Formed: 1972 

Disbanded: Group is active. 

First Attack: October 21, 1972: The MNLF launched an attack on various targets in Marawi City, including the Philippine Constabulary, a government radio station, and a state university (unknown killed, unknown wounded).[1] 

Last Attack: September 9, 2013: Forces from Nur Misuari’s MNLF faction entered Zamboanga City, attacked government forces, and ultimately took about 300 civilian hostages. Fighting lasted until September 28 (6+ killed, 24 wounded).[2]

Executive Summary

The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) is an Islamic separatist organization based in the southern Philippines that seeks autonomy for Filipino Muslims, called Moros. The MNLF was established in 1972, and it led the Moro separatist movement until the 1996 Final Peace Agreement between the MNLF and the Philippine government. Since 1996, the MNLF has been surpassed in strength and influence by its rival group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), which began its own peace talks with the Philippine government. Today, the MNLF consists of many factions, some of which support current negotiations between the Philippine government and the MILF.

Group Narrative

The Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) is an Islamic separatist organization based in the southern Philippines. Its stated purpose was to create an independent Islamic state or autonomous region for the Filipino Muslim minority, known as the Moro people, who live primarily in the Philippines’ Mindanao region. For about two decades beginning in the 1970s, the MNLF was the leading organization in the Moro separatist movement.[3]

The MNLF is a splinter group of the Muslim Independence Movement (MIM), later called the Mindanao Independence Movement. The MIM was founded in May 1968 in the wake of the Jabidah Massacre (also called the Corregidor Massacre), in which the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) killed an unknown number of Moro Muslims who had been trained as soldiers for a coming military operation. The exact circumstances are debated, and the government only acknowledged the event in 2013.[4] After its founding, the MIM was largely a political movement whose primary activity was issuing manifestos that advocated for a separate Moro state in the southern Philippines. The group allegedly also established an armed wing called the Blackshirts, which fought against Christian militants. MIM members – like other Moros – also participated in revolts against the Philippine government.[5] Beginning around 1969, Malaysia started providing training and arms to Filipino Muslims, which included MIM members. Though supported by external partners, the MIM never gained popular support among the Moros. It remained a loose, weak movement with little recorded activity and under high military pressure from the government.

In 1970, MIM leadership agreed to disband after a meeting with then-President Ferdinand Marcos.[6] Afterwards, traditional Moro elites established a second organization, the Bangsa Moro Liberation Organization (BMLO), which was largely comprised of older MIM elites and MIM student leaders. However, the BMLO was soon destroyed by internal conflict fueled by the enduring generational differences among its members. In October 1972, the leaders of the younger generation officially founded the MNLF in Pulau Pangkor, Malaysia.[7] The young leaders distrusted the older Moro elites whom they viewed as antiquated and corrupt, and they used the MNLF to separately pursue the same goal of an independent Moro state. Nur Misuari, an early student leader of the movement, became the MNLF’s first chairman.[8]

President Marcos declared martial law in September 1972, citing violence between Muslims and Christians as well as the existence of an illegal separatist movement. This action curtailed Moro political activity and increased government power. After this declaration, the scattered Moro revolts against the state that had been occurring for years escalated to war.[9] Under martial law, state forces dissolved well-established Moro political groups and confiscated all firearms used by rebel forces and non-state actors. As a result, the leading Moro groups deteriorated, and the newly formed and more radical MNLF was quickly able to dominate the Moro separatist movement. Previously disparate rebel forces that had fought separately against the Philippine government and armed Christian groups began to unite under the banner of the MNLF. The MNLF was particularly attractive to former rebels because the group’s leadership, mostly located in Malaysia, was able to provide a steady supply of weapons from abroad. These weapons were then used to engage local state forces and Christian militias in traditional warfare.[10] Significant foreign support came from Libya, which had historically supported the Moro cause. Around the time of the MNLF’s establishment, Misuari and another key MNLF leader, Hashim Salamat, traveled to Libya and successfully persuaded the Libyan government to shift its support away from traditional Moro elites and toward the MNLF. In response, many Moro fighters soon joined or aligned with the MNLF, greatly unifying the separatist movement.[11]

In 1973, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) began a massive military operation to quell the Moro separatists, including the MNLF. After the MNLF suffered major defeats in conventional battles against the AFP, military advisors from Libya and Malaysia helped the group adopt guerrilla tactics, which proved more effective against government forces. Simultaneously with the AFP’s offensive, the MNLF solidified its organizational structure. In 1974, MNLF leaders living in Libya established the MNLF’s Central Committee. The Committee was originally composed of thirteen members led by Misuari. The MNLF also made several other organizational changes, including establishing an armed wing called the Bangsa Moro Army (BMA) or the Bangsamoro Armed Forces (BAF), a Supreme Revolutionary Tribunal, and a National Congress.[12] However, these components were not equally active or effective. The National Congress—which was supposed to act as a legislative body within the MNLF—was almost never convened, and the MNLF developed as a centralized rather than a consultative organization under Misuari’s leadership.[13]

In 1974, the MNLF released a manifesto that used nationalist claims and rhetoric to justify a separate Moro state, as opposed to the religious motivations that might have been expected from the organization.[14] The manifesto scarcely mentioned Islam despite the MNLF’s Muslim base of support. Instead, the MNLF espoused an independent state – called the Bangsa Moro Republik – for all people of the southern Philippines, provided that they gave up their Philippine citizenship. The manifesto’s openness to non-Muslims and its emphasis on resistance to ‘the Philippine government’s colonial oppression’ attracted the attention of the New People’s Army (NPA), a Filipino Communist militant group. The NPA allegedly approached the MNLF about an alliance, but the MNLF rejected this offer in 1975. The group was cognizant of ideological differences with the NPA, as well as the need to retain the backing of its international Islamic supporters, which may be upset by an NPA-MNLF alliance. Though the MNLF never formally cooperated with the NPA, some critics of the MNLF would condemn the organization as communist and insufficiently Islamic throughout its lifetime.[15]

Throughout the 1970s, women played an important role in supporting the MNLF. They provided communication between MNLF members in urban areas and those in rural areas. Women also delivered supplies, information, and weapons; made uniforms; prepared food; collected financial contributions; and helped with recruitment and raising awareness of the MNLF’s cause. Women also received weapons training from the MNLF. The MNLF also established a Women’s Committee and a women’s auxiliary group for the Bangsa Moro Army (BMA).[16]

By the mid-1970s, the MNLF’s clear leading position within the Moro separatist movement and its successful use of guerrilla tactics against the state led the Philippine government to acknowledge the organization’s power. In January 1975, the Philippine government sent a negotiator to meet with the MNLF’s leadership.[17] In July 1975, in a second acknowledgment of the MNLF’s status, the MNLF was recognizes as a legitimate representative of the Moro separatist movement by the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), an international body of Muslim states and institutions that later became known as the Organization of Islamic Cooperation. The OIC urged the Philippine government to reach a political settlement with the MNLF.[18]

With Libya’s mediation, the MNLF and the Philippine government signed the Tripoli Agreement on December 23, 1976. This agreement would have established an autonomous region that included Basilan, Sulu, Palawan, and other areas in the southern Philippines. It also would have divided authority over the management of the region’s foreign policy, defense, education, courts, and finances between the Philippine government and the proposed autonomous government.[19] The MNLF wanted President Marcos to implement the agreement by executive order, but Marcos submitted the agreement to a referendum within the provinces that would comprise the new autonomous region. Filipino Muslims constituted the majority in only three of those provinces, and voters overwhelmingly rejected the agreement in the referendum on April 17, 1977. Only a few provinces approved the autonomy proposal; those provinces were located in two different regions, known today as Region IX and Region XII. Rather than creating a single autonomous region, the two provinces chose to establish two different autonomous regional governments, which would serve as the predecessors to the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). Thus, instead of creating a large and unified autonomous region led by the MNLF as was stipulated in the Tripoli Agreement, the referendum mostly maintained the status quo.[20] Unsatisfied with this result, the MNLF ended talks with the government. The group instead renewed its call for full independence and returned to guerrilla attacks.[21]

In the same year, Hashim Salamat and other members broke from the organization to form the New MNLF, later called the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF). Salamat condemned Misuari’s dictatorial leadership and divergence from what he considered truly Islamic goals. According to Salamat, the MNLF did not focus enough on promoting an Islamic nation. Salamat believed that the organization’s strategy was largely dictated by Misuari’s autocratic personality rather than consultation with its members. Although Salamat had long been more religiously motivated than Misuari, Misuari’s decision to end government talks – a decision with which Salamat disagreed – exacerbated the leaders’ ideological differences and helped prompt the MILF’s split from the MNLF.[22] Other dissatisfied members also left the MNLF between 1978 and 1982, including MNLF Vice Chairman and co-founder Abul Khayr Alonto. These members often established their own groups, some of which are considered factions of the MNLF rather than independent organizations. One example is the Moro National Liberation Front-Reformist Group (MNLF-RG) founded by MNLF member Dimas Pundato, which later disbanded. MNLF factions often emerged along tribal lines; for example, MNLF members who supported Dimas Pundato were from the Maranao tribe.[23]

The MNLF’s internal problems during the late 1970s and early 1980s were compounded by its military losses to Philippine government forces, which ultimately pushed the MNLF to shift its demands from full independence to regional autonomy. In 1986, Misuari met with then-President Corazon Aquino and agreed to a ceasefire and negotiations. However, in the end, peace talks failed.[24]

Meanwhile, Moro politicians and the Philippine government had been working to change the autonomy arrangement in the southern Philippines. This effort culminated in 1989 when President Aquino signed Republic Act No. 6734. The act established the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM), which evolved from the autonomous regions created after the 1976 Tripoli Agreement. The government held a referendum whereby provinces could vote to be included in the ARMM, and only four of thirteen provinces chose to join the new region. The MNLF was not consulted about Republic Act No. 6734 nor the ARMM, and it opposed both policies.[25]

In the early 1990s, several MNLF members frustrated with the MNLF’s approach to improving Moros’ status broke off to form the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). The ASG presented itself as a more extreme version of its parent organization. It utilized violent tactics like bombings, kidnappings, and assassinations to gain attention and promote the Moro separatist cause.[26]

During the administration of Fidel Ramos, who succeeded Aquino as president in 1992, the MNLF experienced a diplomatic breakthrough with the Philippine government. The MNLF and the government engaged in peace talks mediated by international actors, including the OIC, the Libyan government of Muammar el-Qaddafi, and the Indonesian government of Suharto. The Philippine government and the MNLF signed Statements of Understanding and Interim Agreements between 1992 and 1996. These efforts culminated in the Final Peace Agreement—also called the Jakarta Peace Agreement—that was signed by the Philippine government, the MNLF, and the OIC on September 2, 1996. The 1996 agreement officially ended the MNLF’s fight against the government. It designated a Special Zone of Peace and Development (SZOPAD) in the southern Philippines, which would be the focus of special development and investment efforts for three years, and it expanded the Autonomous Region for Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The agreement outlined the ARMM’s new governance structures and called for the integration of MNLF members into the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). These stipulations would be implemented across two phases.[27] The MNLF at this time allied itself with President Ramos’ political party, Lakas (Strength). About a week after the Final Peace Agreement was signed, Misuari ran in the elections for the ARMM’s regional governorship. With the Philippine government’s support, Misuari easily won.[28]

Despite its benefits for the MNLF’s external relations, the 1996 agreement triggered further divisions within the organization. Some MNLF members supported and participated in the ARMM government, the council overseeing the SZOPAD’s administration, and the Philippine security forces. However, others were angered by what they viewed as capitulation to the Philippine government. Dissatisfied members accused Misuari of sacrificing Moro welfare and independence for his own political gain. Many members left the MNLF altogether to join the MILF, which strongly denounced the agreement and advocated full Moro independence. The MILF attributed the enormous surge in its recruitment to backlash from the 1996 agreement, and its membership grew to approximately 15,000 militants. The MILF is generally considered to have replaced the MNLF as the dominant group within the Moro separatist movement at this time.[29]

After 1996, the MNLF demobilized. The MNLF’s primary purpose and structure during this period are unclear, but it seemed to function almost as a form of political identification. Though the MNLF withdrew from the Moro separatist fight, networks between its members continued to exist. The 1996 agreement originally had provisions for including a certain number of MNLF members in the regional government, and approximately half of the MNLF’s fighters entered the PNP and the AFP. [30] The agreement also created special programs to provide education and technical skills for MNLF forces that did not integrate into the AFP or the PNP. MNLF militants with political ambitions utilized the group’s connections to President Lakas to run for elected office.[31] The MNLF did not disarm, although some MNLF members who integrated into Philippine society chose to surrender some of their weapons through a buy-back program called Balik-BARIL (Return Gun).[32]

Despite its members’ successful integration into Philippine society and politics, the MNLF grew upset with the implementation of the 1996 agreement. Many MNLF members believed that the 2001 New Organic Act for the ARMM – which initiated the 1996 agreement’s second stage – contradicted the Final Peace Agreement’s stipulations of authority over mineral resources. The MNLF fractured into various new factions, including the Executive Council of 15 (EC-15) –  established in 2001 – that emerged in opposition to a faction still loyal to and led by Misuari. Before ARMM elections in November 2001, Misuari’s dissatisfaction with the 1996 agreement’s implementation and his own waning influence drove him to lead an armed attack in Sulu and Zamboanga City. This attack – carried out by Misuari’s MNLF faction, sometimes called the Misuari Breakaway Group (MBG) –  was meant to stop the ARMM elections that Misuari did not believe he would win.[33] Misuari escaped to Malaysia after the rebellion failed. However, he was arrested and deported back to the Philippines, where he was jailed.[34] Misuari was placed under house arrest in 2006. He was released in 2008 after prosecutors could not provide enough evidence to connect him to the 2001 rebellion in Sulu.[35]

After Misuari’s fall, MNLF member Alvarez Isnaji served as acting ARMM governor. Fellow MNLF member Parouk S. Hussin won the second ARMM governorship, which ended in 2005.[36] In the same year, Misuari’s followers within the MNLF launched attacks in Sulu in February and November, allegedly cooperating with the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG). Misuari’s well-armed MNLF faction was able to engage the Philippine military in conventional warfare, conducting direct attacks against army positions. The conflicts in 2005 displaced over 80,000 people from the areas of intense fighting, mostly through a preemptive evacuation of approximately 70,000 civilians and MNLF supporters.[37]

In 2006, the MNLF and the Philippine government attempted to renew their relationship and work together to implement the 1996 peace agreement, introducing the Sulu Road Map for Peace and Development which highlighted several development priorities.[38] The MNLF also began fighting against the ASG, in conjunction with the Armed Forces of the Philippines, after the ASG’s designation as a terrorist organization by the United States and the United Nations.[39] However, the cooperation and goodwill between the MNLF and the Philippine government waned due to continued difficulties with implementation of the peace agreement.[40]

Beginning especially in the late 2000s, the MNLF-Philippine government relationship was complicated further by government negotiations with the MILF. Many MNLF members opposed MILF-Philippine negotiations on the grounds that their own 1996 Final Peace Agreement had already ended the question regarding the status of Muslims in the Philippines.[41] Under President Benigno Aquino III, who assumed office in 2010, talks with the MILF advanced significantly. These talks centered on replacing the ARMM with a new autonomous region called the Bangsamoro. On October 12, 2012, the MILF and the Philippine government signed the Framework Agreement on the Bangsamoro (FAB) to establish this new independent region.[42]

Since the beginning of talks between the government and the MILF, Misuari and his MNLF followers have been among the strongest opponents of negotiations with the MILF and the proposed Bangsamoro region. On August 12, 2013, Misuari unilaterally declared the independence of the Bangsamoro Republik at a gathering in Sulu.[43] In September, MNLF fighters engaged Philippine government forces in Zamboanga City and took hundreds of hostages. Government forces were deployed to the city. The mayor instituted a curfew, and travel to the area was restricted because of the standoff. The hostage crisis in Zamboanga City lasted approximately three weeks.[44] Although an arrest warrant was issued for Misuari, he allegedly managed to flee the country for some time. From 2013 until talks over the Bangsamoro Basic Law (BBL) in 2018, Misuari was believed to be back in the southern Philippines guarded by his followers.[45]

During the 2013 hostage crisis in Zamboanga City, an MNLF faction led by Muslimin Sema condemned the violence and refused to participate.[46] Because of the attack, the MNLF Central Committee allegedly ousted Misuari in absentia on February 10, 2014, a move supported by the OIC. The MNLF Central Committee then elected Abul Khayr Alonto as chairman.[47]

MILF-Philippine government talks on the proposed Bangsamoro progressed, particularly in 2015 with the introduction into the Philippine Congress of the Basic Law for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region (BLBAR), another name for the BBL. There was continual disagreement among the MNLF factions on how to react to improving government-MILF cooperation. Some leaders within the MNLF – including Misuari and Habib Mujahab Hashim, chair of an MNLF faction called the MNLF-Islamic Command Council (MNLF-ICC) – spoke out against the peace process. Misuari originally boycotted talks in support of the original 1976 agreement forming the ARMM.[48] Other MNLF leaders – such as Sema and Abul Khayr Alonto – urged support for the proposed Bangsamoro. Though the MILF-Philippine government negotiations largely excluded the MNLF, various MNLF members appeared before the Philippine Congress in order to express their opposition or support.[49]

On July 24, 2018, the Philippine House of Representatives passed the Bangsamoro Organic Law (BOL), the final name of the former BBL.[50] A Muslim regional entity was created in Mindanao, and MILF representatives at the signing of the bill declared their support. MILF leader Ebrahim declared that 30,000-40,000 fighters would be decommissioned.[51] Misuari and Hashim’s factions of the MNLF remained opposed to the BOL. Instead, they pushed the government to honor the 1996 ARMM agreement and place Misuari in the position of governor of the autonomous region.[52] In March 2019 during a meeting with President Duterte, Misauri allegedly threatened to go to war with the government if the Moros were not given their own form of federal system and advocated for the formation of a panel where the MNLF could negotiate with the Duterte government.[53]

[1] Leifer, Michael. Dictionary of the Modern Politics of Southeast Asia. 3rd ed. New York: Routledge, 2001. Print.; Unson, John. “17 years to a peace deal.” Philstar, 28 Mar. 2014. Web. 27 July 2015.

[2] Medina, Andrei. “Timeline: Crisis in Zamboanga City.” GMA News, 10 Sept. 2013. Web. 27 July 2015.; “Zamboanga clash kills 6, shuts down city.” Sunstar, 9 Sept. 2013. Web. 27 July 2015.; Fonbuena, Carmela. “6 killed, 24 hurt in Zamboanga clashes.” Rappler, 9 Sept. 2013. Web. 27 July 2015.

[3] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.

[4] Cheng, Willard. “Gov’t acknowledges Jabidah massacre for the first time”. ABS-CBN News, 18 March 2013. Web. 6 August 2018. <http://news.abs-cbn.com/nation/03/18/13/govt-acknowledges-jabidah-massa…;

[5] McKenna, Thomas M. Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. Print.; “Philippines: Muslims.” World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples. Minority Rights Group International. Web. 6 Aug. 2015.; Cabigao, Jr., Fernando. “PH south’s separatist, armed groups.” Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 7 Mar. 2015. Web. 6 Aug. 2015.

[6] McKenna, Thomas M. Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. Print. 

[7] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.; Noble, Lela Garner. “The Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines.” Pacific Affairs 49.3 (Autumn 1976): 405-424. Web. 27 July 2015.; Bale, Jeffrey M. “The Abu Sayyaf Group in its Philippine and International Contexts.” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.; Cabigao, Jr., Fernando. “PH south’s separatist, armed groups.” Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 7 Mar. 2015. Web. 6 Aug. 2015.

[8] Bale, Jeffrey M. “The Abu Sayyaf Group in its Philippine and International Contexts.” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.

[9] Philippines. Office of the President. Proclamation No. 1081: Proclaiming a State of Martial Law in the Philippines.; McKenna, Thomas M. Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. Print.

[10] McKenna, Thomas M. Muslim Rulers and Rebels: Everyday Politics and Armed Separatism in the Southern Philippines. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998. Print.; Noble, Lela Garner. “The Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines.” Pacific Affairs 49.3 (Autumn 1976): 405-424. Web. 27 July 2015.; Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.

[11] Bale, Jeffrey M. “The Abu Sayyaf Group in its Philippine and International Contexts.” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.

[12] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.

[13] Bale, Jeffrey M. “The Abu Sayyaf Group in its Philippine and International Contexts.” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.

[14] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.

[15] Bale, Jeffrey M. “The Abu Sayyaf Group in its Philippine and International Contexts.” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.

[16] Angeles, Vivienne SM. “Philippine Muslim Women: Tradition and Change.” Islam, Gender, and Social Change. Ed. Yvonne Yazbeck Haddad and John L. Esposito. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998. 209-229. Print.; Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.

[17] Bale, Jeffrey M. “The Abu Sayyaf Group in its Philippine and International Contexts.” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.

[18] Organization of Islamic Cooperation. Resolution No. 10/6-P: Negotiations between the Moro Liberation Front and the Government of the Philippines. Jeddah: 12-15 July 1975.

[19] The Tripoli Agreement. Tripoli: 23 Dec. 1976.

[20] “ARMM History.” Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Office of the Regional Governor’s Information and Communication Technology Office.; Mercado, Eliseo R. “The Mindanao Peace Process: Mediating Peace between the Philippine Government and the Moro Fronts.” Conference on “The Impact of Islam and Peace-making in the Southern Philippines,” 8 Nov. 2003. Web. 6 Aug. 2015.

[21] Bale, Jeffrey M. “The Abu Sayyaf Group in its Philippine and International Contexts.” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.

[22] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.

[23] Bale, Jeffrey M. “The Abu Sayyaf Group in its Philippine and International Contexts.” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.; Diaz, Jess. “2 MNLF factions support draft Bangsamoro law.” Philstar, 21 Jan. 2015. Web. 27 July 2015.; Noble, Lela Garner. “The Moro National Liberation Front in the Philippines.” Pacific Affairs 49.3 (Autumn 1976): 405-424. Web. 27 July 2015.; Madjilon, Mahendra Alih. “Attempts to Unseat Misuari.” Moro National Liberation Front.

[24] Bale, Jeffrey M. “The Abu Sayyaf Group in its Philippine and International Contexts.” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.

[25] “ARMM History.” Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Office of the Regional Governor’s Information and Communication Technology Office.; Hannum, Hurst. Basic Documents on Autonomy and Minority Rights. 1st ed. Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993. Print.

[26] “Abu Sayyaf Group.” National Counterterrorism Center, n.d. Web. 27 July 2015.

[27] “OIC urges PH gov’t to preserve gains of Bangsamoro peace agreements.” Office of the President of the Philippines: Office of the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process, 3 June 2015. Web. 27 July 2015.; “1996 Peace Agreement with the Moro National Liberation Front.” Manila: 2 Sept. 1996.

[28] Bale, Jeffrey M. “The Abu Sayyaf Group in its Philippine and International Contexts.” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.

[29] Caculitan, Ariel R. “Negotiating Peace with the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Southern Philippines.” Diss. Naval Postgraduate School, 2005. Web. 10 July 2015.; Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.; Bale, Jeffrey M. “The Abu Sayyaf Group in its Philippine and International Contexts.” Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey.

[30] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.

[31] May, R.J. “Muslim Mindanao: Four Years After the Peace Agreement.” Southeast Asian Affairs (2001): 263-275. Web. 6 Aug. 2015.

[32] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.

[33] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.; Jacinto, Al. “Nur Misuari ousted as MNLF chairman anew.” GMA News, 2 Apr. 2008. Web. 27 July 2015.; Vigilar, Rufi. “Philippine separatists may merge.” CNN, 20 Nov. 2001. Web. 6 Aug. 2001.

[34] Fonbuena, Carmela. “How to arrest a rebel like Nur Misuari.” Rappler, 12 Oct. 2013. Web. 27 July 2015.

[35] Fonbuena, Carmela. “How to arrest a rebel like Nur Misuari.” Rappler, 12 Oct. 2013. Web. 27 July 2015.; Chalk, Peter, et al. The Evolving Terrorist Threat to Southeast Asia: A Net Assessment. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation, 2009. Print.; Fonbuena, Carmela. “How to arrest a rebel like Nur Misuari.” Rappler, 12 Oct. 2013. Web. 27 July 2015.

[36] “ARMM History.” Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao. Office of the Regional Governor’s Information and Communication Technology Office. ; “Candidates for ARMM regional governor.” GMA News, 11 Aug. 2008. Web. 6 Aug. 2015.

[37] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.

[38] Tupaz, Voltaire. “MNLF to MILF: Good luck but beware.” Rappler, 16 Oct. 2012. Web. 27 July 2015.; Regalado, Edith. “Peace, development roadmap for Sulu pushed.” Philstar, 18 July 2006. Web. 27 July 2015.

[39] “Foreign Terrorist Organizations.” United States Department of State. Web. 27 July 2015.; “Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities.” United Nations, 26 Aug. 2009. Web. 27 July 2015.

[40] Santos, Jr., Soliman M., and Paz Verdades M. Santos. Primed and Purposeful: Armed Groups and Human Security Efforts in the Philippines. Geneva: Small Arms Survey, April 2010. Print.

[41] Wilson, Jr., Thomas G. “Extending the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao to the Moro Islamic Liberation Front a Catalyst for Peace.” Monograph. School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2009. Web. 27 July 2015.

[42] Regencia, Ted. “Philippines prepares for historic peace deal.” Al Jazeera, 25 Mar. 2014. Web. 27 July 2015.; “What is the Comprehensive Agreement on the Bangsamoro?” Inquirer, 26 Mar. 2014. Web. 27 July 2015.

[43] Pareño, Roel. “Nur declares independence of ‘Bangsamoro Republik.” Philstar, 15 Aug. 2013.

[44] Medina, Andrei. “Timeline: Crisis in Zamboanga City.” GMA News, 10 Sept. 2013. Web. 27 July 2015.

[45] Legaspi, Amita. “Arrest warrants out vs Misuari, Malik and two others over Zambo attack.” GMA News, 9 Oct. 2013. Web. 27 July 2015.; Cayabyab, Marc Jayson. “Despite arrest warrant, Misuari left country—MNLF spokesman.” GMA News, 10 Dec. 2013. Web. 27 July 2015.; “MNLF’s Nur Misuar ‘very much alive and happy with his 6th wife.” Inquirer, 22 June 2015. Web. 27 July 2015.

[46] “MNLF faction led by Sema not joining Misuari-led attack on Zamboanga City.” Inquirer, 9 Sept. 2013. Web. 27 July 2015.

[47] “MNLF reorganized with Alonto as new chair; Misuari out.” Inquirer, 17 Mar. 2014. Web. 27 July 2015.

[48] Romero Alexis. “Government may need more time to pass BBJ, Duterte says”. Philstar, 17 June, 2018. Web. 9 July, 2018. <https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2018/06/17/1825448/government-may-ne…;

[49] Navarro, Louie U. “House panel approves Basic Law for the Bangsamoro Autonomous Region.” CNN Philippines, 21 May 2015. Web. 27 July 2015.; Usman, Edd K. “Four MNLF groups divided on BBL.” Manila Bulletin, 20 May 2015. Web. 27 July 2015.; “Leaders of 2 MNLF factions attend Senate hearing on BBL.” Inquirer, 18 May 2015. Web. 27 July 2015.

[50] Diaz, Jess. “House ratifies Bangsamoro Organic Law”. Philstar, 25 July, 2018. Web. 24 July, 2018 (Manila time is +1 day). <https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2018/07/25/1836632/house-ratifies-ba…;.

[51] Associated Press, “Philippine rebel chief: 30,000 rebels to be disarmed in deal”. Philstar, 25 July, 2018. Web. 24 July, 2018 (Manila time is +1 day). <https://www.philstar.com/headlines/2018/07/25/1836474/philippine-rebel-…;.

[52] Placido, Dharel. “Duterte offers peace to Misuari”. ABS-CBN News, 26 July, 2018. Web. 29 July, 2018. < http://news.abs-cbn.com/news/07/26/18/duterte-offers-peace-to-misuari&gt;.

[53] Elemia, Camille. "Duterte: Misuari Threatened War If Federalism Doesn't Happen." Rappler. March 20, 2019. Accessed May 05, 2019. https://www.rappler.com/nation/226261-duterte-says-misuari-threatened-w….

Disclaimer: These are some selected major attacks in the militant organization’s history. It is not a comprehensive listing but captures some of the most famous attacks or turning points during the campaign.

The MNLF’s militant activity is not always well-documented. In particular, there is little information on specific attacks and battles between 1977 and 2001. Although the MNLF and the Philippine government were engaged in sporadic peace talks, the group continued to mount attacks and use violence to achieve its goals.

October 21, 1972: MNLF operatives launched an attack on various targets in Marawi City, including the Philippine Constabulary, a government radio station, and a state university. This attack was conducted in response to then-President Ferdinand Marcos’ declaration of martial law. It is generally considered the beginning of the MNLF’s armed uprising against the Philippine state (unknown killed, unknown wounded).[1]

February 7, 1974: The MNLF entered Jolo, the capital of Sulu, and reportedly tried to declare Mindanao’s independence for the first time. The group allegedly attacked Jolo and held it for days before the Philippine military retook the city. The Battle of Jolo devastated the city, although reports differ over whether the MNLF or government forces were mostly responsible for the destruction (unknown killed, unknown wounded).[2]

October 10, 1977: A MNLF commander invited a Philippine military general to a market in Patikul under the pretense of a ceasefire meeting. MNLF forces then ambushed the general and his men (34 killed, unknown wounded).[3]

November 19, 2001: Misuari’s followers attacked multiple Philippine military camps on the island of Jolo, allegedly to undermine ARMM elections in which Misuari was expected to lose. (111+ killed, unknown wounded).[4]

September 9, 2013: Forces from Nur Misuari’s MNLF faction entered Zamboanga City, attacking government forces and ultimately taking about 300 civilian hostages. Fighting lasted until September 28 (6+ killed, 24 wounded).[5]

[1] Leifer, Michael. Dictionary of the Modern Politics of Southeast Asia. 3rd ed. New York: Routledge, 2001. Print.; Unson, John. “17 years to a peace deal.” Philstar, 28 Mar. 2014. Web. 27 July 2015.

[2] “Revisiting the February 7-8, 1974 Burning of Jolo.” Moro National Liberation Front. Web. 27 July 2015.; Philippine News Agency. “War in Mindanao cost P2.013 trillion.” Manila Bulletin, 2 Apr. 2015. Web. 27 July 2015.; Moya, George P. “Muslim migrants in Manila: BBL best option for peace.” Rappler, 22 Feb. 2015. Web. 27 July 2015.; Abubakar, Carmen A. “MNLF Hijrah: 1974-1996.” Asian and Pacific Migration Journal 8.1-2 (March 1999): 209-221.

[3] “Most violent encounters between gov’t forces and rebels.” Inquirer, 27 Jan. 2015. Web. 3 Aug. 2015.

[4] “The Jolo conundrum.” The Economist, 22 Nov. 2001. Web. 3 Aug. 2015.; Santos, Jr., Reynaldo, and Mica Romulo. “LIST: MNLF’s 5 major attacks.” Rappler, 9 Sept. 2013. Web. 27 July 2015.

[5] Medina, Andrei. “Timeline: Crisis in Zamboanga City.” GMA News, 10 Sept. 2013. Web. 27 July 2015.; “Zamboanga clash kills 6, shuts down city.” Sunstar, 9 Sept. 2013. Web. 27 July 2015.; Fonbuena, Carmela. “6 killed, 24 hurt in Zamboanga clashes.” Rappler, 9 Sept. 2013. Web. 27 July 2015.