegedly sent millions of dollars per month to fund efforts by Islamic militant groups in the region to create a unified Islamic caliphate in the North Caucasus.[33] Several sources suggest that this relationship was reciprocal; SPIR leader Arbi Barayev is reported to have sent groups of SPIR fighters to Afghanistan in 2001 to train and fight with AQ brigades. The extent of Chechen militants’ involvement in Arab conflicts has not been verified.[34]
Al Qaeda played a critical role in providing the Special Purpose Islamic Brigade with financial resources, personnel, and ideological backing.[35] Saudi militant and IIPB leader Omar Ibn al-Khattab also had an important influence on the SPIR’s ideology; when Khattab introduced a group of Arab jihadist fighters to the North Caucasus, he established close relations with regional militant leaders including SPIR leader Barayev.
[1] Hoffman, Davied. “Gunmen kill aid workers in Chechnya.” The Washington Post, 18 Dec. 1996. Web. 06 Aug. 2018.
[2] Leung, Rebecca. “Terror In Moscow.” CBS News, 11 Feb. 2009. Web. 15 July 2012; “Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR).” UN Security Council, 07 Sept. 2010. Web. 05 Aug. 2018.
[3] Caglar, Armond. “SPIR, Chechen Terrorist Organization, and Al-Qaeda Connection.” Center for Defense Information, 01 May 2004. Web. 15 Aug. 2012; “In the Spotlight: The Special Purpose Islamic Regiment.” Center for Defense Information, 02 May 2003. Web. 06 Aug. 2018.
[4] National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2016). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.
[5] Caglar, Armond. “SPIR, Chechen Terrorist Organization, and Al-Qaeda Connection.” Center for Defense Information, 01 May 2004. Web. 15 Aug. 2012.
[6] Caglar, Armond. “SPIR, Chechen Terrorist Organization, and Al-Qaeda Connection.” Center for Defense Information, 01 May 2004. Web. 15 Aug. 2012; “Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR).” Country Reports on Terrorism 2005, US Department of State, April 30, 2006. Web. 06 Aug. 2018.
[7] Ter, Marta. “The Caucasus Emirate, the Other Russian Front.” Barcelona Centre for International Affairs, Nov. 2015. Web. 07 Aug. 2018; “In the Spotlight: The Special Purpose Islamic Regiment.” Center for Defense Information, 02 May 2003. Web. 06 Aug. 2018.
[8] Leung, Rebecca. “Terror In Moscow.” CBS News, 11 Feb. 2009. Web. 15 July 2012.
[9] “Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR).” UN Security Council, 07 Sept. 2010. Web. 05 Aug. 2018.
[10] Abbas, Hassan. “State Department Blacklists Three Chechen Groups.” The Jamestown Foundation, 2003. Web. 06 Aug. 2018.
[11] Abbas, Hassan. “State Department Blacklists Three Chechen Groups.” The Jamestown Foundation, 2003. Web. 06 Aug. 2018.
[12] Bale, Jeffrey. “The Chechen Resistance and Radiological Terrorism.” Nuclear Threat Initiative, 01 April 2004. Web. 31 May 2012; Kemoklidze, Nino, et al. “Many Faces of the Caucasus.” Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 64, no. 9, Nov. 2012.
[13] National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2016). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.
[14] Vernidoub, Artyom. “Who Is Movsar Barayev?” GAZETA.RU, 24 Oct. 2002. Web. 15 July 2012; “In the Spotlight: The Special Purpose Islamic Regiment.” Center for Defense Information, 02 May 2003. Web. 06 Aug. 2018.
[15] Moore, Cerwyn. “The Radicalisation of the Chechen Separatist Movement: Myth or Reality?” Prague Watchdog, 16 May 2007. Web. 15 July 2012.
[16] “In the Spotlight: The Special Purpose Islamic Regiment.” Center for Defense Information, 02 May 2003. Web. 06 Aug. 2018.
[17] Abbas, Hassan. “State Department Blacklists Three Chechen Groups.” The Jamestown Foundation, 2003. Web. 06 Aug. 2018.
[18] “In the Spotlight: The Special Purpose Islamic Regiment.” Center for Defense Information, 02 May 2003. Web. 06 Aug. 2018.
[19] Caglar, Armond. “SPIR, Chechen Terrorist Organization, and Al-Qaeda Connection.” Center for Defense Information, 01 May 2004. Web. 15 Aug. 2012.
[20] National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2016). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.
[21] Caglar, Armond. “SPIR, Chechen Terrorist Organization, and Al-Qaeda Connection.” Center for Defense Information, 01 May 2004. Web. 15 Aug. 2012; “Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR).” Country Reports on Terrorism 2005, US Department of State, April 30, 2006. Web. 06 Aug. 2018.
[22] Hoffman, Davied. “Gunmen kill aid workers in Chechnya.” The Washington Post, 18 Dec. 1996. Web. 06 Aug. 2018.
[23] Parsons, Robert. “Chechen president orders kidnap crackdown.” BBC News, 13 Dec. 1998. Web. 06 Aug. 2018; Cockburn, Patrick. “Chechen who killed Britons is murdered.” The Independent, 26 June 2001. Web. 06 Aug. 2018.
[24] “In the Spotlight: The Special Purpose Islamic Regiment.” Center for Defense Information, 02 May 2003. Web. 06 Aug. 2018.
[25] “Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR).” UN Security Council, 07 Sept. 2010. Web. 05 Aug. 2018.
[26] Leung, Rebecca. “Terror In Moscow.” CBS News, 11 Feb. 2009. Web. 15 July 2012; “Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR).” UN Security Council, 07 Sept. 2010. Web. 05 Aug. 2018.
[27] “Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR).” UN Security Council, 07 Sept. 2010. Web. 05 Aug. 2018.
[28] Abbas, Hassan. “State Department Blacklists Three Chechen Groups.” The Jamestown Foundation, 2003. Web. 06 Aug. 2018.
[29] “Terrorist Exclusion List.” U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State, 29 Dec. 2004. Web. July 2012.
[30] “In the Spotlight: The Special Purpose Islamic Regiment.” Center for Defense Information, 02 May 2003. Web. 06 Aug. 2018.
[31] Bale, Jeffrey. “The Chechen Resistance and Radiological Terrorism.” Nuclear Threat Initiative, 01 April 2004. Web. 31 May 2012; Kemoklidze, Nino, et al. “Many Faces of the Caucasus.” Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 64, no. 9, Nov. 2012.
[32] “Special Purpose Islamic Regiment (SPIR).” UN Security Council, 07 Sept. 2010. Web. 05 Aug. 2018.
[33] Abbas, Hassan. “State Department Blacklists Three Chechen Groups.” The Jamestown Foundation, 2003. Web. 06 Aug. 2018.
[34] Abbas, Hassan. “State Department Blacklists Three Chechen Groups.” The Jamestown Foundation, 2003. Web. 06 Aug. 2018.
[35] Abbas, Hassan. “State Department Blacklists Three Chechen Groups.” The Jamestown Foundation, 2003. Web. 06 Aug. 2018.