The Mouvement pour l’Unification et le Jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest (MUJAO), or the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa, was a Salafi-Jihadist organization. The group announced its formation in a video statement in October 2011, after kidnapping three European humanitarian aid workers from a refugee camp in Tindouf, Algeria.[i] Ahmed el-Tilemsi and Hamad el-Khairy, two ex-commanders of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) founded MUJAO as a splinter of AQIM and brought many AQIM fighters into the group. MUJAO later acquired fighters from all over North and West Africa and the Sahel region.[ii]

Some analysts attribute the split from AQIM to the lack of black Africans in leadership positions in AQIM, whose leadership is primarily Algerian; other analysts argue MUJAO wanted to focus its efforts geographically farther into West Africa.[iii] Despite the separation from AQIM, MUJAO praised Al Qaeda (AQ) and shared many of AQ’s goals, including establishing Shariah law in West Africa and attacking the West.[iv]

MUJAO was best known for its actions after the Malian coup d'état of March 2012.  Following the military coup that overthrew the Malian government over grievances regarding rebel occupation of the north, MUJAO, in collaboration with AQIM, and Ansar Dine, and the Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), took advantage of the security vacuum and invaded northern Mali, defeated the Malian security forces and occupied northern Mali. Some journalists reported that AQIM and MUJAO settled any lasting tension from their separation in a peace brokered by Ansar Dine during this time.[v] Once territory was established, MUJAO, AQIM and Ansar Dine ended their collective alliances with the MNLA, because the MNLA’s objective -- to establish a secular and independent state in northern Mali—strongly contradicted MUJAO’s aim to create a united Malian state governed by Shariah law.[vi]

MUJAO, with the help of 100 Ansar Dine fighters and crucial military assistance purportedly from AQIM’s semi-autonomous battalion, the Al Mulathamun Battalion (AMB), fought the MNLA in the Battles of Gao and Timbuktu in June 2012.[vii] By late June, MUJAO and its allies controlled Timbuktu, Kidal and Gao, the three major northern Malian cities, and their associated environs in a piece of territory the size of Texas.[viii] Though the militants sought to institute Shariah law, the attempt was not well received by the Gao community, as evidenced by a successful youth protest in August 2012.[ix] However, MUJAO was able to recruit some of Gao’s youth to join its ranks as fighters.

Although the MLNA was ousted from MUJAO’s stronghold in Gao, the two groups continued to skirmish as MUJAO attempted to expand its territory. In January 2013, the French military launched an air and ground campaign in northern Mali and assisted the Malian army in successfully retaking Gao.  By February, the French had expelled MUJAO, AQIM and Ansar Dine.  The damage inflicted on MUJAO is unknown. Analysts suggest that fighters from all three groups fled to the northern Malian mountains near Algeria.[x]

MUJAO continued targeting the French and Malian militaries through a series of suicide bombings around Gao and Kidal.  The group additionally coordinated attacks with the AMB, which had also splintered from AQIM, against targets in Niger, in retaliation for Niger’s cooperation with the French invasion.[xi] In May 2013, for unknown reasons, a group of soldiers split from MUJAO and formed the Sons of the Islamic Sahara Movement for Justice.[xii] After multiple joint attacks, on August 2013, the leaders of the AMB and MUJAO announced that the groups would merge into a new group, Al Mourabitoun.[xiii] Following the merger, the media continued to attribute attacks in Mali to MUJAO; however, it is unclear if these attacks were actually carried out by Al Mourabitoun, or by militants formerly associated with MUJAO.[xiv]

Tilemsi, whose legal name is Ahmed Ould Amer, was a founding leader of MUJAO.  Previously, he was a leader of AQIM and was well known for his operations in kidnapping and ransom collection. Tilemsi was designated by the U.S. State Department as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist and was added to the U.N. Security Council Al Qaeda sanctions list. The Mali national was killed by the French military during a special operations raid in Gao, Mali on December 11, 2014.[i]

Khairy, also known as Hamada Ould Muhammad Kheirou and informally as Abou Qum Qum, was a founding leader of MUJAO and a former AQIM member.  During the Islamist occupation of northern Mali, Khairy worked closely to coordinate attacks with the leader of the AMB, Mokhtar Belmokhtar.  Khairy was designated by the U.S. State Department as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist and added to the United Nations Security Council Al Qaeda sanctions list.[i]

Hamaha served as a spokesman for MUJAO until he was killed in March 2014 by a French airstrike. MUJAO denied his death for a month, but his absence became obvious when the group began to use other spokesmen. Prior to his death, the U.S. State Department offered up to $3 million for information leading to Hamaha’s location.[i]

Sahrawi was a leader of MUJAO and rumored to be Emir of Al Mourabitoun, the group that resulted from MUJAO’s merger with the AMB.[i]

Bady was widely mentioned in the media and was thought to be an important leader in MUJAO, although his exact role in the organization remains unclear.  Following MUJAO’s merger with the AMB, he became Emir of MUJAO forces within Al Mourabitoun.[i]

• April 5, 2012: 1000 (CNN)[i]
• January 2013: 300 – 400 (START)[ii]
• February 2013: 3,000 collective number from MUJAO, AQIM and Ansar Dine (IRIN)[iii]

MUJAO used kidnappings for ransom and drug and weapons smuggling to secure financial resources.[i] The group had a history of kidnapping aid workers and foreigners for ransom.  For example, in 2011, MUJAO demanded ransom and the release of three Islamists from a prison in Mauritania in exchange for three kidnapped European aid workers.  MUJAO claimed it received $18.4 million for the hostages, but a Mauritanian source claimed that a ransom between $2,201,510 and $3,304,050 was paid.[ii]

Disclaimer: This is a partial list of where the militant organization has bases and where it operates. This does not include information on where the group conducts major attacks or has external influences.

MUJAO primarily operated in Mali. Following the Malian coup, MUJAO collaborated with its allies to control an area the size of Texas in northern Mali from June 2012 to January 2013.  MUJAO controlled Douentza from September 2012 to January 2013, Ménaka from November 2012 to January 2013, and Gao and its environs from June 2012 until January 2013. After MUJAO lost its Gao territory due to the French intervention, it carried out a series of attacks in Algeria and Niger.[i]

There are no recorded political activities for this group.

MUJAO was best known for its abductions of international workers, suicide bombings, IED attacks, landmines, and small arms attacks. MUJAO primarily targeted French and Malian military bases, diplomatic stations and international aid workers. In its early days, the group focused more on obtaining ransom money from kidnappings than outwardly attacking targets.  However, after the Malian government was ousted by a Malian military in a coup d’état in 2012, the group shifted its actions towards heavy suicide bombing campaigns as it tried to gain control of northern Mali. The MUJAO leadership was also involved in the drug trade in the Sahel and southern Algeria.[i]

MUJAO’s occupation of Gao in northern Mali and attempt at implementing Shariah law was not well received by the Gao community, as evidenced by a successful youth protest in August 2012 that stopped MUJAO from amputating the hand of an alleged thief.[i] However, MUJAO was able to recruit some of Gao’s youth to join their ranks as fighters.

MUJAO allegedly provided electricity and other social services to Gao residents during the occupation.[ii]

MUJAO split from Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in 2011. MUJAO praised prominent AQ leaders at the time of its formation but was never recognized by AQ as an affiliate.  The majority of MUJAO’s original leaders, including Tilemsi, Khairy, and Hamaha, served as fighters or commanders in AQIM. After MUJAO broke off, the two groups maintained little interaction until the Malian coup. Some journalists reported that AQIM and MUJAO settled any lasting tensions from their separation in a peace brokered by Ansar Dine during their invasion of northern Mali in 2012.[i]

MUJAO cooperated with AQIM, Ansar Dine and the Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) to take control of northern Mali in March 2012.[ii] However, once the groups occupied territory, MUJAO, AQIM and Ansar Dine ended their collective alliances with the MNLA because its objective, to establish a secular and independent state of Azawad in northern Mali, strongly contradicted their aims to create a united Malian state governed by Shariah law.[iii] MUJAO worked closely with Ansar Dine and the AMB to defeat the MNLA in the Battles of Gao and Timbuktu in June 2012.[iv]

During and after its occupation of northern Mali, MUJAO and AQIM’s semi-autonomous battalion the Al Mulathamun Battalion (AMB) coordinated attacks to accomplish the goal of establishing Shariah law in northern Mali.  The AMB leader, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, had maintained close relationships with MUJAO leaders after the group split from AQIM.  When MUJAO set up its Gao base, Belmokhtar and the AMB moved to Gao and allegedly provided crucial military assistance in MUJAO’s battles with the MLNA.[v] The two groups coordinated attacks against military targets, carrying out twin suicide bombings in May and June of 2013 in retaliation for Niger’s cooperation with the French invasion.[vi]

After prolonged cooperation, on August 2013, the leaders of MUJAO and the AMB, which formally split from AQIM in December 2012, announced that the two groups would merge together into a group called Al Mourabitoun.[vii] Following the merger, the media continued to attribute attacks in Mali to MUJAO; however, it is unclear if these attacks were actually carried out by Al Mourabitoun, or by militants formerly associated with MUJAO.[viii]

Militants from Boko Haram also collaborated with MUJAO and allied militants in attacks on Mali in 2012 and 2013.[ix]

MUJAO allegedly received financial backing from AQIM.[i]