The Moroccan Islamic Combatant Group (GICM) was a Sunni Islamist militant group that sought to install a fundamentalist Islamist government in Morocco. The GICM acronym stems from the French translation of the group's name, Groupe Islamique Combattante Marocain. The organization had its origins in the Moroccan fighters who traveled to Afghanistan to fight as part of the mujahideen against the Soviets. While the militants initially joined forces with members of the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), rifts between the LIFG and Moroccan fighters led the Moroccans to establish their own organization; returning to Morocco in 1993, these veterans militants later formed GICM. The early members of GICM sought change and mobilization similar to what was accomplished by the Taliban.[i] Specifically, they sought to displace the governing Moroccan monarchy with an Islamic caliphate.[ii]

GICM initially absorbed several militant cells already operating in Morocco. The group remained relatively invisible on the world stage until May 2003, when GICM was involved in a suicide bombing around Casablanca. The bombing resulted in the deaths of 33 Moroccan and western civilians, and wounded over 100 people.[iii] Following this high-profile attack, the Moroccan government began to crackdown on militants operating in the country, arresting and trying up to 2000 suspected jihadists. The government labelled these fighters as members of “Salafia Jihadia”; today, this label is considered to have referred to militants generally following the Salafi-jihadist ideology, rather than a distinct militant organization.[iv]

GICM operated various sleeper cells in Morocco, neighboring countries, and Western Europe, through which it sought to coordinate activities with other North African Salafi-jihadists, advance recruitment efforts, and establish bases for launching jihad attacks in the west.[v] These cells managed many of GICM’s criminal activities, primarily document falsification and trafficking of arms and drugs, especially in Western Europe. These activities served as the main source of funding for GICM. GICM’s numerous militant cells also allowed the group to maintain logistical and financial connections with other militant groups. GICM had strong ties to Al Qaeda (AQ) and received training and logistical support from AQ and AQ-affiliate Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).[vi] GICM allegedly also assisted AQ with efforts to recruit and assimilate members into European countries as external operatives.[vii] One of GICM’s European cells supported 3 AQ-affiliated militants who later participated in the 2004 Madrid train bombings, frequently cited as one of the most devasting Islamist attacks in European history.[viii]

GICM’s activities in Morocco and Western Europe deteriorated significantly due to western counterterrorism efforts and the Moroccan government’s campaign to arrest GICM and affiliated groups in the 2000s. The group also suffered serious reductions in the amount of territory it controls in Morocco. In the late 2000s, numerous militant cells in Morocco with possible links to GICM were detected and forced to dismantle.[ix] It is suspected that remaining GICM members and sleeper cells have been absorbed into different groups or continue to operate autonomously, independent of the GICM label. One possible indication of GICM’s dissolution is that other militant groups in Morocco, such as the LIFG and AQIM, have recently announced mergers or affiliation with AQ; however, AQ has not indicated any affiliation with GICM in nearly a decade.[x]

Haski was considered one of the masterminds of the Madrid train bombings. He was arrested, convicted, and sentenced to 10 years in prison for his involvement in the bombing.[i]

Guerbouzi is suspected of serving as representative of GICM in Europe and leader of the organization, but he has denied any relationship with the group. He was convicted by Morocco, in absentia, to a 20-year prison sentence for his role in the 2003 Casablanca bombing.[i]

Mejjati was one of the founding leaders of the group. He later became a leader of Al Qaeda in Saudi Arabia, and was killed in Saudi Arabia in 2004.[i]

Nafia, a Moroccan militant and an early leader of GICM, was convicted for his role in the 2003 Casablanca attacks. In the 1990s, he allegedly a drafted 33-page charter of the group’s doctrine.[i]

There are no reputable or precise estimates of GICM's size at any point in its history. Due to numerous arrests and members' strong ties to other organizations, group membership never stabilized at a specific size.[i]

Much of GICM's funding came from its involvement in criminal activities abroad. These included document forgeries, the drug trade, and weapons smuggling throughout North Africa and Europe.[i] The group received training and logistical support from AQIM and other Salafi-jihadist militant groups in Morocco.

Disclaimer: This is a partial list of where the militant organization has bases and where it operates. This does not include information on where the group conducts major attacks or has external influences.

The group was based in Morocco, but had numerous operational cells or affiliates in Afghanistan, Egypt, Turkey, and European nations such as Spain, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands, and Scandinavia. GICM’s main European base was in the United Kingdom.[i]

While GICM used to have strong control over its European cells in Europe, some analysts believe that these cells have been absorbed into different militant groups or operate autonomously, not under the GICM label.[ii]

GICM published a magazine entitled 'Sada al-Maghrabi' (Reign of Morocco).[i] The group did not have a political affiliation or agenda outside of displacing the governing Moroccan monarchy and installing an Islamic fundamentalist government.

GICM utilized suicide bombings and IED attacks against Western and Israeli targets to achieve its goals. The group was also involved in arms trafficking and drug trade, though these served more as sources of financial support than as violent tactics.

GICM operated various sleeper cells in Morocco, neighboring countries, and Western Europe, through which it sought to coordinate activities with other militant groups, advance recruitment efforts, and establish bases for launching jihad attacks in the west.[i]

GICM has been accused of helping to plan, finance, and perpetrate violent acts in support of AQ.[ii] The group allegedly also assisted with efforts to recruit members for AQ and assimilate them into European countries as external operatives.[iii]

At its height, it is unclear if GICM maintained positive relations with Moroccan civilians or local communities in the regions in which it operated.

GICM had its origins in the Moroccan fighters who traveled to Afghanistan to fight as part of the mujahideen against the Soviets GICM. These fighters initially joined the Libyan camp managed by the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG) but broke away to establish their own organization.[i]

In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the Moroccan government grouped GICM, alongside other militants in Morocco, under the “Salafia Jihadia” group label, which broadly referred to militants in the country that followed Salafi-jihadism. GICM is suspected of having operational and logistical ties to several of these militant groups, and interacting with other Moroccan militants through its criminal activities.[ii]

GICM supported the activity of Al Qaeda (AQ) and its regional affiliates. The group was allegedly inspired by AQ’s goal of waging a global jihad and helped to plan, finance, and perpetrate violent acts in support of AQ.[iii] GICM also recruited militants for AQ through its operational cells in Western Europe and North Africa and assimilated them into European countries as external operatives.[iv] GICM was responsible for training three AQ-affiliated jihadists who ultimately participated in the 2004 Madrid train bombings.[v] The group received training and logistical support from Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and other Salafi-jihadist militant groups in Morocco. Unlike AQIM and the LIFG, however, GICM did not merge directly with AQ.[vi]

There are no publicly available external influences for this group.