Narrative
Narrative of the Organization's History
Narrative of the Organization's History
Leadership, Name Changes, Size Estimates, Resources, Geographic Locations
Ideology, Aims, Political Activities, Targets, and Tactics
First Attacks, Largest Attacks, Notable Attacks
Foreign Designations and Listings, Community Relations, Relations with Other Groups, State Sponsors and External Influences
Mapping relationships with other militant groups over time in regional maps
MUJAO was a Salafi-Jihadist organization. MUJAO’s stated goal was to engage in and encourage the spread of jihad in West Africa, as well as establish Shariah law in the region.[28] Six members of MUJAO released a video in 2011 praising the work of Osama Bin Laden, Mullah Omar and local Islamist historical figures, and highlighting the anti-colonial struggle of key individuals in West African Islam.[29] MUJAO’s ideology and goals closely mirrored those of AQ and AQIM, the group it broke off from.[30] Like AQ and AQIM, MUJAO harbored anti-Western sentiment and carried out kidnappings and attacks against Western citizens.[31]
MUJAO has no known political activities.
MUJAO is best known for its abductions of international workers, suicide bombings, IED attacks, landmines, and small arms attacks. MUJAO primarily targeted French and Malian military bases, diplomatic stations and international aid workers. In its early days, the group focused more on obtaining ransom money from kidnappings than outwardly attacking targets. However, after the Malian government was ousted by a Malian military in a coup d’état in 2012, the group shifted its actions towards heavy suicide bombing campaigns as it tried to gain control of northern Mali. The MUJAO leadership is also involved in the drug trade in the Sahel and southern Algeria.[32]
Disclaimer: These are some selected major attacks in the militant organization's history. It is not a comprehensive listing but captures some of the most famous attacks or turning points during the campaign.
October 23, 2011: MUJAO abducted three European aid workers from a refugee camp in Tindouf, Algeria. The Europeans were eventually released in July 2012 in Mali in exchange for three Islamists held in Mauritania. While MUJAO claimed that it received $18.4 million, negotiators never revealed if a ransom was paid (0 killed, 2 wounded).[33]
March 2012: Following the military coup in Mali, MUJAO, along with AQIM, Ansar Dine, and the MNLA, launched an offensive and eventually took control of Northern Mali (unknown casualties).[34]
June 2012: MUJAO fought alongside Ansar Dine in the Battles of Gao and Timbuktu in northern Mali against the MNLA, ultimately seizing Gao, Timbuktu and their environs (unknown casualties).[35]
June 29, 2012: MUJAO detonated a vehicle saddled with 1,300 kilograms of explosives at the Regional Command of the Gendarmerie headquarters in Ouargla, Algeria, in retaliation for Algeria’s pressure on the MNLA to fight the Islamist mujahedeen in northern Mali (2 killed, 3 wounded).[36]
September 1, 2012: MUJAO seized the northern Malian town of Douentza from a local self-defense militia that surrendered as soon as MUJAO forces surrounded the city (unknown casualties)[37]
November 19, 2012: MUJAO and AQIM forces fought the MLNA and took over its stronghold in Ménaka (66+ killed, unknown wounded).[38]
February 10, 2013: MUJAO carried out a suicide bombing followed by an attack on French and Malian forces in Gao, Mali. This attack was part of a larger campaign including several similar attacks throughout February targeting the French and Malian militaries (5 killed, 10 wounded).[39]
May 23, 2013: MUJAO and the AMB carried out simultaneous, coordinated suicide bombing attacks against a military camp in Agadez, Niger and a French-run uranium mine in Arlit, Niger, in retaliation for Niger’s cooperation with France in its 2013 invasion of northern Mali (24 killed, 20 wounded).[40]
June 1, 2013: MUJAO and the AMB attacked a prison in Niamey, Niger with small arms (2 killed, 3 wounded).[41]
MUJAO’s occupation of Gao in northern Mali and attempt at implementing Shariah law was not well received by the Gao community, as evidenced by a successful youth protest in August 2012 that stopped MUJAO from amputating the hand of an alleged thief.[44] However, MUJAO was able to recruit some of Gao’s youth to join their ranks as fighters.
MUJAO allegedly provided electricity and other social services to Gao residents during the occupation.[45]
MUJAO split from Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 2011. MUJAO praised prominent AQ leaders at the time of its formation but was never recognized by AQ as an affiliate. The majority of MUJAO’s original leaders, including Tilemsi, Khairy, and Hamaha, served as fighters or commanders in AQIM. After MUJAO broke off, the two groups maintained little interaction until the Malian coup. Some journalists reported that AQIM and MUJAO settled any lasting tensions from their separation in a peace brokered by Ansar Dine during their invasion of northern Mali in 2012.[46]
MUJAO cooperated with AQIM, Ansar Dine and the Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) to take control of northern Mali in March 2012.[47] However, once the groups occupied territory, MUJAO, AQIM and Ansar Dine ended their collective alliances with the MNLA because its objective, to establish a secular and independent state of Azawad in northern Mali, strongly contradicted their aims to create a united Malian state governed by Shariah law.[48] MUJAO worked closely with Ansar Dine and the AMB to defeat the MNLA in the Battles of Gao and Timbuktu in June 2012.[49]
During and after its occupation of northern Mali, MUJAO and AQIM’s semi-autonomous battalion the Al Mulathamun Battalion (AMB) coordinated attacks to accomplish the goal of establishing Shariah law in northern Mali. The AMB leader, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, had maintained close relationships with MUJAO leaders after the group split from AQIM. When MUJAO set up its Gao base, Belmokhtar and the AMB moved to Gao and allegedly provided crucial military assistance in MUJAO’s battles with the MLNA.[50] The two groups coordinated attacks against military targets, carrying out twin suicide bombings in May and June of 2013 in retaliation for Niger’s cooperation with the French invasion.[51]
After prolonged cooperation, on August 2013, the leaders of MUJAO and the AMB, which formally split from AQIM in December 2012, announced that the two groups would merge together into a group called Al Mourabitoun.[52] Following the merger, the media continued to attribute attacks in Mali to MUJAO; however, it is unclear if these attacks were actually carried out by Al Mourabitoun, or by militants formerly associated with MUJAO.[53]
Militants from Boko Haram also collaborated with MUJAO and allied militants in attacks on Mali in 2012 and 2013.[54]
MUJAO allegedly received financial backing from AQIM.[55]
[1] National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2016). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd; "US Posts $18m Bounty for Four African Militants - Daily News Egypt." Daily News Egypt, 14 June 2014. Web. 23 June 2016; "'Ransom' and Swap Secures Kidnapped Aid Workers' Release in Mali." The Australian, 20 July 2012. Web. 27 June 2016.
[2] National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2016). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.
[3] "Movement for the Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)." Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium, n.d. Web. 01 July 2016; Zenn, Jacob. "Cooperation or Competition: Boko Haram and Ansaru After the Mali Intervention | Combating Terrorism Center at West Point." Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 23 Mar. 2013. Web. 10 July 2016.
[4] "Making Sense of Mali's Armed Groups." Al Jazeera English, 17 Jan. 2013. Web. 01 July 2016.
[5] George, William Lloyd. "Mali's Irrevocable Crisis." Al Jazeera, 16 Apr. 2012. Web. 29 June 2016; Lebovich, Andrew. "Primer on Jihadi Players in Algeria and Mali, Pt. 3: Movement for Tawhid and Jihad in West Africa." Jihadica: Documenting Global Jihad, 22 Jan. 2013. Web. 1 July 2016.
[6] Zenn, Jacob. "Boko Haram's International Connections | Combating Terrorism Center at West Point." Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 14 Jan. 2013. Web. 24 June 2016.
[7] Lebovich, Andrew. "AQIM and Its Allies in Mali." - The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 5 Feb. 2013. Web. 29 June 2016.
[8] "Mali Tuareg Rebels Control Timbuktu as Troops Flee." BBC News, 2 Apr. 2012. Web. 13 July 2016.
[9] Lebovich, Andrew. "AQIM and Its Allies in Mali." - The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 5 Feb. 2013. Web. 29 June 2016.
[10] "Tuareg Rebels Driven out of Timbuktu." Al Jazeera, 29 June 2012. Web. 29 June 2016.
[11] Look, Anne. "Islamic Militant Group in Northern Mali Expanding Southward." Global Security, 4 Sept. 2012. Web. 01 July 2016; "Hope for Mali's Gao Residents as Road Opens." IRIN, 20 Feb. 2013. Web. 1 July 2016; "Mali Protests Rebel Occupation of North." Al Jazera, 5 July 2012. Web. 1 July 2016.
[12] "The Regional Threat Posed by Mali's Militants." IRIN, 18 Feb. 2013. Web. 1 July 2016.
[13] "Belmokhtar's Militants 'merge' with Mali's Mujao." BBC News, 22 Aug. 2013. Web. 23 June 2016; “Mokhtar Belmokhtar 'masterminded' Niger Suicide Bombs." BBC News, 24 May 2013. Web. 12 July 2016; "Refworld | Country Reports on Terrorism 2015 - Foreign Terrorist Organizations: Al-Mulathamun Battalion." Refworld. The UN Refugee Agency, 2 June 2016. Web. 1 July 2018.
[14] Dibaba, Solomon. "Africa: From Whence Comes the Threat to Peace in Africa!" AllAfrica.com, 04 Jan. 2016. Web. 25 July 2016.
[15] "Belmokhtar's Militants 'merge' with Mali's Mujao." BBC News, 22 Aug. 2013. Web. 12 July 2016.
[16] "Mali: Lawlessness, Abuses Imperil Population." Human Rights Watch, 14 Apr. 2015. Web. 12 July 2016; Weiss, Caleb. "Jihadists in Mali Step up Attacks, Kill 7 Soldiers | The Long War Journal." The Long War Journal, 5 Jan. 2015. Web. 12 July 2016.
[17] "Mali Crisis: Key Players." BBC News, 13 Mar. 2013. Web. 28 June 2016; Roggio, Bill, and Caleb Weiss. "French Troops Kill MUJAO Founder during Raid in Mali | The Long War Journal." The Long War Journal, 11 Dec. 2014. Web. 24 June 2016; Roggio, Bill. "US Adds West African Group, 2 Leaders, to Terrorism List | The Long War Journal." The Long War Journal, 7 Dec. 2012. Web. 24 June 2016; "ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List." United Nations Security Council Subsidiary Organs, 24 June 2016. Web. 24 June 2016.
[18] "US Posts $18m Bounty for Four African Militants - Daily News Egypt." Daily News Egypt, 14 June 2014. Web. 23 June 2016; Roggio, Bill. "US Adds West African Group, 2 Leaders, to Terrorism List | The Long War Journal." The Long War Journal, 7 Dec. 2012. Web. 24 June 2016; "ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List." United Nations Security Council Subsidiary Organs, 24 June 2016. Web; Cristiani, Dario. "West Africa's MOJWA Militants – Competition for Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb?" The Jamestown Foundation, 6 Apr. 2012. Web. 23 June 2016.
[19] "US Offers Rewards for Capture of African Militants." BBC News, 4 June 2013. Web. 23 June 2016; Weiss, Caleb. "AQIM Confirms Death of Former MUJAO Spokesman | The Long War Journal." The Long War Journal, 16 Feb. 2016. Web. 23 June 2016.
[20] Joscelyn, Thomas. "Confusion Surrounds West African Jihadists’ Loyalty to Islamic State | The Long War Journal." The Long War Journal, 14 May 2014. Web. 28 June 2016; Mellgard, Emily. "Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)." Tony Blair Faith Foundation, n.d. Web. 28 June 2016.
[21] "UN and French Forces in 'large-scale' Operation in Mali." BBC News, 24 Oct. 2013. Web. 12 July 2016.
[22] "Algerian Diplomats Kidnapped in Gao." CNN IReport, 6 Apr. 2012. Web. 10 July 2016.
[23] "Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)." National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Jan. 2015, Web. 30 June 2018.
[24] "The Regional Threat Posed by Mali's Militants." IRIN, 18 Feb. 2013. Web. 1 July 2016.
[25] "Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)." National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Jan. 2015, Web. 30 June 2018.
[26] "'Ransom' and Swap Secures Kidnapped Aid Workers' Release in Mali." The Australian, 20 July 2012. Web. 27 June 2016; "Mali Hostages 'were Released in Exchange for Prisoners'" BBC News, 19 July 2012. Web. 27 June 2016.
[27] "The Regional Threat Posed by Mali's Militants." IRIN, 18 Feb. 2013. Web. 1 July 2016.
[28] "Africa's Militant Islamist Groups." BBC News, 6 Dec. 2013. Web. 29 June 2016; Cristiani, Dario. "West Africa's MOJWA Militants – Competition for Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb?" The Jamestown Foundation, 6 Apr. 2012. Web. 23 June 2016.
[29] Cristiani, Dario. "West Africa's MOJWA Militants – Competition for Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb?" The Jamestown Foundation, 6 Apr. 2012. Web. 23 June 2016.
[30] George, William Lloyd. "Mali's Irrevocable Crisis." Al Jazeera, 16 Apr. 2012. Web. 29 June 2016.
[31] Zenn, Jacob. "Boko Haram's International Connections | Combating Terrorism Center at West Point." Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 14 Jan. 2013. Web. 24 June 2016.
[32] "Narrative Summaries of Reasons for Listing." United Nations Security Council Subsidiary Organs, 9 Nov. 2014. Web. 30 June 2018.
[33] "US Posts $18m Bounty for Four African Militants - Daily News Egypt." Daily News Egypt, 14 June 2014. Web. 23 June 2016; "'Ransom' and Swap Secures Kidnapped Aid Workers' Release in Mali." The Australian, 20 July 2012. Web. 27 June 2016; National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2016). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.
[34] “Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb.” Australian National Security, May 2013. Web. 27 Oct. 2015.
[35] "Tuareg Rebels Driven out of Timbuktu." Al Jazeera, 29 June 2012. Web. 29 June 2016.
[36] National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2016). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd; McGregor, Andrew. "Where Trafficking and Terrorism Intersect: A Profile of Mauritanian Militant Hamada Ould Kheirou." Aberfoyle International Security, 31 Mar. 2014. Web. 28 June 2016.
[37] Look, Anne. "Islamic Militant Group in Northern Mali Expanding Southward." Global Security, 4 Sept. 2012. Web. 01 July 2016.
[38] AFP. "North Mali Clashes Kill Dozens, Some Unarmed: Source." Daily Nation, 21 Nov. 2012. Web. 17 July 2016.
[39] National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2016). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.
[40] "Belmokhtar's Militants 'merge' with Mali's Mujao." BBC News, 22 Aug. 2013. Web. 23 June 2016; "Mokhtar Belmokhtar 'masterminded' Niger Suicide Bombs." BBC News, 24 May 2013. Web. 12 July 2016.
[41] National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism (START). (2016). Global Terrorism Database [Data file]. Retrieved from https://www.start.umd.edu/gtd.
[42] Roggio, Bill. "US Adds West African Group, 2 Leaders, to Terrorism List | The Long War Journal." The Long War Journal, 7 Dec. 2012. Web. 24 June 2016; "Terrorist Designations of the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, Hamad El Khairy, and Ahmed El Tilemsi." U.S. Department of State, 07 Dec. 2012. Web. 27 June 2016.
[43] "ISIL (Da'esh) & Al-Qaida Sanctions List." United Nations Security Council Subsidiary Organs, 24 June 2016. Web. 15 July 2016.
[44] Look, Anne. "Islamic Militant Group in Northern Mali Expanding Southward." Global Security, 4 Sept. 2012. Web. 01 July 2016.
[45] "Hope for Mali's Gao Residents as Road Opens." IRIN, 20 Feb. 2013. Web. 1 July 2016.
[46] Lebovich, Andrew. "AQIM and Its Allies in Mali." - The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 5 Feb. 2013. Web. 29 June 2016.
[47] Lebovich, Andrew. "AQIM and Its Allies in Mali." - The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 5 Feb. 2013. Web. 29 June 2016.
[48] "Mali Tuareg Rebels Control Timbuktu as Troops Flee." BBC News, 2 Apr. 2012. Web. 13 July 2016.
[49] Lebovich, Andrew. "AQIM and Its Allies in Mali." - The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 5 Feb. 2013. Web. 29 June 2016.
[50] Lebovich, Andrew. "AQIM and Its Allies in Mali." - The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 5 Feb. 2013. Web. 29 June 2016.
[51] "Belmokhtar's Militants 'merge' with Mali's Mujao." BBC News, 22 Aug. 2013. Web. 23 June 2016; "Mokhtar Belmokhtar 'masterminded' Niger Suicide Bombs." BBC News, 24 May 2013. Web. 12 July 2016.
[52] "Belmokhtar's Militants 'merge' with Mali's Mujao." BBC News, 22 Aug. 2013. Web. 12 July 2016.
[53] "Mali: Lawlessness, Abuses Imperil Population." Human Rights Watch, 14 Apr. 2015. Web. 12 July 2016; Weiss, Caleb. "Jihadists in Mali Step up Attacks, Kill 7 Soldiers | The Long War Journal." The Long War Journal, 5 Jan. 2015. Web. 12 July 2016.
[54] "Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)." National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Jan. 2015, Web. 30 June 2018.
[55] "Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)." National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism, Jan. 2015, Web. 30 June 2018.